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

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NAPOLEON THE FIRST

A BIOGRAPHY

BY

AUGUST FOURNIER

TRANSLATED BY MARGARET BACON CORWIN
AND ARTHUR DART BISSELL

EDITED BY

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NEW YORK

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

BEFORE the appearance of the recent *Lives of Napoleon* by Professor Sloane and Mr. J. H. Rose, the work here presented in English was generally recognized by competent judges to be the best brief history of Napoleon that had been written. Whatever relative position would be accorded to it to-day, compared with these biographies, it may be affirmed confidently and without invidiousness that its positive merits are no less great than formerly and that it has the relative advantage in this edition of being comprised in one volume and of being accompanied by a classified bibliography equally well adapted, within its limits, to serve as a guide to the student of Napoleonic history and as a manual for the librarian.

Among the positive merits of Fournier's *Napoleon I.* should be mentioned the thorough research upon which the narrative is based, the interesting, vivid, and at times dramatic style in which it is written, its broad historical spirit and impartiality of judgment, its excellent proportions, not allotting undue space to certain phases nor neglecting the civil side of Napoleon's career, and, finally, its lucid exposition of the general historical situation and of the various contending factors.

These merits so strongly impressed me at the time of its original publication that I felt that a good translation would be a distinct and valuable addition to the large mass of Napoleonic literature already accessible to the English reader. Some years later I secured the author's sanction for such an undertaking and entrusted the work of translation to my friend and former pupil Mr. F. H. Schwan of Cleveland. Mr. Schwan executed the task with scholarly fidelity. As I was not able, however, at the time arrangements were made for publication to

give the manuscript the literary revision which seemed desirable to the publishers and to myself, I enlisted the services of Mrs. Corwin for the work. After revising the first chapters Mrs. Corwin became convinced that she could accomplish better results if she could labour with a freer hand, and she therefore proceeded to make a new translation. Mr. Bissell's experience was similar with his part of the work, which is to an equal degree an independent version, although its preparation was facilitated by consulting Mr. Schwan's manuscript. Mr. Schwan's contribution to the production of the book, therefore, although not exactly measurable, deserves appreciative recognition. For Mrs. Corwin's part of the volume, the first fifteen chapters, the French translation of the first two volumes of the original by E. Jaeglé proved of considerable assistance, and, in most cases where the French text differed from the German, it was followed as representing a revised edition. Mr. Bissell translated the third volume of the German, i.e., the last six chapters in this edition and the bibliographies accompanying them. The index, in the main, is the work of the translators.

As editor, I have gone carefully over the entire work in manuscript and in proof, making such changes as seemed desirable, translated the Table of Contents and the bibliographies for Chapters I-XV, and supplied the material supplementary to the bibliographies as contained in the original. I have refrained almost entirely from editorial comment, and beyond adopting the readings of the French version in most cases of variation, I have made no changes in Fournier's text except a very few of minor character, such, for the most part, as the correction of obvious errors in dates or numbers. I cannot flatter myself that no mistakes have escaped my eye or that I have made none of my own, but I hope that few serious errors will be found. I shall be glad to have my attention called to any that may be discovered.

E. G. B.

NEW HAVEN, August, 1903.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE*

THE purpose of the following pages is to recount briefly and simply for the benefit of the wide circle of cultivated readers the rise, the ventures, and the achievements of a man of incomparable historical importance. I am well aware that persons competent to judge have recently and repeatedly stated that the time has not yet come for the history of Napoleon I. to be written. If I undertake the task in spite of this warning, it is due to the conviction that the historian, even if unable to present definite and final results, is nevertheless under obligation to supply those far from the laboratories of science with information in regard to the existing state of knowledge, just as it is their right to demand of him such information. To delve for ore and never do anything but delve for ore cannot be the chief aim of his life's work; the world demands ornaments and arms, and their makers may not be idle.

! To the historian of Napoleon I. the task is moreover not such an easy one as would be involved in simply clothing in appropriate words a record of present results in historical research. For these results are frequently contradictory to one another and again often not sufficiently substantiated to allow of their being at once accepted as settled. Consider the changes that have come over the memory of the mighty Corsican even in France, from the hymns of Béranger to the satires of Barbier, from the glorifying narrative of Thiers to the annihilating criticism of Lanfrey. The latter work, which was published between 1867 and 1875, overthrew forever the legend of the immaculate glory of Napoleon I., and since that time the

* To the first volume of the German edition.

general judgment in regard to the first Emperor of the French has but increased in severity. Two causes have been especially prominent in bringing about this result. In the first place authentic memoranda made in the days of Napoleon and published since Lanfrey's work—such, for instance, as the memoirs of Madame de Rémusat—have kept disclosing new faults and weaknesses in this the most celebrated self-made man of all ages, and have so influenced and affected the estimate of history in respect to him that at the present time the inclination is but too marked to overlook his greatness in dwelling upon what is petty. In the second place the imperial reign of his nephew, Napoleon III., which had been founded upon the basis of the as yet unshaken Bonapartist tradition, was in 1870 compelled to give place to the Republic, that is to say, to that form of government which Napoleon I. earlier violently and arbitrarily destroyed. France having again decided in favour of a republic, the historians who had been its opponents were thrown as it were for reasons of state into discredit, while the acts and achievements of the great Revolution were brought forward into undeservedly favourable light. Not until quite recently has it been recognized among earnest French scholars, detached from party strife,—having perhaps been incited thereto by the investigations of the Germans,—that there is not only a Napoleonic but also a Revolutionary legend which must needs be rejected as the other has been, and be replaced by the truth without reserve. The efforts made in this direction have not as yet produced incontestable results, nor has the light yet been turned upon all the questions involved in the history of the last hundred years in France. But already it may be seen that with a more correct estimate of the first Republic, 1792-1799, a more accurate appreciation is at the same time to be gained of the historical importance of Napoleon I. The fact must be borne in mind that he was at the same time the product and the consummation of the Revolution, and that he still continued to tread the path which it had marked out even while his hand was boldly preparing to grasp the diadem of France.]

It is from this point of view that Napoleon's biographer of to-day must approach his problem, and it is from such a standpoint that I have attempted in a most modest way to make my contribution to its solution in so far as permitted by the narrow limits imposed by circumstances upon this work. It makes no pretence to being anything further than a simple outline. To what extent I am indebted to earlier works it is impossible to acknowledge in detail; it will be obvious at once to specialists. At times I have, however, preferred to follow my own course, which I hope has led me, avoiding political bias on the one hand and the mere cavilling of a moralizer on the other, to a portrait which, though imperfect and indefinite in its lines, is perhaps a faithful picture of the character and work of this man who more than any one before him has influenced the destinies of the world.

Bibliographical notes are appended, but they are of course far from complete even in regard to the most essential points. Neither they nor the notes at the bottom of the pages are in the least intended to corroborate statements in the text, but are offered rather as guidance in finding the works which may best be relied upon to serve such readers as may be stimulated through this book to wider reading and deeper research into the subject. Only by stimulating such a desire will this work accomplish the result which is desired for it.

THE AUTHOR.

VIENNA, December, 1885.



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CHAPTER I

THE BONAPARTES IN CORSICA. NAPOLEON'S BIRTH AND EARLY TRAINING

"**THERE** is still one country in Europe susceptible of moulding by legislation—the island of Corsica. The courage and steadfastness which enabled this brave people to regain and to defend its liberty well deserve that a sage should teach it how that blessing should be preserved. I have a presentiment that this little island will some day astonish Europe." Thus wrote Jean Jacques Rousseau in 1762 in his immortal book "*Le Contrat Social*." A few years later the prophecy of the philosopher was fulfilled in the birth, on "this little island," of one by the power of whose genius the whole world was to be convulsed.

Jean Jacques Rousseau was not alone in his sympathetic interest in Corsica. The attention of all Europe was attracted toward the patriotic little nation which since 1729 had been waging a war for independence against Genoa, under whose sovereignty it had groaned for centuries. The best minds of Europe were interested in its fortunes; the works of Frederick the Great, of Voltaire, and of Montesquieu speak with respect and sympathy of these energetic mountaineers and of the imposing personality of their leader, Pasquale Paoli. The latter, having been declared regent of the "kingdom" by his compatriots, had wrested the island, with the exception of the seaboard cities, from the grasp of Genoa; had established a wise and beneficent government without infringing upon the liberties of the people,

and had thereby exemplified within narrow bounds the political ideal of the advocates of progress and of a rational system of government. And success would certainly have attended his efforts to drive the enemy out of these last positions and to win complete independence for his country had there not interposed a power whose superior resources finally drove both combatants from the field. That power was France.

This took place during the course of the Seven Years' War, when Genoa gave its adhesion to France, and Louis XV. promised in return to support that republic in its contest with Corsica. For three years (1756-1759) the French occupied the harbours of San Fiorenzo, Calvi, and Ajaccio, and attempted to mediate between the belligerents. Soon, however, they took measures toward securing for themselves this important island in the Mediterranean.

Negotiations with the Doge of Genoa resulted in a treaty in 1768, by the terms of which the King of France, in return for the remission of sums due him from Genoa, and the payment of an annual subsidy, was granted the sovereignty of Corsica "as security." Despite the restrictive clause the whole world understood it to mean a definitive annexation. And indeed who was to prevent it? The attention of the great powers was focussed on a different object and Louis XV. had thus but a single antagonist to deal with—the Corsican people. To surrender their independence to France seemed in nowise more endurable than to submit to the rule of Genoa, and Paoli ventured the unequal contest, but only to succumb. After gaining a few unimportant victories he suffered defeat in a decisive battle on the Golo (May, 1769) and was obliged to flee. In July he left the island to find in England a hospitable refuge. Only a few of his most faithful companions in arms accompanied him thither. The greater part of them had retreated to Monte Rotondo, and, having been offered favourable terms by the French, they laid down their arms. France was in possession of the island.

Among the speakers of the deputation sent to sue for peace from the victor was Carlo Buonaparte, the father of Napoleon. This confidential mission was entrusted to him doubtless on

account of the respect in which his family was held at Ajaccio, where they had lived for two centuries. In later years, when the little Corsican had become great, inventive flatterers were not wanting who traced back his lineage to a Byzantine emperor of the Middle Ages. His line can, however, be traced, with any degree of certainty, only to the sixteenth century, when one Gabriel Buonaparte quitted Sarzana in Tuscany to establish himself at Ajaccio. The Buonapartes were of the nobility. At least the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold of Austria, did not hesitate to confirm the nobility of Napoleon's grandfather in 1757. It was also confirmed later by the Heralds' College of France. The Buonapartes (this was the original spelling of the name and thus Napoleon himself wrote it until 1796), like most of the residents of the seaboard cities, remained loyal to Genoa until no longer able to withstand the patriotic uprising.

When war with France opened, Carlo joined the ranks of the patriots and was rewarded with special distinction by Paoli. After the victory of the enemy, however, he soon became a zealous supporter of the newly-established government. A cordial welcome was ever extended to the foreigners in Carlo's house at Ajaccio, where his beautiful young wife Lætitia (née Ramolino) made a charming hostess, and the French commandant, Count Marboeuf, was a frequent visitor.

Carlo Buonaparte was a man of some attainments, although not remarkably gifted; ambitious, also somewhat frivolous and fond of pleasure, yet solicitous withal in caring for his numerous family. He was a lawyer by profession, and his own client; he had nothing more at heart than the litigation he was carrying on for the recovery of a valuable estate bequeathed by a pious relative to the Jesuits. The latter were for this reason detested by him, and indeed he could never have been counted a very devout Catholic. The lawsuit carried on by the French authorities as legal successors to the banished monks wasted much time and money, as did also the repeated journeys to Versailles, whither his office of deputy of the Corsican nobility led him. It was while on an expedition of this kind that death overtook him at Montpellier in 1785, at the early age of thirty-

eight. He left, besides the undecided lawsuit, but scant means of subsistence for his family.

Maria Lætitia had borne her husband thirteen children. When he died eight were still living, five of them boys. Jerome, the youngest, was but three months old. It was no easy task for the widow to carry on her household and provide for so large a family with these limited resources. But Lætitia solved the problem. A woman of quick perception and sagacity, with the tenacious energy that overcomes difficulties; impulsive yet thoughtful, undaunted and, at the same time, calculating, she was a true Corsican. With no great mental gifts and slight pretensions to education, she had much common sense and was not wanting in a certain loftiness of sentiment. When, at the time of the war with France, Carlo joined Paoli, she had courageously followed her husband into the mountains, and, although she was with child, had willingly borne all the hardships of the campaign. Now she governed her household with a firm hand and utilized her limited means with prudence and economy.

In truth Carlo's unreserved adherence to France and the friendship of the governor had at length proved of practical benefit. The elder sons had been put to school in French institutions at the king's expense; now at his father's death Joseph, the eldest, returned to Corsica to help his mother, and in the same year, 1785, Napoleon, the second son, left the Paris Military Academy as lieutenant, no less ready to help those at home to the extent of his ability. Who would have dreamed that under the protection of this little officer the whole family should some day attain to grandeur, power, and distinction?

Napoleon was born in Ajaccio on the 15th of August, 1769; ✓ a date the accuracy of which is put in question by the most recent investigation. Indeed the latest researches cast no little doubt upon the much-celebrated Napoleon's Day.* According to these the year of his birth should be 1768, and his birth-place Corte.

* See the bibliography, ch. I, for the arguments for and against the accepted date.—B.

The evidence, however, is not so strong as to give cause for abandoning the traditional date, to say nothing of the fact that it is a matter of comparatively little importance whether our hero was born a year earlier or later, whether in the interior of the island or on the coast. Suffice it that there he was and that he soon made his presence felt.

In his childhood he is said to have resembled his mother in appearance, having inherited also Lætitia's energetic disposition, while his brothers were more like their father. Wilful and stubborn, Napoleon gave trouble to all about him. To quote his own words written toward the close of his life: "I was self-willed and obstinate, nothing awed me, nothing disconcerted me. I was quarrelsome, exasperating; I feared no one. I gave a blow here and a scratch there. Every one was afraid of me. My brother Joseph was the one with whom I had the most to do; he was beaten, bitten, scolded; I complained that he did not get over it soon enough." His mother alone was able, by the exercise of great severity, to control the headstrong boy, while his father usually defended him. As is evident, his early training was not of the best. Under the instruction of his uncle Fesch, a half-brother of Lætitia's, Napoleon learned the alphabet, and, later, in a girls' school of the little town he acquired the essentials of his mother tongue.

Doubtless he gave much greater attention to the many tales which he overheard of Paoli and the war for independence and eagerly constructed ideals from the material which lay so near at hand. He was overflowing with heroic dreams of this kind when he afterward went to France.

The lad's untamable spirit may have led his father to discover his predisposition for a military life. He applied for a scholarship for his son at one of the royal schools where the scions of the French nobility were prepared for a military career, and his request was granted. Toward the end of the year 1778 he left home in order to place his two elder sons in the College of Autun, where Napoleon was to learn French before entering the military school at Brienne, while Joseph was to finish his classical studies preparatory to taking orders. In three months

the former had made some progress in learning to express himself in French, and on the 23d of April, 1779, Napoleone de Buonaparte was enrolled among the students at Brienne. The die was cast—he was to be a soldier.

The five years spent in this place were not of the happiest for the young Corsican. To be transported from the ever-smiling scenes of the south to the northern gloom of Champagne, from the sea to the most monotonous province of the interior, from untrammelled freedom to a monastic discipline, where he knew no one of the trifling pleasures which made home happy, what wonder that the sensitive nature of the boy should become gloomy and morose? What above all brought about this unhappy state of affairs was his unsociable disposition. His imperious, defiant temperament found all too soon resolute antagonists in the haughty sons of the Castries, the Comminges, and all the other illustrious houses represented by his fellow students at Brienne. He had to endure the mortification of learning that they considered his title to nobility defective, and that they spoke insultingly of his father, whom they dubbed the “usher” in derision of his incessant petitioning at Versailles. For a time Napoleon revenged himself in his own ungoverned fashion, but at length sullenly withdrew from the society of them all.

Two of his schoolfellows have left us credible accounts of his life at the Military Academy and of his unsociable demeanour. One of them writes: “Gloomy and even savage, almost always self-absorbed, one would have supposed that he had just come from some forest and, unmindful until then of the notice of his fellows, experienced for the first time the sensations of surprise and distrust; he detested games and all manner of boyish amusements. One part of the garden was allotted to him and there he studied and brooded, and woe to him who ventured to disturb him! One evening the boys were setting off fireworks and a small powder-chest exploded. In their fright the troop scattered in all directions and some of them took refuge in Napoleon’s domain, whereat he rushed upon the fugitives in a passion and attacked them with a spade.” Winter

alone compelled him to be more companionable. Then was his opportunity to show the others how to build snow forts and defences of all sorts, and how to attack and defend them. But the first day of spring found him again in his corner of the garden, serious and solitary. Naturally he made no friends among his schoolmates,—he never had one during his life. One is even inclined to doubt whether he ever had any youth; it seems indeed as if no ray of the springtime of life, which fills so many hearts with gladness, had ever brightened the path of this early embittered nature.

It was not long before troubles of a more material nature were added to the pangs of wounded pride. The straitened condition of the family did not admit of keeping the boys at school supplied with an abundance of pocket-money, a new mark of inferiority to the hated Frenchmen. On this account Napoleon, then twelve years old, sent to his father a letter of expostulation which is exceedingly characteristic of the disposition and mental attitude of the writer. He begs to be taken away from Brienne, and rather, if need be, to be set to learn some handicraft, than to be compelled further to exhibit his poverty. He writes: "I am weary of advertising my destitution and of seeing it ridiculed by insolent schoolboys whose only point of superiority to me is in their wealth, for there is not one amongst them who is not a hundred degrees below me in nobility of feeling. What! Sir, would you have your son continually the butt of a lot of high-born clowns, who, vain of the pleasures they are enabled to enjoy, insult me in laughing at the privations which I am obliged to undergo?" * He learned in reply that it was indeed impossible for those at home to furnish him with funds necessary to keep up appearances. Another cause of embitterment augmented by his distress over the situation of the family at home.

[Napoleon was neither a very industrious nor talented scholar. When he left the school after five years of study his spelling was wretched. Indeed he never was able to write pure French. His acquirements in Latin were of so limited a character that

* This letter is rejected by Masson, "Napoléon inconnu," I. 55.—B.

there were among his teachers men narrow-minded enough to consider him on this account without intellectual gifts. History and geography, on the contrary, he studied with pleasure, and above all he preferred mathematics. "It was the general opinion," said he in later days, "that I was fit for nothing except geometry." Taken all in all he matured early. The letters which he wrote from Brienne to his uncle Fesch are throughout serious, clear, and logical. He showed ability to compare, discriminate, and judge acutely. One hears with astonishment the way in which this boy of fourteen characterizes his elder brother who proposed to enter the military service in place of the priesthood. "He is mistaken in this for several reasons," wrote Napoleon to Fesch. "1. As my father says, he has not the intrepidity necessary to confront the dangers of a battle. His feeble health does not permit his undergoing the hardships of a campaign. Indeed my brother considers a military career only from the standpoint of garrison life. He would unquestionably make an excellent officer of the garrison. Well built, with ready wit, therefore fitted for paying frivolous compliments, and with his talents he will make an excellent appearance in society. But in battle?—That is the point whereon my father has his doubts. 2. He has been educated for the church; it is now very late to make a change of profession. The bishop of Autun would have given him a rich living and he would with certainty have become a bishop. What advantages that would entail to the family! My Lord Bishop of Autun has done his utmost to induce him to persevere in his original course, assuring him that he will never have cause to regret it. All in vain,—he is not to be moved. I should commend his determination if it arose from a decided taste for that calling, which is after all the finest, and if the great Controller of human affairs had planted in his breast (as in mine) a real love of things military. 3. He wants a place in the army; very good,—but in what branch of the service? . . . Doubtless he prefers the infantry, that is readily understood; he wants nothing to do the livelong day, to promenade up and down the streets all day. And to add to all this what does a petty officer of infantry amount to?

A loafer three quarters of the time, and that is one thing which neither my father, nor you, nor my mother, nor my uncle the Archdeacon desire, so much the less that he has already shown himself somewhat frivolous and extravagant, etc."

In his moments of leisure Napoleon gave free play to his lively imagination. In his reveries he was carried back to his island home with its high mountains and the ever-clear sky above them, its picturesque seacoast and the deep blue sea,—back to the happier days of his childhood. These day-dreams were his sole recreation and comfort, and in his cheerless solitude in the midst of strangers, his longing for the land of his birth grew to be a glowing patriotism. Are not those who humiliate and sneer at him here at the same time the foes and subjugators of his native land?

The thought that his father had helped to further the cause of the French in Corsica was unbearable,—forgive him he could not, and he took no pains to conceal his feelings. The heroic figure of Paoli appears before his mind in radiant splendour, and he expresses the wish to become another such as he. "I hope," he exclaims, "some time to be in a position to restore her freedom to Corsica."

The fact that he was preparing himself for that purpose at the expense of France gave him not the least uneasiness. But first of all he feels impelled to acquaint himself thoroughly with the history of the Corsican people, and begs those at home to send him Boswell and other books dealing with the subject. Perhaps the plan has even now taken shape in his mind to become himself the historian of his native island. In short, he was an out-and-out Corsican, and implacably hostile toward the French. But above all he detested those among them who arrogantly vaunted their superiority of birth and fortune and looked with scorn upon those who were not their equals in rank.

Thus in the solitary broodings of this mind, naturally given to reflection, were developed those revolutionary ideas which were just then beginning to agitate the whole of France. When once he meets them in the minds of others, they will appear neither strange nor unfamiliar.

According to his father's wishes and his own inclinations Napoleon was to have entered the navy. But Fate willed it otherwise. So large a number of applications had already been made by boys from the military schools who preferred the marine service that had he insisted upon carrying out his intention he would have been obliged to lose a whole year. The straitened circumstances of the family scarcely admitted of this, and he decided without delay upon entering the artillery, a branch of the service usually avoided by the boys on account of the heavier work involved. His resolution once taken he was placed in the company of cadets of the nobility in Paris, to which place he removed on the 23d of October, 1784. This change had but slight effect on the inward workings of his mind. At Paris, as at Brienne, the difference was manifest between the sons of the great families and those of the lesser nobility who were educated at the king's expense. The same insurmountable barrier which separated him from the Comminges and the Castries at Brienne interposed here to keep him from the Rohans and the Montmorencys, and wounded anew his unbounded self-esteem. He made himself no more beloved in Paris than at Brienne and even added to his unpopularity by protesting in a memorial against the effeminate luxury which made the *École militaire* one of the most costly institutions of the state, while it at the same time unfitted its graduates for active service.

Just at this time came the tidings of his father's death, and his attention was turned entirely to the question of an appointment as officer at the earliest possible moment, an advancement to which he was entitled to aspire, having reached the required age of fifteen years. His examination passed after a fashion, he presented a petition to be assigned to the Artillery regiment of La Fère stationed at Valence; his commission as second lieutenant followed on the 1st of September, and in October—having borrowed the money necessary to defray his travelling expenses—he departed for the garrison.

The instructors at the military school, among whom at that time was Monge, the celebrated mathematician, gave, in regard to the student who had just taken leave, the following dis-

criminating report: "Reserved and studious, he prefers study to amusement of any kind, and takes pleasure in reading the works of good authors; while diligent in his study of abstract science, he cares little for any other; he has a thorough knowledge of mathematics and geography. He is taciturn, preferring solitude, capricious, haughty, and inordinately self-centred. While a man of few words, he is vigorous in his replies, ready and incisive in retort; he has great self-esteem, is ambitious, with aspirations that stop at nothing; he is a young man worthy of patronage."

"When I entered the service," said Napoleon one day to Madame de Rémusat, "I found garrison life tedious; I began reading novels, and that kind of reading proved interesting. I made an attempt at writing some; this task gave range to my imagination. It took hold of my knowledge of positive facts, and often I found amusement in giving myself up to dreams in order to test them later by the standard of my reasoning powers. I transported myself in thought to an ideal world, and I sought to discover wherein lay the precise difference between that and the world in which I lived." He was then the same dreamer as of old! The fondness for seclusion and meditation, which appeared under the restraint of his school days, was not lost in the free intercourse of every-day life without its walls. What sort of men could have peopled his ideal world if, on comparison with them, his fellow mortals no longer appeared worthy of his companionship?

One thing at least we may gather with safety from his confessions: that the officers of the royal army had ample time for novel-reading, for dreaming, and for meditation. And as a matter of fact under the old régime the organization of the army was such that neither private soldiers nor their superiors had cause to complain of hardship. Thorough drill, camp-exercises, manœuvres, were things unknown. To be sure, after the discomfiture at Rossbach in 1757 there had been those who demanded reform, but no one heeded them; the weakness of the government and the indolent ease of the officers of the

nobility proved an insurmountable obstacle. There was then no want of leisure, but the prospect of the future presented to the mind of one of these young officers, had he cared to employ his leisure in considering it, could not appear brilliant unless he belonged to a powerful and wealthy family. Such alone might aspire to the rank of staff-officer and general, while the poor and inferior nobility must be satisfied throughout their lives with subaltern positions.

Imagine the fiery-natured Napoleon, with his feverish thirst for appreciation, facing the barren prospect of a half-dozen years of waiting for his promotion to the rank of first lieutenant with at least the same time of weary waiting before he could become captain, finally as such to retire and end his days, having been faithfully accompanied throughout his career by want and privation.

Who wonders that his thoughts turned into other channels, or even that he openly held aloof from those who found pleasure in so modest a lot? He associated with his comrades in the garrison as little as he had with those at school. Indeed, they differed at bottom from the youths at Brienne and Paris only in being a little more mature. Napoleon found much more to his taste the society of royal officials, lawyers, and other persons of the middle class who suffered in a way similar to his own from the rigid distinctions of society and who paid more attention to the outbreaks in which he vented his radical opinions than did the officers of La Fère, who, incensed at his keen derision, threw him, one day, into the Rhone.

For a time he consorted with the social circle of Valence and frequented particularly the house of Madame de Colombier, in which the Abbé de Saint-Ruf was the most prominent guest, and in which assembled the daughters of the neighbouring families of rank. But this was only transitory. He soon resumed his former solitary manner of life.

Was it, perchance, through some tender attachment, that he had been drawn toward this house, and had his feeling remained unrequited? We have no certain knowledge as to this. But five years later—at the age of twenty-two—he wrote the

following in his "Dialogue on Love": "I was once in love and I still retain enough of its recollections not to require these metaphysical definitions which never do anything but confuse matters. I go further than to deny its existence; I consider it dangerous to society as well as to the happiness of the individual. In short, I hold that love does more harm than good and that it would be a beneficent act on the part of a protecting divinity to rid us of it and deliver mankind from its thrall."

But his leisure time was by no means entirely devoted to novel-reading and the fantastic play of his imagination. He developed an interest greater than ever in serious study and read especially political and historical works.

This was the time in which the greatest minds of France had appeared as leaders and teachers of the nation to proclaim those rationalistic theories which condemned existing conditions and demanded in their place a new form of state and of society. The writings of Voltaire and Montesquieu, Rousseau and d'Alembert were in the hands of every one. Bonaparte* had already given himself with eagerness to the study of their works while at the Military School in Paris, and rarely have the words of Jean Jacques fallen upon more fruitful soil. He made excerpts from the "Contrat Social" and added notes thereto, and eagerly adopted the extravagant enthusiasm of the Genevan philosopher for the state of nature. He likewise read Filangieri's "Scienza della legislazione," which had enjoyed since 1780 a quite undeserved consideration, Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations," Necker's "Compte-rendu," and much else. But more than any of these, Raynal appears to have influenced his further development. Raynal was during the eighties the most widely read author in France. His "Histoire philosophique et politique des Établissements et du Commerce des Européens dans les Deux Indes" had acquired an unrivalled popularity on account of its revolutionary tendencies. The book offered more than was to be inferred from its title. It discussed, for instance, not only the political situation of China, but compared the same with that of France to the distinct disadvantage of the latter. It

* I shall henceforth adopt this spelling:

depicted with impressive eloquence the condition of his native land, the unreasonable privileges of the nobility and higher clergy, the immense abyss separating the rich from the poor, and the wrongs suffered by the middle class without power of redress; the demoralizing corruption shown in the sale of office, and the wretched administration of the finances. It prophesied the collapse of the government soon to follow, nay, more, it summoned openly to revolution as a clear duty under such circumstances. This doctrine made a profound impression on Napoleon, more profound than that made by any of the teachings of Rousseau. He acknowledged himself, later, a zealous disciple of Raynal in a pamphlet entitled "*Discours sur le Bonheur*," which he presented (blunders in spelling included) to the Academy of Lyons in 1791. In 1787 he became personally acquainted with Raynal, and spoke with him about his studies into the history of his native land. A few years later he bestowed upon Raynal a fragment: "*Lettres sur l'Histoire de la Corse*," which he had begun writing in 1786 and in which he narrated the history of the island down to the time of Paoli. Napoleon's brother Lucien would have us believe that Raynal showed the "*Lettres*" to Mirabeau, and that the latter extolled the genius of their author. But Lucien's veracity is not unimpeachable.

However that may be, Napoleon had become a writer and now, with indefatigable pen, composed, in addition to his history, a novel, the scene of which is laid in Corsica, a drama—"le Comte d'Essex," and stories after the manner of Diderot and Voltaire.*

But to him it was not sufficient to put his thoughts on paper; he could not be satisfied until they should be printed and read, and this not merely for the sake of vanity and ambition, but in order to gain money. For pecuniary cares had not deserted him in his garrison life; on the contrary, they had become more than ever importunate and tormented him beyond en-

* Bonaparte himself eventually burned, with but few exceptions, all "the rubbish of his youthful literary attempts." (Th. Jung, "*Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires*," t. II. p. 144.)

duration. Not that the one hundred livres a month which he received as pay would have been insufficient for his personal expenses; his wants were not many or great. His lodgings at the house of Mademoiselle Bon cost him something more than eight livres, and for a time he ate but one meal a day; the fact that he had little intercourse with his gay fellow soldiers was in itself an additional economy. But there were times when real want threatened those at home. In September, 1786, death bereaved them of their benefactor and patron, Marboëuf, the governor of Corsica, and a great-uncle, the archdeacon Lucien, who had always helped them with his watchful care and advice, lay seriously ill. Joseph, who, in spite of remonstrance, had discarded the clerical for the military profession, and who, after his father's death, had been obliged to renounce this also in order to find a position at home, was still seeking remunerative work. Up to this time the Bonapartes had been the annual recipients of a certain sum of money, in return for the care of one of the nurseries of mulberry-trees which the government had established in Corsica; now notice was given that this stipend was to be discontinued. It was not long before the household was without money.

This succession of disappointments and troubles was more than even Lætitia's spirited nature could endure. She wrote her son Napoleon of her distress and besought him to return to her. The impression made upon him by this letter was both deep and painful. He resembled his father in his solicitude for the welfare of his family, and to know them to be in difficulties caused him unaffected sorrow. This feeling became the more intense when his request for immediate leave of absence met with the reply that such could be granted him only by the beginning of the following year. Bitter were the words in which his emotions found vent in his diary:

"Always alone when in the midst of men, I return to my room to dream by myself and to give myself up to the full tide of my melancholy. Whither did my thoughts turn to-day? Toward death. In the springtime of my life, I may still hope to live for a long time. I have been away from my native

land now for six or seven years. What pleasure shall I not feel in seeing once more, four months hence, both my compatriots and my relatives? From the tenderness felt in recalling the pleasures of my childhood may I not infer that my happiness will be complete? What madness then impels me to desire my own destruction? What, forsooth, am I here for in this world? Since death must come to me, why would it not be as well to kill myself? If I were sixty years old or more, I should respect the prejudices of my contemporaries and would patiently wait for Nature to finish her course, but, since I begin life in suffering misfortune, and nothing gives me pleasure, why should I endure these days when nothing with which I am concerned prospers?

"How far men have departed from Nature! How dastardly, abject, and servile they are! What sight awaits me at home? My fellow countrymen loaded with chains kissing with trembling the hand which oppresses them. These are no longer the gallant Corsicans roused by the virtues of a hero, enemies of tyrants, of luxury, of base courtiers. . . . Frenchmen, not content with having ravished us of all that we held most dear, you have in addition corrupted our morals! (The picture thus presented of my country, and my own powerlessness to change it, are a new reason for leaving a world where duty compels me to praise those whom virtue bids me despise.) When I reach my own country again what attitude am I to take; in what manner am I to speak? When his country ceases to exist, a loyal citizen should die. . . . My life is a burden to me, for I relish not a single pleasure and everything causes me pain; it is a burden to me because the men among whom I live, and shall probably always live, have habits of mind as far remote from mine as the light of the moon differs from that of the sun. I am, therefore, unable to follow the only manner of living which could make life endurable, from which results a disgust toward everything."

Nothing could be more characteristic than this effusion of a soul filled with discontent. It is evident that Goethe's *Werther* (which Napoleon claims to have read five times) and Rousseau's impassioned writings have had their effect upon his mind;

their influence is plainly discernible in more than one place. And yet, side by side with this apparent subserviency, there exists a vigorous and self-reliant judgment, and one is at once convinced that the writer of the diary, however readily he may speak of his thoughts of death, has as little real intention of making his words good as had the dethroned emperor at Fontainebleau, twenty-eight years later, of taking his own life. It is always the same double nature to which he himself bears witness in the conversation with Madame de Rémusat above cited; the same [fantastic dreaming, to which nevertheless is always applied the measuring-rod of a calm and methodical deliberation; an idealism subdued, corrected, and controlled by a highly developed, realistic intelligence. } This is the fundamental trait of his character and at the same time its key.

And now he has suddenly fixed upon a practical resolution. Once in Ajaccio, he will get his leave of absence prolonged, "on the ground of ill health," as far as the forbearance of the Minister of War will permit. In this way his family will profit by his pay, while he himself will have the opportunity to carry out his literary projects. And as a matter of fact he did not rejoin his regiment at Auxonne before May, 1788.

It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the young officer's concern for the support and future of his family and the cheerlessness of his own prospects were alone responsible for his dejection. What tormented him beyond all these was the conflict between what he recognized as his duty and what he himself honoured as civic virtue in the light of his speculations on the natural rights of mankind.

He had once written in a letter to Fesch: "A soldier's sole attachment should be to his flag." But did not this flag bind him to the cause of the French whom he had learned to hate even while at school, before whose doors his pride had been obliged to humble itself to beg assistance and benefits for the Buonaparte family—the French who had subjugated his country, in the liberation of which he saw realized the most audacious dreams of his fancy? He, to whom Sampiero and Paoli had been shining ideals, had sworn allegiance to their victorious

foes and thereby imposed upon himself fetters which paralyzed his ambition and condemned his existence to insignificance. He had purposed to become the hero of his nation and he had become merely one of its armed custodians. This state of affairs was intolerable and yet it was scarcely to be changed.

For unheard-of things must take place in order to overcome the obstacles which towered before the feverishly urgent determination of this ambitious youth. The established order of a world must be overturned to make way for the flight of this extraordinary genius.

And behold! the unheard-of came to pass: the order of the world was disestablished and a new era opened.

CHAPTER II

THE REVOLUTION. NAPOLEON'S CORSICAN ADVENTURES

It is impossible to undertake to set forth here all the causes and occasions which brought about in France that revolutionary movement to which a large proportion of our modern political and social conditions owe their existence. In point of fact, the necessity for these changes was felt long before the decisive year of 1789. As early as the middle of the century, during the reign of Louis XV., notorious in history for his mistresses and his defeats, the word "Revolution" had been uttered with something of that prophetic tone with which the Old Testament seers pronounced the name Messiah, and having once acquired a foothold, it never again disappeared from the language. Upon the succession of Louis XVI. to the throne of his grandfather he showed the best of intentions toward the correction of abuses, but it soon became evident that the evil was too deep-rooted to be moved by well-intentioned attempts at reform. No minister, however able, could hope by means of judicious measures to overcome the difficulty. Ever since the seventeenth century the government in France had been tending toward despotism and centralization; the welfare of the nation rested solely upon the caprice of the king and the will of his domineering ministers. The fundamental rights of the people were ignored; the States General—the legal representatives of the three political classes, the clergy, nobility, and commons—had for a long time not been convoked for participation in the framing of laws, though this right was accorded to them by the ancient constitution of the realm. As a consequence there existed a constant feud between the government and the Parliaments, the highest judicial courts of the country. The clergy and nobility had submitted to the position of political

insignificance which the new system gave them, and were rewarded with lavish hand by the king for their loyalty; their exemption from taxation, together with all other prerogatives formerly granted them by the state in acknowledgment of their services as judges and guardians, was preserved to them.

On the other hand, the third estate, which had not shared in any of these privileges, was obliged to assume, almost unaided, the burden of the state's expenses. Of the land two thirds were owned by the two privileged classes and were accordingly free from taxation, while the remaining third was divided among a large number of small property-holders who were in nowise entitled, as were their superiors, to exact feudal service and levy turnpike and bridge toll of the peasantry, but were compelled to pay taxes of all descriptions upon their meagre lands. The peasants, living exclusively upon the domains of the privileged classes, had to pay taxes to state, church, and stewards of the landlord, and there remained to them after the deduction of these imposts an all too scanty means of subsistence. In the cities a few rich and favoured circles were opposed to a populace without property, who, excluded from guilds, corporations, and all municipal offices, earned their living in daily labour for the upper classes. Thus the poor man of France was oppressed, while the aristocracy squandered the fruit of others' labour in Paris or at the prodigal royal court at Versailles in leading the brilliant and luxurious life of the salons.

That these conditions were contrary to nature had long been recognized by thinking minds. In imperishable works, conspicuous for their brilliancy and elegant simplicity of language, they attacked the intolerance of the church, which, even after 1760, incited the willing authorities to harsh measures against the members of the reformed churches; they demonstrated that existing social conditions were in violation of the rights of man, and sought, in sundry ways, the ideal government to replace the present one when that should collapse as it deserved to do.

And the catastrophe followed soon. Bad financial administration on the one side, with failure of crops and distressing need on the other, hastened the crisis. After the disclosure by

Necker, Minister of Finance, in the early eighties, of the desperate condition of the State's treasury; after the ineffectual labours of his successor Calonne over the problem of how to draw upon the wealth of the two privileged classes for the benefit of the country; after repeated borrowings had exhausted credit and bankruptcy seemed inevitable, the king at last decided to yield to the universal demand and to convoke the States General at Versailles early in May, 1789.

The States General as they had assembled for the last time in 1614 was no such united deliberative body as, for instance, the English Parliament or the modern German Reichstag. The deputies of the three estates debated and voted separately, and the majority of votes of all three—two to one—was necessary to enact or reject a bill. Under such conditions the commons were of necessity at a disadvantage when opposed to the clergy and the nobility.

But the third estate of 1789 was a different body from that of 1614. The example of two great and successful revolutions, that of England in the seventeenth and that of America in the eighteenth century, had not remained without effect upon the minds of its members.

The doctrines of philosophers and political writers had penetrated their minds, the conviction of the injustice of existing conditions was pre-eminently theirs, and the wish to give expression to this conviction in deeds impelled them to take the first step toward revolution.

Contrary to the provisions of the ancient constitution, as well as to the wish of Louis XVI., the representatives of the third estate, who equalled in number those of the other two combined, refused to conform to the former manner of sitting. They declared themselves to be the representatives of the nation, and summoned the deputies of the other two estates to co-operate with them in their deliberations and decrees. (June 17th, 1789.) This purpose was accomplished and thus the feudal States General were transformed into a modern Chamber of Deputies which, far from contenting itself with complacently approving the government loans, felt itself called upon to do away en-

tirely with the old régime and to constitute in its place a new France. The first part of this task was accomplished before the end of the year. In the night session of the 4th of August, amidst universal excitement, those memorable decrees were passed which annulled all privileges of rank, removed all feudal burdens from the peasant, declared ecclesiastical tithes redeemable, suppressed the selling of public offices, and proclaimed all citizens eligible to any office whether civil or military. By this action—too precipitate, to be sure—was demolished the crumbling edifice of ancient France and the foundation laid for a new and habitable structure.

These decrees were, however, not the result of calm consideration and deliberate judgment. While the lawmakers at Versailles were drawing up the code of newly-acquired liberty the capital near by was in the wildest uproar. Riots had for years been frequent in Paris, but now they became the established order of the day. Shortly before the above-mentioned decrees were passed by the National Assembly, the populace of Paris, having become "sovereign," had repulsed the royal troops on the Place Vendôme, had taken by storm the Hôtel des Invalides, and had razed to the ground the Bastille. It was with the greatest difficulty that the Deputies were able to restrain the mob from further excesses. Strange and varied elements constituted the populace of Paris: fairly-educated, honest enthusiasts in the cause of freedom stood side by side with brutish vagabonds whom the poverty of the open country had driven by thousands into the city; oppressed labourers who were contending for their just right to live decently, marched beside impudent adventurers and light-fingered gentry who brazenly declared war upon all movable property; theorists ready to push their cherished ideas to the last extreme were beside legions of ignorant beings who blindly acted upon any suggestion overheard in the streets—an imposing array enlisted in the interests of anarchy and soon to assume a fearful importance.)

The capital did not remain alone a prey to revolt. The provinces also felt the force of the current from the beginning of the political movement. Here hunger assumed the executive

power. Hundreds of grain riots were but the precursors to further excesses. The harvests of 1789 in the south of France had proved a failure. In the middle and northern parts of the country, where the yield had been sufficient, no one showed the spirit necessary to put the grain on the market. The high prices kept up and occasioned new disturbances. Proprietors were forced by threats of violence to deliver up their supplies. Peasants assembled before the castles of the nobility and compelled them to yield not only their feudal rights, but their possessions. Whoever resisted forfeited his life. Eastern France, from the extreme north down to Provence, was distracted by peasant-uprisings and confiscations of property. Murder and assassination were nothing unusual. All authority was powerless to restrain the disorder.

Auxonne on the Saône, where the artillery regiment La Fère was stationed in garrison, was not undisturbed by the Revolution. In July, 1789, the alarm-bell had sounded here also, the toll-gates had been broken down, the office of the tax-collector destroyed. A detachment of cannoniers, appointed to re-establish order, refused obedience to commands and stood with their weapons passive spectators of the disturbance. Their captain, who attempted to arrest one of the ringleaders, was pursued by the mob and barely escaped with his life. Not until some companies of the city's National Guard began to quell the tumult would the troops give the least assistance. Whether the young Lieutenant Bonaparte participated in this affair is unknown, nor can we gain any knowledge as to his attitude in these days, interesting as any information on this subject would be. We know only that after his return from Ajaccio he was more than ever friendly to the idea of a radical change in the government. In his diary we find under date of October 23d, 1788, the outline of a "Dissertation sur l'Autorité Royale." "This work," it reads, "will begin with setting forth general ideas upon the origin and growth of the name of king in the mind of man. Military government is favourable to it. This work will enter next into the details of usurped authority enjoyed by the monarchs of the twelve kingdoms of Europe.

There are but very few kings who have not deserved dethronement." Tolerably advanced ideas for a lieutenant in the royal army at the age of twenty!

Still his mind remains fixed upon Corsica. He revises his "*Lettres sur l'Histoire de la Corse*" and purposes dedicating them to the banished Paoli. In a letter of June, 1789, in which he attempts to approach his hero, he manifests most unmistakably his hatred toward the French oppressors. Presently a single idea seizes possession of his mind—to take advantage of the Revolution to obtain power and influence in his native land, and to acquire at the same time with his own independence that of his people. This is no longer the hour for written words. The "*Lettres sur l'Histoire de la Corse*," which Paoli declined to have dedicated to himself, remain unprinted. Their author is seeking for himself a place in the history of his country.

Since their conquest by the French, the Corsicans had been divided into two parties—the partisans of the foreigner, who had reconciled themselves with the new order of things and turned the same to their own advantage, and the Nationalists, who submitted with the greatest reluctance to the yoke of the new supremacy. To the former faction, the Conservatives, belonged the inferior nobility and the clergy with its blind following, as did also a part of the residents of the seaport towns; indeed those who lived along the coast and were thus at the mercy of every passing frigate speedily learned submission to the will of a foreign power, while the mountaineers of the interior, not unlike their neighbours, the Montenegrins, preserved more readily their free and independent spirit.

The Nationalists were themselves cleft into two divisions, of which one hoped to secure civil liberty by making common cause with the revolutionists in France, while the other wished to have nothing to do with them or with any compact in which they were concerned.

The Conservatives elected to the States General the official candidates, General Buttafuoco and the Abbé Peretti. The Nationalists chose Salicetti and Colonna di Cesare Rocca, members of the opposition. The latter succeeded in making

the wishes of their constituents prevail in the National Assembly: the Commission of Nobles, who acted as advisory board to the governor of the island, was to give place to an elective Council of Administration, and a paid native militia was to be maintained.

While the idea of a native administrative body originated in the ambition of a group of young Corsicans, Pozzo di Borgo, Peraldi, Cuneo, and others, who were already dreaming of themselves as Regents, the creation of a militia was the suggestion of Lieutenant Bonaparte in Auxonne, who was kept informed by his uncle Fesch as to all events on the island, and whose family after the death of Marbœuf had joined the opposition. He, too, aspired to the highest office at home, but his ambition did not rely upon elections and debates and fickle public sentiment. Even now the bayonet was to him the surest means of acquiring power. He felt that his military education would assure him a high command in the Corsican militia and that he, once in possession of such a command . . . But such projects demand one's presence on the scene of action. Accordingly he again obtains a somewhat extended leave of absence and the month of September, 1789, finds him back in Ajaccio.

Difficulties present themselves at once upon his arrival. The Conservative deputy Buttafuoco had prevailed upon the royal government to defer the carrying out of the changes demanded by the opposition. For the present there was no hope of a popular council or a paid militia.

But the time has come in which the opposition resorts to violence. Napoleon, also, has not passed through the experience of this revolutionary summer without result. He has seen the National Guard form in French cities and recognized the magic of the cockade; he now utilizes his observations and displays a feverish zeal in making preparations for carrying out his aims. He plans to wrest the power from the hands of the reactionary authorities, to organize a National Guard, to seize the Bastille of Ajaccio and drive the French from the island. The patriotic club of the city, to which he confides his purposes, is full of the wildest enthusiasm in favour of them.

And in fact a National Guard was formed, and the revolution, under the leadership of the young lieutenant in the royal army, started under most favourable auspices. One of his biographers tells us that "in Ajaccio he moved, he electrified everything with his indefatigable activity." But at this point Napoleon's plans were interfered with by the reinforcement of the French garrison, the suppression of the club, and the disbanding of the National Guard; the leaders of the revolution had to content themselves with addressing a protest, drawn up by Napoleon, to the National Assembly at Paris begging its protection to their liberties. (Last of October, 1789.)

Meanwhile, in imitation of Ajaccio, other towns had revolted, and in some instances, as in Bastia and Isola Rossa, remained victorious. Upon the advice of Buttafuoco the government determined to quell the insurrection by levying for that purpose a large detachment of troops, and orders therefor had already been issued, when the National Assembly, at the instigation of Salicetti, raised Corsica, hitherto considered merely as conquered territory, to the dignity of a French province enjoying all the rights and immunities to which others were entitled.

No regard was paid to the treaty of 1768 by which Genoa had surrendered the island to France "as security." An amnesty made it possible for Paoli and his companions in exile to return to Corsica. The government at Paris was forced to abstain from carrying out the harsh measures intended, and the radicals of the island recovered complete liberty of action. In Ajaccio the club resumed its sessions in the summer of 1790, the National Guard was drilled under Napoleon's directions, and a new municipal council was elected wherein Joseph Bonaparte at last found employment.

What was more natural than to resume the plans interrupted the year before? Nothing but the watchfulness of the garrison which occupied the citadel prevented Napoleon from carrying out his plan of seizing the stronghold; to his proposal of laying a regular siege the club would not consent. The hated French remained in possession.

Shortly afterwards Paoli returned. Thousands assembled

to do him honour and greeted him with ecstasy and transports of joy. Deputations from all cities met him. The former dictator, the glorious chief, whom the recollections of the struggle for independence and the martyrdom of exile surrounded with a sublime halo, was the object of unmixed veneration. When, in accordance with the new constitution of France, the election of public officers took place in each of the departments in September, 1790, Paoli was unanimously chosen president of the Council of Administration. All who had political aspirations gathered around him. Napoleon was among these, always confident that the paid militia, to the command of which he so ardently longed to be appointed, was about to become a reality. This would have enabled him to resign his commission in the royal army which was such a burden to him and withheld him from the real scene of his ambition. At the side of Paoli, who was not a trained soldier, he would have played a distinguished part—and Paoli was already an old man. Vain hopes! The ministry refused to arm the Corsican people at the expense of France, and Bonaparte at last was obliged in February, 1791, to rejoin his regiment.

Meanwhile the emigration of the royalists had deprived the regiment of La Fère of many of its officers, and it was owing to this circumstance that Napoleon was not called to account for being deficient in his sense of duty and in discipline, but was even promoted, June 1st, 1791, to the position of first lieutenant in the fourth regiment of artillery at Valence.

The country was enjoying then an apparent calm, and he was able to resume his manner of life such as it had been two years earlier, except that he now shared his modest lodging and meagre pay with his younger brother Louis, the future king of Holland. When, twenty years later, Louis created difficulties for the Emperor of the French by arbitrarily resigning his crown, Napoleon alluded in conversation with Caulaincourt to these bygone days. "What!" exclaimed he, "my brother injure instead of helping me! This Louis whom I brought up on my pay of a lieutenant, at the price of Heaven knows what privations! I found means of sending money to pay the board and lodging of

my younger brother. Do you know how I managed it? It was by never setting foot inside a café or appearing in the social world; it was by eating dry bread and brushing my clothes myself so that they should remain the longer presentable. In order not to be conspicuous among my comrades I lived like a bear, always alone in my little room with my books—then my only friends. And those books! By what strict economies, practised on actual necessities, did I purchase the enjoyment of possessing them! When, by dint of abstinence, I had at length amassed the sum of twelve livres, I turned my steps with the joy of a child toward the shop of a bookseller who lived near to the bishop's palace. I often went to visit his shelves with the sin of envy within me; I coveted long before my purse allowed of buying. Such were the joys and dissipations of my youth."

But frequently his small income could not be brought to cover his expenses. Debts had to be contracted, modest to be sure, but nevertheless oppressive with the hopelessness of increasing his resources.

Presently he resumed his literary projects. His "Discours sur le Bonheur," presented to the Academy of Lyons in the hope of its being awarded the prize of twelve hundred francs, brought nothing but disappointment to its author. His literary reveries were resumed and resulted in the above-mentioned "Dialogue sur l'Amour." Besides this he wrote "Réflexions sur l'État Naturel," in which he combated Rousseau's hypotheses and gave evidence of being a keen observer of human affairs.

All at once the speculative solitude of the young officer is interrupted by the noise of unprecedented excitement which prevails throughout all France.

During the first months of 1791 the fundamental provisions of the new Constitution of France had been formulated, and they needed but the royal sanction to become law. But since this Constitution reduced the royal authority almost to insignificance, and the radical laws concerning the church wounded the religious conscience of the king, Louis XVI. decided to flee

from Paris and seek in some foreign land safety and defence for his person and kingly dignity.

The plan failed; the king and his escort were stopped on the way and brought back to Paris.

A storm of indignation swept the country against the king and against those who had persuaded him to abandon his people. The National Assembly suspended the royal authority, and in all the towns of France the clubs, the militia, and the troops of the line swore unswerving fidelity to the decrees of the Parliament and to the new Constitution. With difficulty only could the more moderate, the "Feuillants," restrain the radical "Jacobins." Only when the king had accepted the Constitution was order in some slight degree restored.

At this time First Lieutenant Bonaparte subscribed to the following oath:

"I swear to use the arms delivered into my hands in the defence of my country, and to support against all enemies, whether from within or from without, the Constitution decreed by the National Assembly, to perish rather than suffer the invasion of French territory by foreign troops, and to obey only such orders as are given in accordance with the decrees of the National Assembly.

BUONAPARTE,

Officer in the 4th Regiment of Artillery.

Valence, the 6th of July, 1791."

Napoleon was taking an active part in the political clubs. He was secretary of the "Amis de la Constitution" of Valence, who were affiliated with the Jacobins in Paris, and in that capacity he composed an address to the National Assembly in which its acts were approved by the members of the club.

On the occasion of a patriotic banquet he offered a toast in honour of the radicals. But it would be an error to regard these acts as evidence of the patriotic enthusiasm with which at that time all Frenchmen were carried away and which raised to a new significance the word "Nation."

In the midst of all this Napoleon remained a Corsican, and only a Corsican, and held firmly to the plans which linked his

destiny with that of his native land. These projects were soon to assume more solid form.

In the session of July 22d, 1791, the National Assembly determined to create battalions of paid volunteers, the force to include something over one hundred thousand men. The department of Corsica was to furnish four such battalions.

Hardly had the news reached Napoleon when it became an impossibility for him to remain longer at Valence. The long and ardently desired opportunity to play a military part in his native island had presented itself. Before the end of September he was again on furlough in Ajaccio. What mattered it to him that France was on the eve of war? He was equally unconcerned that his leave of absence would terminate on the 1st of January, 1792. He sought later to exculpate himself on the ground of "unforeseen circumstances," and of "the dearest and most sacred duties to be fulfilled." "In these difficult circumstances," he writes to Sucy, the Commissary of War, "the post of honour of a good Corsican is in his own country." That he was at the same time a French officer, educated at the expense of the king, and that he had just sworn to defend France, counted for nothing with him. He succeeded in getting his name struck off from the army list, the act taking effect January 1st, 1792, and more zealously than ever endeavoured to obtain the position of lieutenant-colonel in the volunteer battalion of Ajaccio, which appointment lay with the vote of the troops.

For years he had ingratiated himself with the mountaineers who now voted for him, and this resulted in giving him a majority above his rival. Meanwhile, until the election should be over, Napoleon took the precaution to seize and detain in his own house one of the commissioners of the election who was hostile to him. With an insignificant man chosen as first lieutenant-colonel, Bonaparte became virtual commander of the battalion from his native city. This was his first coup d'état. Again his eyes turned toward the citadel, still the residence of French officers and soldiers. Now, at the head of a band of devoted men, the blow could not fail. Nothing was needed but to await a favourable opportunity.

There was in Ajaccio, as in other Corsican cities, a considerable number of ardently pious Catholics to whose religious feeling the new laws governing the church seemed no less iniquitous than to the King of France. It was no difficult matter for the numerous priests of the island to strengthen this element in its hatred toward the new order of things and its advocates. It was no wonder that there were many bitter enemies of the Jacobin Club, which was in close touch with the clubs of Toulon and Marseilles. Napoleon was particularly detested, not only as having attached himself at home, as in Valence, to the radical party, but as having, with the collaboration of his uncle Fesch, published a pamphlet dealing with the question of the oath required of priests.

Even as far back as in July, 1790, there had been tumults in which were heard such cries as "Vive la Révolution! Death to Jacobins, death to the officer!"

Once the frenzied mob had hurled itself upon him, and his rescue from its hands was due alone to the intervention of a friendly bandit. This feeling had not modified since that time, and the church laws were accorded but slight respect. Napoleon now made use of this circumstance.

"In order to secure respect for the decrees of the National Assembly," he took possession with his volunteers of the convent of the Capuchins in the city. He calculated that in the conflict which must ensue with the friars, the moderate supporters of the Constitution among the civil authorities would be obliged to take their stand on his side, which would afford him the desired influence against which the gates of the citadel could not remain closed. Having gained an entrance, his plan was to fraternize with the French soldiers, compel the officers to decamp and make himself master of the city. As he had anticipated, during Easter week, 1792, a furious brawl arose in the streets and Napoleon hastened to occupy the most important points throughout the city. He had already erected a mighty barricade facing the gate of the citadel, in preparation for a contest with the garrison, when commissioners of the government, sent by Paoli, appeared and demanded a cessation of

hostilities, and delivered to Bonaparte the censure of the governor for instigating the disorder, and the order to leave Ajaccio at once with his forces for the interior of the island.) The occurrence was further reported to the Minister of War, and only the turmoil of the time prevented the trial by court-martial of the officer guilty of such misdemeanours.

Again all seemed lost. Hated at home by a large number of his countrymen and regarded with just suspicion by the authorities, with charges filed against him in France, and without a position in the regular army, to what could he look forward when the brief one year's term of service of the volunteers came to an end?

Nothing but decisive measures taken at the right place could help in this quandary. With the consent of the government Napoleon betook himself to Paris.

He found the capital a prey to the most violent agitation. The truce between Crown and Revolution had been of short duration. Louis XVI. had incurred anew the resentment of the progressive parties by denying his sanction to the decrees of the legislative assembly against the priests who refused to take oath to support the new church laws, and against the emigrant princes and aristocrats, whose assembling in arms on the frontiers was to be punished by confiscation of their property. The Jacobin clubs already openly declared themselves in favour of a republic.

Besides, there could be no longer any doubt concerning the relations between the Court and foreign countries, and the opposition was persuaded that a successful war against foreign powers would be at the same time a triumph over the French monarchy. Accordingly the republicans of the Assembly agreed to foster a war against foreign princes, overthrew the ministry desirous of peace, and compelled the king to declare war against Austria, a court to which he was personally related. (April 20th, 1792.)

The result was, however, at first disappointing. An attack upon the Austrian Netherlands was easily repulsed and the defeat of the French troops created prodigious excitement in

Paris. "Treason," was the cry on all sides. The king was regarded as personally responsible and a conspirator against his own people, a suspicion which was strengthened by the fact that just at this time, June 13th, 1792, Louis dismissed the radical ministry and surrounded himself with advisers chosen from among the moderate royalists.

The leaders of the radical parties profited by this feeling in playing the animosity of the anarchistic elements of the capital against the Crown. On the 20th of June a great crowd consisting mainly of an armed rabble streamed into the Tuileries to compel the sanction of the two decrees. Nothing but the calm, dignified manner of the king averted an attempt upon his life. But on August 10th, at the instigation of the Jacobins, the populace returned to the charge. Bands of pikemen, workmen from the suburbs of St. Antoine and St. Marcel, and all manner of riffraff besieged the royal palace and forced Louis XVI. to seek protection in the National Assembly. But here his dignity as sovereign was declared forfeited and the monarchy suspended. With him fell likewise the conservative ministry, giving place to a government consisting of republican Girondists.

This change in the course of the revolution was to Bonaparte of the greatest importance. Without means of subsistence, in disrepute at home, he had come to the capital to solicit readmission into the army. He was not entirely without patrons, but they were powerless in dealing with the June ministry, which was perfectly informed as to the recent occurrences in Corsica. It was not long before he was unable to secure the necessaries of life. He chanced to meet Fauvelet de Bourrienne, a former schoolfellow at Brienne, whom he tried to induce to enter with him into a scheme for subletting apartments, but nothing eventually came of the plan as Bourrienne just then received an appointment at the Legation in Stuttgart. Napoleon's embarrassment increased so that he was at length obliged for a time to part with his watch. Those were hard, distressing days. The only possible chance of help lay in the downfall of the refractory Minister of War who had shown him-

self so obdurate in regard to Bonaparte's application. For this reason was the 10th of August a day of great significance to Napoleon. Whether it was a fact, as has been asserted, that he helped to keep up the agitation by harangues in wine-shops is unknown. His own account of what took place, given at a somewhat later time, would not indicate that such had been the case: "I felt, on the 10th of August, that, had I been called upon to do so, I should have defended the king. I was opposed to those who would establish the Republic by means of the populace; besides I saw civilians attacking men in uniform, that gave me a shock." No doubt that was his inmost feeling; but it did not accord with his personal interests of that time. These demanded victory to the despised rabble, and that victory was welcome to him.

At any rate Napoleon's circumstances now improved of a sudden. To the new radical ministry the machinations of the young officer seemed nothing extremely blameworthy; he was again received into favour, and more, he was appointed captain in his regiment, the commission being dated February 6th, 1792, that is, on the day when his promotion would have occurred if he had not quitted the army. Indeed, in consequence of the flight of aristocrats, advancement of officers was at this time unusually rapid. It will be supposed that Napoleon now went to rejoin his regiment at the front, to fulfil the duties for which he was at least receiving payment. Not at all. The fate of France did not interest him in the least. The horizon of his thoughts and efforts was still bounded by the coast-line of his native island. To regain there his lost reputation was to him a higher aim than honours and triumphs in the service of those principles for which at that time thousands of Frenchmen joyfully met death. Had accident not furnished a pretext for his return to Corsica he would nevertheless have found some means of accomplishing that purpose. But it so happened that the new ministry closed the boarding-schools for young gentlemen and sent the pupils back to their homes. Among these young ladies was Napoleon's sister, Marianne Bonaparte. Who could wish to hinder a brother from accompanying his sister in

times such as these with the entire country in a state of agitation? By the middle of September they were both again in Ajaccio. Napoleon remained there into the summer of 1793.

This period of nine months was decisive for his career, and likewise for the fate of the world. At once upon his arrival Napoleon had several violent altercations with Paoli, owing to the fact that Napoleon resumed his command of the volunteer forces just as if nothing had meanwhile occurred and he were not a captain in the regular army. The young officer was, indeed, in so far successful in what he desired as to be granted the command of the troops provisionally and for the time during which they were engaged in an (unsuccessful) expedition against the island of Sardinia. But the relations between him and the aged governor grew more and more strained in the course of the next few months, to end eventually in complete rupture. The cause lay to a large extent in the general situation of affairs. Paoli had returned from England with a strong predilection for constitutional monarchy and had approved the French Constitution and agreed to serve under it only because it was in accordance with that condition of affairs which he had learned to admire on British soil. But this Constitution had been shattered in its most essential provisions, the new National Convention had abolished royalty, the king had been deposed, accused of treason, tried, and put to death, January 21st, 1793. The government was in the hands of extremists who could give no assurance of stability. Furthermore, at the time of his return to Corsica, Paoli, moved by a sense of gratitude to those who had received him so hospitably during his exile, had stipulated that he should never be called upon to bear arms against England. Now, after the execution of Louis XVI., war had broken out with England, and Paoli was a French general. He refused to comply with the order to leave Corsica and attach himself to the Army of the South, and when, in reply to this resistance to command, the Convention, on April 2d, 1793, issued a warrant for his arrest (later withdrawn as having been the result of misapprehension), nine tenths of the Corsican population of the island declared themselves for their aged chieftain and

against the republican government and its adherents upon the island.

Among the latter figured Napoleon Bonaparte. It was the critical moment of his life; two courses lay before him, and he had to choose between them. Another had achieved what it had been his dream to accomplish in Corsica, what he had striven for. Should he attach himself to the Paolists it was certain that there would be nothing but a subordinate part for him. On the other hand, his duty as an officer of the French army imperatively demanded his presence with his regiment. Moreover, all the political opinions which he had entertained up to this time drew him toward the Convention, where the Radicals were continually gaining ground. If there were still a possibility of his mastering Corsica, his ambition could be realized only with the aid of France. Accordingly, early in May, 1793, he broke openly with Paoli,—who had made one more effort to win over the son of his friend Carlo,—and threw himself unreservedly into the arms of the French who had for so long been the objects of his bitter hatred. Shortly afterwards a Corsican popular council declared him an outlaw and the whole Bonaparte family infamous. It was with difficulty that Lætitia escaped to Calvi with her children; her house in Ajaccio was sacked and set afire.

A final effort was made by Napoleon to conquer Ajaccio. Relying upon the continued devotion of his battalion in the militia, he planned an attack upon the city with the aid of French expeditionary troops. But the enterprise miscarried. On the 11th of June, 1793, he and his family left the island and withdrew to Toulon. His brother Lucien had preceded them by a few weeks, having hurried over to France with a deputation of like-minded men, to denounce Paoli as a conspirator against the Republic, and at the same time to demand support of the Jacobins. Napoleon had himself made accusations against the aged patriot in a memorial of the 4th of June, and therein calumniated and insulted the ideal of his boyhood and youth.

His rôle in Corsica has been played to the end. Two motives

had guided him in his revolutionary undertakings there: a strong local patriotism which almost ignored everything which lay beyond the confines of the island, and an uncontrollable impulse toward the acquisition of power and influence by the aid of which he believed himself called to be the deliverer and ruler of his people. Of these two motives one had lost its object. The curse of his own nation had deprived him of his country and annihilated in him every tender feeling which he had hitherto cherished toward it. In truth the desire to conquer the island was still active within him during the next two years, and many were the schemes which he conceived to carry out this purpose; but these were no longer due to patriotism, but rather to hatred toward the patriots and to fulfil his craving for revenge. When later, in 1796, he actually brought Corsica again under French dominion this feeling also had ceased to exist and his native country could inspire no greater interest in him than, for example, Corfu or Malta.

If sympathetic interest in the weal and woe of his own people be a moral element in the nature of a man, Napoleon's subsequent life and acts were lacking in this characteristic. He ceased of necessity to be a Corsican, he never succeeded in becoming a Frenchman. His ambition, likewise, became divested of national feeling; this ambition, hitherto circumscribed by the coast-line of a small island, knew henceforth no bounds.

CHAPTER III

THE SIEGE OF TOULON AND THE DEFENCE OF THE CONVENTION

THE revolt of Corsica was but one of a long series of uprisings in opposition to the rule of the Jacobins which had developed in Paris after the execution of the king. The contest, carried on over the grave of Louis XVI., between the two republican factions of the Convention—the radicals of the Mountain, and the moderate Girondists—ended in the defeat of the latter in the summer of 1793. All among them who had not fled were imprisoned and perished on the scaffold. The victors thenceforth governed France by means of that body appointed by the Convention and known as the Committee of Public Safety, the members of which, led by Robespierre, relied upon the Jacobin Club and its branches for support. This Jacobin government possessed one quality lacking to its Girondist predecessor and indispensable to success under the extraordinary conditions then existing: unparalleled energy. The Girondists, the greater part of whom were young orators, entirely unequal to the political issues ("des fous extrêmement honnêtes"), had plunged France into an interminable war with almost the whole of Europe, unprovided as the country was with either information or resources necessary to encounter the dangers they had conjured up. Their successors in executive power assumed with this war a gigantic problem, and they found its solution, though not without constant resort to illegal measures, unsparing bloodshed, and cruelty. Commissioners of the Convention travelled throughout the country overseeing the compulsory recruiting among the people and supporting, "in the name of the Representatives of the People," the courts-martial and revolutionary tribunals appointed to

punish the refractory and to judge the suspicious. And since those now in power owed their advancement solely to absolute subservience to the will of the lowest class and could preserve their authority only by further concessions to it, there arose in the capital, as in the cities of the provinces, a tyranny of the common people which, not content with threatening and persecuting holders of moderate political opinions, eventually accused as "traitors to their country" all wealthy and educated people.

Such a Reign of Terror could not long remain unopposed. It was not only in those parts of the country where the partisans of the king and of the old faith had taken up arms against the Parisians that the opposition manifested itself, as in Vendée and Brittany, but also among those who had originally and enthusiastically promoted the revolutionary movement. Such was the case particularly in the towns of southern France, which had zealously taken part in the contest against the old régime, but which now, incited by fugitive Girondists, rose up against radicalism carried to the point of anarchy.

In Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon the Jacobins were overcome by the more moderate and peace-loving element in the community, and in Provence there arose a central committee which constituted itself an independent government and decreed armed resistance to the terrorism of the Committee of Public Safety. Battalions of insurgents had already advanced from the south as far as Avignon, when the Convention, which by the exercise of a little moderation could have easily restored order without bloodshed, eagerly accepted the challenge, proclaimed as the primary object of the government the complete extermination of all domestic opponents and directed its Commissioner, Dubois de Crancé, to subjugate Lyons and prevent the concentration of the forces of the insurgents. Dubois hurriedly collected a corps of men from troops of the line and volunteers and sent it under command of his subordinate Carteaux against the rebels at Avignon. In the middle of July, 1793, this force encamped before the ancient residence of the popes.

Here aid was forthcoming to Carteaux. He was, to be sure, reinforced only to the extent of a single petty officer of artillery,

but yet a man who was to render no slight service in the expedition against the cities of the south: Captain Bonaparte.

After his flight from Corsica, Napoleon had established his family in needy circumstances at La Vallette near Toulon and gone to rejoin his company, stationed at that time in Nice, which had been recently conquered. He bore a certificate from his fellow countryman and friend, Salicetti, Commissioner of the Convention, to the effect that his presence in Corsica had been imperatively necessary during the last few months, and this attestation shielded him from censure. On the 25th of June, 1793, he began his service in the shore battery established on the Riviera. The defences at Nice being inadequate, Napoleon was ordered to Avignon to bring back the cannon parked there. Here he came upon the before-mentioned corps commanded by Carteaux, who straightway took him into his own service, and assigned to him, as officer of artillery, a small flying column. Soon afterwards the insurgents and the troops of the Convention disputed in battle the possession of Avignon, and the forces under Carteaux were successful. Napoleon is said to have aimed the cannon himself in this engagement, and to have brought about the flight of the enemy through his personal efforts. The former statement is not improbably true, the latter is supported only by the assertions of sycophants of a later day. As the result of this victory, the neighbouring towns of Tarascon, Cavaillon, and Beaucaire had to be abandoned forthwith by the insurgents, and the way to Marseilles lay open to the troops of the government. Napoleon was despatched back to Avignon to organize an artillery park. The leisure afforded him by this task he utilized in writing "*Le Souper de Beaucaire*," in which he discussed the question of the civil war, the object being to convince the Marseillais of the futility of their resistance to the Convention. Two merchants of Marseilles, a native of Nîmes, a manufacturer from Montpellier, and a soldier of the line accidentally meet one evening at an inn in Beaucaire, and the soldier, aided by the travellers from Nîmes and Montpellier, attempts to prove to one of the merchants from Marseilles that from a military point of view the position of that city is untenable and that its political

stand is to be condemned. One passage, particularly, is interesting historically, in which, the citizen of Marseilles having adduced the Girondists as testimony in behalf of his views, the soldier, who voices the personal opinions of Napoleon, replies: "The case, as I am satisfied, is, that 'the Mountain,' actuated by public or by party spirit, having proceeded to the harshest extremities against them, having outlawed, imprisoned, and, I will admit, calumniated them, the Brissotins (Girondists) were lost without a civil war which would put them into a position for laying down the law to their enemies. It is then in reality to them that your war is useful. Had they merited their early reputation they would have thrown down their arms upon the formulation of the Constitution, they would have sacrificed their own interests to public welfare; but it is easier to cite Decius than to imitate him." To this the traveller from Marseilles makes answer that he and his friends also desired the Republic, but wanted a Constitution formulated by representatives who were free to act; they also desired liberty, but liberty as granted by worthy deputies; what they did not want was a Constitution favouring pillage and anarchy. To this Napoleon makes reply through the manufacturer from Montpellier, who reproaches the insurgents with rebellion and counter-revolution, "for," he declares, "the Convention is the centre of unity, the real sovereign, especially when the nation is divided."

Hardly was this piece finished when the Commissioners of the Convention arrived in Avignon. These were his friend Salicetti, the younger Robespierre, brother of the autocrat at Paris, and the deputy Gasparin; they were on their way to the Army of the South. Napoleon was introduced to the others by Salicetti, and his penetration and culture charmed Robespierre, with whom he from this time entered into near relations. The "Souper" was listened to with attention and satisfaction by the Commissioners, who at once published it at the expense of the state. In this wise Napoleon made his entrance into the political movement.

Meanwhile Carteaux had marched upon Marseilles and, after a victorious engagement, retaken the city for the Con-

vention. The "treason" of the inhabitants toward their country was punished with frightful barbarity. After a short interval the march was resumed toward Toulon. The conquest of this port was the more essential as the insurgents there had opened negotiations with England and had actually already delivered into her hands the fleet which lay before the town and was the best in France. In the siege laid to this stronghold Napoleon was now to play a distinguished part. During an engagement in the neighbourhood of Toulon, one of the superior officers in the artillery had been wounded, and on the 19th of October, 1793, Napoleon was promoted to the command of a battalion in the Second Regiment of Artillery; from this time he was able to act with greater independence. To add to this his new friends had made every effort to recommend him to the Convention, representing him as the only man in the besieging army capable of projecting a plan of operations. He himself had addressed a memorial to the Committee of Public Safety in which he complained of the neglected condition of his branch of the service, and asked for the appointment of an artillery general with full powers, "who, by virtue of his very rank, would increase respect and make an impression upon a lot of ignorant fellows on the staff with whom one has to be continually laying down first principles and coming to terms in order to carry out plans approved both by theory and by experience."

Carteaux was soon afterward removed from his position and the chief command given Major-General Dugommier, whose coolness, perseverance, and military perception Napoleon commends; General Duteil was entrusted with the command of the artillery, while Napoleon himself was put in charge of the battery established to the west of the city. He proposes now—this is the plan which he submitted to the Council of War—to capture the peninsula of Cépet lying to the southwest, from this point to clear the harbour, and by this roundabout way to bring the city to surrender. His plan having been adopted by the generals, he at once set about the task with the greatest zeal. It was not long before his guns were placed in the desired

locations; a sally on the part of the English was repulsed on the 30th of November, and for his fine conduct on this occasion Bonaparte was appointed colonel. On the 17th of December Fort l'Éguillette, and with it the before-mentioned peninsular fell into his power. When this gain was followed up by a concentric attack of all the divisions upon the defences of the city, the besieged Toulonese, menaced with certain destruction by Napoleon's batteries, dared make no further energetic resistance. The English and Spahiards, allies of the insurgents, promptly embarked their troops and sailed out of the harbour, taking with them many fugitive inhabitants of the city. On the 19th of December the victors made their entrance into Toulon, and, in mad rage for vengeance, as at Marseilles and Lyons, relentlessly condemned all who were under suspicion or who were in any way compromised. Hundreds of such were assembled together and shot down. It was the intention of Fréron, one of the Commissioners of the Convention, to leave not a single rebel alive, but this was opposed by Dugommier, and one readily accepts the statement that Bonaparte also counselled moderation. He was not inclined to the exercise of useless cruelty, and was animated in no degree by that spirit of bloody fanaticism to which in that awful year such innumerable victims were sacrificed.

While the part played by Bonaparte before Toulon was one of great importance, he occupied but an inconspicuous position; he was nothing more than commander of a battalion. He had none the less rendered great service to the government through the strategy which he advised. An attack from the north and east would not have led to such prompt results, and upon this point much depended just at this time when the allied foes of France were beginning to turn the closest attention to Toulon, when already the English had despatched an expedition, primarily intended for Vendée, toward southern France, and the Austrian court had determined to send forces thither. Accordingly it was but a well-earned acknowledgment of his services when Napoleon was now appointed brigadier-general of artillery by a provisional decree of the Commissioners of the Conven-

tion on the 22d of December, 1793, a nomination afterwards confirmed by the Committee of Public Safety.

When on this occasion the authorities demanded the necessary record of his life he disclaimed all nobility of origin. It could but have told against him with the Jacobins, to whom he had allied himself, and in whose service he was employing his great talents. Whether he was really in sympathy with them, whether he inwardly espoused their cause, or whether it was due to anything more than ambition that he cast in his lot with the Radicals, is not made clear by this act. Once,—shortly after his appointment as general,—unmindful of the prevailing radicalism and on purely strategic grounds, he recommended the rebuilding of the Marseilles Bastille, Fort St. Nicholas. He was at once declared "suspect," and called upon to justify himself before the Convention. Salicetti had much difficulty in disposing of the matter. From that time Napoleon lost no opportunity of showing himself a zealous republican. Says Mlle. Robespierre in her memoranda: "Bonaparte was a republican, I should say even that he was a republican of the Mountain, at least he made that impression upon me from his manner of regarding things at the time when I was at Nice (1794). Later his victories turned his head and made him aspire to rule over his fellow citizens, but then, while he was but a general of artillery in the Army of Italy, he was a believer in thoroughgoing liberty and genuine equality." The younger brother of the dread President of the Committee of Public Safety recommended him in April, 1794, as a man of transcendent merit, and reposed such confidence in him that the initiated called him the "privy counsellor" of the Commissioner. Yet the latter did not fail to add to his praise this observation: "He is a Corsican, and offers only the guaranty of a man of that nation who has withstood the petting of Paoli and whose property has been laid waste by that traitor."

But Robespierre had absolute confidence in Napoleon's military counsels and discussed with him and Ricord, the Commissioner, a secret plan of operations for the so-called "Army of Italy." That portion of the French forces was encamped

on the Riviera, engaged in war against the allied Sardinians and Austrians, who occupied the heights of the Apennines. The revolt in southern France had exhausted the land, and the Army of Italy was compelled to draw its supplies from the neutral territory of Genoa. Two problems presented themselves in the management of this part of the army: first, to protect these indispensable importations against interception and attack by the allies, and, second, by some fortunate offensive movement to clear the way into the rich plain of Piedmont. This plan of offensive operations was elaborated in several ways by Bonaparte, who had been detailed as general of artillery to the Army of Italy in May, 1794. In July he himself went on a mission to Genoa, officially to treat with the Doge on the subject of the condition of roads and coasts, but secretly to investigate the fortifications of Savona as a possible gateway of invasion. Two aides, Marmont and Junot,—the subsequent Dukes of Ragusa and Abrantès,—accompanied him; he was himself filled with joyful hope of being able soon to carry his plans into execution as General-in-chief.

But too soon these high-soaring dreams were to come to naught. When, at the end of July, he returned to Nice, affairs in France had taken a complete change. Robespierre, who had gradually rid himself of his rivals in the Convention, Danton, Hébert, and their adherents, and had been more and more openly aiming to secure the dictatorship, was overthrown by a coalition of the radical and conservative elements of the Convention and condemned to the scaffold, July 27th, 1794 (Thermidor 9th). With him fell the government to which Napoleon had but recently offered his services. His fate could not but be affected by this change, particularly as the plan of campaign upon which he had been labouring had been under discussion between him and Robespierre without the knowledge of the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety. The Jacobins, regardless of their own safety upon the fall of their powerful leader, sought to protect themselves in the denunciation of others. And thus it came to pass that Salicetti accused his fellow countryman Bonaparte to the Convention of being

"plan-maker" to the Dictator. Napoleon was deprived of his commission as general, and on the 12th of August, 1794, imprisoned in Fort Carré.* What a tempest of distracting reflections must have assailed him here! In the midst of his ambitious hopes he found himself paralyzed and suddenly cast out of the way whereby so many had already arrived with rapidity at power and influence. The reform in the organization of the army, begun in 1793 under Dubois de Crancé, a member of the Convention, with its principle of universal military obligation and its revised list of officers, had already begun to bear fruit. At the end of the year 1792 there had been not more than a hundred and twelve thousand men of the regular troops in France, by the summer of 1794 there were not less than seven hundred and thirty thousand, animated by a fatalistic patriotism, controlled by rigorous discipline, and commanded by generals whose abilities, developed by equal competition in the open field, were brought to recognition with unexampled rapidity. At the head of the Army of the North stands Pichegru, who had at one time superintended as sergeant the little cadets at Brienne; he was now driving the enemy out of France and conquering the Austrian Netherlands. Jourdan, one of the volunteer officers of 1792, is in command of the Army of the Sambre-et-Meuse, fighting victoriously against the Austrians in the battle of Fleurus, June 26th, 1794, while the decisive attack is led by General Marceau, a man of Napoleon's own age. Another, Hoche, his senior by a year, at the beginning of the Revolution a mere subaltern, had, as general-in-chief, vanquished the Austrians at Weissenburg and driven them out of Alsace in December of the preceding year, thereby covering

* He may have anticipated this outcome, for he wrote a letter a few days previous to his arrest to Tilly, the French Chargé d'Affaires at Genoa, who would, as he knew, make report in Paris concerning it. In this he speaks of his relations with the younger Robespierre and adds: "I was somewhat affected by the catastrophe of Robespierre the younger, to whom I was attached and whom I believed to be pure; but, had he been my father, I would have stabbed him myself if he had aspired to tyranny." Napoleon III. considered it advisable to omit this letter from the official edition of the correspondence of his uncle.

himself with fame and honour. Following these was a long succession of others: Saint-Cyr, in 1792 still a captain of volunteers, was now general of division; Bernadotte, sergeant-major at the opening of the Revolution, commanded in 1794 likewise a division; Kléber, a volunteer in the year 1792, had, a year later, reached the same rank; and so on. And he, the most ambitious of them all, fully conscious of his abilities and qualifications, saw himself shut out of this circle, perhaps forever, and, moreover, threatened by an accusation which had already cost many their lives in that terrible year.

But he was not the man to give himself up to despair. One thing already in his favour was that he had not been sent to Paris. In a letter addressed to the Commissioners of the Convention, he attempted above all to manifest his unqualified patriotism. "Have I not," it reads, "been attached to its principles ever since the beginning of the Revolution? Have I not been seen in the struggle here with the domestic enemy, or there as a soldier against the foreign foe? I have sacrificed my residence in my own department, I have abandoned my property, I have lost all for the Republic. . . . Ought I then to be confounded with the enemies of my country; and are patriots heedlessly to lose a general who has not been unserviceable to the Republic? Should Representatives put the government under necessity of being unjust and impolitic? Hear me, make way with the oppression which surrounds me, and restore to me the esteem of the patriots. An hour later, if the evil-minded desire my life, I will yield it to them gladly; I care so little for it, and I have so often wearied of it. Yes, only the idea that it may still be of service to my country helps me to bear the burden of it with courage."

Necessity had taught him to use the word "*Patrie*" in speaking of France; his own country had become to him merely a "*Département*."

The letter produced the desired effect. Furthermore, Salicetti had come to the conclusion that he was himself no longer in danger and again took up the defence of his fellow countryman, whose papers he examined personally and declared to be free

from anything of a suspicious character. On the 20th of August Napoleon was released from custody. A few weeks later, on the 14th of September, he was rehabilitated with his rank of general, and in the same month was permitted to take part in the offensive movement of the Army of Italy by means of which the Austrians were driven back from the crest of the mountains of the Riviera as far as Dego and Acqui. Upon the return of the French to the coast Bonaparte was assigned the post of commander of artillery in the expedition fitting out for the reconquest of Corsica.

There the last remaining French strongholds had fallen into the hands of the English: San Firenze on the 17th of February, Bastia on the 24th of May, and finally Calvi, on the 1st of August. In the interior of the island the British had established themselves somewhat earlier. Paoli was invited by King George III. to come to England. Influenced by the English, a popular meeting was held at Corte on the 18th of June, 1794, in which the Corsicans declared their island a constitutional monarchy under the protection of England and under Sir Gilbert Elliot as viceroy. Upon hearing of these events the new Committee of Public Safety at Paris undertook once more to wrest the department from the enemy. But while the division of troops intended for this service stood ready by the end of autumn, the wretched condition of the navy delayed the expedition into the following February. Napoleon in one of his letters represented the prospective conquest as a mere military "promenade," but the result was far from justifying this assumption. When in March, 1795, the French fleet at last set sail to clear the Corsican waters of English craft, an encounter which took place between Cape Corso and Livorno ended disastrously to the French. Two of their ships fell into the hands of their adversary and the remainder were obliged to retreat into the Gulf of Saint-Juan. After this rebuff the expedition was abandoned; the troops already on board the transports were disembarked and detailed to the Army of Italy; Corsica was, for the present, lost.

Again Napoleon was without a command. Unexpectedly

came the order to betake himself to the Army of the West. On the 2d of May, 1795, he left Marseilles; on the 10th he reached Paris. He had no intention of leaving that city for some time.

After the events of the 27th of July, 1794 (Thermidor 9th), the more calm and cautious elements of the population of Paris had waked, as from a state of torpor, into life. As if with the death of one man all terror had ended, they now fearlessly expressed their opinions and set forth their demands. In newspapers and pamphlets, no longer under any restraint of censorship, and in all public resorts of the capital the abhorrence in which the Jacobins were held came to unreserved expression. For the first time the number of their victims began to be appreciated. There were but few families who had not suffered under the iron yoke; many among them had lost one or more members, many had lost their property during the Terror. The opening of the prisons brought day by day new horrors to light and increased the indignation of those who had suffered injury. In the Convention itself, where the factions of the "Mountain" had formed an alliance to depose the Dictator Robespierre, one of these, composed of the former adherents of Danton, withdrew from the Jacobins. They styled themselves Thermidorians, as they claimed the merit of having brought about the decisive step of that day. Their leaders, Merlin and Tallien, Fréron and Barras, sought to come into touch with the moderate element of the Centre against the extreme Left. The banished Girondists were recalled to the Convention, and the readiest tools of the fallen government, after making a futile attempt at resistance, expiated their offences on the scaffold.

Just at this time Napoleon arrived in Paris. Hardly a favourable moment in which to make an appearance for a man recently under accusation of being a sharer in the designs of the abhorred tyrant. Very likely he had not pictured to himself so complete a change in the situation of affairs. For his outward circumstances this was exceedingly unfavourable. The mere order to betake himself to the Army of the West and serve under Hoche, who was barely his elder, as simple brigadier-

general, was intolerable to his boundless ambition. And this in a war against peasants and irregular troops where little opportunity would offer for his art to display itself! He was determined not to obey the order, and sought above all to gain time and await the outcome of a new move on the part of the Jacobins, for he still belonged to that party. But this new insurrection against the Convention, that of the 1st Prairial (20th of May, 1795), ended in the defeat of the rebellious Jacobins and increased the difficulty of Bonaparte's situation. He was transferred, as being a supernumerary in the artillery, to the infantry, and received peremptory orders to depart for the west. If he now hoped to maintain himself under the new condition of things, he must cut loose from the radicals and try to come into touch with the Thermidorians. He undertook this feat and was successful in accomplishing it. At no time did Fortune completely forsake him. It was certainly a happy coincidence for him that two of the leaders of the party now in power, Fréron and Barras, had, as Commissioners of the Convention, been present at the council of war held before Toulon, when the proposals of the young captain of artillery had been accepted. To them, at least, the conduct of Bonaparte, in serving a government they were themselves at that time endeavouring to uphold, could not appear blameworthy. They accordingly received him well and lent him their support.

Those plans which Napoleon now submitted to them were essentially his projects of an offensive war which he had communicated a year before to Robespierre, but with certain alterations imposed by the general political situation. Prussia had retired from the list of the enemies of France and had concluded a separate treaty of peace, April 5th, 1795. Negotiations had already been entered into with Spain which were soon also to lead to peace. There remained on the Continent but one of the great powers as adversary, but Austria was making preparations to prosecute the war with all possible vigour. These changes in the situation of affairs necessitated the modification of the young general's plan of campaign. The year before it had been his proposal to have the Army of Italy take

the offensive, co-operating with the troops in Germany, according to which plan the weight of action would fall upon the last-named country. "It is Germany," said he in the memorial addressed to Robespierre, "which should be overpowered; that accomplished, Spain and Italy will fall of themselves. . . . The defensive system should be adopted on the Spanish frontier, and the offensive system on that of Piedmont. Our blows should be directed against Germany, never against Spain or Italy. If we have great success, we should not allow ourselves to be thrown off the scent by penetrating into Italy while Germany still presents a formidable and unweakened front." *

Now that, through the withdrawal of Prussia, the power of resistance on the German side had become weaker, he proposes striking the decisive blow against the Austrians in Italy. For this purpose the force of the Italian Army should be substantially increased, an achievement easily possible by drawing for that purpose upon the troops set free by the peace with Spain. The Riviera having been seized and secured as far as Vado, the army thus reinforced would press forward along the coast and across the mountains toward Piedmont, cutting off the King of Sardinia, known to be already desirous of peace, from Austria and winning him over to the cause of France. Once in the plains the army could support itself by levying requisitions. If the expedition were started at the most favourable time, in February, Mantua could be conquered before the end of spring, and by the termination of this first campaign the army could have reached Trent. In a second campaign, united with the Army of the Rhine, it would penetrate into the heart of Austria and dictate terms of peace.

Such was the daring plan which a year later he was to carry into execution with amazing ability, laying thereby the foundation of his fame and power. This plan was not entirely original. For a great part of it he was indebted to the profound study which he had made of military history, particularly of the campaign in Italy conducted by Count de Maillebois in 1745. This campaign had been the object of his conscientious study while

* Jung, "Bonaparte," II. 436.

captain of artillery at Nice, as we are assured by a credible witness.*

This plan was based upon his knowledge of a territory which he had studied minutely during the last few years, and of an adversary who was no stranger to him. And now he was called upon to remove himself from both in order to play a secondary part in Vendée, while perhaps another would be carrying out these plans of his in Italy! He could not submit to such a fate. Hardly had the conservative Aubry, who had been the occasion of his transference to the infantry, retired from the Committee of Public Safety, when he made bold, relying upon the protection of his friends, to make an energetic protest against such an arrangement. He says in this document: "General Bona-parte relies upon the justice of the members of the Committee of Public Safety to reinstate him into his former position, and to spare him the pain, after having commanded the artillery under the most unfavourable conditions during the war and having contributed to its most brilliant successes, of seeing his place occupied by men who have always kept in the rear, who are absolute strangers to our successes, unknown in our armies, and who have the impudence to present themselves to-day to grasp from you the fruit of victory which they have not been willing to incur risk in obtaining." He was so much the more confident of a favourable reply to this complaint as Aubry's successor, Doucet de Pontécoulant, had accepted his plan of operations and had sent it to the generals commanding the Italian Army for consideration. He was temporarily assigned to serve on the committee having the duty of directing the armies and plans of campaign, and was full of happy confidence. The same hope that had been frustrated by the sudden downfall of Robespierre animated him once more. He writes at

* See the excellent article "Sur la Campagne de Napoléon en l'Année 1796," in the third supplement of the "Militär-Wochenblatt," 1889, where it is shown that the young general-in-chief followed the "Histoire des Campagnes du Maréchal de Maillebois en 1745 et 1746," by Pezay (Paris, 1775), with regard to the ruling idea which was to separate the Piedmontese from the Austrians, impose peace upon the former, and drive back the latter as far as the Adige.

this time: "My offensive plans have been adopted; we shall soon have serious action in Lombardy." Under date of September 8th, 1795, he writes to Joseph: "I see nothing but pleasant prospects before me, and, should it be otherwise, one must nevertheless live in the present. A man of courage may disregard the future."

And "otherwise" it resulted, and his courage was soon put to a new and severe test. It was his fate henceforward to cut his way through ceaseless vicissitudes of good and evil fortune. The end of Doulcet de Pontécoulant's term of service on the Committee of Public Safety arrived, in accordance with the law of rotation in office, before the protest of the young general had been acted upon. In him the suppliant lost his strongest supporter. Nor was he without personal enemies, and when the time for decision of his case arrived, his petition was rejected by the officials of the War Department, and his name was again stricken from the list of French generals on duty, on account of his refusal to proceed to the post assigned him. (Decree of September 15th, 1795.)

And now once more his brightest hopes had been dashed. Without a position at a period whose uncertainties had already been the ruin of thousands; without money, for, as Marmont relates, "the small fund of bank-bills which he had brought back from the army" had been lost in unfortunate speculations; without credit in a financial crisis in which by the end of July, 1795, paper money had depreciated to one fortieth of its face value, he was impotent to help his family again in need through the changed political situation. He had been mistaken: one cannot always "live in the present."

And what made his situation appear the more gloomy was the fact that a new and great danger was already imminent. The royalists and the liberals of '89 and '91 menaced the hated Convention in which his friends sat. If they should be successful, he and his friends were lost together.

The last revolts of the Jacobins had inclined the factions of the centre of the Convention, the Thermidorians and independents,—to use a modern expression,—farther toward the right.

The new Constitution, drafted during the summer of 1795, was moderate in character and was to render a return to the circumstances of the last few years forever impossible. First of all, the executive and legislative powers were no longer to be united in the hands of the national representatives. The legislative power was to be entrusted to two bodies instead of one: a "Council of Five Hundred," and a "Council of Ancients" (Anciens) numbering two hundred and fifty members; while the executive authority was to be vested in a "Directory" of five men who must be at least forty years of age. One third of the members of each of these legislative councils was to retire annually, their places to be filled by election. It did not come within the domain of the executive body to propose bills, nor could it refuse to execute laws passed by the legislature; one of the Directors must retire yearly, and the outgoing member was not eligible for re-election until five years had elapsed. The Directors, to whom the ministers of departments were subordinated, were chosen by the Ancients from a list drawn up by the Five Hundred. They were to have the charge of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, Justice, and Affairs of the Interior. The Constitution accorded liberty of the press, of worship, of commerce, and of trade; it extended its protection to home and property, but clubs were forbidden and political societies were tolerated only on condition that no public meetings should be held and that there should be no affiliation between them; no petitions of the masses, no banding together of the people was allowed; the Émigrés were forbidden to return home, and the Jacobins were prohibited from reappearing at their club.

These were the distinctive features of the Constitution of the year III (1795). It was as little in keeping with the desires of the Jacobins as with those of the Royalists. The moderation of the parties in power tended rather to convince the latter that the hour for them to strike had come. Already there was talk of restoring the monarchy and of proclaiming the son of the decapitated king as constitutional sovereign under the name of Louis XVII., when the child died, worn out by the inhuman treatment to which he had been subjected during the preceding

years. At once the partisans of the Bourbons turned to Louis XVIII., the emigrant brother of the former king, who from Verona was flooding France with his unskilful agents.

The agitation was accompanied by outrages on the part of the royalists in the provinces almost equal to the horrors of the Reign of Terror. In Vendée the civil war, but just quenched by Hoche, blazed up anew. In Paris itself the common people, who were royalists, or at least of the moderate party, armed themselves against the Convention. These events made a deep impression upon that body; its republican elements, who recognized that with the loss of control their very existence was threatened, united and decreed that two thirds of the new legislative body of Five Hundred must be composed of members of the Convention, the remainder to be elected without restriction. This transition decree as well as the Constitution was to be submitted to the people of France for approval by vote. While they thus secured for themselves a majority in the new constitutional legislature these members of the Convention believed also that they were assuring in the best way the new dispensation and preventing the return of the old monarchical government. To protect themselves further against probable attack from the Paris populace, the Thermidorians united once more with the Jacobin deputies, gathered to the capital a few thousand soldiers of the line and formed a "battalion of patriots" from those brigand elements upon whose pikes the throne of Terrorism had been erected.

This last precaution increased beyond measure the wrath of the Parisians who were opposed to the Convention. The Constitution they were ready to accept, it is true, but they rejected the additional decree, and when, in spite of their remonstrance, the Convention promulgated, as law, the new Constitution including the transition provisions, the citizens from forty-four out of the forty-eight sections revolted, assembled some thirty thousand men of the National Guard, and on October 4th successfully resisted General Menou in command of the troops of the Convention, who in consequence of this defeat was charged with treason and removed. The

situation of the legislature was distinctly critical. Barely six to eight thousand men were available with which to confront the militia of the National Guard, and absolutely no artillery. The Convention declared itself a permanent body and appointed from the Commissioners of Government a committee of five who were empowered to maintain order. Barras was one of these, and as he had formerly been an officer in the navy he assumed charge of the military part of the task. He was indeed courageous, but he was without the requisite breadth of view for the emergency and shrank from extraordinary efforts for which he did not feel himself equal. On the same day that he was appointed he called to his assistance his friend Bonaparte and discussed with him the problem of protecting the legislature against an attack which had been planned for the ensuing day. Barras having been made commander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior as the result of a stormy night-session of 4th-5th October, he induced the Committee to appoint Napoleon second in command and invest him with full power necessary to the defence of the Convention.

In later life Napoleon gave Madame de Rémusat the following account of this decisive moment of his career: * "One evening I was at the theatre, it was the 12th Vendémiaire (October 4th 1795). I overheard some one say that there was to be a 'row' ('du train') on the following day; you know that was the customary expression of the Parisians who had come to view with indifference changes in the government, since they did not interfere with their business, their pleasures, or even their dinner. After the Reign of Terror they were satisfied with anything which did not disturb their way of living. They were saying around me that the sittings of the Assembly were permanent; I hurried thither, I found nothing but confusion, hesitation. From the depths of the hall a voice was suddenly raised which said: 'If any one knows the address of General Bonaparte, he is requested to go and say to him that his presence is desired by the Committee of the Assembly.' I have always liked to take note of the element of chance in certain events; this determined

* Mme. de Rémusat, "*Mémoires*," I. 269.

me; I went to the Committee; I found there several deputies who were quite distracted; among others Cambacérès.* They expected to be attacked on the morrow and did not know what course to pursue. My advice was asked; I replied by demanding cannon. This suggestion appalled them; the whole night passed without coming to any conclusion. The next morning brought bad news. Thereupon the whole affair was turned over to me, after which they began to deliberate whether after all they had the right to repel force by force. 'Do you expect,' I said, 'that the people are going to give you permission to fire upon them? I am now involved, since you have nominated me; it is no more than just that you should let me act according to my own discretion.'"

Unfortunately we are compelled to accept with great mistrust all accounts given by Napoleon of events in his own life. He seldom restricted himself to the exact truth, least of all where his purpose was to disguise his obvious ambition in the garb of unconstrained and disinterested conduct. Who is going to believe that the intimate of Barras and Tallien first learned of the permanent sittings of the Assembly on the decisive night while innocently attending the theatre? No one. Even though we had no knowledge of a certain note from Barras, dated on the 3d of October, summoning Napoleon to meet him, to the suspension of all other business, on the morning of the 4th of October. It is nothing unusual to encounter in the life of this ambitious man an attempt to make his decisive measures appear to be the work of the last moment and a sudden inspiration of his genius. In the present instance also he would have one believe that the really masterly arrangements for the defence of the Convention were devised only on the morning of the 5th and immediately carried into execution. But it would be safe to conclude that everything had been carefully weighed and considered on the previous day and the essentials determined upon when the deputies gave Napoleon permission to "act according to his own discretion."

* One of the leaders of the moderates who appreciated Napoleon's genius. Cambacérès had recommended him to Doulcet.

It was but natural that he should insist upon the use of energetic measures. His fate was linked to that of the Convention. As a good artilleryman he knew the power of his weapon. The National Guard had no cannon. Everything depended upon getting the ordnance from an artillery park outside the city to the Tuileries. A spirited cavalry officer, Murat, the future brother-in-law of Napoleon, was despatched, doubtless at the suggestion of the latter, to assure their safe-conduct before daybreak. He was successful, and when, on the afternoon of the 5th of October (13th Vendémiaire), the National Guard advanced upon the Tuileries where the Convention was in session, they found it already flanked by guns behind which the general in command had posted infantry and cavalry. Seeing the numerical superiority of the sections, the deputies wavered and were disposed to parley with the insurgents. But a shot was fired which gave the signal for battle. It will never be known whether this shot came from the side of the assailants or the defenders, or whether, perchance, in obedience to a secret order from Napoleon. The police reports on the occurrences of this day are missing from among the archives of Paris. At once the strong position held by the insurgents at the church of Saint-Roch was carried, and the street of Saint-Honoré effectively raked by cannon, the bank of the Seine was swept clean by volleys of grapeshot, and the Guards were driven back during the night of the 5th of October to the most remote quarters of the city, where they were easily overmastered on the following day by separate detachments of troops of the line.

Napoleon had saved the Convention and the Convention showed its gratitude. In the session of October 10th, upon the motion of Barras and Fréron, his appointment as second in command of the Army of the Interior was confirmed. But this did not satisfy Napoleon. He understood striking while the iron was hot. He first of all urged his reassignment to service in the artillery, then—in a petition of the 16th of October—he requested for himself the commission of general-of-division, and on the 26th of the same month he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior in the place of

Barras, who now at the close of the session assumed the duties of Director in the new government.

But a few weeks before without a position and with forbidding prospects, a supplicant for a mission to Constantinople, he had suddenly attained to one of the highest military positions in France. It was not without cause that he wrote to Joseph on the day after the 13th Vendémiaire: "Fortune is on my side." It is said that destiny can make fatalists of men; it produced in Napoleon, with its sudden changes of favour, a man who from that time forth journeyed through life with full confidence in his star. "Au destin" became his motto, and this was engraved in the wedding-ring of her whom he chose to become his partner in life. But this reliance on fate was not blind. Whenever fortune appeared to hesitate, he had learned to put forward the whole of his own reckless power, his abundant talent, and—that heritage of his nation—subtlety and cunning. Fortune did not make a slave of him, he understood controlling it and making it serve his ends. Certainly the paths by which he climbed unremittingly to power, if regarded merely from the standpoint of a moralist, were not always of the straightest, the means employed to accomplish his purposes sometimes equivocal and objectionable, and if history had but to pass judgment upon the way in which such assertive individuals come to dominate over others, words could not be found harsh enough to characterize the conduct of this man. But there yet remains the far more important question: how was the acquired power utilized and turned to account? Only in the answer to this question can be found the means of deciding upon the historical significance of Napoleon Bonaparte.

CHAPTER IV

JOSEPHINE

THE downfall of Robespierre and his associates had brought about not merely a political revolution, but also a profound social change. It did more than simply to replace one of the political factions in power by another. The population itself, heretofore paralyzed by terror, now came forward to demand and recover the freedom of action of which it had so long been deprived. Every one rejoiced to feel that his life was safe once more and the general joy was unbounded. The theatres were crowded, and poets, enthusiastic in the cause of peace and order, lashed the overthrown rule of arbitrary cruelty, eliciting unprecedented applause from the audience. From the houses and apartments, in which they had been living in retirement, the timid thronged into the streets, rejoicing in their deliverance from self-imposed captivity; and in the open squares where the guillotine had but recently done its cruel work, thousands of happy couples joined in the whirling dance. In the salons of the people of rank assembled a heterogeneous company of upstarts of both sexes who tried to assume the manner and appearance of the aristocracy of the "ancien régime." Everywhere reigned joy and pleasure, with gallantry and levity, corruption and undisguised indulgence. The iron bondage of the Reign of Terror had deprived womankind of her ruling influence over the other sex. Now upon its overthrow they again exercised the power of their charms. As if to make amends for the lost years of sway, they now attempted to captivate the men by the practice of all the arts of seductive beauty, their dress was designed to reveal much of the person, and conversation became more than ever frivolous and animated. Those who like Madame de Staël had wit, brought that also into play. The other leading ladies

of the new society, Madame Tallien, the beautiful Madame Récamier, Mesdames de Beauharnais, Hamelin, and others were the centre of the society which gathered about the victors of Thermidor. Barras, the hero of the day, was the idol of this female throng, but not the only object of their devotion.

No man however uncouth and unsociable could resist the charm of this newly-awakened life of heedless enjoyment. One of those attracted and dazzled by this gay existence was the young General Bonaparte, the author of the "*Dialogue sur l'Amour*," who held the omnipotence of love in contempt. We know that his interests led him also to seek the society of Barras and Tallien; but he failed to acquire in their salons such polish as to make him a particularly attractive member of society. Carelessly dressed and indifferent as to his personal appearance, with nothing engaging in his looks or manners, he attracted attention only by his singular appearance. The wife of his friend Bourrienne says of him that he was ill-dressed and negligent in his toilet, his character cold and often gloomy, his smile forced and often badly out of place. To be sure he could relate anecdotes of his campaigns in a way which was sprightly and charming, though sometimes tinged with cynicism. He gave way at times to outbursts of wild hilarity which gave offence and repelled those who were about him. At the theatre, while the rest of the audience was convulsed with laughter, he would remain entirely unresponsive and change no line of his face, or he would sit brooding with a gloomy and sullen expression as if totally unaffected by what was taking place before him. And yet we know from his own account that the unrestrained conviviality of this new life with its surroundings of splendour and beauty made a profound impression upon him. His letters bear witness to this. "Luxury, pleasure, and the arts are reviving here in an astonishing way," he writes from Paris to his brother Joseph in July, 1795: "Carriages and people of fashion reappear, or rather they remember only as a long dream that they had ever ceased to shine. All that can help to pass the time and make life agreeable is here crowded together. One is torn away from incongruous reflections, and indeed how is it possible to regard anything in a dismal

way in the midst of such ready wit and such a whirlwind of activity? The women are everywhere: at the theatre, on the promenades, at the libraries. In the study of the scholar you find charming young ladies. Here alone among all the places of the earth do they deserve to control the rudder; and the men are all crazy about them, think of nothing but them, and live only for them. A woman needs just six months of Paris to know what is due to her and what the extent of her dominion." A few days later he adds: "This great people gives itself up to pleasure; dances, plays, and women, who are here the most beautiful in the world, are the questions of chief importance." On the 9th of August he writes: "Life is pleasant here and much inclined to gaiety; it seems as if every one were seeking to indemnify himself for his sufferings in the past, and the uncertainty of the future prompts them to be unsparing for the pleasures of the present. Good-bye, my dear fellow; do not be anxious about the future, be happy in the present and gay, and learn to enjoy yourself."

What a transformation in this solitary nature! He who had hitherto preferred seclusion, for whom society had no charms, was now its captive. Not only that, but woman, who had become all-powerful, cast her spell upon him. He was seriously considering taking unto himself a wife and beginning family life. He was then at work in the Central Committee, full of hope and with bright prospects before him. A year previous Joseph had married Julie Clary, the daughter of the rich silk-merchant of Versailles; Napoleon had her sister Désirée in mind. He wrote to Joseph requesting him to make advances for him to this lady, "for," as he says in his letter, "I've taken the notion to have a home of my own." His removal from the army on September 15th put an end to this plan for the time being, and the outcome of the 13th Vendémiaire turned the thoughts of the suitor in another direction.*

Now that he had made such a position for himself why

* Three years later Désirée married General Bernadotte, and, after a further lapse of twenty years, ascended the throne of Sweden as the wife of Charles XIV.

should he not choose from among those brilliant women who were leaders of fashion at the capital and who had influence and prestige? There was, for instance, Madame Permon, a widow. She was of very ancient lineage, known in Corsica, and had been moreover a friend of his father's. This lady was by many years his senior, but wealthy and highly esteemed. It is said that Napoleon made proposals to her, but was rejected. Shortly afterwards another woman inspired him with genuine passion—a passion as real and true as his soul was susceptible of. The object of this affection was the Marquise Josephine, widow of General de Beauharnais.

Josephine, the eldest of the three daughters of Joseph Gaspard Tascher de la Pagerie, was born June 23d, 1763, on the Island of Martinique, where her father, formerly a captain of the Royal Dragoons, managed his estates. The family was originally of Châteauneuf in Thimerais (central France). Educated in Paris at Port-Royal, Josephine was married in 1779 to the young Viscount Alexandre de Beauharnais, son of the former governor of Martinique, who had long been an acquaintance and friend of the Tascher family. The first fruit of this marriage was a son, Eugène (born September 3d, 1781). But the union was not a happy one. Beauharnais left for the Antilles the following year to fight against the English, and there fell in love with a Creole and tried to get a divorce. Meanwhile his wife gave birth to a daughter who is known in history as "Queen Hortense." When the Revolution broke out, Beauharnais, who had returned to France, was elected deputy of the First Estate, and was one of the few of that order who gave energetic support to the new Constitution. In the memorable night of August 4th, 1789, he was particularly zealous in taking part against the old régime. Furthermore, he did not emigrate but remained as an officer, and when the monarchy was replaced by a republic he became a general and was given an independent command in the Army of the Rhine.

Not until the Prussians had retaken Mayence in 1793 did he resign his commission. During the Reign of Terror he was, as an aristocrat, accused of treason toward his country, and,

though innocent like many others, was executed four days before the fall of Robespierre.

Josephine, who had rejoined her husband while he was playing a part in the National Assembly, was also imprisoned, and her release was due to the intervention of her fellow prisoner Madame de Fontenay-Cabarrus and of this lady's lover, Tallien.

But Josephine had lived too many years out of sympathy with her husband to mourn him now for long. She was too fickle, weak, and fond of pleasure to turn her back on the gay life which the salons of the "nouvelles couches" of 1795 offered her. She showed her preference by attaching herself the more closely to Madame Cabarrus, and soon became one of the best-known members of Parisian society and the intimate friend of Barras. Her relations with him have been disclosed in recent times by the publication of his "Mémoires," but she did not at that time have the reputation of a prude.* To the captivating charm of her person all witnesses testify. Even Lucien, who was not particularly well-disposed toward her, had to admit this. In his "Mémoires" he gives us the following picture: "Hardly to be noticed in the midst of this circle of pretty women, generally reputed to be of easy morals, is the widow of the Marquis de Beauharnais. With little, very little wit, she had no trace of what could be called beauty, but there were certain Creole characteristics in the pliant undulations of her figure which was rather below the average height. Her face was without natural freshness, it is true, but the artifices of the toilet remedied this defect so as to make it appear fairly well by the light of the chandeliers. In short, her person was not entirely bereft of some of the attractions of her youth."

Arnault, in his "Souvenirs d'un Sexagénaire," does her

* "At that time her reputation was badly compromised." (Madame de Rémusat, "Mémoires," I. 138.)

"My father was chamberlain to the Empress Josephine. He had been her lover prior to her marriage to Napoleon, and resumed his relations with her after her divorce." (Viel-Castel, "Mémoires," II. 16.)

Barras' "Mémoires" were published 1895-96, but critical readers will make some reservations as to Barras' veracity in recounting his gallantries and in characterizing those to whom he bore ill will.—B.

better justice. He says: "The evenness of her disposition, her good-nature, the amiability that shone in her eye and which expressed itself not only in her words but in the tones of her voice, a certain indolence peculiar to Creoles which was recognizable in her carriage and movements even when she was making an effort to please, all these lent to her a charm which transcended the dazzling beauty of her two rivals Mesdames Récamier and Tallien."

Madame de Rémusat, who had known Josephine since 1793, gives perhaps the most accurate description of her friend in these words: "Without being precisely beautiful, her whole person was possessed of a peculiar charm." Her features were delicate and harmonious, her expression gentle, her tiny mouth dexterously concealed defective teeth; her somewhat dark complexion was improved by her clever use of cosmetics. Her figure was perfect, every outline well rounded and graceful; every motion was easy and elegant. Her taste in dress was excellent, and whatever she wore seemed to have its beauty enhanced. With these advantages and her constant care for her appearance, she succeeded in being never outshone by the beauty and youth of so many women around her. She was not a person of especial wit; a Creole and coquette, her education had been rather neglected; but she knew wherein she was wanting, and never betrayed her ignorance. Naturally tactful, she found it easy to say agreeable things. . . . Unfortunately she was lacking in earnestness of feeling and true elevation of mind."

At that time she felt no warm affection for the young general. And indeed Napoleon was by no means a handsome man. Short of stature, hardly five feet in height, with an abnormally developed chest and disproportionately short legs, he was far from irresistible. Moreover, he was thin at the time, and the angular lines in his face sharply prominent; his sallow skin made him look like a sick man; the glance of his gray eyes was full of determination and resolve, frank and straightforward, but often with something wild about it. The nervousness of his disposition, which had been marked even in childhood, had

developed in later years under the stress of violent emotions caused by the continual changes in his fortunes and the repeated disappointments to his inordinate ambition, until it had become morbid. A contemporary informs us that at this time Napoleon slept but three hours a day and was in reality ill. Later a facial neuralgia asserted itself together with several idiosyncrasies, such as shrugging of the right shoulder and an involuntary moving of the lips. We may safely attribute to this extreme nervousness much of his downright selfishness and rudeness and the irritability which suffered no contradiction, as well as his distrust of every one and his occasional strange and excited behaviour. On the other hand his confidence in himself impressed everybody and involuntarily one became interested in him. To Josephine he became an object of interest if nothing more.

Very different was the impression which she produced upon him. "I was not insensible to the charms of women," he said later at St. Helena, "but up to that time I had not been petted and spoiled by them and my disposition made me timid in their company. Madame de Beauharnais was the first to reassure me. She said some flattering things to me about my military talents one day when I chanced to be seated next to her. That praise intoxicated me; I addressed myself continually to her; I followed her everywhere; I was passionately in love with her, and my infatuation was generally known among our acquaintances long before I ventured to declare myself to her. When this rumour became general, Barras spoke to me about it. I had no reason for denying it. 'If that is the case,' he said to me, 'you ought to marry Madame de Beauharnais. You have rank and talents to be turned to good account, but you stand alone, without fortune and without connections; you must marry; that will give you position.'"

To what manner of man did Barras say this? Napoleon was capable of suppressing any passion if it were found to interfere with his ambition. He gave way to this one because it was evident to him that his union with this lady of rank, the influential friend of the Directory, would strengthen his social

position and secure advantages for the future. He felt himself to be exalted by this marriage which enabled him to ascend from his rank of plebeian to a higher social station wherein his past could sink into oblivion. Even while still a Jacobin he could not conceal a certain predilection for the aristocratic mode of life; the coarse instincts of the masses were repugnant to him, and the courtesy and politeness of people of culture were all the more agreeable to one who was himself completely lacking in social talent. There was still another reason in favour of this union. Barras valued Napoleon's genius at its true worth, and his somewhat indolent nature led him to try to put under obligations to himself a man whose ambition and ability might some day raise his benefactor again to power. It is said that he made an attempt to have Napoleon appointed Minister of War, but that his colleagues refused their consent. Now Barras undertakes to obtain Josephine's hand for him. In a letter to a friend she admits that she does not really love Napoleon, but that she does not feel any aversion toward him; her feeling is rather that of indifference, which is as little favourable to love as it is to religion. "I admire the General's courage," continues she, "the extent of his knowledge upon all sorts of topics, upon all of which he talks equally well, the vivacity of his mind, which enables him to grasp the thoughts of others almost before they have been expressed, but I am frightened, I admit, at the control he tries to exercise over everything about him. His searching glance has something unusual and inexplicable in it, but which compels the respect even of our Directors: judge for yourself whether a woman has not good cause to feel intimidated by it! Finally, that which ought to please me, the force of his passion, which he expresses with an energy which leaves no room for doubt of his sincerity, is precisely that which makes me withhold the consent which I have often been ready to give. Can I, a woman whose youth is past, hope to hold for any length of time this violent affection which in the General resembles a fit of delirium? If, after our marriage, he should cease to love me, will he not reproach me with what he has done for me? Will he not regret having failed to make a more ad-

vantageous marriage? And what answer can I make then? What will there be for me to do? Tears will be my only resource." And yet the fatalistic confidence with which Napoleon spoke to her of his plans and his future allured her, and when the rumour became general that the Directory would make him Commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy she yielded to his suit. As a matter of fact her friends wondered that she could marry a man so little known.*

On the 9th of March, 1796, the civil marriage ceremony was performed. Barras and Tallien acted as witnesses. But Truth veiled her face when the couple presented their forged certificates of baptism to the magistrate of the deuxième arrondissement. Napoleon pretended to have been born February 5th, 1768, and Josephine, who was in reality six years his senior, gave as the date of her birth June 23d, 1767—a sacrifice of facts to the cause of female vanity to which the bridegroom gladly consented. People were then not very scrupulous in such matters, and Napoleon was the last man to hesitate at straining the truth. Joseph and Lucien likewise made false representations at their marriages. By an absurd coincidence each of the three brothers declared as his birthday a different day of the *same year*, 1768. Indeed the moral standard of the whole family was low.

Two days before the marriage, upon the motion of Carnot, the Directory had signed the décret (dated March 2d) appoint-

* A genuine love-letter from the man who a few years before had spoken so harshly of love will not be without interest. "I awake full of thoughts of thee. Your portrait and the intoxicating evening of yesterday give my senses no rest. Sweet and incomparable Josephine, what a strange effect you have on my heart; are you angry, do I see you sad, are you anxious, . . . my soul is bowed down with anguish and there is no rest for your lover; but is there then more for me, when, yielding to the immeasurable feeling which overpowers me, I draw from your lips, from your heart, a flame which consumes me? Ah! it was but this very night that I realized fully that your portrait was not you. Thou leavest at noon, in three hours I shall see thee. Meanwhile, 'mio dolce amor,' a thousand kisses, but do not give me any, for they set my blood on fire." (Mme. de Rémusat, "*Mémoires*," I. 182.)

ing Napoleon Commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy; on the 11th he took leave of his wife and set out for his post.

To what an extent were his interests already advanced! Here was an independent command and with it the opportunity of showing the world what he could do, and of turning from Hoche to himself the universal admiration which that general had won by his unbroken series of victories. To be sure his former position as commander of the Army of the Interior had been both high and important, for he had soon acquired a considerable following of men whose hopes for the future rested in this general who had become so influential. On the other hand he had been detested by the Parisian populace ever since the 13th Vendémiaire, and he was besides pursued by the envy of those who begrudged him his rapid advancement, and who were systematic and persistent in calling attention to his errors and defects, his adventures in Corsica, and his connection with Robespierre, even to his foreign accent and his lack of breeding, all of which were made much of and used against him. Who could assure him that he would not soon be pushed aside by new elements, inasmuch as the Constitution provided for changes in the highest positions of the government? While at Paris and General of the Army of the Interior he was but the hero of a single party, and victory in the streets of the capital could secure for him nothing more than the thanks of one faction. But in conflict with foreign enemies, upon what he himself had designated the most important theatre of war, glory and honour were to be acquired in the eyes of the whole nation, the nation to which he had more closely allied himself by marrying a French gentlewoman of ancient family. This was more in accordance with the extravagant plans for the future which his exuberant fancy invented and which were too vast and undefined to depend upon the fortunes of a political coterie. Power was his party, and its possession his aim.

Even before her marriage Josephine had written these remarkable words to her friend: "Barras assures me that if I marry the General he will obtain for him the appointment of Commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy. Yesterday, in

speaking to me of this favour,—which is already the occasion of grumbling among his companions in arms, although it has not yet been bestowed,—Bonaparte said: ‘Do they suppose that I am in need of their protection in order to succeed? They will all be but too happy some day if I will grant them mine. My sword is at my side and with it I shall go far.’ What say you of such certainty of success? Is it not a proof of assurance born of excessive self-esteem? A brigadier-general protect the chiefs of the State! I know not, but sometimes this absurd self-reliance leads me to the point of believing possible everything that this singular man would put it into my head to do.”

If the letter be genuine, the woman’s instinct in Josephine recognized in the soul of this extraordinary man what the acute observation of his teachers had before discovered—“an ambition with aspirations that stop at nothing.”*

Whatever Josephine lacked in love for her husband she made amends for in her belief in him, in his genius, in his future; nor did that faith deceive her. Yet she does not seem to have had the necessary moral strength to fulfil her duty of fidelity to the man she admired. Hers was a sensual nature; not like that of Catharine II., whom not even the risk of participating in crime prevented the satisfaction of her passion; Josephine was passive, weak, vacillating, and in danger even of becoming a victim like Mary Stuart. Her faithful friend, Madame de Rémusat, who fondly dwells upon her merits, does not conceal the fact that her reputation was badly compromised before she made Napoleon’s acquaintance, and we cannot but gather from his letters that during the early years of their married life she never ceased to play the coquette with the men with whom she came in contact.

* His brother Lucien in his “Mémoires” (II. 314) also furnishes proof of the fact that Napoleon obtained command of the Army of Italy on account of his marriage with Josephine. Seven years later, in 1803, Lucien dared to brave the anger of his all-powerful brother who tried to compel him to separate himself from his wife and marry the Queen of Etruria. “What absurd presumption,” said Lucien to Cambacérès,—or at least claims to have said,—“to dare to hope that he could make me abandon my wife! A wife who was not forced upon me and who brought me neither dowry nor command of an army.”

Some weeks after his parting with his bride he wrote a letter full of yearning desire asking her to follow him into Italy. She waits two months, until the close of the Paris season, before she decides to comply. He writes to Carnot at this time: "I am in despair, my wife does not come; she must have some lover who detains her in Paris. Cursed be all women!"

During the summer and autumn in which Napoleon was winning his immortal triumphs, she whiled away the time in Milan, Bologna, and Rome. The beginning of winter finds her again in the beloved capital on the Seine. Later, in the spring of 1798, when Napoleon undertook his Egyptian expedition, she remained in France, and her conduct during that time caused much anxiety to her distant husband, who was minutely, although perhaps not always accurately, informed of all that was taking place. From Cairo he wrote in July, 1798, to Joseph in these resigned words: "I have many domestic sorrows, for the veil is at last entirely removed. You alone are left to me on earth, your love is very dear to me, nothing more is needed to make me a complete misanthrope but to lose that and to find myself betrayed by you. . . . It is a sad condition to have to harbour at the same time all kinds of feelings toward one person in one poor heart. You will understand me. See to it that on my return I have a country-seat near Paris or in Burgundy; I count upon shutting myself up there and spending the winter; I am tired of human nature. I need solitude and isolation; greatness wearies me, my feelings are dried up."

After the Coup d'État, when Napoleon had made himself the master of France,—it was at the time when her charms began to be less alluring to other men,—Josephine clung to him with a lasting affection, and she was almost beside herself with jealous rage whenever his heart was occupied, even if but temporarily, in some other quarter. This devotion on her part and the belief that his good fortune was associated with her prevented him for a long time from divorcing himself from her. In the end his selfish policy triumphed over this last vestige of sentiment.

CHAPTER V

THE CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY AND THE PEACE OF CAMPO FORMIO

THE fact has already been mentioned that in 1795 Prussia and Spain withdrew from the great coalition which had been formed two years previous against revolutionary France. Even before this act Tuscany had been led to conclude a separate treaty of peace with the great republic in order to secure its own immunity in case of the advance of the French army into upper Italy. Holland also had been conquered during the winter and compelled to become the humble ally of France under the name of "The Batavian Republic." It was even rumoured that Austria was secretly making negotiations in Paris, but such report was entirely without foundation; Emperor Francis II. had not the slightest intention of effecting a separate treaty of peace. In view of the victories of the enemy during the foregoing year, such a peace would have but entailed losses to Austria, and Thugut, the chief adviser of the Emperor, was intent upon making gains. Since the loss of Silesia, the conquest of which had raised Prussia to one of the Great Powers, the Court of Vienna was seeking compensation everywhere: in Poland, Turkey, Germany—where Bavaria was the coveted territory,—and in Italy—where the object was to acquire Venice in order to connect Lombardy with the hereditary domains of the house of Habsburg. Thugut had made advance toward the realization of his plans to the extent of receiving from Russia, on January 3d, 1795, a promise of support together with a portion of Poland, on condition that Austria should continue to oppose France. This put all thought of treaty with the Republic out of the question. On the contrary, Thugut entered, May 20th, 1795, into a treaty of alliance and mutual guaranties with Pitt.

Prime Minister of England, the aim of whose secret stipulations was to induce the Czarina to take part in active hostilities against France. On September 28th of the same year Catharine II. agreed to be a third party to this alliance.

The majority of the German States having refused Prussia's offer to mediate for peace, they, with Sardinia, Portugal, and Naples, joined also in this powerful coalition. Peace was not to be thought of in that quarter.

A pacific outcome of affairs between France and Austria might perhaps have been possible had the Republic been willing to renounce its recent conquests and restore them to the great power on the Danube. The situation of internal affairs in France during the last months of the Convention had been discouraging enough to make a conciliatory attitude appear not unadvisable. The demoralization was unprecedented. In its precipitate zeal the Revolution had made an end of the rotten feudal system, but had not yet been able to set up in its stead a more enduring form of government. As with "Liberty" for the watchword all political institutions had been destroyed, so, in the name of "Equality,"—which had degenerated into an ever-increasingly tyrannical principle,—the entire social edifice had been overthrown. Laws of marriage and inheritance were changed to accord with revolutionary ideas, with the sole result of depriving the family of its former importance and respect. The government had confiscated the estates of the Church as well as the property of the emigrants, who were for the most part victims of arbitrary proscription. Public credit had been based on what had been thus appropriated without heed to the fact that the value of real estate decreases as the protection of the laws becomes insecure, and where that protection is wanting becomes a mere fiction. In consequence France was now flooded with worthless paper money; honest tradesmen were reduced to poverty, speculators and gamblers flourished, dealing in stocks took the place of legitimate business, corruption and fraud reigned supreme.

In addition to these disheartening circumstances came the confusion in the affairs of the Church and the inadequacy of the

new educational system, which decreed compulsory education without being able to enforce its commands. The Marquis of Poterat, a man of dubious character but of unusual intelligence, describes the situation of France in a memorial addressed to the government in July, 1795, and verily his picture is in every respect accurate and faithful. "Consider the dangers of your position, they are truly alarming; with the exception of Prussia, which I mistrust, you have as declared enemies all the Great Powers of Europe; most of the young men of the land you have lost in battle or hospital; before long recruiting will have become impossible. Agriculture is neglected for want of hands, horses, and fertilization; trade, both domestic and foreign, is destroyed; labourers in the arts, manufactures, and trades have lost either life or reason. You are in need of provisions and of naval stores as well as of every variety of imports, and you are without credit either at home or abroad. Currency is inflated with an immense amount of worthless paper money. The administration of the Interior does not work because it is subdivided into too many departments and because those departments are wretched. In short, you have as yet no government at all. When shall you have one? Shall you ever do so? If so, will there yet be time for it to avail?"

There was indeed every reason for thinking of peace and giving the country opportunity to recuperate. And in fact there was in the Convention's Committee of Safety a party which was desirous of a general peace even at the price of contenting itself with the old boundaries of France. But the old boundaries represented the system of the Old Régime. The radical Revolution had wider aspirations, and for this reason its leaders would agree upon peace only on condition that France should retain her conquests of the previous year and that the "natural boundary" along the banks of the Rhine should be secured to the state. This idea was due to the doctrines of Rousseau, who derived from nature not only his theory of law and morals, but was indebted to her as well for his views of what constituted the frontiers of his country.

Inasmuch as the need of rest was deeply felt throughout the country and especially in Paris, the conservative policy naturally

received the support of the people, while the Progressives placed themselves in violent opposition to it and eventually brought the Convention into that critical position from which it was rescued by Napoleon's strategic talent on October 5th, 1795. Three days previous the majority of the Convention had acceded to the proposition of the government committee to incorporate Belgium with France, thereby giving sanction to a principle of conquest which was henceforth for twenty years to remain the policy of France.*

* Whoever reads the acts and debates of the year 1795 with reference to the question then under consideration of the natural boundaries of France and the incorporation of Belgium will find therein the already developed germs of Napoleon's subsequent insatiable policy of conquest with its contempt for traditional rights. In an edict of the Committee of Public Safety dated June 26th, 1795, addressed to Barthélemy, Chargé d'Affaires, occurs, for example, this query: "Of what use to us then would have been this terrible war and this long Revolution if everything were to return to former conditions; and do you suppose that the Republic could maintain its existence in the midst of circumstances which had undergone no change?"

Rewbell, who was afterwards to direct the foreign policy of the Directory, discussing this question with a diplomat, gives utterance to his views, saying that one must be but little enlightened in regard to the true interests of the Republic or be completely given over to Austria and England to dare to propose a return to the former limits of the country in order to obtain peace; such a peace would not only cover France with disgrace, but would infallibly lead to the destruction of the Republic; that one could not shut his eyes to the fact that the country was insufficiently provided with manufactured goods, gold, silver, and produce; that, on the return of the armies to a country without means for recompensing its defenders and without other resources than valueless paper money, discontent would soon become general; the soldiers would of necessity take part in political and religious dissensions, and the inevitable result would be civil war of the most cruel order; foreign powers would not fail to take advantage of such circumstances, and as a consequence France would suffer the same fate as Poland. . . . Those who advocate peace at any price should not omit to take into account the fact that in Belgium alone there was public property to the amount of at least three billions in specie, and that there was still more in the other countries which had been conquered and annexed, and that this was the only resource for the redemption of the assignats. (Revue historique, XVIII. 208, 308.)

Tallien never wearied of recalling the principle of 1792, that France

When, shortly afterwards, the Directory succeeded to the Convention, it accepted with other responsibilities the war against three of the Great Powers of Europe together with their dependencies; and inasmuch as the five men who now were placed at the head of the French government, Barras, Rewbell, Carnot, Letourneur, and La Révellière-Lépeaux, all belonged to the dominant party a change of policy was not to be expected. Their close alliance with the republican Thermidorians (under Tallien) and the Jacobins (under Sieyès) gave them no choice but to make war upon existing monarchies. This was a war apparently without end and, indeed, not intended to have one, as its termination would have brought about the close of the Revolution, and thereby the end of the power of its ambitious leaders. To them the revolutionary tendencies of foreign countries were the most welcome of allies, and for that reason Germany, Switzerland, and, if possible, Italy were to be roused to insurrection by a systematic propaganda and drawn within the range of French political action. It was a programme of expansion in every direction.

It must be confessed that at the outset the execution of this plan was greatly inferior to the boldness of its conception. Generals Jourdan and Pichegru, who had crossed the Rhine in order to take the offensive, were repulsed by the Austrian com-

should surround herself with a circle of republics of her own founding and which should be dependent upon the mother country. Sieyès had even elaborated a plan for the secularization of the ecclesiastical principalities of Germany which was in all respects similar to that which was carried out in 1803.

Mallet du Pan, the clear-sighted correspondent of the Cabinet at Vienna, writes as follows in a letter of August 23d, 1795: "The Monarchists and many of the deputies of the Convention would sacrifice all conquests made for the sake of hastening and securing peace, but the fanatical Girondists and the committee led by Sieyès persist in this plan of expansion. Three motives impel them to this course: 1st. The scheme of extending their doctrine with their territory; 2d. The desire of uniting Europe by degrees in a federation with the French Republic; 3d. That of prolonging a war, involving a part of the nation, which prolongs at the same time extraordinary powers and revolutionary measures." (Correspondance inédite, I. 288.) Cf. Chapter VIII below.

manders Clerfayt and Wurmser and thrown back to the other side of the river; at the south, likewise, the Italian Army was accomplishing but little. The latter had indeed been reinforced by troops drawn from Spain and put under command of Schérer, a general of advancing years who had hitherto been active in the Pyrenees. His instructions from Paris were to press forward through the passes of the Apennines into the plains beyond, and success attended his first efforts in the victory of Loano (November 23d-25th, 1795), but the winter season opened and interrupted hostilities against the united Austrian and Sardinian armies. Fortunately Russia sent no aid to Austria, and the latter, being unsupported in her endeavors to hold France in check, could not bring her forces to bear on the Italian theatre of war. For a moment, it is true, Vienna had considered removing the weight of her army from the Rhine to Italy, a move which would probably have made far more difficult the victories which Napoleon was soon after to gain in those regions. Thugut was indeed informed that the French government was seeking to separate Sardinia from Austria by offering her Lombardy in exchange, and the reports which Mallet du Pan sent to Vienna in the beginning of the year 1796 asserted confidently that the French were determined to penetrate into Piedmont and Milan, cost what it might.

But in spite of everything no decisive measures were taken. The English were able by means of subsidies to keep the Austrian forces in Germany, which was in accordance with her interests; the Grand Duke of Tuscany refused to allow Neapolitan auxiliary troops to pass through his territory; Thugut himself feared aggressive measures on the part of Prussia and wished to be armed for resistance in Bohemia, and therefore refrained from sending reinforcements, beyond a few battalions, to the army in Italy; in short, everything conspired to the neglect of a field of operations upon which events of the utmost importance were soon to take place.

While Schérer and his troops remained inactive in the South, the plan of campaign as elaborated by Napoleon demonstrated not only the possibility but the necessity of commencing hos-

tilities as early as February. To Schérer's complaints that his troops were needy and in distress (a situation which the financial state of the republic did not admit of rectifying), Napoleon made reply by pointing to the rich plain of Lombardy and promised to support the army upon the enemy's country. On the 19th of January, 1796, his plan was at length adopted and sent to the Army of Italy for execution. This Schérer refused to do. Such projects, he said, might be carried out only by the man who had conceived them, and asked for his own discharge. The request came opportunely. On the 13th Vendémiaire the little general had saved the lives of the men who were at present in power; now he showed them the way in which their policy might be saved. Then, when every military reverse shook the foundations of the Directory and strengthened the opposition, he promised triumphs which would justify the conduct of the governing body and assure its position. Schérer was relieved of his command and Napoleon took his place. On March 27th he assumed in Nice the command of the army.

The new general-in-chief found his troops in deplorable condition. Of his effective force of six divisions, numbering 60,282 men, something more than 22,000 were in hospital, leaving about 38,000 in fighting trim. These were men inured to war and hardened to fatigue, but suffering for the want of proper nourishment and equipment, for the declivities of the Apennines with their poor little villages could contribute but little to the support of the soldiers, and the state's treasury was empty. To these troops the manifesto now issued by the young commander-in-chief—for Napoleon was younger than any one of his generals—fell on their ears like a message of deliverance: "Soldiers, you are ill-fed and almost naked; the government owes you much, it can give you nothing. Your patience, the courage which you exhibit in the midst of these crags, are worthy of all admiration; but they bring you no atom of glory; not a ray is reflected upon you. I will conduct you into the most fertile plains in the world. Rich provinces, great cities will be in your power; there you will find honour, glory, and

wealth. Soldiers of Italy, will you be lacking in courage or perseverance?"

This language, of which, to be sure, we have no record beyond the recollections dictated by the Emperor at St. Helena, is the unvarnished expression of that policy to which financial embarrassment now for some time had reduced France. Before this time the Convention had instructed the armies which crossed the Rhine that they must support themselves at the expense of the enemy, and their leaders were to use every means to obtain the required articles of subsistence from their adversary. The Directory made no change in this maxim beyond extending its significance. But these words are at the same time characteristic of the man who uttered them; he knew human nature too well to fail to promise wealth and glory to the poor and ambitious. It required audacity to make such promises, but still greater was the audacity of action by means of which they were to be realized.

It will be remembered that two years previous to this time Napoleon had demonstrated to Robespierre the importance of effecting a passage of the Apennines from Savona, and that he had in secret, under orders of the Dictator, informed himself minutely as to the territory and fortifications of the enemy.* He was now able to profit by the knowledge thus acquired, availing himself of the very same strategic principles which he had submitted in 1794 to the all-powerful deputy in Paris. He said then: "In the management of a war, as in the siege of a city, the method should be to direct the fire upon a single point. The breach once made, equilibrium is destroyed, all further effort is useless, and the place is taken. . . . Attacks should not be scattered, but united. An army should be divided for the sake of subsistence and concentrated for combat. Unity of command is indispensable to success. Time is everything."

The road which leads from Savona to the north over the crest of the Apennines divides upon the further side into two branches, one of which proceeds westward by way of Millesimo and Ceva to Turin, the other northeastward through Cairo

* p. 45.

and Dego to Alessandria and thence to Milan. The former was held by the Piedmontese, the latter by the Austrians, the two armies being in close touch with one another. How to make his way through between them was the problem which confronted Napoleon. It was the plan of Beaulieu, commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces, to attack from the east the French division of Laharpe which had been thrown forward as far as Voltri, while the Austrians under Argenteau were to fall upon its rear from Montenotte, a village to the north of Savona. The plan was badly conceived, and in order to take advantage of this mistake on the part of the foe Napoleon was obliged to give battle before the arrival of the expected army supplies. Laharpe retreated before Beaulieu to Savona, while Argenteau was surprised at Montenotte on the 12th of April by a force twice outnumbering his own and defeated with great loss. On the following day a second Austrian division which had been detailed to the assistance of Colli, the Piedmontese general, was dispersed at Millesimo by Masséna and Augereau, Bonaparte's subordinates.

Without loss of time Napoleon turned in person again toward the north, and on the 15th, at Dego, completely wiped out the remnant of Argenteau's corps. Beaulieu, fearing to be cut off with the main body of his army on the road to Alessandria, withdrew on the 16th from the mountains into the plain near Acqui. Napoleon had accordingly scored a success in his first move on the chess-board. He had forced his army between those of the allies, driven back the Austrians, and isolated the Piedmontese at Ceva. The latter soon abandoned their advanced position, and on their retreat were overtaken at Mondovi, April 22d, where they suffered grievous defeat.

The promised plain now lay open before the French, and their advance guard soon extended as far as Cherasco and Alba. Napoleon had generously fulfilled his promise to his soldiers. From this time they clung with blind confidence to him. His genius had triumphed not only over the Austrians and Piedmontese, but also over a third foe—mistrust and the envy of his subordinate generals. The greater number of them were

henceforward devoted to him, and thanks to his talent for giving precise orders with the requisite firmness, he was able to exact absolute obedience from such as were not personally attached to him. The Directory in Paris was again compelled to recognize the superiority of his policy when he, contrary to their orders, pursued Colli rather than Beaulieu, his unanswerable argument being that he could not operate with a hostile army in his rear.

King Victor Amadeus of Sardinia took precisely the course which Napoleon had foreseen; insufficiently supported by Austria, and threatened in his own country by revolutionary tendencies, without means of strengthening himself, he turned to the French and requested an armistice preliminary to peace. Bonaparte granted this on condition that three forts should be surrendered to him as security and that his army should have freedom of passage throughout Piedmont. On April 28th the treaty was signed whereby France rid herself of her Sardinian opponent. At once Napoleon hastened to pursue the Austrians, who had retreated from Piedmont into Lombardy, and were awaiting the enemy in a strong position behind the Ticino. But Bonaparte failed to appear at the place where Beaulieu was expecting him; he had instead marched down the Po with a view to crossing it at Piacenza and thus come upon the Austrians in the rear. By the time that Beaulieu became aware of this step he was able only with the utmost exertion, and at the price of abandoning Milan, to reach Lodi and take up his stand behind the Adda. But even this position was untenable. On the 10th of May the French columns appeared at Lodi and forced a passage across the river with unheard-of gallantry. The Austrians fled, and the remains of the scattered and crest-fallen army gathered only on the farther side of the Mincio and in the fortress of Mantua. Lombardy was conquered. On the 16th of May Napoleon made his triumphal entry into Milan.

But at the seat of government in France this unprecedented series of victories by the ambitious general was followed with a certain feeling of apprehension. Without consultation with Salicetti, who accompanied the army as commissioner of the

government, Bonaparte had agreed upon a truce with Piedmont, while the government had intended to make this land a republic. When at last the Directory reluctantly signed the treaty, he wrote to Paris: "I have received the articles of peace with Sardinia, the army has approved it." This was a new tone. The army now gave its sanction to the acts of the government and set up in opposition to it a purpose and decision of its own! Hitherto it had been the docile instrument of the leaders in Paris. A decisive change in the order of things announced itself in these few words which did not pass unnoticed. There were indeed some who were of opinion that the writer of such language should be shot. But his protector Barras and the Jacobinical war-party put up even with this insult.

But with a view to controlling in the future the course of a general so prone to act according to his own desires, Kellerman, Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Alps, was ordered with his troops to strengthen the army in Italy, he himself to share with Bonaparte the command of the whole force and the direction of further operations, while to Salicetti was to be reserved the management of all diplomatic affairs. The news of this decree reached Napoleon just after his victory on the Adda, and he was incensed by it. Give up to another the glory and the power which he was on the point of acquiring! The thought was intolerable. His ambition dictated a reply which his acuteness of perception enabled him to put in a form at once tactful and unmistakable: "If you impose all sorts of fetters upon me," he wrote, May 14th, 1796, to the Directory, "if I must refer every step to the Government Commissioners, if they have the right to alter my dispositions, to remove or send me troops, you may look for no further successes. . . . In the present situation of affairs it is indispensable that you should have a general in whom you have entire confidence. If I am not the person I shall have no complaint to make, but shall use redoubled zeal to merit your esteem at whatever post you may see fit to entrust to me. Each person has his own way of making war. General Kellerman has had more experience and will do it better than I; but both together we shall do it badly." To Carnot, the Director

in charge of military affairs, he wrote: "I can be useful to you only if granted the same confidence which you bestowed on me when in Paris. Whether I wage war here or elsewhere is a matter of indifference to me; to serve my country, to merit from posterity a page in our history, to give the government some proofs of my attachment and of my devotion, that is the sum of my ambition."

Most certainly it was not a question of indifference to him where he should make war; of the whole asseveration only the appeal to posterity was sincere; the judgment of succeeding generations was ever present in Napoleon's mind, and even during the last hours of his life he sought to influence that opinion by a vast tissue of inventions and embellishments. "Human pride," said he to Madame de Rémusat while Consul, "creates a public to its own taste in that ideal world which it calls posterity. If one has brought himself to think that in a hundred years beautiful verses will recall some fine action, that a picture will preserve its memory, then imagination rises, the field of battle has no further dangers, the cannon roars in vain, it seems but the voice which is to carry through a thousand years the name of a brave man to our remotest descendants."

Whatever the case, whether he was sincere or not, the Directory yielded. Kellerman was to them a person of small consequence, and Bonaparte, with his talent for making requisitions of which he had just given such marvellous proof, was hardly to be spared while the treasury of France remained in the impoverished condition of that time. The order was retracted and the Directory contented itself with merely expressing the wish that an expedition toward Rome and southern Italy should precede the march northward. "From this time," according to the recollections at St. Helena, "Napoleon had faith in his own greatness and in his call to play a decisive part in the politics of France." The fact was that he was now completely at liberty to do as seemed best to him in Italy. And the matter of first importance was to reduce Beaulieu to entire harmlessness.

The territory of the Republic of Venice extended at that time a long distance westward, as far as the Lake of Como; Brescia and Bergamo formed Venetian provinces. Bonaparte marched a portion of his army into this country, thereby threatening the retreat of the Austrian commander from the Mincio toward the north and leading him to suppose that the French were going to invade the Tyrol. Beaulieu fell into the snare and scattered his forces along the whole length of the Mincio from Mantua to Peschiera. Suddenly Bonaparte turned toward the southeast and on the 30th of May forced his way with but little difficulty across the Mincio at Borghetto. He thus cut in twain the Austrian army, one portion being driven back into Mantua and the other on to the Adige and toward Tyrol. With the exception of 12,000 men who occupied Mantua, there was not an Austrian corps left on Italian soil and Bonaparte could turn his attention toward subjugating the allies of the emperor, or at least to extorting from them the heaviest possible contributions. The Directory had charged him to "bring away from Italy everything which was of value and capable of transportation." He fulfilled these instructions to the letter. On the 9th of May he concluded a truce with the Duke of Parma, and on the 17th with the Duke of Modena, in both cases at the price of many millions of francs besides works of art and supplies of all kinds, for paintings by the old masters figured beside beeves and corn in the list of his demands. After his victory on the Mincio Naples was constrained to sign a treaty according to the terms of which that state promised to remain neutral and to withdraw her ships from the British fleet. Thereupon the Papal government, fearing to see the Eternal City occupied by the godless republicans, ransomed the capital on the 23d of June by surrendering to the French the Legations of Ferrara and Bologna and the important harbour of Ancona, promising that English ships should be kept at a distance from the coast of the Papal States, besides making payment of something over 20,000,000 francs and yielding from their galleries a great number of works of art. Finally, the trading port of Leghorn was seized and occupied a few days later, with a view to further crippling

the English, whose merchandise was confiscated and sold to the profit of the French treasury.

But the French were yet far from being where they could enjoy their successes in peace. Austria, whose interests, as has been shown, depended upon maintaining her possessions and influence in Italy, was straining every nerve to reconquer her lost position. General Wurmser, who had been in command of the Army on the Rhine, was ordered thence to the Tyrol to replace Beaulieu at the head of the army and, with the aid of fresh troops, to advance to the relief of Mantua.

Napoleon was fully aware that he had before him a struggle of no mean extent, upon the issue of which depended the question whether he were able or not to maintain his own despotic position, and he took his measures accordingly. What the young general accomplished during the ensuing months, in combat with four armies successively relieving one another, belongs among the wonders of military history. His successes were due to the superiority of a genius of inexhaustible resources, a clear-sightedness which recognized at a glance favourable or unfavourable points in a territory, as well as the weakness or strength, advantages or mistakes on the part of the enemy. Napoleon's watchfulness was always on the alert, he grasped all phases and all details of an action and kept them in mind, and he fully appreciated the value of making use of the right moment.

To these considerations must be added another. The generals who were his opponents in these Italian campaigns were trained and experienced in a methodical kind of strategy only and, like all the generals of the older governments, in duty bound to be as saving as possible of their costly armies of mercenaries; to them a series of bloodless manœuvres was the object aimed at. The generals of the Revolution, on the contrary, commanded armies composed of hundreds of thousands of their countrymen, animated by a frenzy for conquest and liberation; their recruits cost nothing, and with war thus carried on at the expense of foreign nations they had an immense advantage over those who were obliged to subordinate strategy to economic considerations; their object was decisive battle

at whatever cost. Frederick the Great, of whose writings Napoleon was an assiduous student, had advocated the same principle; dire necessity and the pressure brought to bear against him by allied and superior forces had compelled him to act upon it. In one essential point, however, his method of warfare differed from Bonaparte's, for, as has been very justly remarked, "he did not, like the French general, have 10,000 men a month to spend." Dubois de Crancé and Carnot share the merit of having organized the revolutionary armies. But to Napoleon belongs the honour of having applied these tactics in offensive warfare in a manner displaying transcendent genius. Throughout the campaign which was about to take place, the contrast between the leaders of the antagonistic forces was but too clearly displayed. The general of the republican army was scarce twenty-seven years old, reckless and daring, heeding only the commands of his own inspiration, while the commander of the Austrian troops at the age of seventy-nine was dependent for direction upon the Emperor, his ministers, and the Aulic Council.

At the end of July—far too late—the Austrians, in two divisions, advanced impetuously southward from the Tyrol. One of these columns, under command of Quosdanovich, marched down the western bank of Lake Garda, the other, under Wurmser, followed the course of the Adige. Their forces outnumbered those of the French by more than 10,000 men, the latter having not more than 42,000 in fighting condition, including those who were engaged in laying siege to Mantua. Should they succeed in the execution of their plan to surround Napoleon's army by means of concerted and simultaneous action, its fate was sealed, and the outlook appeared so much the more ominous since the Austrians gave proofs in the very first engagements of unusual courage and firmness, and had cut off the avenue of retreat for the French to either Milan or Verona. Napoleon recognized to the full the danger of the situation and considered the advisability of making a retreat behind the Adda, but finally allowed himself to be led by the audacious confidence of Augereau, one of his generals, and risked an engagement, though in constant danger of being caught between two

fires. The daring venture was successful. With all available troops he threw himself first on Quosdanovich, defeated him on the 3d and 4th of August at Lonato, and compelled his retreat toward the Tyrol. Then he turned against Wurmser, whose overcautious advance cost him a crushing defeat at Castiglione on the 5th of August; for him also the only way of escape lay toward the mountains. Mantua, whose blockade had been necessarily abandoned, was at once reinvested by the French.

But no decisive outcome had yet been reached notwithstanding these victories. As long as this important fortress was not within his power Napoleon could not consider making further advance, inasmuch as the mere investiture of the city required so great a proportion of his troops as to make it impossible for the rest to penetrate unsupported into the Tyrol or the interior of Austria.

The Court of Vienna, moreover, appreciated as clearly the significance of this stronghold to themselves; its loss would entail that of all the Austrian possessions in Italy, and for this reason their efforts were redoubled to relieve and liberate the city. On the 19th of August positive instructions were sent to Wurmser by Emperor Francis bidding him advance again to the relief of Mantua. This order he obeyed early in September with one division of the army through the valley of the Brenta, while the second, under command of Davidovich, was to hold a position on the Adige, whence, in case Wurmser should turn westward from Bassano and draw the enemy upon himself, they were to descend the valley of that river at full speed to his assistance. But shortly after the opening of this action the whole scheme was shattered by the course pursued by Napoleon, who marched with the bulk of his army into the Tyrol, where he defeated Davidowich and drove him far behind Trent, then, turning into the valley of the Brenta, hastened to overtake Wurmser, and inflicted upon him an overwhelming defeat on September 8th.

Only by the practice of the most strenuous exertions did the aged general with the remnants of his vanquished army succeed

in gaining the sheltering walls of Mantua. One division had made its retreat eastward behind the Isonzo. This enterprise had cost Austria more than 100 cannon, all her munitions of war, and far above 10,000 men.

For Bonaparte the achievement was one of much wider-reaching importance than had been his victory at Castiglione. Its significance was enhanced by the fact that it came just at the time when disaster had overtaken the armies at the North under Moreau and Jourdan, who had lost the advantages which they had previously obtained in Germany. By the recall of a portion of her troops from the Rhine to the aid of the forces contending against Napoleon, Austria had considerably weakened her forces in the North. The young Archduke Charles, who had given evidence of military talent in the Netherlands, now succeeded Wurmser in the chief command of the army. To him it seemed advisable (overestimating as he did the strength of his adversary) to withdraw his troops to the east of the Rhine. Moreau, who now, in place of Pichegru, commanded the Army of the South, took this as a challenge to cross the river, whereupon he defeated the Archduke and forced him to retreat beyond the Danube. Jourdan also was successful in an advance made against the second division of the Austrian army under Wartensleben which enabled him to invade Franconia. Würtemberg and Baden hastened to make peace with France, while Saxony recalled her troops from the field and declared herself neutral. It seemed as if the projected junction of the Republican armies in the Tyrol for a united advance upon Vienna were really about to take place. Just then, early in September, Archduke Charles met Jourdan at Würzburg and totally defeated him, thus compelling both his army and Moreau's to retreat from southern Germany back to the Rhine. The honour of the Austrian arms was at least splendidly retrieved. More than ever now everything depended upon the fate of Mantua.

After his last victories Bonaparte had again acted contrary to the intentions of the Directory, which purposed restoring Lombardy to Austria when peace should be agreed upon in return for Belgium and the Rhine frontier. His method of pro-

cedure had been to stir up revolt among the peoples of northern Italy against their hereditary rulers, and to incite them to the creation of national legions; such were, in fact, organized in Milan and Bologna. Austrian prestige hung in the balance. The most strenuous efforts were put forth to maintain it. Extensive armaments, especially in Croatia and the military borders, were fitted out, the Tyrolese sharpshooters were called into requisition. Everything was done to increase the effective force of the Imperial Army, so that presently Davidovich found himself at the head of upward of 18,000 men in the Tyrol, while Quosdanovich was in command in Friuli of more than 25,000.

The command of the whole army was entrusted to Alvinczy, a brave but aged general who had become immovably attached to the old methods. It seemed as if Fate had ordained that the generals opposed to this young and energetic genius should be of the oldest and those most wedded to tradition, thus giving to his victories the appearance of being the triumph of a new era.* The Austrians again had the advantage in point of numbers when on November 1st they advanced westward from the Piave under command of Alvinczy, and southward toward Verona under Davidovich. But these troops consisted largely of young recruits, who, like the Croatians, showed their best points in

* In 1797 Bonaparte expressed himself thus in regard to the enemy: "My military successes have been great; but then consider the service of the Emperor! His soldiers are good and brave, though heavy and inactive as compared with mine; but what officers! They are wretched. The generals who were sent against me were unfit and absurd. A Beaulieu who had not the slightest knowledge about localities in Italy; a Wurmser, deaf and eternally slow; an Alvinczy who was altogether incompetent. They have been accused of being bribed by me; those are nothing but falsehoods, for I never had such a thing in view. But I can prove that no one of these three generals had a single staff of which several of the superior officers were not devoted to me and in my pay. Hence I was apprised not only of their plans but of their designs, and I interfered with them while they were still under deliberation." (Jung, "Bonaparte," III. 154.)

To what extent this harsh judgment is justified there is no way of ascertaining. Other evidence indeed indicated that demoralization did exist among the officers of the Austrian army.

attack, while their lack of firmness and endurance soon put them at a recognizable disadvantage.

And in truth the opening of this new campaign was in every way unfavourable to Napoleon, so that for a time he stood in the same danger as at Castiglione of being attacked by both divisions of the Austrian army at the same time.

But the enemy did not take advantage of the victory which they gained on November 12th at Verona, where the French lost some 3,000 men, and Napoleon thus had time to prepare a new stroke of genius by means of which he caught Alvinczy in both flank and rear.

With unheard-of daring he reduced to a minimum the forces in Verona and before Mantua, and with all available troops, about 20,000 men, descended the course of the Adige, which he crossed at Ronco to the eastern bank of the river, in order to surprise the enemy. But this was by no means to be so easily accomplished.

At Arcole on the little river Alpon two battalions of Croats, commanded by their colonel, Brigido, stationed themselves so as to defend the bridge until the arrival of reinforcements. Everything depended upon forcing a passage across and securing the hamlet which commands the position before the strength of the foe should be increased by the expected forces. The successive assaults of the French were repulsed by the murderous fire of the enemy, who were under cover; thereupon Napoleon in person seized a flag and rushed upon the bridge, followed by his staff; an aide-de-camp fell at his side and several officers were wounded. But all in vain: an attack of the Austrians brought everything into confusion, and the commander-in-chief, who was swept backwards in the rush of the fleeing soldiers, fell into a quagmire, where his life was in the utmost peril. With difficulty his aide Marmont and his brother Louis succeeded in extricating him from the morass and in concealing him from the pursuing enemy. Only under cover of the night did the French regain their position on the Adige (November 15th). Meanwhile the whole force under Alvinczy had massed itself around Arcole and there the battle was renewed on the next day and the following in a bloody and long-indecisive struggle, until at length the physical endur-

ance of Napoleon's hardened troops carried the day against the brave Austrian recruits, and in the afternoon of the 17th the bold charge of a handful of mounted officers sufficed to assure the victory on the Alpon. The French had won in the three days' battle of Arcole (November 15th to 17th, 1796).

Davidovich, who through delay had failed to take part therein, was in like manner attacked immediately after the battle and compelled to withdraw into the Tyrol. The third attempt to relieve Mantua had failed.

But Austria ventured a fourth trial, being unwilling to yield this advanced position in Italy until her utmost endeavours had been put forth. In the opening of the year 1797 Alvinczy made another advance against the enemy, this time from the Tyrol, while two lesser subdivisions commanded by Provera and Bajalich marched from the east to overcome Napoleon. Alvinczy had himself no further hope of victory and was only acting under orders of the Emperor. And yet there came a critical moment, on the plateau of Rivoli, which, properly put to advantage, might have brought about decisive results in favour of the Austrians. This was on the 14th of January, when one of the Austrian columns fell upon the French position, threatening its rear, while four others attacked it from the front with marked success. But Bonaparte was no longer the same man as before Lonato; he hurled all his available forces against one of these columns, which recoiled under the shock, the three others followed, and soon all the forces of the enemy attacking from the front were put to flight. The column executing the flank movement found itself cut off and was taken captive by the French. The battle of Rivoli terminated in a total rout of the Austrians. Their last attempt had gone against them. On the 3d of February the fortress of Mantua capitulated. Austria's dominion in Italy was at an end.

Thugut, a man of inflexible purpose and of great political ability, was scarcely able to believe the fact. Hardly two years previous, when Austria had divided with Russia all that remained of Poland, he had obtained the promise of political support from this northern neighbour for whatever further

acquisitions Austria should make in Italy, an agreement similar to that which had formerly been made with Kaunitz and Joseph II. But in November, 1796, Catharine II. died, just at the time when the command had been issued for the mustering of the Russian auxiliary troops, and her successor Czar Paul I. refused to contribute aid toward the aggrandizement of Austria. And when in addition to this disappointment Austria's other ally, England, withdrew her fleet from the Mediterranean, thereby greatly facilitating the operations of the French in Italy, the task became more than ever difficult. And now the struggle had ended in a decisive overthrow. Yet in spite of all Thugut was of opinion that the contest ought not to cease. At the close of the preceding year, relying upon the strength of the Austrian forces alone, he had refused the proposal of the Directory which required the cession of Belgium and the Rhine frontier. Even recent events had not sufficed to shake this confidence. "We are not yet at the end of our resources," he exclaimed; "all we need is to gather together all our courage." He advocated removing all troops from the Rhine so as to concentrate their entire force in Italy, a step which might in truth far better have been taken a year earlier. Archduke Charles, who had been victorious in the preceding year, was to assume the chief command of the Italian army, reinforced by the divisions which had been active on the Rhine, and to make a vigorous advance toward the South and thus bar the passage for Bonaparte through central Austria to Vienna. It was, of course, essential that this move should be made as promptly as possible. But the contrary occurred. The Empress was a daughter of the Queen of Naples, and she, at her mother's solicitation, besought the Emperor to make peace; he was moreover prejudiced by the Tory party against his minister, Thugut, who was a commoner who had risen to power. Accordingly he hesitated which course to pursue, and it was several weeks before he finally determined to continue the war. And when at length this resolution had been taken, it was not in the Tyrol that the main body of the army was assembled, but in Friuli, whither it had retreated after the defeat of Rivoli and where it had re-

mained, evidently because there it was most easily supported. The fatal drawback to this arrangement was that the reinforcements from the Rhine were thus detained several weeks longer on the way to their destination, communication between Friuli and the Tyrol by means of the Val Sugana being interrupted. These troops were in fact still on the way when operations were begun by the French in the early part of March, 1797.

Upon the part of the French, also, hostilities against Austria had not been continued immediately after the fall of Mantua. Bonaparte's army, as well, had suffered and was in need of considerable additions from the Rhine and the Sambre to fit it for new and daring enterprises. The intervening time was turned to account in a move upon Rome. Pius VI. had refused the proposals of peace made by the Directory, since they encroached upon the jurisdiction of the Church in demanding recognition of the civil constitution of the clergy in France, the suppression of the Romish Inquisition, and sundry other similar concessions. In accordance with an agreement entered into with Austria he had also failed to pay to France the millions of indemnity promised in June. But with the fall of Mantua the cause of the Holy Father was lost, and on the 1st of February, 1797, Napoleon declared war against him. With a small force he dispersed the Papal troops, who proved to be unspeakable cowards, and opened up a way for himself through the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino as far as Ancona. It will never be forgotten how Lannes, who commanded the advance-guard, at the slightest possible cost compelled thousands of the foe to surrender, nor how, while himself escorted by a few officers, he came one day upon some hundreds of cavalymen of the army of the Pope, who, upon being ordered to dismount, were entirely disconcerted and allowed themselves to be disarmed. It was in vain that the monks exhorted the Papal soldiery to courage and steadfastness, in vain that everywhere images of the Madonna stood with averted eyes in wrath against the French; the soldiers of the Pope were not a whit the more courageous, and the fall of Rome was imminent. But here Napoleon stayed his hand. To threaten the capital would have entailed the

flight of the Pope and prolonged a war which the General regarded as a mere episode in the greater conflict and wished to bring to a close with the greatest speed consistent with profit. He was far too shrewd a statesman to underestimate, as did the Directory, the immense political importance of the Church, and his sagacity in that respect contributed much to his success. Instead of striking at the root of Catholicism, as he was instructed to do, he left the Pope entirely at liberty in all matters pertaining to religion, and Rome unmolested; on the 19th of February he concluded at Tolentino a treaty which was, from a material and political point of view, advantageous to the French in every particular: Pius renounced every alliance antagonistic to France, closed his harbours to the English, relinquished the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna together with the important port of Ancona to the French, and paid 14,000,000 francs in addition to the 16,000,000 still due.

Once more Bonaparte had carried out his own intentions, contrary to those of the Directory, precisely as he had concluded the armistice with the King of Sardinia upon his own authority. It was evident that his designs in regard to Italy differed from those of the government. And what may these designs have been? Something may be inferred from the fact that he at one time thought it necessary to defend himself against the charge of having had thoughts of setting himself up as Duke of Milan or even King. It is not impossible that he may have had some such object in view and consequently sought a *modus vivendi* with the Pope. More probably, however, he now had a clear and definite apprehension of the possibility of himself reigning some time on the Seine and of then establishing his rule on a firmer basis and extending his sway over a wider territory than the Directory had succeeded in doing. Carnot suspected him of being "a second Cæsar, who would not hesitate to cross the Rubicon as soon as the occasion should present." Certain it is that of the tremendous contributions levied in Italy but a small portion was put at the disposal of the government and used in the support of the other armies. On the contrary, Napoleon was far from displeased when his generals seized

their share of the booty; he thus assured himself of their devotion. The treasure thus obtained was secretly conveyed to Switzerland for safe-keeping.

When Bonaparte arrived in Ancona the proximity of Turkey made a profound impression upon him. "Ancona is an excellent port," he wrote to Paris; "in twenty-four hours from here one can reach Macedonia, and in ten days Constantinople. We must keep this port when a general peace is made, and it must remain always a French possession; this point will give us invaluable influence upon the destinies of the Ottoman Empire, and will give us the mastery of the Adriatic Sea as we now have that of the Mediterranean through Marseilles, the island of Corsica, and St. Pierre." Doubtless the form of Alexander the Great appeared at this time to his imagination and suggested to his ambition the idea of an Oriental Empire of the like of which the Directory then scarcely dreamed. Under its spell he afterwards made his expedition into Egypt, and it was only upon his return thence in order to establish his dominion in France that the alluring vision of the conquering Macedonian gave place to that of Charlemagne as model. It was in just this respect that Napoleon differed from his immediate precursors in their systems of revolutionary conquest of the world,—from the *doctrinaire* Girondists with their ideal of universal liberty, and from the Directors with their system of purposeless agitation,—that his ambitious designs were based upon the solid ground of history and carried out according to a policy with a definite aim. Only the fact that he too was never able entirely to free himself from the spell of the Revolution finally caused his downfall.*

* At the very time when Bonaparte's victories in Italy were occurring in such rapid succession Mallet du Pan addressed these remarkable words to the Court at Vienna: "Those who think that the imperishable Republic will perish in the course of time are certainly correct in their surmises, but if they mean thereby that this downfall more or less near is to insure actual stability to the rest of Europe, if they expect that everything then will change from white to black, they are greatly mistaken; *for to the Republic of to-day there may succeed another Republic which may be under either a monarch or a dictator. Who knows? In the course of twenty years a nation in commotion may give a hundred different forms to a revolution of*

The campaign of 1796 had established Napoleon's military fame; he had even eclipsed Hoche, who had been so much admired. But he knew very well that public opinion in France was more in favour of peace than of new victories, and that the Directory was detested and execrated because of its war policy. Elections for replacing one third of the members of the Council of Five Hundred were (at hand,) and no one doubted that their places would be filled by conservatives in favour of peace, and a majority thus created hostile to the Directors. Bonaparte foresaw that if he should succeed in compelling Austria to conclude a preliminary peace upon terms favourable to France he would thus not only gain the favour of the people, who had not yet forgotten the 13th Vendémiaire, but he would also put the five Directors under obligations to himself, since they would then be in a position to face the elections more composedly. But Bonaparte knew also how highly Austria valued her footing in Italy, and that she would not permit herself to be thrust out of the peninsula without determined resistance, and that for a long time the power on the Danube had planned the conquest of Venice. He accordingly resolved upon availing himself of the first opportunity to offer Emperor Francis the territory of San Marco and its dependencies in Istria and Dalmatia in exchange for Lombardy and Belgium. The fact that he should thereby destroy an independent neutral state was no obstacle in the eyes of this man whose ruling principle it was to press forward toward his aim regardless of the consequences to others. Had not the legitimate monarchies dealt with Poland in the

this kind." Mallet du Pan did not at all events suspect then that the "revolutionary monarch" was to be the very man of whom he then wrote contemptuously. "This Bonaparte, this little puppet with dishevelled hair, whom the orators of the Councils delight to call 'the young hero' and 'the conqueror of Italy,' will soon have to suffer for his mountebank glory, his misconduct, his thefts, his fusillades, his insolent slanders. It would be an entire mistake, in reading the last declaration which the Directory had printed in eulogy of the General, to suppose its expressions sincere: There were voices in favour of sending 'the young hero' to the 'Place de la Révolution' to have a score of bullets lodged in his pate; but, as a friend of Barras, protected by the Jacobins of all classes, he has escaped the penalty of his folly."

same manner? It is evident that this plan already filled his mind when he began the campaign of 1797. To accomplish his purpose it was indispensable that Austria should be placed at the earliest possible moment in such a situation as to make this offer acceptable, and that before the armies on the Rhine under Hoche and Moreau might be able to dispute his laurels.

While the Austrian reinforcements were yet far distant, those of the French arrived at headquarters during the latter days of February; the beginning of March Napoleon resumed hostilities. Three small divisions under General Joubert were ordered to the Tyrol to protect the flank of the French army against more than 20,000 Austrians. With but four others, amounting in all to about 34,000 men, Bonaparte himself undertook the expedition which was to lead to peace. As in the preceding year at the opening of the campaign, his plan was once again to prevent the armies of the adversary from effecting a union of forces by placing himself between the two, and then, with a superior number of troops, to defeat the main body of the enemy. On March 10th he brushed aside the advance-guard of the Austrians stationed on the Piave and hastened on to the Tagliamento, behind which Archduke Charles had withdrawn with the main body of his army, while Masséna upon the French left endeavoured to turn the right wing of the enemy. Before these superior forces the Austrians, instead of receding to the northeast along the valley of the Tagliamento to Pontebba, retreated southeastward to Udine and Cividale and at length to the Isonzo, where they intended to await the arrival of the troops from the Rhine. But these did not come, and Bonaparte, who continued to press impetuously forward, threatened their position, which now became untenable. The Austrians withdrew in two columns, one marching from Goerz straight toward Tarvis, the other aiming for Laibach. They planned to unite at Villach, but that proved impracticable, for the Pontebba Pass, inadequately defended after a struggle of some days, fell into the hands of Masséna on the 23d of March, thus cutting off communication with the Pusterthal, through which the eagerly expected reinforcements were to have come.

For the present any serious resistance to the French was out of the question. In these few days the losses of the Austrians had been enormous, particularly in prisoners; the Archduke had remaining at his disposal only about 15,000 men; these he conducted first to Klagenfurt and then northward on the high road to Vienna.

This seemed to Napoleon the favourable moment, before Hoche and Moreau could strike a decisive blow in Germany, for making his proposals of peace, especially as his position was more or less critical in the heart of a hostile country, without any possibility of support from the army in Germany. On the 31st of March he wrote from Klagenfurt to the Prince a letter which he himself designated as "philosophical." He alludes therein to the attempt on the part of the Directory to conclude peace with Austria, which attempt had been frustrated by England. "Is there then no hope whatever of coming to some agreement between us, and must it be that, for the sake of the interest or passions of a nation untouched by the evils of this war, we must continue to cut each other's throats? I appeal to you, Sir, the Commander-in-chief, who by your birth are so near the throne and above all the petty passions which so often animate ministers and governments, are you determined to win for yourself the title of benefactor of all mankind and of true deliverer of Germany? . . . As for myself, Monsieur the General-in-chief, if the proposals which I have the honour to submit to you could be the means of saving the life of a single human being, I should account myself more justly proud of the civic crown to which I should feel myself thus entitled than of the melancholy glory which may come as the reward of military successes."

In order to give proper emphasis to these words, he recalled to himself at Lienz, Joubert, who had made a victorious advance as far as Brixen and had driven back the enemy to the north-west as far as Sterzing and to the west as far as Méran, and ordered Masséna to seize the passes at Neumarkt, an operation during the course of which, in truth, the life of more than "one human being" was sacrificed. Thence he was to advance far enough into the valley of the Mur to be able to cut off at St.

Michael and Leoben all communication remaining to the enemy with the west. On April 7th, this task having been accomplished, Masséna entered Leoben with his troops.

Archduke Charles meanwhile had lost no time in transmitting Napoleon's letter to Thugut. This statesman was likewise unwilling to enter unsupported by a military force into negotiations with a general who had perhaps already advanced too far into the territory of his foe. Thousands of volunteers were enlisted, the Hungarians were called upon for assistance, and preparations made for the defence of Vienna before the plenipotentiaries were sent by the minister to Leoben.

Here, at the Château Gocss, were carried on the negotiations between General Merveldt and Marquis Gallo, representing Austria, and Bonaparte, in which the latter made the astounding offer of the Venetian mainland in exchange for Milan and Belgium. The proposal made a sensation at Vienna. Importuned by both Court and nobility to make peace, unsupported by Russia, deluded by England, whence he had been led to expect a fleet in the Adriatic in addition to considerable subsidies, and convinced of Prussia's determination to extend her borders, the outlook was indeed unpromising and Thugut reluctantly yielded. The acquisition of the long-desired territory seemed in a measure to indemnify his country for the losses she was sustaining; there still remained to her a firm foothold on Italian soil, and at the first favourable opportunity the lost preponderance might be regained. But argeemnt became more difficult when Napoleon introduced his demand for the relinquishment of Modena. It was clear that his intention was to restrain Austrian influence in Italy within the line traced by the river Oglio, or, if possible, to make the Adige the boundary of the dominion of Francis II. Thugut, on the contrary, sought to preserve Modena to its prince and the House of Habsburg, and to establish a boundary line to the political power of France which should extend from Lake Iseo along the Oglio to the Po, and then should follow the valley of the Enza, and strike the coast near Massa and Carrara, thus cutting off the peninsula from the territory of the Republic. But Austria failed to secure her point in this diplomatic contro-

versy; Modena had to be yielded and remained a portion of the Republic. On April 18th, 1797, the compact was signed in the Eggenwald Garden at Leoben. It was merely a preliminary convention, containing indeed the principles of agreement, but capable of modification in regard to sundry points when the final treaty should be ratified. According to its secret articles Austria was to cede Milan and the Duchy of Modena to the newly-created Republic of Lombardy, while Belgium was to be given to France; Austria was, on the other hand, to acquire the mainland of Venice as far as the Oglio, besides its dependencies (Istria and Dalmatia) on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, for which Venice was to be indemnified by the bestowal of the three former papal legations, Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna.

At the very moment when Napoleon was putting his signature to the contract which ended hostilities, Hoche was winning a momentous victory from the Austrians on the Rhine, which he followed up by penetrating deep into the country of the Germans. But these victories came too late. Bonaparte had rendered them fruitless, that is, provided that the Directory were willing to ratify a treaty which, as a matter of fact, he had been totally unauthorized to make. In a letter accompanying the papers he had artfully laid stress upon the merely preliminary character of the agreement, and laid at Austria's door the initiative in the detestable Venetian business which had in reality been his own work. The government, thus misled, and desirous of remaining upon friendly terms with the mighty General, raised no objection and ratified the treaty making the one stipulation that no further steps were to be taken against Venice, inasmuch as the transaction which had been proposed was in violation of the principles that a people should have the right to determine their own future. The exhortation came too late. One week before, on the 3d of May, Napoleon had declared war on the Senate of the island city. He had deemed it quite unnecessary to inform the Directory that he had undertaken in Leoben to obtain the Venetian territory for Austria, and for this cause would open hostilities against the Republic of San Marco immediately upon the conclusion of the treaty.

The pretext for this he had long been holding in readiness. In spite of his statements to the contrary, it may safely be assumed that Napoleon before invading Austria had organized in the Venetian cities also a democratic revolution against the aristocratic rule of that state. The "Patriots" rose in revolt. The unlooked-for result was that the peasantry, who were friendly to the government, turned upon the insurgents, and a number of French soldiers, who had openly taken part in the uprising, were killed. Thus in Verona there occurred a counter-revolution which cost the lives of many democrats and Frenchmen, and it was quelled only by the energetic intervention of the French garrison. Two days later there took place in the harbour of Venice a fight between a French and a Venetian war-ship in which the captain of the former was killed. Thereupon followed Napoleon's declaration of war against the Doge. A democratic uprising in the city openly supported by a French *Chargé d'Affaires* contributed largely toward increasing the disturbance. On May 15th the "Great Council" was forced to abdicate and a provisional government was set up by the "Patriots," who at once disbanded such troops as the government still had at its disposal and came to an agreement with Napoleon according to which that general, in return for a consideration of 5,000,000 francs and a number of war-ships, promised to cease hostilities and to give the Republic the protection of his arms (May 16th, 1797). How little in earnest he was with this promise of protection is shown by the fact that within a few days (he offered to the Marquis Gallo, who had been sent by Thugut to Milan to conduct negotiations for the final treaty, to surrender to Austria the city of Venice in addition to the mainland territory, on condition that the Austrian boundary line be receded from the Oglio to the Adige (May 24th, 1797). In order to reassure the Venetians, he wrote, two days later, to the new municipality: "Whatever the circumstances, I shall do all in my power to give proof of my warm desire to see your liberty confirmed and to see unhappy Italy at length take her place with glory, free and independent of all foreign powers, upon the world's stage, to resume among the great nations the rank to which she is entitled by

nature, position, and destiny. . . . Venice has the only population worthy of the blessing of liberty." Directly contradictory to all of these statements was his report to the Directory written on the following day, which reads: "Venice, which has been in process of decay ever since the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the rise of Triest and Ancona, can but with difficulty survive the blows which we have just dealt her. This is a wretched, cowardly people, entirely unfit for liberty, without land and under water; it seems but natural that they should be turned over to those to whom we are giving the mainland. We shall take all their ships, we shall despoil the arsenal, carry off all their cannon, and destroy their bank. Corfu and Ancona we will reserve for ourselves." The haughty city was to be bled ere her carcass should be delivered over to Austria.

It was questionable whether the Court of Vienna, which desired above all things to acquire the three papal legations, would accept the new proposals made by Napoleon. But meanwhile affairs in Paris were assuming an aspect which of necessity affected Bonaparte's attitude. In these affairs he was personally concerned, and in consequence they reacted upon foreign relations.

The elections of April, 1797, had resulted, as was to have been foreseen, in an outcome entirely unfavourable to the Directory, giving the Moderates a majority in the Councils both of the Five Hundred and of the Ancients. A new Director was also to be appointed at this time. The choice fell upon Barthélemy, who with Carnot, likewise a Moderate, formed a Conservative minority in opposition to Barras, Rewbell, and Larévellière. Consequently from this time the democratic-Jacobin element prevailed in the Directory, while the Conservatives and Royalists controlled the legislature. The antagonism grew fiercer from day to day and a clash was inevitable. One day the opposing majority would spring an attack on the wretched financial policy of the government, which with difficulty continued its existence despite a double bankruptcy; next day its dealings with priests and émigrés would be arraigned, then its colonial administration, its commercial policy, and

finally its foreign policy, which was more and more clearly revealing its character of revolutionary propagandism, whose acknowledged aim was to make Europe republican. The Directory was openly accused of prosecuting an endless war because it could not maintain the troops at home. The suicide of several naval officers, who took their lives because they were unable to procure food, produced a deep impression. The proceedings in Italy were censured with especial severity, and particularly the dealings against Venice. The Directory was accused by the right wing of the opposition of declaring war without securing consent of the legislature as the Constitution demanded, and of interfering, equally unconstitutionally, in the domestic affairs of foreign states, thus systematically preventing the settlement of a definitive peace.

Bonaparte, who felt himself personally implicated in these charges, espoused the cause of the majority of the Directory against the majority of the legislature. On July 14th, in honour of the anniversary of the storming of the Bastille, he issued a manifesto to his army which contained a formal declaration of war against the adversaries of his party. The opposition thus menaced was composed in part of royalists, and these were detested by the republican armies chiefly on account of the émigrés. "Soldiers," said he, "I see that you are profoundly affected by the misfortunes which threaten your country; but the country cannot undergo any real dangers. The same men who have made her triumphant over Europe in coalition are at hand. Mountains separate us from France, but you would clear these with the rapidity of the eagle if necessary to uphold the Constitution, to defend liberty and protect the government and republicans. Soldiers, the government keeps watch over the laws which are entrusted to its custody. The Royalists will cease to exist from the moment that they show themselves. Let us not be disquieted and let us swear by the spirits of the heroes who have died beside us in the cause of liberty, let us swear upon our new banners, implacable war to all enemies of the Republic and of the Constitution of the year III!" This summons found an echo in every garrison of his army, and in

the other armies as well, and sundry detachments affirmed their loyal devotion to the Republic in addresses to the Directory. In addition Bonaparte composed a number of memorials which, in a way as masterly as it was false, were intended to justify his course in relation to Venice. "I forewarn you," he vociferates to the orators of the opposition, "and I speak in the name of 80,000 men, that the day is past when cowardly lawyers and wretched babblers sent soldiers to the guillotine!" And he was not the man to content himself with words. He sent one of his generals, Augereau, to Paris bearing the addresses of the divisions, and put him at the disposal of Barras and his two colleagues for their defence in case of need. Hardly had he arrived before he was put in command of the Army of the Interior. Besides this Napoleon rendered the three Directors another and peculiar service. In Venice one of the principal agents of the Bourbons, the Comte d'Antraigues, had fallen into Napoleon's hands, and in conversation with him the count made disclosures concerning Pichegru's relations with the Bourbon Prince de Condé in 1795. Such revelations were now the more valuable since Pichegru had become one of the leaders of the majority and President of the "Five Hundred." By means of promises or threats Napoleon induced d'Antraigues to commit these statements to paper, and before long this writing found its way to Paris, where it served the three Directors as an effective means and ostensible reason for a Coup d'État by means of which they rid themselves on September 4th, 1797 (18th Fructidor), first of their two colleagues Carnot and Barthélemy and then of a considerable number of conservative deputies. The vacant places in the Directory were filled by two men of confirmed democratic principles, Merlin de Douai and François de Neufchâteau. The attempt had been successful in every particular. As justification for it Pichegru's alleged treason was made public. But the real victor of Fructidor was Bonaparte, exactly as he had been on the 13th Vendémiaire. There is in truth warrantable doubt whether, in giving his support to the Directory, he had desired that affairs should assume this aspect, whether his intention was not simply to overthrow Pichegru.

It is possible that Augereau compromised him more deeply than was necessary in regard to his designs. That at least would appear to be the case judging by the *Mémoires* of Barante recently published. But in face of the accomplished fact, in order to remain master, he was obliged to lay claim to the victory for himself and his army; and this he publicly did in a bulletin issued on the 22d of September, the anniversary of the birth of the Republic. Therein occurs this passage: "Soldiers, far from your native land and victorious over Europe, chains were being prepared for you; you knew it, you spoke, the people roused itself and secured the traitors, and already they are in fetters."

He was more than ever in favour with the government. Augereau, who had supposed himself the ruling power in the Coup d'Etat, though he was in reality but the undiscerning tool, was put out of the way by his appointment as Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Rhine. Hoche, the Corsican general's only rival worthy of mention, died just at this time of an acute pulmonary disease, though the report then current that his death was due to poison seemed all too probable. The Army of the Alps was united with that of Italy and Napoleon's forces thus very considerably increased. The Royalists were vanquished, the Moderates condemned to inaction, and the new Directory, which was under obligation to the General, avoided any resolute opposition to his wishes. His ambition no longer knew any bounds. Some years later he said, in conversation with Madame de Rémusat: "It has been said of me as a reproach that I facilitated the events of the 18th Fructidor. They might as well reproach me for having upheld the Revolution. Advantage had to be taken of that Revolution, some profit derived from the blood which it had caused to flow. What! consent to yield unconditionally to the princes of the House of Bourbon, who would have thrown in our faces the calamities which we have suffered since their departure, and imposed silence upon us by pointing to the need which we had shown of their return! Exchange our victorious banner for that white flag which had not feared to take its place amid the standards

of the enemy; and finally I myself be content with some millions and with some dukedom or other! * Of a surety, the part played by Monk is not a difficult one; it would have cost me less trouble than the Egyptian campaign or than the 18th Brumaire; most certainly I should have found a way, if there had been need for it, to dethrone the Bourbons a second time, and the best advice which could have been given them would have been to rid themselves of me."

How well this avowal accords with what attentive observers say of him in that same year! One of his old friends, Sucy, the Commissioner of War, writes in August, 1797: "I know for him no halting-point other than the throne or the scaffold." And the before-mentioned Comte d'Antraigues says in a report made that September: "This man means to subjugate France and, through France, Europe. . . . Were there a king in France other than himself, he would wish to have enthroned him, and that the royal authority should rest upon the point of his own sword, from which sword he would never be separated so that he might plunge it into the heart of his sovereign should that monarch for a moment cease to be subservient to his will."

Was this calumny or exaggeration? Neither one nor the other. Napoleon himself made some strange confidences to Melzi and Miot in June, 1797, before the Coup d'État of Fructidor: "Do you suppose that I gain victories to increase the glory of the lawyers in the Directory, for Carnot, or for Barras? Have you the impression that I have any thoughts of establishing a Republic? What an absurd idea! A Republic of 30,000,000 souls! And with our customs and our vices? How would such a thing be possible? . . . The nation wants a chief-tain covered with glory, and cares nothing for theories of gov-

* Bonaparte, like Pichegru, had been approached by agents of the Bourbons. The claimant to the throne had even written him a letter in his own hand, and in December, 1796, he was promised the title of Duke, the hereditary vicerealty of Corsica, and the baton of a Marshal of France on condition that he would declare himself for the hereditary monarchy. These short-sighted conspirators had indeed no idea that what they thus offered him had long ceased to be sufficient to curb Napoleon's ambition.

ernment, fine words, or dreams of idealists, none of which the French understand. . . ." No one questioned who was to be this chieftain, for already his outward bearing gave evidence of his independent power. He held court, like a prince, in his villa of Montebello in the vicinity of Milan. There, like a prince, he received ambassadors from Austria, Naples, and Piedmont. He even took his repasts in public with a few privileged persons, exhibiting himself to the gaze of the curious as was customary with monarchs. And like a monarch he now negotiated the final treaty of peace with Austria, according to his own designs and in no wise in accordance with the intentions of the government at Paris. The latter did indeed attempt to make Bonaparte follow the line of conduct prescribed by its democratic doctrinairism, to force him to revolutionize all Italy, and to exclude the Emperor completely. But he rejected this demand as impracticable with so much decision, and with the threat of his own abdication in case of persistence in it, that there remained to the Directory no choice but to let him follow his own inclinations. In the letters which he addressed to the Foreign Office at the capital he assumes throughout a superior and didactic tone. In one of the most noteworthy, dated October 7th, 1797, and addressed to Talleyrand, the newly-appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, he says: "You but little know these Italians. They are not worthy that 40,000 Frenchmen should be killed for them. I see by your letters that you are acting upon a mistaken presumption; you imagine that the possession of liberty will bring about the accomplishment of great deeds by a people effeminate and superstitious, buffoons and cowards. . . . The distinguishing characteristic of our nation is to be far too rash in time of prosperity. If, as the basis of all our dealings, we make use of true policy, which is nothing else than the reckoning of combinations and chances, we shall for a long time be the great nation and arbiter of Europe. More than that: we hold the balance of Europe; we will make it incline according to our wishes, and, should it be the will of fate, I see no reason why it should be impossible for us in the course of a few years to attain even to

results already dimly seen by the heated and enthusiasm, and which only the extremely cool, per-
d rational man may ever hope to reach."

soon to be the turn of the Court of Vienna to feel inence and superior bearing of Bonaparte. Thugut sed a readiness to deviate from the stipulations of inary convention of April, his intention being, of add to Austria's territory in Italy through the acqui- he Legations. But in this he failed. Napoleon, to ad willingly consented to the alteration of the former t only in order to reduce still further the influence of It was to gain this point that he had in May offered f Venice with the Adige as a boundary. Thugut had ejected this proposal. But in vain he prolonged the ns for months, evidently in the hope that a victory oderates in Paris would also bring about a more con- foreign policy in France; in vain he sent to Udine to n Bonaparte, Count Louis Cobenzl, the ablest diplomat rvice of the Emperor; in September the situation was t, in view of the isolation of Austria and the supremacy ace party at court, not even the terms offered at Leoben : insisted upon, and those now proposed by their ad- had to be accepted. It was at the end of a series of sessions that the final treaty was at length concluded. te used all the resources of his temperament for the of influencing the Austrian envoy; he flattered, he im with seductive promises, he threatened and insulted nce, upon a refusal on the part of Cobenzl to some pro- apoleon was seized with a veritable paroxysm of fury; g up a porcelain vase, he hurled it to the floor and out of the room, cursing and shrieking; a scene similar which, in later years, he repeatedly, and not without tation, enacted in the presence of the envoys of foreign

At last, on October 17th, 1797, after two occasions ick negotiations were on the verge of being completely off, the definitive treaty was signed at Passariano, near hough the paper was dated Campo Formio. Belgium

and the Ionian Isles were to belong to France, while Austria received the city of Venice and the mainland of that republic as far as the Adige and southward from this river the district between the Bianco Canal and the main branch of the Po. The territories of Mantua, Milan, Bergamo, Brescia, Modena, and the three Legations were collectively to constitute the Cisalpine Republic. The Duke of Modena was to receive the Austrian Breisgau as indemnity for his former possessions. Austria, which, in addition to the Breisgau, was obliged to surrender the county of Falkenstein and the Frickthal in the Aargau, was to receive in compensation the archbishopric of Salzburg together with that portion of Bavaria lying on the right bank of the Inn, and France engaged to sustain these claims in behalf of the Emperor. In return for this Austria promised her friendly intervention in the treaty yet to be concluded with the Empire, whereby France was to obtain the long-desired Rhenish boundary-line between Basel and Andernach. The affairs of the German Empire were to be regulated at a special congress soon to assemble at Rastatt. The German princes whose lands might be encroached upon were to receive compensation in territory upon the right bank of the Rhine. In token of his good faith the Emperor at once put the French in possession of the commanding fortress of Mainz.

The tidings that peace had been concluded brought boundless joy at Vienna among the people at large as well as at the court. Only a few clear-sighted statesmen, Thugut especially, deplored the stipulations of the treaty as a misfortune to the monarchy, and had no faith in the durability of the situation thus brought about. The Emperor had consented to the diminution of the territory of the Empire and had expressed his willingness to annex to his own the domain of an ecclesiastical prince when it was precisely these ecclesiastical States of the Empire upon which the House of Habsburg most depended for its hold on the imperial crown. If only Austria, could have gained the longed-for increase of power, there would have been some consolation, but instead she had been driven inexorably backward toward the East.

Napoleon, on the contrary, had every reason to contemplate his achievement with satisfaction. It is said that on the day that the treaty was signed he gave unreserved expression to his joy and showed the Austrian ambassador a charming amiability of manner which was as much at command of his talent as an actor as had been his former anger and violence. To him personally the failure to reach a conclusion through these negotiations would have entailed the undesired discomfort of a winter campaign in the inhospitable Alpine regions, with the possibility in the mean time that the decisive victory might be gained elsewhere by another, while their successful termination enabled him to carry out the vast designs which he had been maturing during the course of the summer—designs which, for their world-embracing extent and clear conception of purpose, have rarely been equalled in the mind of a human being.

CHAPTER VI

EGYPT

WHEN Napoleon, under the guise of a faithful ally, concluded the treaty with the new government of Venice, his object was not merely to secure a compensation which he could deliver to Austria; he reserved to France a portion of the Venetian inheritance: the position of the ancient Republic as a power in the Orient was to descend to the French. In May, 1797, Bonaparte sent General Gentili, a French officer, with a Venetian fleet to occupy the Ionian Isles, whose population joyfully received the emissary of the illustrious general as their deliverer from the oppressive rule of the Lion of St. Mark. He had thus taken a momentous step toward the Orient, where he saw extended a vast field for the development of French influence and his own ambition, provided that they could be made to coincide. As long before as the previous May he had insisted that France must retain Corfu. "Corfu and Zante," he afterward wrote to Talleyrand, "make us masters of the Adriatic and of the Levant. It is useless for us to attempt to sustain the Turkish Empire; we shall see its downfall within our own times; the occupation of these four beautiful Ionian islands will put us in a position to support it or to secure a portion for ourselves." It was in accordance with this scheme that he by means of clever agents established relations for himself from the Ionian Islands with the Greeks, the Mainotes, and the Pashas of Janina, Scutari, and Bosnia. And already his far-seeing eye had discovered new objects for his activity. It had long been a part of the policy of France to cut off England's communication with India, and to this end to secure as much foothold as possible in the Mediterranean.

It was on this account that, upon the departure of the English fleet from those waters in 1796, Napoleon had had Corsica re-

occupied by General Gentili,* and for the same reason also, during the ensuing spring, similar proceedings were carried out against Genoa as had been instituted against Venice, and on June 5th, 1797, a treaty was concluded making France the absolute master of the "Ligurian Republic," which now received a new democratic constitution. Finally, on the 16th of August, 1797, he wrote to the Directory: "The time is not far distant when we shall feel that in order to really disable England we must possess ourselves of Egypt. The vast Ottoman Empire, which is rapidly crumbling into decay, makes it our imperative duty to take prompt measures for protecting our Eastern commerce." With a single bound his thought traverses the space which intervenes between him and the land of the Pharaohs. On the 13th of September he writes to Talleyrand: "Why should we not possess ourselves of the island of Malta? Admiral Bruceys might readily anchor there and take possession of it. Four hundred knights and a regiment of five hundred men constitute the entire garrison of the city of La Vallette. The people there are much inclined toward us and much out of conceit with their knights, who have no means of subsistence and are dying of starvation. I had all their property in Italy confiscated on purpose. With the island of St. Pierre, which the King of Sardinia has ceded to us, Malta, Corfu, etc., we shall be masters of the whole Mediterranean. If it should prove necessary for us to give up the Cape of Good Hope when the time comes for us to make our peace with England, we must take possession of Egypt. One could start from here with 25,000 men escorted by eight or ten ships of the line or Venetian frigates. . . . Egypt does not belong to the Sultan. I should like to have you make investigations in Paris so as to let me know what the consequences of our Egyptian expedition would be to the Porte."

Talleyrand eagerly entered into the projects of the General, his penetration having doubtless recognized the future master under

* Napoleon accorded amnesty to the Corsicans, making exception only in the case of the heads of those families who had ranged themselves under Paoli's banner against him, particularly Pozzo di Borgo, Peraldi, Bertholani, and others. Pozzo di Borgo remained henceforth his foe and implacable adversary.

this exterior of brutal superiority. These schemes of Napoleon's were akin to conceptions and projects of his own. Before the receipt of Napoleon's letter, he had, in July, 1797, read a paper before the members of the National Institute, "*Sur les avantages à retirer des colonies nouvelles après les révolutions*," in which he directed attention to Egypt and claimed for Choiseul the honour of being the first to conceive the idea.*

Furthermore, Magallon, the French consul at Cairo, had for a year reiterated in his reports the advantages to be gained from an Egyptian expedition. For these reasons Bonaparte's proposals met with approval on the part of the minister, who entered into the plan himself and furthered it, laying stress upon the importance of French supremacy on the Mediterranean and especially upon the Nile. In fact he once even claimed to the Prussian envoy that he had himself been the instigator of the enterprise.

It may reasonably be questioned whether at this time Napoleon had the intention of assuming himself the leadership of this expedition. It was quite out of keeping with his ambitious plans to undertake such an adventure in a distant land with 25,000 men, setting at stake upon an uncertain issue the glory which he had so rapidly and completely won, giving up his position of

* But the idea was an older one. Leibniz had urged the same upon Louis XIV. in order to distract the attention of the French from the Rhine. In 1738 d'Argenson, the future French minister, again brought up the suggestion and counselled the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez. Since that time the French government had taken up the question a number of times. Thus in 1780 the explorer Sonnini came upon a French officer in Cairo who had been sent to study the possibility of making a conquest of Egypt and a way thence to the Indies. Five years later the question was again under discussion, for Emperor Joseph II. assigned Egypt to France in his plan for the division of Turkey. In 1795 and 1796 emissaries of the Republic scoured the valley of the Nile. It is, moreover, a certainty that Bonaparte concerned himself about Egypt long before 1797. He had in 1792 made the acquaintance of Volney, who had travelled throughout the Orient and had published five years before his "*Voyage en Syrie et Égypte*." Volney had an estate near Ajaccio. In his "*Considérations sur la guerre actuelle des Turcs*" (1788), the idea of a French expedition to Egypt is the subject of detailed study.

power in France and relieving the Directory at so small a price of the anxiety caused by his ambitious efforts. He did indeed later conduct the expedition, but only because compelled by circumstances unforeseen in the autumn of 1797. For the conquest of Egypt was but a single link in the chain of projects whose final aim was disclosed in a proclamation to the fleet: "Comrades, when we shall have accomplished our task of pacifying the continent we shall unite ourselves once more with you to conquer the liberty of the seas. . . . Without you we could carry the glory of the French name but to a small corner of the continent. United with you we shall cross the seas, and the remotest regions shall behold the national glory." On the day following the conclusion of peace with Austria he indicated the present moment, in a letter to Talleyrand, as particularly favourable to combat with Great Britain: "Let us concentrate all our activity upon the upbuilding of the navy, and let us destroy England. That accomplished, Europe is at our feet!" Even before this time the Directory had taken into consideration a landing on the British coast and made preparations accordingly. Bonaparte favoured the idea. When on the 2d of November he was informed in Milan of the ratification of the Austrian treaty he was notified at the same time of his appointment as commander-in-chief of the Army of England. He at once directed fifteen demi-brigades of the Italian army to march to the seacoast, and ordered cannon cast of the calibre of those used by the English, "in order to be able, in the enemy's country, to avail one's self of English projectiles."

But another matter concerned him far more deeply than these military designs. He had long ceased to be the mere military servitor of the Directory. His whole being was expressive of the determination to conquer for himself, if possible, a leading position and, if such a thing could be accomplished, to exercise in the government at the heart of France the same power which he had up to this time enjoyed in foreign lands.

November 17th, 1797, he left his headquarters in Milan in order to betake himself to Rastatt, where he as first French plenipotentiary was to negotiate with the ambassadors of the

Emperor the treaty with the Empire. He remained but a short time in this little town in Baden,—where he occupied the same apartments put at the disposal of Villars during a previous congress,—only until Cobenzl arrived and he had signed with him the agreement concerning the surrender of Mainz, December 1st, 1797. Then on the same evening he began his journey toward Paris, whither Barras in his capacity of chief of the Directory had bidden him and whither he was driven by his own desire of profiting by the fame he had acquired.

He was received by the Directory with every outward token of amity. Fêtes were given for him at the Luxembourg and at the Louvre, whose walls were adorned with the works of art brought as plunder from Italy, while theatrical performances and similar festivities were organized in his honour. Even the populace appeared to have forgotten its mistrust of the man of the 13th Vendémiaire, and saw in him only the war hero; interest and curiosity at least, if not sympathy, were everywhere manifest. In the theatres the public boisterously demanded a sight of the General upon learning that he was present; it was scarcely possible for him to elude such ovations. He was elected by the National Institute to a life-membership in that body in the place of Carnot, and from that time he appeared only in the ordinary garb of the scholar by way of demonstrating his "civism." In fact he affected a complete simplicity of manner and conduct which must have been irksome to a man so eager for glory. He lived in his wife's unpretentious house in the Rue Chantereine, which had been rechristened Rue de la Victoire in his honour; the many attentions bestowed upon him he met with studied reserve and rarely showed himself in public. To his old comrade Bourrienne, who had become his confidential secretary, he said: "At Paris nothing is long remembered. If I remain inactive for any considerable time, I am lost. One celebrity crowds out another in this Babylon. They need only to see me three times at the theatre to pay no further attention to me, and I shall appear there but seldom." Upon the observation of Bourrienne that he must nevertheless feel flattered to see the people throng thus about him, he replied: "Pshaw!

They would crowd around me just as eagerly if I were on my way to the scaffold."

Of all the official festivities the chief event was the splendid fête given in his honour by the Directory on the 10th of December, 1797, at which he was to deliver to them the treaty of Campo Formio ratified by the Emperor Francis. All the distinguished people and high officials in Paris were assembled that day in the great salon of the Palais de Luxembourg, which was magnificently decorated. Minister Talleyrand delivered the official address in which he lauded Napoleon's old-fashioned preference for simplicity, his predilection for the sciences, his contempt for vain splendour. "All these qualities," said he, "are to us the surest guarantee that he will never allow himself to be led away by ambition." The audience awaited with intense interest Napoleon's reply, which was as follows: "The French people, in order to be free, had to fight against kings. To obtain a Constitution founded upon reason, it had to overcome the prejudices of eighteen centuries. The Constitution of the year III (1795) and you yourselves have vanquished all these obstacles. Religion, feudalism, and monarchy have in turn governed Europe during twenty centuries; but from the peace which you have just concluded dates the era of representative governments. Success has attended your efforts to organize this great nation whose vast territory is circumscribed by the confines which nature herself has imposed. You have done even more. The two fairest countries in Europe,* once so celebrated for the arts, the sciences, and the great men of which they were the cradle, now see with the brightest hopes the spirit of liberty rising from the tombs of their ancestors. These are two pedestals upon which destiny will rear two powerful nations. I have the honour to deliver to you the treaty signed at Campo Formio and ratified by his majesty the Emperor. . . . When the happiness of the French people shall be established upon the best organic laws, all Europe will become free."

The meaning of these words was far from clear. The last phrase especially was enigmatic. Its solution was vaguely

* Italy and Greece.

divined by a few, while the remainder of his auditors exhausted themselves in conjecture. Then with this vaunted Constitution of the year III France was not yet "established upon the best organic laws"? Far from it, according to Napoleon's innermost convictions. Shortly before he had written confidentially to Talleyrand upon this subject; the letter, dated September 19th, reads: "The organization of the French nation is then in reality nothing more than roughly outlined. In spite of our conceit, our thousand and one pamphlets, and our verbose and endless harangues, we are very ignorant in political science. We have, as yet, no definite conception of what is meant by executive, legislative, and judiciary power. Montesquieu has given us misleading definitions; not that this celebrated man was not abundantly able to give us what we need, but his work, as he himself says, is only a kind of analysis of that which had existed or was then in existence; it is a summary of notes made during his travels or in his reading. He fixed his eye upon the government of England and defined in a general way executive, legislative, and judiciary power. Why, indeed, should one regard as an attribute of the legislative power the right to make war or conclude peace, or the right to fix the quantity and the nature of taxes? The English Constitution has very reasonably entrusted one of these attributes to the House of Commons, and this was an excellent step, because the English Constitution is simply a charter of privileges, it is a black ceiling but bordered with gold. As the House of Commons is the only body which actually represents the people, it alone should have the right to determine this question of taxation; it is the only discoverable bulwark against the despotism and insolence of courtiers. But in a government where every authority emanates from the nation, where the sovereign is the people, why class among the attributes of the legislative power things which are foreign to it? The governmental power, using the term in the broadest sense, should be considered as the true representative of the nation, and this should govern in accordance with the written constitution and organic laws. This governmental power appears to me to be subdivided natu-

rally into two very distinct jurisdictions, one of which should supervise without acting, while that which we now call the executive power should be obliged to submit to the former all important measures; this, if I may be permitted the expression, would be the legislation of the executive. The first of these bodies would be in fact the great council of the nation; it would have all that part of the administration or of the executive which according to our Constitution is entrusted to the legislative power. The governmental power would thus be vested in two magistracies appointed by the people, one of them, consisting of a large number of men, to which no one would be eligible who had not already held some office which would have given experience in state affairs. The legislative power would in the first place make all the organic laws, and alter them, but not in the course of two or three days, as is the present practice; for, once an organic law has been made operative, according to my idea, it could not be changed without five or six months of discussion. This legislative power, without rank in the Republic, impassive, without eyes and without ears for its surroundings, would be free from ambition and we should no longer be inundated with a thousand laws passed for the occasion which annul themselves by their very absurdity and which make us, with three hundred folio volumes of legislative enactments, a nation without laws."

These conceptions, which Napoleon calls his "*Code Complet de Politique*," are of the greatest possible interest. They demonstrate not only his dissatisfaction with existing circumstances, but it is noticeable also that no word escapes him relative to the nature of the real executive power; that was, and should remain for the present, his own secret. The letter, as has been said, was directed to Talleyrand, who was to show it in confidence to Sieyès, the great theorist and constitution-maker. Both of these men were as little in favour of the Constitution of that time as Bonaparte himself. The last named was then twenty-eight years of age, and Article 134, to the effect that Directors must have reached the age of forty, was to him particularly obnoxious.*

* According to the testimony of Prince John of Liechtenstein, who

(It needed only a favourable opportunity to bring about the overthrow of this obstacle to his further progress. Should such an one present itself during the winter of 1797-98 Napoleon was prepared to make a Coup d'État against Directory and Constitution. When in the midst of the festivities of the 10th of December a curious spectator fell from the roof of the palace to the ground, the sad occurrence was regarded as an omen of the approaching downfall of the government.

But the authorities were using every means to maintain their friendly relations with Bonaparte. The Directors consulted him upon all questions of foreign policy and accepted his recommendations with a greater or less degree of readiness. Toward the end of December, 1797, there arose in the Papal States a revolt of the democratic elements of the populace under French protection, and this insurrection was forcibly suppressed by the papal troops.) When upon this occasion General Duphot was killed, the Directory, acting upon the counsel of Bonaparte, took advantage of this pretext to advance upon the papal government. Berthier received command from Napoleon to enter Rome, where the rule of Pius VI. was declared at an end and a republican government proclaimed, February 15th, 1798. It is improbable that it was the intention of Bonaparte that these measures should be carried out as far as the deposition of the Pope. The inference is that here the feeling in the Directory was too strong for him to resist.

The Batavian Republic was at this time ruled by federalists, and, the government feeling itself incapable of meeting the heavy demands for money and ships imposed upon it by the alliance with France, the French envoy openly came to the aid of the democratic centralists, who rose into power January 22d, 1798, by means of a Coup d'État similar to that of the 18th Fructidor, and placed themselves absolutely at the disposition of the Directory. Joubert, the favourite of Napoleon, received the command of the Dutch troops.

But it is in respect to relations with Switzerland that Napoleon saw him in Udine, he had, to be sure, even then the appearance of a man of forty.

leon's influence is most clearly seen. While still in Italy he had released the Valtelline from the dominion of the Grisons,—“since, according to the rights of nations under the new liberty, no people could remain subject to another,”—and this territory he had incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic.

The treaty with Austria had delivered into his hands the Frickthal, which belonged to the Canton of Aargau. He now conceived a desire for a thoroughfare through Valais which would facilitate communications between France and Lombardy. This purpose could be achieved if Switzerland could be induced to accept a place like that of the Batavian and the Cisalpine in the circle of dependent republics with which France was to surround herself as a shield against the rest of Europe. Accordingly the democratic element in Switzerland was aroused and supported in opposition to the aristocratic government of the patricians, and the same means were employed which had proved so efficacious in Holland and Venice, in Rome and Milan and Genoa. Upon the solicitation of the democrats of the Canton of Vaud for assistance from the French against the rule of Bern, the Directory willingly granted their request and charged its diplomatic agents in the chief cities throughout Switzerland to fan the flame of the insurgent movement to their utmost.

Bonaparte and Rewbell had contrived with Ochs of Basel, the leader of the democratic centralists, a regular plan of revolution. General Brune invaded the Bernese territory and under the guise of a liberator succeeded in separating the adversaries only to take possession of Bern, March 5th, 1798, whence he delivered to the Directory the “Bernese treasure” consisting of about 25,000,000 francs * besides an immense supply of provisions and munitions of war. A burdensome treaty of alliance with France was then imposed upon the newly-established “Helvetian Republic.” Switzerland had become a French dependency. Of the money seized 3,000,000 francs passed into Napoleon's military chest to be used in defraying the expenses of the projected under-

* According to Dändliker the value of this treasure has been greatly exaggerated. “It actually consisted of about seven millions in money and twelve millions in bonds.” (Short Hist. of Switzerland, 217.)—B.

taking against England, and, according to the statements of Madame de Staël, it was commonly believed that the general had advised this lucrative enterprise as a means to this very end.

But however great the condescension whereby the Directors permitted the victorious general to take part in their deliberations, he was nevertheless without any secure official position such as this influence upon proceedings would appear to denote. Bourrienne affirms that he demanded admittance to the Directory in spite of the Constitution, but was unable to accomplish his purpose. It is not impossible that there was ground for the surmises of the observant that the massing of great bodies of troops at that time was ordered less with a view to the enterprise against England than to the establishment of a dictatorship. Disagreeable scenes took place in the Directory over this question of which something appears to have reached the public, for the Prussian envoy reports that the populace of Paris were already asking one another what the general was doing so long in the capital and why he did not set sail for England.

Napoleon had thus not only failed of securing a position at the head of the government, but he was at the same time running great danger of seeing the glory of his former triumphs wane in the light of every-day existence, and of losing, by continued inaction, the popularity which he had acquired. He recognized that, for the present at least, there was no hope of a successful issue to a Coup d'État. Hated as the Directors were by the people, he was himself far from being beloved to such an extent as to be able to rely upon his popularity in a struggle against them. His chief concern must be to "keep his glory warm," to use his own expression. In view of the inefficiency of the French navy a landing in England seemed to him too hazardous a venture. Even later, in 1805, he again eagerly availed himself of the occasion furnished by the coalition to lead his forces elsewhere. He much preferred a return to his former plan of a campaign in the Orient. "I will not remain here," he said to Bourrienne, "there is nothing to be done. I see that if I stay it will be but a short time before I am done for. Everything wastes away here below.

I am already bereft of my glory. This little Europe has not enough to offer. The Orient is the place to go. All great reputations have been made there.* I mean, however, to make a tour of inspection of the northern coast in order to convince myself as to what may be ventured. If I see reason to doubt the success of a landing in England, as I fear may be the case, the Army of England will become the Army of the Orient and I shall go to Egypt."

On February 8th, 1798, the proposed journey along the coast was undertaken. It was soon completed. Bonaparte easily satisfied himself of the present impracticability of the enterprise, and upon his return tried to bring the Directory to the same conclusion.

In two memorials of February 23d he demonstrates that a landing in England without having first secured the mastery of the seas would be a most difficult and daring measure, which, if achievable, could only be accomplished during the long nights and consequently not before the coming autumn. Meanwhile—as he explains in a later communication bearing date of April 13th—the expedition on the Mediterranean with Egypt as its destination might be undertaken which would compel the English to detach a part of their Channel fleet to send to India and the Red Sea. Meantime the forces in the northern ports of France could be increased to a considerable army, so that a landing in November or December with 40,000 men might be possible.

The Directory, with a feeling of relief, at once decided in favour of the expedition to the Levant, and on the 12th of April sent to Napoleon the commission, drawn up by himself, appointing him General-in-chief of the Army of the Orient. He was authorized and commissioned to take possession of Malta and Egypt, and to drive the English from their possessions as far as he was able to reach them, but particularly from the Red Sea, and he was to cut through the Isthmus of Suez in order

* While still in Italy he had spoken to Bourrienne in a similar way: "Europe is nothing but a mole-hill; it is only in the Orient that there have been great empires and mighty revolutions, there where 600,000,000 people live."

to assure to the French the possession of that sea. Until his return a substitute should take his place in command of the army destined to make war upon England directly, for it was a matter of course that, upon the termination of the Egyptian expedition, he should reassume command of the combined forces directed against the British. At Toulon he apostrophized the troops of the expedition in these words: "You are one wing of the Army of England!" and in his official orders issued at the end of April he styles himself: "General-in-chief of the Army of England."

The die, then, was cast. "I do not know what would have become of me," he said later to Madame de Rémusat, "if I had not had the happy idea of going to Egypt." Two of the greatest minds of his age have tried to answer this question: "Had he remained in France," says Madame de Staël, "the Directory would have launched against him calumnies without number by means of all the newspapers under their control, and would have dimmed his exploits in the minds of the idle. Bonaparte would have been reduced to powder even before the thunderbolt had struck him." According to Beyle, things might have resulted even worse: "Napoleon lent himself to this project, impelled by the double fear of being forgotten or being poisoned." This is doubtless exaggeration, but in any case the Egyptian expedition seemed to have been undertaken because the Directory and Bonaparte were antagonistic and yet could not attempt an encounter to decide the question of supremacy. The Directory sought a means of disencumbering itself of a dangerous rival, while Bonaparte was trying to avoid the loss of all authority; he was resolved upon increasing it by the acquisition of new glory, and to renew the combat with the Directory when a favourable moment should present. His genius at once perceived all the advantages offered him by the new combination, and, with characteristic energy, he proceeded to execute the mission consigned to him.

He set about his preparations with a zeal such as had never before been seen in him by those who were about him, and his arrangements were made upon so vast a scale as to guarantee

the result and to incur no risk to the renown of the general in command. This was no longer the modest expedition which could easily be undertaken by 25,000 men with a few frigates. The expedition to the Orient was begun with an army of 40,000 of the best soldiers, embarked upon one of the greatest fleets which had ever been equipped by France, and which was designed to assure to the Republic the supremacy on the Mediterranean. The general was accompanied by a staff of a hundred and twenty scholars, mechanicians, and engineers, among whom figured Monge and Berthollet, who were to make scientific investigations in that distant country, to prepare the way for projected colonization and to open the necessary waterways. Talleyrand was to follow a little later to enter upon direct negotiations with the Porte and convince the Sultan that the expedition was in nowise aimed against him, but solely against the Mamelukes, who, despising his suzerainty, were governing Egypt like independent princes. A library was selected to be carried on the expedition, and among these books were Ossian, Tasso's "Jerusalem Delivered," Homer and Virgil, Rousseau's "Nouvelle Héloïse" and Goethe's "Werther." It is characteristic and interesting to note that the Bible, the Koran, and the Vedas were grouped with the works of Montesquieu under the head of "Politics." History was prominent in the collection. Naturally Plutarch's "Lives" were there as well as the Anabasis, Arrian's "Alexander," and Raynal's "Histoire philosophique des deux Indes." The deep and lasting impression made on Napoleon by this work has already been observed. The passage referring to Egypt had doubtless been of particular interest to him. It reads: "At sight of a region situated between two seas, of which one is the gate of the Orient and the other the gate of the Occident, Alexander formed the project of establishing the seat of his empire in Egypt and of making it the centre of the world's commerce. This prince, the most enlightened of conquerors, recognized that, if there were a means of cementing the union of the conquests which he had already made and those which he proposed to himself, it would be in a country which nature seemed, so to speak, to

have attached to the point of junction between Africa and Asia to bind them to Europe."

It would be easy to prove that the designs of the great Macedonian now engrossed the attention of Napoleon with special vigour and tempted him to imitate, to surpass his predecessor. His imagination soared aloft, but we know how he controlled it. "I always have two strings to my bow," was a customary phrase with him. And thus in the midst of his vast conceptions he did not overlook what lay at hand to be achieved. To Bourrienne, who asked him how long he expected to remain in Egypt, he replied: "A few months or six years, everything depends upon the outcome of events." And in fact as matters then stood it was but too probable that within "a few months" a new war would break out in Europe which would of necessity recall his name to popular remembrance. For the progress made by the spirit of revolution in Italy and the republicanization of the Papal States had approached near enough to Tuscany and Naples to appear threatening, and the probability was only too strong that Austria would extend her protection to the ruling princes of those countries, they being related to the House of Habsburg, and thus at the same time defend her own interests.

Moreover, Russia would of course resent the interference of France in the Eastern question. It would be a mistake to attribute to Bonaparte the introduction of this policy. France had begun her system of revolutionizing her neighbours long before the young general had acquired the slightest influence upon affairs.* But there can be no doubt that he now secretly advocated it in the selfish hope that the difficulties accruing to the Directory through war with a new coalition would bring that body into discredit, apparently necessitate his own return

* The perspicacious Mallet du Pan wrote to Vienna as early as May 25th, 1796: "In all countries which they do not care to retain they will sow the seed of republicanism, declare themselves allies of every State which will imitate the example set by France, and provoke such imitation in every possible way; they flatter themselves by the use of such means to achieve in a short time what has been, ever since 1792, one of the first and most important aims of the war."

to France, and elevate his power and authority to a position whence he hoped to grasp the reins of government. To this end France must be beaten in Europe, while he should be winning fresh laurels to his name in the Orient; such was the aim of his unpatriotic ambition. This was the occasion also for removing all the best soldiers and ablest generals. He said to his brother Joseph: "I start for the Orient with every means for achieving success; if my country needs me, if the number increases of those who think as do Talleyrand, Sieyès, and Roederer, if war breaks out and is not auspicious to France, then I shall return, surer than now of public opinion. If, on the contrary, the war is favourable to the Republic, if a new warrior like myself should arise and gather about him the hopes of the people, well! I may perhaps still render greater service to the world, in the Orient, than he!"

But while he still tarried in Paris the first indications of new complications on the Continent became apparent. At Rastatt the Austrian envoy had opposed the demand of the Directory for the cession of the entire left bank of the Rhine, and in Vienna Bernadotte, who represented France, had offended the court and incited the populace to an uprising on account of which he was obliged to leave the country. The situation looked serious. War was imminent. Napoleon hesitated and delayed his departure. If report is to be believed, his thoughts turned again for a moment to a Coup d'État and dictatorship. But in spite of all peace was preserved, and in the night of May 3d Napoleon left Paris to embark at Toulon, urged to departure by the anxious Directors, who preferred to feel that this ambitious schemer was in Africa.

The preparations in the port of Toulon had been prosecuted with the greatest zeal. The actual destination of the expedition was known to but few. It is true there had been much talk of Egypt and the newspapers had commented upon it, but precisely for this reason no one believed in the genuineness of a venture which would place at a distance the best general in the French army at a time so critical. And yet such was really the case. On the 19th of May, 1798, the fleet weighed anchor with a part of

the expeditionary troops on board, the General-in-chief being on the flag-ship "Orient." At the same hour the divisions of Baraguay d'Hilliers, Vaubois, and Desaix sailed from Genoa, Ajaccio, and Civita Vecchia to join the squadron from Toulon, and the combined forces made an imposing armament of fifteen ships of the line, as many frigates, seven corvettes, and over thirty smaller war-vessels carrying all together two thousand guns as protection to the four hundred transports conveying the expeditionary troops.

Among the generals of division who took part in this campaign, in addition to those already mentioned, were Kléber, Menou, Reynier, and Dugua, while among the brigadier-generals were the bearers of those names which were later to be made so glorious, Lannes, Davout, Murat, Andréossy, and others; at that time Marmont, Junot, Lefebvre and Bessières still ornamented the rank of colonel.

The chief danger to the expedition lay from the English, who had, it is true, some time before withdrawn their fleet from the Mediterranean to the Channel as a protection to their own coast against the landing of the French, but since that time the ships at Toulon had attracted their attention, and the decision had just been reached to send a squadron under Admiral Nelson to observe them. Napoleon was totally unaware of this proceeding. Fortunately for him, Nelson was driven by a storm from his ambush a few days before the departure of the French fleet, and returned to his hiding-place only after they had made their way out of the harbour he was watching. Doubtful whither they had gone, he sought them in Sicily and Naples, while they had already captured the first important halting-place on their journey,—Malta.

A year previous French agents had bribed certain of the Knights of the Order of St. John which had been in possession of the island since the time of Charles V. The Grand-master, Herr von Hompesch, was an incapable and short-sighted man, whose faculties deserted him completely on this occasion; he made no attempt at resistance to Napoleon, and on June 13th, 1798, he yielded to him the strong fortifications of La Vallette without even

an effort to hold them until the arrival of succour from the British. It was scarcely an honourable capitulation—a word which, by the way, Napoleon avoided using in the articles of rendition, in order, as he sarcastically observed, not to employ a term which would sound harshly to the ears of an Order once so celebrated for its martial valour. The property of the Knights was confiscated, while they themselves, provided with scanty pensions, were compelled to leave the island; some of them joined the army of the conqueror. The Order itself was placed under the suzerainty of Naples and under the protectorate of the Czar of Russia. In accomplishing its annihilation Bonaparte counted doubtless upon thus hastening the conflagration with which Europe was already menaced.

Leaving at Malta a suitable garrison, Napoleon set sail toward the East, and while off Candia received his first intimation of the fact that he was being pursued by a powerful English squadron. This was entirely out of keeping with his designs, for not only the Egyptian expedition, but also the future invasion of England was based upon the supposition that the French fleet was to remain mistress of the Mediterranean at least until the vanquishers of the Mamelukes should be brought back to France. It was now all-important to evade the pursuing enemy and reach Alexandria with these hundreds of transport ships. On this occasion Bonaparte made it evident that if in his boyhood he had, according to his inclination, been appointed to the marine service, he would have furnished France with a most efficient admiral. By sailing close to the southern shore of Candia he eluded the vigilance of the pursuer and thus escaped the threatening danger. Nelson, having failed to come upon the object of his quest in the Gulf of Naples, had decided to direct his course to Egypt. Sailing along the coast of Africa, he, in his zeal to overtake the enemy, outstripped the French and arrived ahead of them in Alexandria. Finding that roadstead empty he at once hastened away again, this time setting his helm for Syria. Immediately after his departure the French fleet arrived in Egypt, July 1st, and had time to land the expeditionary troops.

While still on the high seas, on the 22d of June, the com-

mander-in-chief had issued a proclamation to his soldiers preparing them for the task which awaited them. "Soldiers," said he to them, "you are about to undertake a conquest the effects of which will be incalculable upon the situation and commerce of the world. You will deal to England the most certain and terrible blow while awaiting the hour in which you may inflict her death-stroke. We shall have some fatiguing marches to make, we shall fight a number of battles, we shall succeed in all our enterprises; fortune is with us. . . ." He admonished them to respect the religion of the Mohammedans and their muf-tis, adding: "The people whom we are about to encounter treat woman differently from what we do; but, in any country, he who violates is a monster. Pillage enriches but a few; it dishonours us, it destroys our resources, it makes hostile to us those whom it is to our interest to have as friends. The first city to which we come was built by Alexander. We shall find at every step reminders of great deeds worthy to excite the emulation of the French." Many of his soldiers doubtless understood him better when in Toulon he made the promise of enough money to each of them, upon the return of the expedition, to buy six acres of land.

Bonaparte, having taken Alexandria on the 2d of July, likewise addressed himself to the inhabitants of the country. In a proclamation rendered into the Arabic he represented himself as the friend of the Sultan come to destroy his enemies the Mamelukes and to deliver the Egyptian people from their tyranny. He proclaimed the equality of all men before God the same God whom he recognized in the Koran; and in order to awaken more completely the confidence of the population and counteract the precepts of the Koran which forbade submission to any nation not of the faithful, he declared that the French were true Mussulmans, and adduced in evidence the fact that they had vanquished the Pope and annihilated the Knights of Malta. All this was hardly likely to make any great impression upon the dull sensibilities of the Fellaheen. They submitted to the new invasion as to any other domination. The actual enemy with which Bonaparte had to contend was the cavalry of the Mamelukes.

Originally in the twelfth century only a body-guard of the Caliph, created of slaves purchased for the purpose, the Mamelukes soon possessed themselves of the mastery of Egypt, which advantage they retained until overcome in the sixteenth century by the Ottomans, when Selim I. committed the administration of affairs of the country, as a Turkish province, to twenty-four of their chieftains. Each of these Beys commanded a considerable body of horse, and as the Turkish power began to wane the position of these Beys became more and more independent until the authority of the Sultan dwindled to a mere name. At the time when Bonaparte took up arms against them their two generals, Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey, commanded over 8000 splendidly equipped and practised horsemen, who were dexterous in the use of sabre, lance, and firearms, but of other troops there were none. Infantry and artillery were entirely lacking, except that the small flotilla on the Nile carried a few cannon. These were circumstances, coupled with the fourfold superiority in numbers of the French, to leave little room for doubt as to the issue of the campaign in favour of the invaders. The real difficulties arose from other causes.

First among these was disheartening disappointment. Alexandria fell far short of all expectations. Not more than a twelfth part remained of the metropolis of civilization to which the Macedonian hero had given his name, the rest had fallen away into ruin and dirt. And when, on July 7th, Napoleon broke camp to proceed to Cairo, choosing the more direct way across the desert instead of the longer and easier route via Rosetta and along the Nile, the suffering from hunger, thirst, and heat was so great that the artfully cherished visions of an Eastern paradise suddenly vanished. The soldiers grumbled, threatened to turn back, and reviled the scholars to whom alone they imputed the blame of the deception practised upon them. In the Fellah villages there was no trace of civilization; grain there was in abundance, but neither mills nor ovens, and for drink there was nothing to offer but slimy cistern-water. Many of the soldiers perished with thirst, while terrible homesickness prevailed in the ranks and was the cause of frequent suicide; even the superior

officers felt the demoralization. At length the Nile was reached at Ramanieh, but there the enemy, roving about in detached bands, began to harass the divisions, so that progress could be made only by forming hollow squares and marching thus with the cavalry in the centre. At Shebreket they came upon the bulk of the army of Murad Bey. The two flotillas on the Nile joined battle; Murad made two ineffectual attacks and then withdrew.*

It was not until the Pyramids came in sight on July 19th, at Om Dinar, three miles from Cairo, that a serious engagement took place. With toil and hardship, marching only in the early morning hours from two to nine, the French reached Embabeh, the place where Murad had intrenched himself, and now, on the 21st of July, offered battle with something over 5000 horsemen and a troop of Fellaheen against the French forces numbering five times as many as his command. It was scarcely necessary to excite the fervour of the Republican troops by pronouncing those celebrated words: "Soldiers, from the summit of these Pyramids forty centuries are looking down upon you!"

The superiority of their numbers alone made a victory seem easy, and the longing to escape from the desert increased their ardour for battle. The issue was the only one possible. Bonaparte's five divisions formed at once in squares six men deep, with the cannon at the corners, the staff and baggage in the middle. Murad threw himself impetuously upon that of Desaix. Repulsed here, the Mameluke renewed his attack upon the

* One example, taken from many, will serve to show the extent to which the deeds of the Army of the Orient were exaggerated by the time they reached the Directory at Paris in Napoleon's reports. Marmont, in his *Mémoires*, mentions only four or five Mamelukes at Shebreket who with mad impetuosity rushed upon one of the squares and were cut down. There were unquestionably more than that, but in a letter written by Bonaparte to Menou, who had remained in Alexandria, the number had already increased to fifty, and in his report to the Directory, dated July 24th, 1798, it had become nothing less than a "battle at Shebreket" wherein three hundred of the enemy were slain. At a later day he frankly said that a statesman must understand lying to perfection, and the negotiator of Udine and Passariano was a statesman.

divisions of Reynier and of Dugua (wherein Napoleon had taken his position), with the same lack of success. Then he galloped away.

His camp at Embabeh fell after a short resistance into the hands of the conquerors, who derived from it a rich harvest. Ibrahim, who had been posted on the farther side of the Nile, at Boulak, with a portion of the Mameluke army, abandoned his position and withdrew eastward to the borders of the Syrian desert. The battle of the Pyramids delivered Cairo into the hands of the French. On the 22d of July, Napoleon took up his headquarters in Murad's palace.

Hitherto the complaints of the troops had been met with the promise of consolation for their pains in the booty which Cairo with its splendour and treasures was to afford. What they found in this city of 300,000 inhabitants proved only another disappointment. Provisions could be obtained for money, but there was no vestige of the abundance and good cheer which had been counted upon; everything, even to the deserted Mameluke quarter, bespoke only poverty and squalor. Discontent in the army increased. The many letters written home by soldiers and officers in their dejection, which were seized and published by the English, testify to the spirit of dissatisfaction which was making itself felt. Bonaparte had all he could do with punishing, appeasing, and promising, besides the thousand details of organization and administration, with the dispositions to be taken necessary for the reduction of the enemy, who had withdrawn only to renew the charge with fresh forces. And what added greatly to his cares was the entire lack of tidings from Europe, while from Alexandria came news of crushing disaster: on August 1st the English fleet under Nelson had reappeared on the Egyptian coast and totally overwhelmed that of the French in the roadstead of Aboukir.

Bonaparte in leaving the squadron under Admiral Brueys had instructed him to convey the fleet into the old harbour of Alexandria provided it were of sufficient depth; if not, he was to occupy a secure position in the roadstead of Aboukir, or, if

this should prove impossible, he was to leave the transports and sail for Corfu. Brueys found the entrance to the harbour impassable, and anchored at Aboukir in a position which he deemed strong enough to withstand attack of the enemy. In a letter to Bonaparte dated July 20th he even declared it impregnable, since he was protected on one side by the coast defences and no hostile ship could take up its position between him and the land. The error was a fatal one. On August 1st Nelson appeared with his squadron. He had until this time been seeking eagerly and excitedly, but in vain, for a trace of the enemy, and now rushed without delay upon the French ships, a large portion of the crews of which were not on board. It now became evident that Brueys' position was quite open to attack and that the English ships of the line, though fewer in number, were manœuvred with such skill and audacious courage as to enable them in spite of everything to push between their enemy and the coast. Caught between two fires, the French vessels succumbed one after another notwithstanding all the heroism of their defenders. Brueys atoned for his mistake with his life. The "Orient" blew up with him and all his crew; the valiant warriors met their death shouting, "Vive la République!" It was such a victory as had never before been won on the sea. Only two ships of the line and two frigates were saved by the rear-admiral, Villeneuve, in the flight. Two others had been previously towed into the harbour. Everything else was destroyed or in the hands of the enemy.

Bonaparte received the tidings on his return from a march eastward in pursuit of Ibrahim, while he at the same time entered upon negotiations with Murad, though the latter were without result. He was in Marmont's tent when the news was brought to him, and at first received the message with perfect composure; he even began then and there to estimate its significance. In his *Mémoires* Marmont records the words of his superior on this occasion. "Here we are now," said he, "cut off from the mother country. . . . We have got to be sufficient unto ourselves. Egypt was once a powerful kingdom. . . . What a point of vantage this position would be in offensive warfare

against the English! What a point of departure for the conquests which the possible disintegration of the Ottoman Empire may bring within our reach! We are perhaps destined to change the face of the Orient and to inscribe our names beside those recalled to our remembrance with the greatest radiancy by ancient and mediæval history. . . . This is the hour when characters of a superior order should show themselves."

These were spirited words and they did not fail of their effect. They did not, however, express the whole of the impression produced upon the commander of the expedition by the information just received. The loss of the fleet had been more of a blow to him than he had allowed himself to show. His intention, as we know, had been to conquer Egypt, and, having secured its possession, to return to France if meanwhile the fortunes of the new Continental war should have been of such a character as to enhance the value of his sword in the mind of the nation. In Bourrienne's *Mémoires* we read: "According to what General Bonaparte said to me before receipt of the news of the 1st of August, he intended, the possession of Egypt once assured, to start again for Toulon with this fleet, which with its mission accomplished was thenceforth useless; to send thence troops and provisions of every kind to Egypt and to unite the fleet with all the forces which the government should have collected for use against England, . . . to which France would then be superior. . . . The loss of the navy shattered all these schemes."* Its further consequences were even more serious; it even put in jeopardy the position of the French in Egypt.

Napoleon had been in hopes that the Sultan might be deceived as to the character of his expedition, or at least that he

* Bourrienne was at that time as little as Napoleon in a position to know that the Directory had already renounced the plan of making the projected invasion in the following autumn, and had sent the ships stationed in the northern ports to the help of the Irish, who had revolted against England at the end of May, 1798. This enterprise entailed nothing but losses to the French. Dispersed in separate expeditions, some of the ships were lost, others were driven out of their course. A new concentration of the maritime forces in the north was for the present entirely out of the question.

could be prevented from interfering. This was to have been Talleyrand's task, but since the appearance of the English in the Mediterranean he had lost courage for the enterprise and transferred the office to the envoy in Constantinople. The Sultan wavered for a long time between friendship with the Republic and an alliance with Russia, which was offered him by the Czar Paul I., whose political sphere of action was likewise disturbed by the French intervention in the Orient and the seizure of Malta. Just at this critical juncture news arrived on the Bosphorus of the destruction of the French fleet and decided the question in favour of the Russian alliance. What had been counted impossible was accomplished; Turkey, wishing to defend her rights of suzerainty against the invader in Egypt and the Ionian Isles, had been won over by Russia. On September 1st the Porte declared war against France.

Bonaparte, who was now cut off from all tidings of events, did not at once learn of this turn of affairs. But he soon suspected it. Immediately upon his arrival in Egypt he had made offers of friendship to Achmed Pasha, Grand Vizier and Lieutenant-Governor of Syria, who was surnamed Jezzar, the Slaughterer, on account of his cruelty; to him Bonaparte represented the object of his mission as being none other than the protection of French commercial interests against the Mamelukes. No reply had been received to these letters. On the other hand he learned in the early part of October that the Porte had ordered the arrest of French consuls everywhere. But he still had no certain knowledge of the attitude of Turkey, and until he was definitely informed he could not think of leaving Egypt. If advices should prove of unfavourable character, the task before him would be a double one; he should have to defend his recently acquired position not only against the hostility of the Arab population and the forces of the Mamelukes, but also against the rightful lord of the land—the Sultan. After the defeat of his fleet at Aboukir, which naturally had made a bad impression at home, he stood in need of fresh triumphs to efface the remembrance of that disaster; the laurels which he had won in the battle of the Pyramids, even when the loss of the

enemy had been multiplied by ten, were insufficient to maintain his personal renown. And yet he had come to Egypt only to increase his fame while waiting for the war on the Continent to open to him a new field of action! On the 18th of September he wrote to the Directory: "I am awaiting news from Constantinople; I cannot be at home, as I promised you, by October, but the delay will be only for a few months."

During this time of anxious waiting Bonaparte had opportunity to convince himself that the Egyptian people submitted only with great reluctance to foreign rule and that his professed sympathy with Islam was of little avail. In October the inhabitants of Cairo revolted. The insurrection was occasioned by the rumour that the Sultan had declared war against France, that Jezzar was advancing from Syria, that the French were going to be compelled to withdraw, but were resolved first to set fire to the city. The populace assaulted the French in their houses and killed a number of them, among others twenty-five sick or wounded soldiers. The masses armed themselves and organized a revolt. Napoleon at first attempted to pacify the insurgents by the use of gentle means. When these failed he ordered the rebellious quarter surrounded and bombarded. The uprising was soon at an end. To insure himself against repetition of the offence he ordered the immediate decapitation of a number of prisoners. "That will serve as a lesson to them," he wrote to his generals. He had supposed that he could accomplish his ends with mild measures, but with these people intimidation alone was effective.

The time of quiet following these terroristic measures was employed in the development of the organization of the interior. The scholars who had accompanied the expedition, with certain officers of education, such as Caffarelli and Andréossy, founded an "Institute," at which they read papers on the subject of cultivation of the country. These papers were published in a periodical entitled "*La Décade Égyptienne*," while political and local news were reported in "*Le Courrier d'Égypte*." The first session of the Institute was held on October 23d. Bonaparte himself on that occasion proposed a series of questions the study

of which was committed to different sections of the organization. The sessions were held every five days. It was here that the materials were brought together for the imposing scientific production which began to be published ten years later. This work, wherein the foundations were laid for the scientific study of Egypt in all its aspects, constitutes a title to imperishable honour for the man who made it possible by his energy and the interest which he gave to it. The best possible feeling prevailed between the members of the Institute and its president. Upon a single occasion, as is reported by an officer of the expedition, Bonaparte got into a dispute with Berthollet and allowed his anger to overmaster him upon being repeatedly contradicted by the latter, whereupon the great chemist observed: "You are in the wrong, my friend, for you are getting uncivil." When upon this Desgenettes, the chief surgeon, took sides with the naturalist, Napoleon broke forth: "I can see plainly enough that an understanding exists between you all. Chemistry is the kitchen department of medicine, which is itself the science of murderers." To which Desgenettes coolly replied: "And how do you define the art of the conqueror, Citizen General?"

Since he could look for no further supplies of money from home, Bonaparte had recourse to the wealth of the rich Arabs. One is reminded of the art of financiering as practised by Mephistopheles in "Faust" when one hears that the French commander was continually searching for hidden treasure and in the interim ordered the manufacture of 100,000 francs in paper money. The need for money was real, for a new campaign was about to be entered upon.

The tidings of the declaration of war by Turkey, which had been the cause of the Cairo revolt in October, were later substantiated, but the report of the advance of Jezzar proved to have been premature. In December, 1798, Bonaparte went to Suez to make a search for traces of the old canal, and to investigate into the actuality of the miracles of Moses; there he received the information that the troops of Achmed Pasha had made an incursion into Egypt and had established themselves in the frontier fortress of El Arish. He at once made prepara-

tions for taking the offensive in Syria. The opportunity had now come for winning new victories, and he seized it with ardour. His own tranquillity of mind was contributed to by the news brought by a Frenchman who had reached Alexandria on a merchantman from Ragusa: the negotiations at Rastatt were still pending and only Naples was at war with France. This was exactly in accordance with Napoleon's wishes: to be assured that the great Continental war had not yet burst into flame and yet at the same time to realize the probability that, kindled by the contest with Naples, it would not be long before it would break out generally. It was his intention to return then to France, and of this he openly informed the Directory in a letter of February 10th, 1799, written before he set out for Syria.

In the same letter he made known the plan which he was following in penetrating into Syria: he meant not only to repulse the invasion and by means of fortifications on the frontier to prevent any co-operation between the Syrian army and a second which would probably land on the Delta, but, in addition, once he had acquired possession of Syria, to take advantage of it to exercise some pressure upon Turkey. The Syrian expedition was thus designed to restore the political ascendancy lost through the destruction of the fleet. Whether his designs extended still further may be inferred from the fact that on January 25th he had written to Tippo Sahib, Sultan of Mysore and sworn enemy of England, inviting him to enter into relations with himself. Toward the Shah of Persia also he had made some advances in regard to the necessary halting-places on a march to India. Five years afterwards he said to Madame de Rémusat: "In Egypt I felt myself freed from the shackles of a restricting civilization; I dreamed all sorts of things, and I saw means of executing all that I had dreamed. I created a religion, I saw myself on the way to Asia, mounted upon an elephant, a turban on my head, and in my hand a new Koran which I had composed to my own liking. I should have brought together in my undertakings the experiences of the two worlds, gathering to my own profit from the history of all countries, attacking the power of England in India, and by means of this conquest

renewing my relations with ancient Europe." His imagination following in the footprints of his great predecessors was evidently inexhaustible in its projects. But in a historical narration it is not permissible to attach too great weight to such fantasies. For even when indulging in these dreams calm reason was ever at hand and ready to assert itself. He told Bourrienne in confidence that he should not venture upon the expedition to India unless Egypt were first made secure and he could leave 15,000 men there while pursuing his march with 30,000 more. Since these prerequisites were lacking he was obliged to content himself with the Syrian campaign. "He himself felt keenly," observed his confidant in his *Mémoires*, "that all these projects were too little in accord with our means, the weakness of the government, and the distaste already evinced by the army to these deserts."

The conquest of the Holy Land was undertaken with four divisions (about 13,000 men), under Kléber, Reynier, Lannes, and Bon. On February 20th the garrison at El Arish was led to capitulate, being granted the right of withdrawal without molestation, and on the 24th the advance-guard reached Palestine, where the troops could refresh themselves, having been driven nearly to desperation by thirst and heat and a parching wind which kept them on their march in the midst of a cloud of sand. Gaza soon fell into their hands, no determined resistance being shown by the few thousand men who were its defenders, and on the 4th of March the fortified city of Jaffa was invested by the French. And here was the beginning of more obstinate resistance. The French officer sent to negotiate terms with the garrison was beheaded by order of the Turkish commander of the place, and the ardour for battle on the part of the expeditionary troops was thereby goaded to reckless fury. By March 7th their batteries, consisting only of light field-pieces, had made breaches in the walls, and the fortress was at once stormed and taken. Hereupon followed a general massacre in the streets of all that fell into the hands of the victors. Of the garrison, originally 4000 men strong, 1000 had already been killed. The others retired, fighting their way, to a caravansary. Upon the appear-

ance of two of Bonaparte's aides-de-camp; the besieged Turks offered from this refuge to surrender on condition that their lives should be spared, to which condition the officers agreed without waiting to obtain further orders, to the extreme chagrin of the commander-in-chief, to whom the great number of prisoners was the cause of no small embarrassment. To send them to Egypt was impossible on account of the necessary escort; to release them would mean only to strengthen the enemy; to divide and maintain them offered difficulties no less considerable; the French soldiers grumbled at being obliged to share their bread with the murderers of the negotiator; the generals, in a council of war held to decide the question, voted unanimously to allow that law of war to take its course which forfeits the lives of defenders of a fortress taken by assault. Bonaparte considered the question for three days before approving the decision of his officers. Finally the prisoners were taken to the beach and massacred in a body.

History has condemned this horrible act, but military writers have declared it justifiable.* But certainly this can apply only in so far as concerns the garrison of Jaffa, who were taken in the assault with arms in their hands after having rejected every manner of capitulation. These were, however, according to report, not the only ones who were put to the sword. In addition 800 militiamen from the garrison of El Arish were murdered with them. To these the promise of unmolested withdrawal had been made, but, in the end, not kept, for fear that they should go to strengthen the enemy. If this be true, it is an abomination such as no argument of military usage can excuse.†

* For example, Yorek, in his recently published book on "Napoleon als Feldherr" (I. 132), says: "History of a pedantic order has been shocked and horrified at this deed; from a military standpoint the question wears a very different aspect. The welfare of his own army, and with it the possibility of winning a victory, must precede all other considerations in the mind of the commander. If the proceeding were necessary to the safety of his army, not only was the act in this case justified, but its repetition in a future war would be the same, and any convention would be powerless to make any change in the matter."

† A staff-officer in the expeditionary army relates: "Contrary to the terms of the capitulation, the prisoners from El Arish had been dragged

On the 19th of March Bonaparte encamped before Acre. The fortress differed apparently but little from those of the easily conquered El Arish and Jaffa. A superficial reconnoissance of its works yielded a similar impression, and since the heavy artillery which had been ordered sent on from Alexandria had not yet arrived,—if, indeed, it ever should succeed in escaping the English cruisers,—the commander-in-chief began this siege with the same means which had proved sufficient in the former cases. But at Acre the result was to be a different one. The works were much better adapted to effectual resistance, being provided with a counterscarp behind the outer walls. In addition, the English rear-admiral, Sir Sidney Smith, was in the offing with several ships whence he furnished the fortress with provisions and means of defence, and sent to Jezzar a capable officer of engineers who conducted the defence. By a strange coincidence that officer was Picard de Phélippeaux, a fellow student of Bonaparte's at the Paris "École Militaire." These two men who had sat together on the same bench at school were now opposed to one another at this moment so significant in the world's history, the Corsican in the service of France, the Frenchman as the instrument of the English.

The speedy conquest of this place was very important for Bonaparte, for war had now really broken out on the Continent. In March he received from the Directory a despatch of November 4th, 1798,* which confirmed the report that the Neapolitan

along in the train of the army; Bonaparte feared that instead of going to Bagdad they would go to Jaffa or to Acre, where they would have reinforced the enemy. After the taking of Jaffa these militiamen protested and became unruly. Bonaparte, said they, had no further occasion to fear their going to Jaffa, he ought to let them depart according to agreement. Still he could not make up his mind to permit this, and as he had resolved upon ridding himself of the prisoners made at Jaffa, he secretly ordered those from El Arish included with the others, and had them all massacred together on the 10th of March." (*Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine*, XXXVI. 141.)

This account would agree with Bourrienne's statement, giving the number of the victims at about 4000,—3000 men of the Jaffa garrison, with the 800 militiamen.

* Since the battle of Aboukir, and in consequence of the constant

forces were about to take the field under command of Austrian generals (Mack and Sachsen), which was at the same time an indication of the renewal of hostilities on the part of Austria. Further, that an Austrian detachment had penetrated the Grisons, thus violating the neutrality of Switzerland, the ally of France. To meet these complications the Directory had ordered a levy of 200,000 men and given to General Jourdan the command of the Army of the Rhine, and to Joubert that of the Army of Italy, where presumably the decisive blows were to be dealt. Bonaparte himself was to act according to circumstances and the dictation of his own judgment. The Directory not being in a position to give him any support, it would refrain also from giving him any commands or instructions. The despatch closed with the words: "Since a return to France appears to be difficult of achievement at the present juncture, three alternatives seem to offer among which you can choose: to remain in Egypt and so establish yourself as to be safe against all attacks of the Turks,—in which case, as you are aware, the fact must be taken into consideration that there are seasons there extremely calamitous to Europeans, especially if without aid from the mother country; to penetrate into India, where, on your arrival, there is no question but that you would find men ready to unite with you to accomplish the overthrow of British domination; or, finally, to march toward Constantinople against the enemy which threatens you." This letter was accompanied by newspapers dated as late as February, which the consul at Genoa had given the courier to take with him and which told of war actually broken out between France and Naples and Sardinia, and of the advance of the Russians toward Italy.

Much impressed by these tidings, and disregarding the pro-cruising about of English ships, intercourse with France had been made extremely difficult, especially when, after Turkey's declaration of war, the Barbary States also assumed a hostile attitude and communication between Tripoli and Egypt became altogether unsafe. This despatch had reached Alexandria in safety by means of a Genoese transport-ship; but how many letters fell into the hands of the English is evidenced by the two volumes of the "Correspondence of the French Army in Egypt" which appeared in London in 1799.

tests of Kléber, Bonaparte, toward the end of March, 1799, ordered the storming of Acre with all possible speed. Only this "heap of stones" more to conquer, and then—covered with the glory of having outshone the crusaders—away to Europe, alone, where the Directory, as their letter shows, are undertaking a war with very little confidence of success. These were his reflections. Moreover, when leaving Cairo he had announced to Bourrienne that if he received in March tidings that France was at war against the coalition, he should depart at once. These tidings had reached him, and immediately he told General Dommartin in confidence that he counted upon returning to France with a certain number of generals and higher officers. He needed then only to acquire a little glory before taking his departure.

But Acre resisted all attempts. The assault was repulsed, and the result heightened the self-confidence of the besieged. Good artillery manned by English gunners inflicted serious losses upon the French; Albanian sharpshooters threatened the slightest indiscretion with certain death; Caffarelli, the excellent general of engineers, died of a wound received in the trenches; the besiegers were kept constantly on the alert by frequent sorties. To add to their difficulties, an army of relief organized in Damascus was hastening to the aid of the besieged and had already crossed the Jordan. Kléber's division, which was sent out against it, was soon surrounded by forces twenty times as many as his, and in spite of the heroism of his soldiers they were in a most critical situation. Napoleon had to go to their assistance, and on the 16th of April, by means of a brilliant feat of arms, he was successful in routing the enemy at the foot of Mount Tabor. Murat then drove the remainder back across the Jordan.

Meanwhile the work of the besiegers had been pushed vigorously forward. Mines had been laid, but with insignificant results. The assault had been again and again renewed, but all in vain. Finally the point of attack was changed with no better success than before. At command of Phélippeaux a second "enceinte" was constructed within the fortress and the

streets barricaded. An assault on May 8th, 1799, undertaken with unparalleled gallantry, broke upon this accumulation of defences, and only a few hundred of the most foolhardy grenadiers reached the interior of the city, where they were obliged in the end to give themselves up to the English. It was not long before pestilence began to spread in the French camp, ammunition was growing scarce, and, as if to take from Napoleon his last ray of hope of success, a Turkish squadron landed reinforcements for the besieged. When, on the 16th of May, there followed the last decisive attack upon the nearly demolished city, it miscarried, as had the others. To tarry further was now useless, indeed ruinous, especially to the personal standing of Bonaparte with his troops, whom he sacrificed without number. Two days, May 7th and 8th, had alone cost 3000 men and two generals. The army began to murmur and to contrast their unfeeling commander-in-chief with the humane Kléber, and there were individuals who even wanted the chief command transferred to the latter. Napoleon determined upon retreat to Egypt. The more improbable the conquest of Acre became, the more he had expatiated upon his far-reaching designs in case the siege were successful. Where his deeds no longer yielded the coveted glory, he had recourse to his imposing dreams. With the weapons plundered from the fortress at Acre he should arm the discontented tribes of Syria, march upon Damascus and Aleppo, proclaim the end of the tyranny of the pashas, and, with the hordes which should come to swell the ranks of his army, move upon Constantinople. "Then," said he to Bourrienne, "the Turkish Empire falls before me; I establish in the Orient a new and great empire which will assure my place with posterity, and perhaps I shall return to Paris by way of Adrianople or Vienna after having crushed the House of Austria."

Here were again the visions of that imagination of which he had said in the before-mentioned conversation with Madame de Rémusat that it had "died confronting Acre." That may have been, but in any case we know from his own letters written from Syria to those who had remained in Egypt that his efforts were to be directed toward a return to Cairo whether the fortress

yielded or not. For he was convinced that a Turkish army, which had already been seen at Rhodes, was designed to land at the Delta of the Nile, and it was clear to him that these forces must be conquered if everything were not to be lost. The unyielding claim of this immediate necessity put to flight all further dreams of advance toward Constantinople or India, or the foundation of an Oriental kingdom. And an empire might not impossibly be founded elsewhere than in Asia.

On May 20th the siege was raised and the retreat begun. According to descriptions of contemporaries the latter was horrible in the extreme. The march from Acre to Jaffa is portrayed in these words: "A consuming thirst, total lack of water, excessive heat,* a fatiguing march through scorching dunes, demoralized the men and caused all generous feeling to give place to the most cruel selfishness, the most distressing indifference. I have seen officers with amputated limbs thrown from the litters upon which they were to have been transported according to orders, even in cases where the wounded man had paid the bearers for their labour. I have seen abandoned to their fate those who had suffered amputation, the wounded together with those who were attacked by the plague or only suspected of being so. The march was illumined by torches kindled to set fire to small cities, towns, villages, hamlets, and the rich harvests with which the land was covered. The whole country was in flames. We were surrounded only by plunderers, incendiaries, and the dying. By the side of the road where they had been thrown lay men half dead, calling out with feeble voice, 'I am not sick with the plague, I am only wounded,' and to convince the passers-by many of these poor wretches could be seen reopening their wounds or inflicting new ones upon themselves. No one believed in them. . . . The sun in all its splendour under this clear sky was obscured by the smoke from our incessant conflagrations. We had at our right the sea and behind us the desert which we had created, before us the priva-

* In the desert, between Syria and the Nile, the thermometer registered 34° Réaumur (108° Fahr.) when exposed to the air, and 42° Réaumur (125° Fahr.) when in contact with the ground.

tions and sufferings which awaited us; such, in truth, was our situation."* Besides there were hovering all about them swarms of Nabulusians, one of whom on one occasion shot at Napoleon, who had fallen asleep upon his horse while on the march.

On the 24th of May they reached Jaffa. Here yet lay those wounded during the attack on the city. The plague had asserted itself here as in the ranks of the army. Napoleon himself hastened through the wards of the hospital, calling out to the sick: "The fortifications are destroyed. Fortune was against me at Acre. I have got to return to Egypt to keep it from enemies who are about to descend upon it. The Turks will be here in a few hours; let all who feel able to get up come with us; they will be transported on litters and horses." And how about the others? There were about sixty stricken with the plague who were obliged to remain. Fable has exaggerated this visit to the hospital both in art and writing, while ill-disposed criticism has set forth as a crime his suggestion that those who must remain should be protected from the fury of the pursuing foe by administration of a narcotic which should bring about painless death. He never denied having taken this view of the situation, and at St. Helena he declared himself to his physician to be still of the opinion that the measure suggested would have been the wisest, and that under similar circumstances he should have pursued the same course toward his own son.

Through Ascalon and Gaza and then for nine long days through the burning sands of the desert, the expeditionary troops, wofully reduced in number, dragged their weary way; a procession smaller in extent but otherwise closely resembling that awful retreat from Russia's bitter cold and ice which thirteen years later prefaced the end of the "Fortune" of the Emperor of the French. Five thousand men had been sacrificed without making the slightest impression upon the Porte. And to disperse a Turkish army there was no need for travelling that long road of suffering to Mount Tabor. Least of all had anything been accomplished toward the satiation of the ambition of the commander. His chief concern now was that there should

* Jung: "Bonaparte et son Temps," III. 290.—B.

be no avowal of the truth. While still before Acre, on the 10th of May, he had announced to the Directory that his object had been attained, the season was growing unfavourable, and Egypt demanded his presence; he should return through the desert after having demolished the fortress. In another report, of May 27th, his statement was that he might have occupied the city, but had abstained from doing so on account of the plague which, his spies, prisoners, and deserters all concurred in testifying, was raging there most frightfully. (What a pity that his spies had been so late in making this discovery!) In a war bulletin of the 16th of May he announced to the Divan of Cairo, an organization of his own creation, that he was bringing with him a vast number of prisoners and flags, that he had razed to the ground the palace of Jezzar, likewise the ramparts of Acre, and so bombarded the city as to leave no stone upon another; the inhabitants had all fled by way of the sea: Jezzar, who was wounded, had retired with his followers into one of the forts on the seacoast. He even went so far as to reassure his own soldiers with the confidently affirmed falsehood that they might have hoped in a few days to overpower the Pasha of Syria himself in his palace, but that at this season, with the possibility of a landing of the Turks in Egypt, the capture of Acre would not counterbalance the loss of time spent in the effort. When his secretary ventured to protest against this distortion of the actual circumstances, Napoleon silenced him with the observation that he was a simpleton who tormented himself about trifles and had no comprehension of matters of this kind.

Toward the middle of June, the Syrian army, reduced it is true to only 8000 men, made its triumphal entry into the capital of Egypt. A short time afterward Bonaparte received word from Marmont in Alexandria that 100 Turkish ships had appeared on the 11th of July in the roadstead of Aboukir under escort of Sir Sidney Smith and had landed 18,000 men.* The

* The number fluctuates between 8000 and 18,000 according as the statement be made by the English or by the French. The former is certainly too low an estimate, the latter too high in comparison with the

same message had evidently reached Ibrahim and Murad, whom Desaix had until now kept at a respectful distance; for the former now again appeared on the Syrian frontier, while the latter made efforts to reach the North with some hundreds of Mamelukes, both with the object of co-operating with the Turkish forces just landed. The latter had intrenched themselves temporarily upon the peninsula of Aboukir, Alexandria being fortified by the French.

Bonaparte determined upon attacking them in this place and at the earliest possible moment. Murad was speedily driven toward the South, while a close watch was kept upon Ibrahim. To facilitate the concentration of the French forces, Desaix was ordered to evacuate Upper Egypt, while with all other disposable troops—numbering about 6000 men, besides a reserve of 2000 entrusted to Kléber—the commander-in-chief advanced against the enemy. It was a hastily conceived plan brilliantly executed on the plain of Aboukir, July 25th, 1799. The plan of action in this battle was characteristically Napoleonic—to unite all forces before the onslaught, make use of them all in the engagement, and seek to annihilate his foe; its execution was made much easier through the defective order of battle adopted by the Turks. The success was complete. The left wing of the enemy having been surrounded and driven into the sea, the right was made to undergo the same fate. Lannes then succeeded in gaining possession of a commanding redoubt which Murat and his cavalry, with mad impetuosity, had ridden around and which constituted the strongest point of the Turkish centre. That also was now forced, and only a few remnants of the Turkish forces escaped to the fort on the apex of the little peninsula. These were reduced by starvation and forced to capitulate a week later. This time Napoleon confined himself strictly to the truth in writing to Cairo: "The staff will have acquainted you with the outcome of the battle of Aboukir; it is one of the finest I have ever witnessed. Of the army landed by the enemy not a man has escaped."

number of transport-ships. More than 15,000 men were scarcely to be conveyed on 100 transport-vessels.

In addition to this triumph but one thing more was needed to fulfil the requirements of his self-seeking ambition; to be assured that he had been correct in the second assumption upon which he had based his departure to Egypt—that the war broken out meanwhile in Europe should result disastrously to France, thus not only increasing his own personal importance, but bringing the government at Paris into discredit so that a determined soldier who knew how to conquer at this time might with the same blow easily acquire the power of the State. And the certainty of this condition of affairs Napoleon obtained for himself.

Since the message which had overtaken him while before Acre no other had reached him. He could not know that at the end of May, 1799, the French admiral Bruix had received orders to unite his squadron with the Spanish fleet to defeat the English on the Mediterranean and bring home the expeditionary army from Egypt—an enterprise which fell through on account of the refusal of the Spanish commander to co-operate. He failed also of receiving a letter sent to him on May 26th by the Directory notifying him of Bruix's mission and recalling him to Europe.* But he heard nevertheless what he needed to know. It is almost a certainty that he received occasional tidings from his brothers by way of Tunis through the consuls of Genoa and Ancona, who were devoted to his interests. And here again chance came to his aid. Sir Sidney Smith, who now lay at

* A passage from this letter signed by three of the Directors runs thus: "The extraordinary efforts just put forth by Austria and Russia, the serious and almost alarming turn taken by the war, necessitates to the Republic the concentration of all its forces. The Directory has accordingly just given command to Admiral Bruix to employ all means in his power to make himself master of the Mediterranean and to bear toward Egypt for the purpose of bringing back from thence the army under your command. He has orders to arrange with you as to the method to be employed in effecting its embarkation and transport. It is left to your discretion, Citizen General, to decide whether you can with safety leave in Egypt a part of your forces, and you are authorized by the Directory in this case to entrust the command to whomsoever you may judge fit. The Directory would take pleasure in seeing you at the head of the republican armies which you have up to the present time commanded with so much glory."

anchor before Alexandria and was entering into negotiations with Bonaparte in regard to the release of prisoners, took pleasure in communicating to him the late defeats suffered by the French in Italy, where indeed Schérer had been overcome in April and the Cisalpine Republic dissolved. As testimony to the truth of his assertions he sent to Bonaparte a package of the most recent newspapers, announcing in addition that he was under orders to prevent the return of the expeditionary army desired by the Directory. Nothing more was needed to determine Napoleon's immediate execution of the plan long before resolved upon. In the words with which he announced his decision to Marmont may be found the entire plan by which his actions were to be directed during the ensuing months: "I have determined upon taking my departure for France, and I count upon taking you with me. The state of affairs in Europe forces me to this momentous step; reverses have overwhelmed our armies, and Heaven knows to what point the enemy may have already advanced. Italy is lost, and the reward of so many efforts, of so much bloodshed, escapes us. And what, in truth, is the use of these incapables put at the head of affairs? There is nothing but ignorance, stupidity, or corruption amongst them. It is I, I alone, who have borne the burden and by means of constant victory given strength to this government, which without me would never have been able to lift its head and support itself. As soon as I was gone everything had to collapse. Do not let us wait until the destruction be complete. . . . The news of my arrival and of the destruction of the Turkish army at Aboukir will be heard in France almost at the same moment. My presence, in raising their spirits, will restore to the army the confidence which it lacks, and to good citizens the hope of a brighter future."

His intentions were confided to but a few trusted men and concealed from most of the generals. With the utmost secrecy also were the two frigates at anchor in the harbour of Alexandria fitted out for the voyage. Sir Sidney Smith, to whom it was apparently inconceivable that the commander-in-chief should return to France without this army, had left the roadstead for a short time to renew his supply of water at Cyprus. Hardly had he

taken his departure before Napoleon profited by this new favour of fortune and made his way out to sea during the night of August 21st, accompanied by only a few devoted adherents, Lannes, Marmont, Murat, Monge, Berthollet, and a few hundred soldiers of the guard. To the gallant Kléber, whose inconsiderate frankness had made him obnoxious to Napoleon, was left, by written order, the command of the army remaining in Egypt.

The fact does not appear to have been taken into consideration by Napoleon that honour required his continuance with the troops which had been entrusted to his leading and which had courageously shed their blood in the furtherance of his own ambitious designs. And yet it is scarcely admissible to accuse him of abandonment of the army, nor—as has even been done—of desertion. His position toward the Directory was without question exceptional. At the time of his departure for Egypt it was understood that he was to return during the autumn of 1798 to resume command of the Army of England. This was not to be the case with the entire expeditionary corps, since it was the plan also to found a colony and to organize plantations which would require perpetual protection. The letter of November 4th, 1798, from the National authorities at Paris, received while besieging Acre and which has been before cited, left him entire freedom in his decisions. He himself had repeatedly and openly announced his approaching return to France, which he would certainly not have done had it been directly contradictory to instructions. But it is equally certain that in taking this step he was acting only out of regard for his personal ambition and interests. For neither of these was anything further to be acquired in Egypt and everything to be lost. The situation of the expeditionary army must inevitably grow more and more critical, and in announcing that he left it just after a victory in the field which would long protect it from molestation his statements did not wholly coincide with the truth. He kept silence upon one point which he afterwards divulged at St. Helena: that he was already convinced from the moment of the loss of the fleet at Aboukir that expedition could end only in catastrophe, since any army which cannot be recruited must eventually

capitulate. He also prudently refrained from communicating what was revealed by the honest Kléber in a letter to Talleyrand: that the army, already reduced by one half, was suffering for the want of munitions and clothing; that the population of Egypt, roused by the Sultan against the Christians, was ready at any moment to rise in revolt; that an advance of new Turkish forces was threatening, and that Alexandria was almost defenceless, since the heavy artillery had been lost in the Syrian campaign and the remainder of the equipment used in fitting out Napoleon's two frigates; finally, that the distress of the situation was aggravated by a grievous lack of money, since the arrears of pay to the troops now amounted to 4,000,000 francs, and Napoleon had left nothing but debts with not a single sou in the treasury.

Much has been said of the courage shown by Napoleon in exposing himself to the dangers of a voyage upon the Mediterranean, infested as it was by ships of the enemy. But it may be questioned whether it would not have required greater courage to remain under such desperate circumstances. And in this courage Napoleon would not have been found wanting if his ambitious schemes had not impelled him to make this effort toward the acquisition of supreme power in France. Of these schemes the distinguishing features had long been determined upon, nor was there any lack of devoted adherents, so that even before the expedition to the Orient they had been on the point of realization by means of a Coup d'État. The Army of the Orient was composed almost exclusively of fervent republicans. He felt not the least pang in separating himself from it; it suited him perhaps better to know that it would be far from France at the moment when his designs were to be executed. During the campaign in Italy Napoleon had already obeyed only his own impulses, regarded himself as sovereign in conquered countries, and negotiated and concluded the treaties of Leoben and Campo Formio by which France had been bound. Here in Egypt, where even more than before he acted as his own master, his spirit of domination had found new sustenance and his yearning desire to become the head of an independent government had struck deeper root than ever into his character. He could

scarcely think of himself any longer as without a crown. Only it seemed to him manifestly easier to pluck it from the withered liberty-tree of the Revolution than to disinter it from the endless sands of the desert.

CHAPTER VII

THE COUP D'ÉTAT AND THE CONSULATE

At that time, when everything depended upon wind and weather alone, a voyage to or from Egypt was a question of the season. From the beginning of spring until autumn it was an easy matter, driven by the constant northwest wind, to reach Alexandria from Toulon, but just so much the more difficult to make the trip in the opposite direction. It was, therefore, no favourable season for a journey to France when the two frigates, "Muiron" and "Carrère", with Bonaparte upon the former, left the Egyptian harbour. Only for the sake of eluding the vigilant watch of Sir Sidney Smith had they put to sea in August. The contrary wind compelled the two ships to give up the direct course to Toulon and to sail along the north coast of Africa. Their progress was scarcely to be designated as such. A number of times they were driven back ten miles during the day and only regained their former position by night when the breezes blew from the shore. Not less than three weeks were thus consumed by the impatient travellers before they arrived off the Carthaginian headlands, in constant anxiety of being attacked from the rear by the enemy. But the real danger began only when the wind at last turned to the advantage of the homeward bound. The narrow passage between Sicily and Tunis had to be passed, and this was guarded by an English cruiser belonging to Nelson's fleet, which was at anchor off Syracuse. Should the frigates be discovered by this vessel, it would be a very short time before the dreaded admiral would be in pursuit. Fortunately they succeeded in passing the scout at night with lights extinguished, and now directed their course toward the north along the west coast of Sardinia as far as Corsica, which they

reached in the beginning of October. And here they were again detained for several days by a return of the northwest wind to the vexation of Napoleon, who was overrun in Ajaccio by cousins and godparents and every one who could claim relationship of any kind. He was totally unmoved by everything except the meeting with his old nurse, who hailed him eagerly as "caro figlio." He showed to his companions, not without a certain pride, the former estates of the Bonapartes, and hunted with them in the adjoining thickets. This was the last time that he ever saw his native island.

As if his programme were to be literally carried out, he learned in Ajaccio that the French armies had suffered new reverses, that on June 19th a battle had been lost on the Trebbia, and on August 15th another at Novi, and that Joubert had been killed. But something else which he learned was of still greater importance to him: that the Directory had succumbed after a struggle with the legislative bodies in June (the 30th Prairial), and had been compelled to admit new members, among them Sieyès. It is well known that Napoleon's confidence in the abbé was great, and these tidings consequently could not but be reassuring to him. They induced him to change his plan for the rest of the voyage. It had been his intention to hasten at once to the theatre of war in Italy, there to assume the supreme command, and having by new victories ingratiated himself with the people of France, as their deliverer in the hour of need, to present himself before the Directory with all the weight of his renown. This plan being now abandoned, he put forth all efforts to reach the capital. The circuitous route by way of the battle-field seemed now only a loss of time.

But first of all it was indispensable to reach the shores of France, and this was to be more difficult than had been foreseen, now that, after having passed through so many dangers, they were so near the goal. A favourable wind had at last carried them away from Corsica, and on the 8th of October they were already in sight of the islands of Hyères and sailing toward Toulon, when suddenly at sundown an English squadron was made out bearing directly upon their course. The

critical moment was at hand, for the Englishmen had also observed the frigates and began to give chase. The French admiral attempted to turn back toward Corsica, but Napoleon gave orders to veer again to the north and continue in their course. He was resolved in case of necessity to throw himself into a small boat carried by the ship, and to attempt an escape to land alone. And once again was his courage rewarded by success. The English were misled in the distance by the apparent direction of the sails, and fancied them to be steering in a northwesterly direction. Under this mistaken impression they pressed rapidly forward. Nightfall prevented them from discovering their error until too late. The frigates escaped thus narrowly, and the following morning, October 9th, found them safely at anchor in the harbour of Fréjus.

The tidings of Bonaparte's return was spread in a moment throughout the town. At once the sea was covered with craft which, regardless of the danger of pestilence, escorted the honoured general to land. Here, as in Ajaccio, the question of quarantine was entirely set aside, affording no small gain in time to Napoleon, and what must have seemed to him of still greater consequence was the inference to be drawn from this enthusiastic reception that the public mind had become most favourably disposed toward himself. It is even related by Marmont that he was publicly greeted by a club-orator with the words: "Only go and beat the enemy, General, and drive him away, and then we will make you king if you so desire!"

After a few hours of repose he pursued his journey without stop as far as Aix, whence he sent on a messenger to the Directory to announce his arrival. Every word of his letter was carefully weighed. It opened with the statement that the General had received the communication sent by the government on November 4th of the previous year, and had concluded from it that war was about to break out on the Continent. That if he had not at once put himself at their disposal the incursion of the Turks was to blame, since they had first to be overcome before he might think of return. He should have ventured to make the voyage home whatever the circumstances

even had it been possible only "in a small boat and wrapped in a mantle." He, of course, asserted in the letter that he had left Egypt perfectly organized, nor did he fail to take precautions that the arrival of the courier should precede his own but by a very short interval.

He travelled rapidly after leaving Aix. The journey was a veritable triumphal procession. His companions can hardly find words to describe the enthusiastic reception accorded along the entire route between Lyons and Paris. The cities vied with each other in tokens of homage to the man in whom they saw not so much the conqueror of the foreign enemy as the deliverer in time of need from intestinal dissension, the saviour from the dilemma of having to choose between anarchy and the Bourbons, the man who was to raise the country from the state of utter despondency into which it had fallen. And this feeling was not confined to the provincial towns. At the capital also the same effect was produced by the tidings of his return, in the possibility of which faith had ceased to exist. When it became known the news was greeted with a wild outbreak of joy. Since the beginning of the Revolution never had the hopes of every one been so fastened upon a single name as now when the end of political upheaval was so ardently desired. And yet this was the same people who a year and a half before had with no very great regret seen this same man sail away to take part in a dangerous adventure! What was it which had brought about this rapid and complete change in the popular feeling and realized the hopes of Napoleon based upon it? The answer to this question is to be found in the events which had taken place in France during his absence. These must be more carefully considered.

After the Coup d'Etat of the 18th Fructidor the Directory had sought to protect itself against a recurrence of the danger of being driven from power by the conservative elements of the populace, and had for this purpose resorted to the same means by which the rule of the Radical minority over France had once before been made possible. It had established a tyrannical dictatorship which stopped the mouth of the oppos-

ing press, proscribed nobility and clergy, and compelled more than 100,000 men of means to emigrate, while rendering almost valueless by means of forced loans the possessions of those who remained; it had scaled down the public debt one third, deported to the colonies political opponents, and called forth into prominence those elements which had been frightened away by the events of the 9th Thermidor: and this despotic rule was expected to insure to the Directors the continuance of their power. In order that they and their creatures might remain in supremacy these men, Barras, Rewbell, and Larévellière-Lépeaux crushed millions of people into timid subjection; in order to assure great revenues to themselves and their followers they ruined property throughout the country.

But soon the Directory had to recognize that the Radicals, its allies of the 18th Fructidor, might become quite as dangerous opponents as the Conservatives and the Monarchists. The more quiet and peaceable elements of the population had indeed been conquered, but the sympathizers with the system of terrorization pushed themselves only so much the more boldly into the foreground.

Although forbidden by law, numerous Jacobin clubs were organized and confederated with one another, and these by resort to the old methods of intimidation were successful in controlling the elections in the spring of 1798, at which a third of the Council of Five Hundred was to be chosen. The vanquished Conservatives stayed away from the polls, and the adherents of the Directory, who had separated themselves from the Jacobins, were left in a minority with their candidates. The rule of the Directory was consequently as seriously endangered now through the preponderance of infuriated members in the legislature as it had been a year before through that of the Conservatives. But the Directors knew a remedy which might perhaps be of avail; it had proved efficacious in the preceding summer and should again be made useful: this was the violation of the Constitution on the part of the government. Instead of annulling the elections and appointing new ones, on the ground that these were illegal

since intimidation had been practised upon the voters, the Directory induced the Five Hundred to confirm the elections of the members of the minority devoted to the existing government, and to exclude sixty Radical deputies (May 11th, 1798; 22d Floréal). All that had been gained by this measure was that the government ceased from this moment to be sustained by either of the two great parties. The Conservatives detested it and had been its sworn enemies ever since the 18th Fructidor; since the 22d Floréal the Jacobins had become equally antagonistic. Its existence was assured only so long as the army yielded obedience to its commands. But party division began to affect the generals; Moreau, for example, was a Conservative, while Jourdan was a Jacobin; among officers and privates alike the antipathy to this government of lawyers was becoming pronounced, so that the situation of the administration was liable to become precarious if war did not soon break out on the Continent to give another direction to the attention of these various dissatisfied elements.

And measures had been taken which would prevent the possibility of its being longer delayed. The peace-party had been overcome on the 18th Fructidor, just as it had been before on the 13th Vendémiaire. The abrupt discontinuance of negotiations with England which followed, the arrogant demands of the envoys at Rastatt, the defiant attitude of Bernadotte in Vienna; the revolts against the legitimate powers in Italy and Switzerland, the instigation of republican propaganda in Southern Germany, and the encroachments in the Orient,—all these could not but lead to a new and tremendous conflagration in Europe which would give employment to all the forces of France and would prolong the rule of those in power.

And first of all there arose in Russia an inexorable enemy. For the unconcealed support given by the Republic to the Poles, the occupation of the Ionian Isles, the secret alliance with the turbulent elements on the Balkan peninsula, the expedition to the Levant and particularly the seizure of Malta, whose Order of Knights had but recently put themselves under the protectorate of the Czar, combined to make Paul I. an adversary of France and the champion of hereditary monarchy threatened

and combated by the Republic and its agents. He concluded treaties of alliance with England and Turkey, whose hostility also had been incurred by the encroachments of the French, and urged immediate attack. England on her part induced the King of Naples as early as November, 1798, to open hostilities against the French who were in possession of the States of the Church—a premature and hazardous attempt which failed miserably—with the result that the French forces under General Macdonald penetrated as far as Naples, compelled the flight of the king into Sicily, and founded the “Parthenopean Republic.” This was one more step toward the complete ascendancy of France in Italy, and the blow was nowhere more keenly felt than in Vienna, whose court was linked by kindred with that of Naples and had made the loan of one of its generals (Mack) to command the Neapolitan army. From the time of the departure of the French ambassador, Bernadotte, from Vienna all relations between Austria and France had been broken off, nor were the conferences held at Selz between Cobenzl and François de Neufchâteau, the former Director, able to bring about their renewal. The outbreak of hostilities was no longer anything but a question of weeks, when Austria also made an agreement with Russia and a corps of Russian auxiliary troops marched into Galicia. And when the French demanded the withdrawal of these northern troops, stating that non-compliance with this requisition would be regarded as cause for war, the last hope of maintenance of peace was at an end. The Russians continued to advance, and Thugut paid not the slightest attention to the menaces of France. Early in March the French crossed the Rhine, the Austrians under Archduke Charles passed to the other side of the Lech, and on March 12th, 1799, France declared war against the power on the Danube, hostilities being at once begun. To add to the gloom of the situation the congress at Rastatt came to a tragic end: on March 28th the French envoys in taking their departure from the town were attacked by Austrian hussars and massacred with the exception of one man. It may have been through a misunderstanding of orders or it may have been due to some other motive as yet unexplained.

It would be reasonable to suppose that the Directory which had by its policy provoked this war would have been fully armed so as to be perfectly prepared to meet the danger. But it now became evident how disastrous was the reaction upon public affairs of the system of personal government. Under this wretched administration the finances had at length reached a condition of total disorder, and the contributions levied in neighbouring countries did not suffice to make up the deficit. The army, upon whose ranks the government depended at all times as a last resort, stood in need of the energetic and watchful care of the banished Carnot, and its best commander tarried far away in the East. It is true that in September, 1798, the institution of conscription had been established, and according to the law all Frenchmen between the ages of twenty and twenty-five years were to serve in the army divided into five classes, but this law had been but imperfectly carried out. In Italy not more than 50,000 men could be opposed to the Austrians, and in Southern Germany not more than 40,000. The troops were ill-armed, and the commissariat in the hands of speculators who were in no wise more conscientious than the government. Besides these drawbacks a difference of opinion prevailed in the Directory as to what generals should be put in command. Among these, certain ones, like Joubert, had quarrelled with the government commissioners who accompanied the armies; others, such as Moreau, were too conservative; the outcome of it was that to the old and incompetent Schérer had eventually to be assigned the important supreme command in Italy.

The adversary came into the field far better equipped. Austria unassisted had the advantage in point of numbers upon the three fields of operation, Suabia, Switzerland, and upper Italy; she had in Archduke Charles an able leader, and in the Russians under the valiant Suvaroff a powerful support and helper. And the result was inevitable. Jourdan, who had advanced to the Danube, was defeated at Osterach and Stockach by the Archduke before the end of March, 1799, and forced back to the Rhine; Masséra, who had begun by victoriously pushing his way eastward from Switzerland, was checked at Feldkirch,

while Schérer was met by the Austrians under Kray at Magnano in the Cisalpine Republic and thrown back behind the Adda.

And what Schérer had been unable to accomplish against the Austrians alone, his successor, Moreau, was still less able to do against the united Austro-Russian armies under Suvaroff. At Cassano on the Adda he underwent a decisive defeat, on April 27th, 1799, which opened to the northern conqueror the gates of Milan and Turin and caused the Cisalpine Republic to vanish. Austria again entered into possession of Lombardy, supported by a flood of conservative feeling among the population which everywhere drove the Democrats from their positions. The fortresses alone remained in the hands of the French. Through a victory of the Archduke over Masséna at Zurich on June 4th a third of Switzerland soon after fell into the hands of the Austrians. These occurrences compelled Macdonald to evacuate Naples and march toward the north, and with his departure the Parthenopean Republic was at the same time brought to an end. The only hope of recovering what had been lost now lay in Macdonald's effecting a junction of forces with those which Moreau had been able to withdraw to the Genoese Riviera and, with these reinforcements, winning a victory. But this attempt also was doomed to failure. Even before the projected union could take place Macdonald's army was attacked by the Russians in a furious onslaught and defeated in the three days' battle on the Trebbia, June 17th-19th. The loss of the French was severe, and they were compelled to retreat beyond the Apennines. This disaster was followed in a few weeks by the capitulation of Mantua, for the sake of which so much blood had flowed two years before.

A natural consequence of these losses in the field was a diminution of respect for the Directory throughout France. The war had, it is true, two years before secured in its position of power a most unpopular government. But then there had been a series of victories won by a general who had adopted as his own the government's policy of expansion and conquest, while now the reputation of the army was being constantly dimin-

ished by a succession of defeats, under commanders, moreover, in no political sympathy with the leaders of the government. It is consequently not surprising that the elections in the spring of 1799 should bring to the Directory new discomfiture such as they were not able to recover from as heretofore by the use of force. It was also a sign of the general mistrust that when, in accordance with the law, one of the Directors had to retire, the man chosen to take his place was one well known to have shown opposition as a member of the Convention to the Constitution of the year III, and to be ambitious of providing France with a better one; this was the abbé Sieyès, the same man to whom Napoleon had confided, through Talleyrand, his ideas upon the framing of a constitution. Barras, who was entirely without principles, at once attached himself to the popular abbé, with the result that there arose, as in 1797, a minority in the Directory (Sieyès and Barras against Treilhard, Larévellière, and Merlin), corresponding with a majority in the Chambers opposed to the existing government; hence came new contentions. In face of the defeats abroad the majority in the Directory could no longer think of attempting a Coup d'État as on a former occasion; they were obliged to confront their adversaries in the legislature, who, attacking them upon their weak point, the financial disorder, succeeded in overthrowing the detested three. On June 18th, 1799 (30th Prairial), they retired, their places being filled by two pronounced Radicals (Gohier and Moulins), and a partisan of Sieyès (Roger-Ducos). Thus the party of the latter obtained a majority in the Directory.*

— This overthrow of the government had been the work of a coalition between the two great parties making up the Five Hundred, the Radicals, all branches of which were classed together under the denomination of Jacobins, and the Moderate Republicans under the leadership of Boulay de la Meurthe, to which party belonged Napoleon's brothers, Lucien and Joseph. This alliance was, however, at once dissolved upon the accom-

* The Constitution required for the validation of an act of the government the signatures of at least three of the members of the Directory.

plishment of its object. The Moderates being now in power, since they were in the majority in the Directory (with Sieyès, Ducos, and Barras), the Jacobins joined themselves to the opposition. At first they were so upheld by the neutral members that they succeeded in enacting a forced loan to be levied upon the wealthy, and a law against the nobility who were to serve as hostages in the Royalist departments of France. Elated by these successes, they, contrary to law, reopened their club in Paris, they proposed a succession of radical measures to the effect that children should be brought up in common, that public workshops should be opened for the benefit of the poor, that the people should have the right to form federations, and demanded further the re-establishment of the old Convention and public declaration that the country was in danger, in order to introduce by this means a government similar to that of 1793; but here their allies abandoned them and they found themselves in the minority. Sieyès could now venture to close their club and to organize a system of strict surveillance, which he entrusted to a former member of the Convention, Fouché, with the title of Minister of Police.

To Sieyès the essential thing now was to secure in the army a support upon which he could rely, and his first care had to be to establish his influence by means of decisive successes gained at the theatre of war. Accordingly the equipment of troops was vigorously advanced during July, and the young General Joubert put in the place of Moreau in command of the Army of Italy. Should he be victorious in his encounter with the enemy, it was more than possible that he could be made by the Director a very useful instrument for effecting a change in affairs of the interior. But Sieyès was destined to be no more fortunate than his predecessors. The reinforcements which Joubert took with him to the Genoese Riviera were insufficient to support him in withstanding the allied Austrians and Russians. He also was defeated by Suvaroff. In the bloody battle of Novi, on the Bormida (August 15th, 1799), the Republic lost 12,000 men, Joubert his life, and Sieyès his prestige.

One person only profited thereby. It was the man whose

name, as he had foreseen, would be recalled by every one upon the discomfiture of the French armies. "Where," the people began to ask, "was the victor of former days? Why was he not at hand? Where were the thousands he led away? Was it really better for the interests of the country that its sons should shed their blood far away upon the sands of the desert, while at home upon the scenes of former triumphs the fame of the nation was suffering disgrace?" The unseated government was accused of having "deported" the general, the radical opposition even demanded that the former Directors be brought to judgment upon this charge and inveighed against those now in power for abandoning to their fate the members of the expedition.* Talleyrand was forced to resign his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and tried to justify himself by asserting that it was not he but his predecessor who had proposed the expedition to Egypt. Formerly, in 1798, when public opinion still connected Napoleon with the detested Directory, he could acquire but little popularity despite his victories; but now that he was considered to be in opposition to the government and to be as it were the victim of its self-seeking policy, he became the favourite of the people and the ideal of millions belonging to no party who desired quiet and order and a vigorous government which should put an end to the perpetual changes in the organic laws of France and to the horrible confusion of the administration, that the land might have peace and the citizens enjoy the wholesome fruits of the Revolution. To them Napoleon was not merely the tried conqueror who could defeat the enemy, but still more the man of energetic purpose who could suppress anarchy. This was the reason why his return was greeted everywhere by such boundless enthusiasm and why his popularity did not abate when it became known that in the last days of September the Russians and Austrians had been defeated in Switzerland by Masséna, that the English had suffered in like manner at the hands of Brune in Holland

* Lucien and Josephine did all in their power to foster the idea that the Directory had sent Napoleon upon the expedition in order to rid itself of him.

early in October, that the Coalition had been ruptured, and danger to France from every foreign foe had vanished. Napoleon had no longer any need for fresh triumphs on the field to prepare the way for him, the cherished favourite of the people, before proceeding to extreme measures. He had not been mistaken when he had before his departure expressed to his brother the conviction that he should be "surer of public opinion" upon his return.* This had been lacking to him a year and a half earlier when a Coup d'État had been under consideration; now that this had been secured nothing should prevent him from putting his ambitious schemes into execution.

When, in 1803, Napoleon was telling Madame de Rémusat of his past life and came to the time following the Egyptian expedition, he said: "The Directory trembled at my return; I kept a careful watch upon myself; it was one of the periods in my life when I acted most skilfully. I saw the abbé Sieyès and promised to put into execution his wordy constitution; I received the leaders of the Jacobins and the agents of the Bourbons; I refused advice to no one, but I gave only such as was to the interest of my plans. I concealed myself from the people because I knew that when the time came curiosity to see me would throw them at my feet. Every one fell into my snare, and when I became the head of the State, there was not a party in all France which had not some hope based upon my success."

Bonaparte did in fact act the part of an impartial man, but he nevertheless followed in reality a well-defined plan in his complicated system of dissimulation and intrigue. His object was power, that point was settled. Only the means by which to acquire it could need consideration. The readiest way would have been to get himself elected Director. But when for the sake of appearances he sounded the presiding Director Gohier, a zealous and honest Jacobin with that political narrow-mindedness which at one time constituted the strength of his party, the latter referred him to the Constitution which excluded men under forty years of age from the Directory. This provision was but too

* See page 126.

well known to Napoleon. Once before it had presented itself as an obstacle in his way, and the thought had long been maturing in his mind of overthrowing this embarrassing Constitution. Nothing was more natural than that he should now join with those who were likewise planning to make an end of it. Sieyès was foremost amongst these. Since his outline of a constitution had been declined in 1795, the abbé had ostentatiously kept aloof from the government. Not until 1799 did he take a leading position, for he believed the time now come for him to put an end, by means of his Constitution, to the general discontent with existing conditions and to prove himself thus the saviour of his country. And the encroachments of the Jacobins seemed about to hasten the realization of his plans. Sieyès found secret support in the moderate Republicans in both Chambers who styled themselves "Reformists"; among these belonged Lucien Bonaparte. An agreement was reached upon the following points: In order to strengthen the executive power the five Directors should be replaced by three Consuls elected for a term of ten years; beside these there should be a Senate with life-membership and a Chamber of Deputies elected by universal suffrage. In order to have this Constitution adopted the Council of Ancients, a majority of whom had been won over, was to decree the transfer of the two legislative bodies to a place outside the capital so that the Jacobin opposition in the Council of Five Hundred should be separated from their following in the suburbs. Articles 102-104 of the Constitution of the year III. conferred upon the first Council the power to take this measure. Once assembled outside of Paris the Ancients would recommend Sieyès' proposition to the Five Hundred, win over to it the neutral element among them, and finally cause the new Constitution to be sanctioned by a plebiscite. Every step in this plan was clear but one. Would the Council of Five Hundred consent without opposition to the decree of the Ancients and leave Paris? Its refusal to comply might be a dangerous matter, the more so since Generals Jourdan, Augereau, and Bernadotte were all numbered among the Radical deputies. A soldier of renown was needed to whom the execution of this measure could be en-

trusted. Sieyès had undoubtedly counted at first upon Joubert, and after his death upon Moreau, who seemed to him the right instrument since he was devoid of all political ambition, his aspirations being entirely military; he summoned the General to Paris. But at the same time with Moreau, Bonaparte entered the capital, the former in perfect silence, the latter surrounded by the acclamations of millions; the one defeated, the other as conqueror; and Sieyès could not hesitate as to which of these soldiers he should confide the execution of his project. He had to choose Napoleon even at the risk of being overshadowed by him.

Immediately upon his arrival Napoleon was made acquainted through Lucien with the contemplated reform, and expressed himself as in sympathy with it. He himself stood in need of a new Constitution in order to come into power, and Sieyès was in want of a general esteemed by the army to establish his Constitution. This was the pivot about which the destinies of France at that time revolved. Talleyrand, who was desirous of regaining favour with Napoleon, assumed the task of bringing the two men into relations, and on November 1st they met secretly at the house of Lucien. Bonaparte was not in favour of submitting the new Constitution to the Chambers at once in the form given it by Sieyès, but expressed a desire to entrust it first to a commission of Deputies for examination and meanwhile to have all energies bent upon obtaining the establishment of a provisional government to be composed of Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, and himself. Sieyès was obliged to consent whether or no. He recognized that his rôle of saving genius was at an end from the moment that his Constitution should have to undergo examination by a committee, and it was no less clear to him that in a provisional government with Bonaparte as colleague he could have no hope of obtaining the foremost place. But it was too late to withdraw.*

* After a dinner at which Sieyès met Joseph Bonaparte and the Deputy Cabanis, who was in the secret, he said to them: "I am going to join forces with General Bonaparte because of all our military men he is the most of a civilian; nevertheless I am aware of what is before me: success attained, the General will do like this to his two colleagues," whereupon

Sieyès and Bonaparte met again on November 6th, after a banquet given by the Chambers in honour of Moreau and Bonaparte at which the latter proposed the toast, "The unity of all Frenchmen," and at this time the final arrangements were discussed. The abbé had brought with him a draft which he had already made of the decrees to be issued by the Ancients. The first convoked the Chambers at St. Cloud, the second appointed Napoleon to supreme command of all troops, and a third proposed him with Roger-Ducos and Sieyès as provisional Consuls. Each Chamber was to appoint a special committee to pass upon the Constitution and adjourn for three months. The action was to be taken on the 18th Brumaire (November 9th).

During the ensuing days Napoleon sounded the generals and officers. Several regiments of the Paris garrison had formerly served under him in the Italian army, the officers' positions in the National Guard had been for the most part of his bestowal while General of the Army of the Interior after the 13th Vendémiaire; inclination and discipline would assure to him the fidelity of the troops who idolized the "little corporal." Of the generals only Jourdan and Augereau held themselves at a distance; Bernadotte, who, as he wrote to Lucien in 1804, might easily have roused the suburbs to opposition, yielded to the solicitations of Joseph, whose brother-in-law he had recently become; Moreau simply obeyed the man in supreme command. Possibly he took this course because he hoped, as has been affirmed, that, the illustrious general having once been made the head of the government, he should no longer have him as a rival at the head of the army; or it may have been, as he himself assured Napoleon at a later date, because he firmly believed that this audacious adventurer would be overthrown six weeks after the event.*

he stepped suddenly between Joseph and Cabanis and threw them by a powerful swing of his arms into the chimney-corner and stood alone in the middle of the room. Napoleon, to whom Joseph related the scene, was much amused and laughingly exclaimed: "Long live the witty! This augurs well."

* See the letter of General Willot of October 30th, 1809, in Boulay de la Meurthe's "*Les dernières années du Duc d'Enghien*," p. 293.

Meanwhile Sieyès and his confidants were taking the last steps to make sure of the Council of the Ancients. A threatening outbreak of the Jacobins was used as a bugbear to win over those who wavered. Those deputies who could not be counted upon were, through the connivance of the hall-inspectors, kept away from the decisive session, some being summoned at a later hour and some not at all.

On November 9th (18th Brumaire), at seven o'clock in the morning, the Ancients assembled. Regnier, who had been taken into confidence, at once took the floor to make the following motion: "The Council of the Ancients, in accordance with Articles 102, 103, and 104, decrees: 1st. That the Legislature be transferred to the commune of St. Cloud, where both Councils will hold session in the two wings of the palace. 2d. That they will there assemble to-morrow, the 19th Brumaire (November 10th), at noon. All continuation of functions or deliberation is prohibited elsewhere and until that time. 3d. That General Bonaparte be charged with the execution of the present decree. He will take all the necessary measures to protect the National Republic. The general in command of the seventeenth division, the guard of the Legislative Body, the National Guards and the regular troops in Paris, in the constitutional arrondissement, and in the whole seventeenth division are put directly under his orders and are bound to recognize him as commander. Every citizen will be required to render him assistance upon demand. 4th. That General Bonaparte be summoned to appear before the Council of the Ancients to receive a copy of the present decree and to take the oath. 5th. That this decree shall be at once communicated to the Council of the Five Hundred and to the Directory. That it shall be printed and promulgated throughout the length and breadth of the Republic by means of special messengers.* The motion was carried unanimously and a mani-

* The Articles of the Constitution of 1795 upon which the Ancients relied for their authority in this matter were the following: "Article 102. The Council of the Ancients may change the place of meeting of the Legislative Body. It shall, in such case, indicate another place and

fest to the nation was decided upon in like manner, announcing that the Council of the Ancients had decreed these measures in order to control the factions which wanted to tyrannize over the National Representatives and for the sake of securing peace within the country.

While the Council of Ancients was thus engaged Bonaparte, surrounded by officers and generals, was awaiting at home his nomination. As soon as it had been delivered to him he mounted his horse and proceeded with a numerous retinue to the Tuileries, where he entered the hall in which sat the Council of the Ancients in order to take the required oath. Here he made a short address in his accustomed tone of command and closing with the following words: "Your wisdom has passed this decree; our arms will find a way to execute it. We are desirous of a Republic founded upon true civil liberty, upon representation of the people. And we shall have it, I swear it; I swear it in my own name and in that of my companions in arms." Of maintenance of the Constitution he said not a word; on the contrary, every syllable intimated a change in public affairs. The members of the Council were none the less warm in their applause of the General, and the session was brought to a close not to be reopened before the following day at St. Cloud. When shortly afterwards the Council of the Five Hundred assembled it was met with the announcement of the decree of the First Chamber, and Lucien Bonaparte, who had been elevated to the presidency as a token of honour to his brother, at once adjourned

time at which the two Councils must assemble. The decree of the Council of the Ancients in this matter shall be irrevocable.

"Article 103. Upon the day that this decree is issued neither of the Councils may deliberate within the communes in which its sessions have until that time been held. Members who shall there continue their functions will be guilty of assault upon the safety of the Republic.

"Article 104. Members of the Executive Directory who shall delay or refuse to seal, promulgate, and send out the decree for the transfer of the Legislative Body, will be guilty of the same misdemeanor."

Of the right of entrusting to a general the execution or the protection of the decree there was no word in the Articles. This was the first unlawful act, and this the managers of the Coup d'État cleverly shifted on to the shoulders of the representatives of the people.

the session. The activity of the Legislature had been suspended.

Upon leaving the hall of the Ancients, Napoleon betook himself to the garden of the Tuileries, where he passed in review the troops drawn up there. He next issued a proclamation to the National Guard and another to the regular troops. In each he arraigned the government which had until now been in power. "For two years," said he to his soldiers, "the Republic has been badly governed. You have been in hopes that my return would put an end to so many evils; you have celebrated it with such a unanimity as to impose upon me obligations which I am about to fulfil. . . . Liberty, victory, and peace will restore to the French Republic the rank which she formerly held in Europe and which incapability or treachery alone could have caused her to lose. Long life to the Republic!" Execution followed close upon the heels of accusation. As had been arranged, Sieyès and Ducos presented their resignations as members of the Directory. It needed but to persuade Barras to do likewise to stop the wheels of government altogether, since the validation of every act required the signatures of at least three Directors. Up to this day Napoleon had kept his former friend and patron in ignorance as to his real designs, and had made use of him to hold Sieyès to a certain extent in check. The time had now come to lay aside precaution, and he sent to him two of his confidants, Talleyrand and Bruix to demand the resignation of his office. Barras announced his willingness to accede to this requisition; he was led to this decision by the power at the disposal of Bonaparte and by the universal contempt in which he was himself held; his only request to the all-powerful man of the day, made through his secretary Bottot, was for a safe-conduct beyond the city. Bonaparte made use of this occasion to express himself before a number of witnesses concerning the policy of the Directory. To Barras's frightened messenger he exclaimed: "What have you done with that France which I left you so glorious? I left peace and find war! I left you victory, I find only defeat! I left you the millions of Italy, I find everywhere poverty and laws that plunder! . . . What have you

done with the hundred thousand Frenchmen whom I knew, my companions in glory? They are dead! This state of things cannot last; before three years had passed it would lead us to despotism. We want a Republic founded on the basis of equality, of morality, of civil liberty, and of political toleration." These at least were the words in which the "Moniteur" reproduced the speech two days afterwards.

With the retirement of Barras, Moulins and Gohier became powerless. The latter had been invited by Josephine to breakfast at eight o'clock in the morning of this eventful day. Was it Bonaparte's intention to make sure of this man? Did he hope in spite of everything to win him to the support of the movement in hand? Gohier did not come. Only during the course of the forenoon did he learn of what had occurred, and hastened with Moulins to Napoleon to expostulate with him. His remonstrances were of course without avail. The two Directors returned with their mission unaccomplished to the Palace of the Luxembourg, where the Executive of the government had hitherto held its sessions. Moreau received instructions to detain them there.

✓ The Directory had ceased to exist. All that was needed further was to get the two Councils at St. Cloud to ratify the political change, to accept the provisional government, and to appoint the committees which were to pass upon the proposed Constitution. Sieyès had advised that on the following day some twenty or thirty of the most pronounced Radicals, especially Jourdan and Augereau, should be prevented from attending the session of the Five Hundred. This, however, Bonaparte declined to do; it should not be said of him that he stood in fear of these two men. "On the whole," said he exultingly to Bourrienne that evening, "things have not gone badly to-day. Good-night; to-morrow we shall see what comes next." He did not, however, fail to take the precaution to load his pistols before going to bed.

On the morrow, the 10th of November (19th Brumaire), the deputies of both Chambers assembled at noon, the appointed hour, in St. Cloud. To the Ancients had been assigned a hall

in the second story of the palace, while the Five Hundred were to sit in the Orangery on the ground-floor. Before the opening of the session the deputies met in the park and eagerly discussed the event of the day. The Jacobin members of the Five Hundred and such of the Ancients as had been excluded on the previous day demanded explanations; others began to comprehend that assent to this momentous decree had been drawn from them under false pretences and for the purpose of making a Coup d'État; they had intended at the utmost to aid in effecting a change in the Executive and not at all in overthrowing the Constitution; their indignation waxed hot at sight of the troops which filled the courtyard. Thus began the sessions of the two Chambers. Napoleon had taken his place with his generals in the hall of the inspectors of the legislative body. Here he was kept informed, as he had arranged, of the progress of affairs in both of the assemblies. The reports were hardly of a nature to give him satisfaction.

In the Council of the Ancients continual excitement prevailed, and the feeling grew still more intense when it became known there that three of the Directors had abdicated and that the remaining two were forcibly detained. In the Council of the Five Hundred one of the initiated had taken the floor, but he was interrupted by cries from the Radicals of "No dictatorship! Down with dictators!" They further proposed and carried a motion that every member should at the roll-call renew his oath to support the existing Constitution. Upon receipt of this news Napoleon could contain himself no longer. Should he allow this hostile feeling to grow, and perhaps even finally to spread among the troops, all would be lost. "This must be put a stop to," said he, suddenly jumping up, to officers of his retinue, and going at once to the hall where the Ancients were in session. He was no orator, and his words on this occasion seemed altogether incoherent and abrupt. They were standing on the crater of a volcano, he told them. He and his companions in arms had gladly obeyed the summons of the Council, and now he was calumniated with the charge of playing the part of a Cæsar or a Cromwell. Had he wished to destroy

the liberty of the country he might have availed himself of frequent opportunities which had presented. He then spoke in a general way of the dangers threatening the Republic; "liberty and equality must be preserved," said he. "And how about the Constitution?" called a voice. This was striking Napoleon in the most sensitive spot, and he broke forth: "The Constitution? you yourselves rendered it of no account. You violated it on the 18th Fructidor. you violated it on the 22d Floréal and on the 30th Prairial. It is appealed to by all parties, and all parties have sinned against it. It cannot afford safety to us, for no one respects it any more. Let us find the means of assuring to every one the liberty to which he is entitled and which could not be guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the Directory."

Some members having demanded enlightenment concerning the threatening dangers of which he had spoken, he was unable to get out of the difficulty without recourse to falsehood. He declared that two of the Directors, Barras and Moulines, had proposed to him to place himself at the head of a party purposing to overthrow all men of liberal ideas. This was palpably nothing but an invention which irritated his adherents and put his opponents out of patience to such an extent that the president, Lemercier, was forced to call upon him to reveal the details of the plot. But Napoleon, having no exact information to impart, could only reiterate what he had said before; he declared the Constitution ineffectual, and finally turned in his helplessness and agitation to the soldiers who were stationed outside and who were totally unable to hear him; he apostrophized them in flattering words and expressed to them his confidence that they would protect him in case any speaker should attempt to raise the cry of "outlaw" against him. "for," said he, "I am accompanied by the god of war and the god of fortune!" With these words he lost all command over what he was saying. Bourrienne, who with Berthier was standing at his side, whispered in his ear: "General, you no longer know what you are saying," and induced him to withdraw. The session was then brought to a close.

But the most difficult task was yet before him. Napoleon

went down-stairs and presented himself at the session of the Five Hundred, where its members had meanwhile one by one taken oath to support the Constitution and were, for their part, awaiting a disclosure from the Upper Chamber as to the motive for the transfer of the Legislative Body. This communication was not forthcoming, which fact in nowise tended to increase their calmness of mind. Instead of the expected message there arrived a letter from Barras presenting his resignation and saying that he retired before the man made so glorious alike by his personal renown and by the marks of confidence given him by the National Representatives. The Jacobin deputies hereupon demanded to know what circumstances could have determined the Director to resign his office. Suddenly, just at this juncture, appeared Bonaparte in the hall, unannounced and followed by four grenadiers. This was an act of flagrant disregard of all conventionalities. There arose at once a frightful uproar of indignation against him. "Armed men in the hall!" cried the Jacobins, and a number of Radicals rushed in uncontrollable excitement upon the intruder. Hands were laid upon him and he was pushed toward the door. In the tumult he for a moment lost consciousness. He sank into the arms of the grenadiers and was carried by them into the open air. But from within there followed him furious clamours of "Hors la loi!" "Outlaw him!"—a cry which but a few years before had meant certain death.

And who knows what would have occurred if the Jacobins had quietly listened to Napoleon? A careful observer, Brinkmann the Swede, at that time resident in Paris, expresses in his recently published letters only the general verdict when he says: "Evidently they ought either to have slain the general on the spot, or to have listened to him quietly, keeping always themselves within the limits of the Constitution and of prudence . . . in order to lay all the blame upon the shoulders of the aggressor." Certainly the behaviour of the Jacobins was of a kind to put them at a disadvantage if the circumstances were cleverly made use of. To no one was their mistake more promptly evident than to Lucien Bonaparte, the president of the Council, against

whom their attack was now directed; the most excited demanded that he should put to vote the proscription of his brother; others demanded that Napoleon be declared not in command of the troops since the Council of the Ancients had been in nowise authorized to appoint him to that post. The desk in the middle of the hall was surrounded by members clamouring to be heard.

In the midst of the uproar Lucien resigned the chair to the vice-president in order to speak from the tribune in his brother's favour. His voice, however, was unable to make itself heard above the din, and he sent a deputy who was in sympathy with the plot to Napoleon with the message that he was compelled to relinquish his seat and required military protection. At the same time he took off his toga. Just as he was being forced by his colleagues to resume his seat appeared the soldiers sent to his assistance by Napoleon, and by them he was escorted out of the room. A number of deputies followed him.

Outside in the courtyard Napoleon waited with his officers at the head of a battalion of the Garde du Corps Législatif. Near him stood certain confidential friends. Sieyès, Ducos, and Talleyrand sat in a carriage at the gate ready to save themselves by flight if affairs should assume an unfavourable aspect. Intense excitement could be recognized in every face. Before the Councils the cause of the Coup d'État seemed as good as lost. The question now was in regard to the troops. The outcome of the day depended upon their attitude. Lucien at once recognized this fact, and mounting a horse he addressed the battalion in a few words in which he exaggerated the tumult provoked by the Jacobin minority to the extent of making it an attack upon Napoleon's life. "Frenchmen," he cried, "the President of the Council of Five Hundred declares to you that the immense majority of this Council is at the present moment held in terror by certain Representatives armed with daggers who beset the tribune threatening their colleagues with death and proposing to them the most frightful resolutions. I declare to you that these audacious brigands, inspired no doubt by the evil spirit of the English government,

have put themselves in the position of rebels toward the Council of the Ancients in demanding the outlawry of the general charged with the execution of this decree of the Council, as if we still belonged in those awful times of their reign, when that word 'hors la loi' was enough to cause the fall of any head however dear to our country. . . . To you warriors I entrust the duty of delivering this majority of the Representatives of the People, so that, protected by bayonets against stilettos, we may deliberate in peace upon the interests of the Republic. . . . You will recognize as Deputies of France only those who present themselves with their president in your midst. As for those who will persist in remaining in the Orangery in order to vote proscriptions, let them be put out by force!" "And if any one offers resistance," added Napoleon, "kill, kill! Yes! follow me, follow me. I am the god of the day!" And he would have continued in this strain if Lucien had not whispered to him for heaven's sake to keep still. "Vive Bonaparte!" shouted the soldiers, but they made no attempt to move. And it was indeed no light matter to direct the bayonet against the National Representatives. But Lucien, recognizing this fatal hesitation, seized a dagger and pointed it against his brother's breast, swearing to strike him down with it should he ever attempt to violate the liberties of the French. At this the grenadiers ceased to waver. At a sign from Napoleon one division with drums beating allowed itself to be led by Murat into the hall. Upon the failure of the deputies to comply with his order to disperse, the soldiers advanced, and the legislators were forced to take flight through the windows.

Nothing could more clearly show the deep gulf which separated the army from the nation than this painful scene. Constant absence from home had made the militia strangers to the people, and whoever commanded the soldiery could domineer recklessly over the nation. It is true that the Bonapartes had been obliged to resort to calumny and invention in order to set this force in motion against the constituted authorities; the allusions to English influence in Lucien's speech were totally without foundation; in fact the "daggers" of the deputies

had been seen by no one, personal danger to the President of the Chamber did not exist, and the dagger brandished against Napoleon was an unparalleled piece of buffoonery; but the fact that such means could be successful and sufficient to decide the fate of a great nation showed to what an extent disintegration had taken place. And what of the people itself? On the 18th and 19th Brumaire the Parisians quietly occupied themselves with their private affairs, totally indifferent to events which a few years before had thrilled every fibre. That for which hundreds of thousands had then risked their lives in fanatic devotion to liberty now seemed scarcely able to awaken curiosity.

The Coup d'État once accomplished everything else was very soon reduced to order. Lucien could now describe to the Council of the Ancients the occurrences in the lower house with the same degree of partiality as had marked the account which he had given to the troops. He summoned the Ancients to pass a resolution "that the fasces of the Consuls, those glorious symbols of republican liberty of ancient times, be raised to disarm our calumniators and to give reassurance to the French people, whose universal approbation will not withhold its sanction to our labours." And the Council at once agreed upon adjournment of both Chambers, upon the nomination of a provisional government of three Consuls, and upon the election of a commission for consideration of the new Constitution. And similar action was taken during the same night by such members of the Five Hundred as could, with no small difficulty, be assembled. The number of those present seems to have been from fifty to one hundred and twenty.* Lucien presided at this gathering, just as he had occupied the chair at the session of the whole number, in order that appearances of legality at least might be preserved. The proposed amendments to the Constitution were submitted, whereupon Boulay de la Meurthe made a long speech in justification of them, during the course of which he denounced the Con-

* The last number is given by Brinkmann from the statements of impartial eye-witnesses. Bourrienne, on the other hand, speaks of only thirty deputies.

stitution of the year III and the policy of the late Directory. This "Rump Parliament" then passed the following definitive resolutions formulated in sixteen articles: "The Directory has ceased to exist. A committee consisting of three Consuls, Sieyès, Ducos, and Bonaparte, is to constitute a provisional government. They are clothed with all directorial power and authorized to re-establish order in public affairs, to secure domestic tranquillity, and to establish an honourable and lasting peace with foreign nations. The Legislative Body will adjourn until February 20th, 1800, after having declared sixty-two deputies, designated by name, to have forfeited their seats, and after having elected a commission of twenty-five members who, in conjunction with a similar one appointed by the Ancients and the three Consuls, shall act upon the urgent business of police and financial legislation, formulate a new representative constitution and a new civil code." The commission was hereupon elected and the decree transmitted to the Ancients and ratified by them. Finally, the three Consuls took an oath of inviolable fidelity to the sovereignty of the people, to the French Republic, to liberty, equality, and the representative system of government. It was long after midnight before the assemblage broke up. The Coup d'État had been accomplished.

How correct Napoleon had been in his calculations when he risked everything on the 19th Brumaire was shown at once in the events of the ensuing days. France approved the Coup d'État. The fact was not to be denied. "Every previous revolution," wrote the Prussian ambassador, Sandoz-Rollin, to the government at home under date of November 13th—"every previous revolution had inspired much distrust and fear. This one, on the contrary, as I myself can testify, has cheered the spirits of every one and awakened the liveliest hopes." And the causes of this phenomenon are given us by Brinkmann in a remarkable letter of November 18th: "Never, perhaps, did a legitimate monarch find a people more devoted to his will than did Bonaparte, and it would be unpardonable should this clever general fail to profit by this fact to establish a better government upon a more stable basis. It is literally true that France will accom-

plish the impossible in order to contribute to this result, for the people, with the exception of the contemptible horde of anarchists, is so tired, so disgusted with revolutionary horrors and follies, that all are inwardly convinced that they cannot but gain by any change. All classes of society jeer at the heroics of the demagogues, and everywhere the demand is rather for their expulsion than for the realization of their ideal dreams. Even Royalists of every shade are sincerely devoted to Bonaparte, for they suppose it to be his intention to bring back little by little the old order of things. Those unattached to any party adhere to him as the man best fitted to procure peace to France, and the most enlightened Republicans, while trembling at the danger of destruction to their system, are better satisfied that it should be one man of talent rather than a club of obscure conspirators who should gain exclusive control of public affairs."

Even when it became known that the accusation made against Moulins and Barras was a mere slander, that the alleged conspiracy and the daggers of the deputies were all fabrications, the hatred felt toward the Jacobins and the yearning for a return to conditions of social order were so great that, in spite of all, in the end achieved it was forgotten that the means employed had been anything but moral.

It is surprising to observe in contemporaneous accounts of the Coup d'État how Bonaparte is nearly always the only actor named, while Sieyès and Ducos, if mentioned at all, are spoken of only incidentally. And yet all three were formally invested with equal executive power and at first shared equally in the labour of government, strictly maintaining their equality. But at the end of a very short time Bonaparte alone was in full possession of the executive power. For this there were sundry causes. In the first place the people regarded him alone as their deliverer, while Sieyès and Ducos, in disfavour as former Directors, interested nobody, and, justly appreciating this fact, voluntarily kept themselves in the background. Moreover, there was among the three really only one who had had practical experience in affairs of state; that one was Napoleon, who, having governed Italy in 1797, and organized the affairs of

Egypt in 1798, was acquainted with all the detail of administration. Finally, he alone had the unswerving desire for work and marvellous capacity for it which was needed to bring security and order out of the appalling confusion into which affairs had sunk. Ducos, appreciating his unfitness, soon withdrew altogether, and Sieyès, perceiving that his cherished plan of playing political saviour had stranded, contented himself with elaborating his Constitution in interminable discussions with both committees, while abandoning to his zealous colleague the arduous labours of the ruler.

Napoleon was thus left free to act as he saw fit. He chose his own ministers. Gaudin, who had acquired much experience in the administration of public revenues under the monarchy, and who had refused to accept a portfolio under Sieyès, now willingly assumed the burdensome duties of Minister of Finance. Talleyrand, formerly Bishop of Autun, whose sordid avarice and irregular manner of life were a reproach, but whose penetration in statecraft was unequalled, was again made Minister of Foreign Affairs. As a token of respect to the National Institute, Laplace, the great mathematician, was appointed Minister of the Interior, a position he however soon yielded to Lucien Bonaparte on account of entire lack of capacity in the management of affairs. Berthier, the skilful manager of military operations in Napoleon's campaigns, became Minister of War, but later gave place to Carnot. Fouché retained command of the department of police, Cambacérès was given the portfolio of justice, and Forfait received that of the Navy.

The Ministry having been constituted, attention was turned to the regulation of the desperate financial situation. Such was the confidence inspired by the new government that the five per cents rose from 7 to 12 after the Coup d'État, and to 17 within a few weeks. When thereupon Napoleon did away with the pernicious compulsory loans, capitalists became somewhat more confident. By way of compensation taxes on real estate were raised, and in order to secure the revenue thus levied, a project which had already previously been under discussion was made law reorganizing the collection of direct taxes. In every

department the Receivers General had to furnish security by means of which contributions of money the most crying needs could at least be met. That capital might be still further reassured more than fifty Jacobin deputies, among them General Jourdan, were sentenced to deportation or imprisonment, but this sentence was afterwards commuted to police surveillance. These measures did not, it is true, themselves remedy the desperate financial straits of the State, but they furnished the conditions essential to the bringing about improvement. Everything depended upon whether Napoleon were confirmed legally in his ascendancy in the government. He began seriously to concern himself in regard to the new Constitution.

Sieyès had sought to make his draft of a Constitution acceptable to both committees appointed by the former Chambers. It was based on the principle that the different branches of the government should counterbalance one another. The people was declared sovereign and universal suffrage guaranteed. But the people were not to elect their representatives directly, merely to cast their votes for candidates from among whom the legislators were to be appointed by the supreme power of the State. The five million adults comprising the voters of all France were to elect from their number one tenth, 500,000 men, who were to be called Notables of the Communes, eligible for communal offices; these were to elect from among their number 50,000 Notables of the Department, eligible for departmental offices; finally, these last were to elect one tenth of their number for Notables of France, candidates for the legislative body, and for central administration offices up to that of Minister. All such as had during the last ten years held high office or been representatives were to be included in the list of Notables of France, and all lists were to be valid for ten years. From the Notables of France were to be chosen the members of two legislative bodies, one of which should discuss but not vote upon bills originating in their own assembly or proposed by the government, while the other was to vote without discussion. At the head of the State there was to be a president styled the Grand Elector. He was to enjoy an ample income, represent the Republic, sign laws and treaties

and appoint or dismiss the two chief magistrates, the Consuls, but this was to be the limit of his functions. Of the Consuls, one was to have charge of the war department (army and foreign affairs), the other of the peace department (Ministry of the Interior). Each was to appoint his subordinates. As an outward check upon the government and as a guardian of the Constitution there was to be an independent body, the Constitutional Jury, to consist of eighty members appointed for life. They were to choose their own successors, appoint the Grand Elector and the members of the two legislative houses, and annul unconstitutional laws. In case the Grand Elector or any other high official abused his authority this Jury was empowered to appoint him a member of their own body, thus depriving him of his former office, since, as member of the Jury it was impossible for him to hold any other official position.

Such were the principal features of the Constitution which Sieyès had elaborated with so much subtlety. The sovereign people was rendered powerless by the Jury, the first Chamber by the second, the power of the Consuls was neutralized through the Grand Elector, and that of the Grand Elector in his turn through the Jury. This system, however perfect theoretically, was altogether impractical. So insecure a mechanism could least of all find approval with a man like Bonaparte, whose dreams of rule were on the threshold of realization. He ridiculed the contrivance, characterized it to Joseph as far too "metaphysical," and compelled the commission, zealously desirous of being serviceable to so powerful a man, to undertake radical changes therein. The useless Grand Elector, "this shadow of a 'roi fainéant,' this fatted swine," as Napoleon designated him, was at once eliminated. He was replaced by a First Consul as head of the government, charged with the execution of the law, to be elected by the Senate for a term of ten years. He was to appoint and dismiss ministers, ambassadors, councillors of State, administrative officials (prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors), all officers whether of the army or navy, and all judges excepting members of the "cour de cassation" (highest court of appeals), and the "juges de paix." His will should be law when promulgated in the

form of a decree. He was to direct in matters of diplomacy, and was to be Commander-in-chief of all military forces. He was to sign treaties and laws upon their adoption by the legislative body. He was to appoint the members of a Council of State which constituted a part of the executive and which was to assist the government with its advice. At the side of the First Consul there were to be two colleagues whose powers were, however, much less extensive, since they could assist only with counsel and could exercise no influence in the appointment of State officials. It would almost seem as if they had been created to veil the omnipotence of the First Consul.

In the face of a governing power thus constituted an efficient legislative body was scarcely possible. Bonaparte therefore readily agreed to the manner of election by means of the before-mentioned lists of candidates. The legislative power was to be exercised by three bodies. Sieyès' Constitutional Jury was transformed into a Senate with life-membership (*Sénat conservateur*), whose 80 members were to be chosen from the Notables of France. From the same list of candidates the Senate was to choose the *Corps législatif*, with 300 members, and the *Tribunate*, with 100. No one of these bodies possessed the right of initiating legislative measures. The executive laid bills before the *Tribunate*; the latter debated questions thus brought before it, but could vote only as to whether certain of its members designated for that purpose should speak for or against the measure before the *Corps législatif*. The members of this last body, on the other hand, did not debate the question, but voted at once after hearing the *Tribunes*. In a letter to Talleyrand already quoted Napoleon had spoken of a legislature "impassive, without eyes and without ears for its surroundings." Such an one had now been found. In the same letter the Council of State was also designated as one of the two branches of the executive. Now for the first time could it be seen who was to constitute the other branch. It became suddenly apparent that the real authority was to rest in his hands and his alone.*

Other provisions of the Constitution concerned the judicial

* See page 118.

and financial regulations, especially the court of appeals ("cour de cassation"), whose members were to be elected by the Senate, as were also those of the exchequer ("cour des comptes"). The yearly salaries of the dignitaries were then fixed. That of the First Consul was to be 500,000 francs, while his colleagues were to receive 150,000. All three were to have residences in the Tuileries. Senators were to receive 25,000 francs, the Tribunes 15,000, and members of the Corps législatif 10,000.

To this modified form of the proposed Constitution the fifty members of the Commission had on the whole given their approval with but little opposition. It remained only to elect the three chief magistrates whose names were to appear in the Constitution of the year VIII. All naturally were agreed upon Napoleon for First Consul. Sieyès having declined to serve in the capacity of one of the other Consuls, the choice fell upon Cambacérès and Lebrun. The former, who had befriended and patronized Napoleon in Paris in the days before the 13th Vendémiaire, was an eminent jurist, though decidedly inclined toward a life of ease. The latter was a financier of like ability who contributed to the new régime the benefit of his wide experience acquired under the monarchy. To Sieyès was accorded the sinecure of the presidency of the Senate with a handsome income besides a great estate in the vicinity of Paris, a price gladly paid by Napoleon to relieve himself of the abbé. Ducos was made a Senator.

With these appointments the Committee of Fifty completed its task in a night session of December 12th. Nothing was now lacking but its sanction by the sovereign, that is to say by the people of France, as was clearly expressed in the Constitution. Upon this absolute reliance could be placed. The more the new statute differed from those which had during the last ten years led to the overthrow of order at home and to a state of war abroad, the more favourably would it be received. Napoleon might safely venture, without waiting for the vote of the people, to fill the places created for the representatives of the nation. Sieyès and Ducos in company with Cambacérès and Lebrun chose thirty-one Senators according to their discretion, or rather that of Bonaparte, and these thirty-one selected colleagues sufficient

to bring their number up to sixty, which was for the present to be its limit. Their ranks being filled, the Senate proceeded at once to the appointment of the Tribunes and the members of the Corps législatif, while Napoleon appointed the members of the new Council of State, which held its first session on December 25th. A new government having many positions to bestow always finds many adherents among the ambitious, the enterprising, and the covetous—a power which Napoleon well understood making use of to establish his rule. And from this time forth he was master of France.

The manifesto of December 15th, 1799, in which the Consular Constitution was presented to the people of France for its ratification, closed with these words: "Citizens, the Revolution is established upon the principles which were its origin. It is at an end."

That was the question.

CHAPTER VIII

WAR AND PEACE

No, the Revolution was not at an end. Napoleon might acquire an unlimited dictatorial power over France, he might render the representatives of the nation a blind, impassive instrument of his will, he might finally destroy the Republic and set up in its stead his own absolute sovereignty, still the Revolution had not reached its end. It had but undergone a change of form, a metamorphosis, such as would be described chemically as an allotropic state of the Revolution resulting from the decomposition of the Directory. For two of its most essential principles were retained by the Consulate: that of equality at home and that of extension in all directions abroad.

Civil and social inequality, the barriers separating classes and circles, had been set aside by the Revolution, and these were not restored by the Consulate. "Liberty" had been far too often misused by the people in the ten years of their supremacy to be valued highly now; "Fraternity" had become a hated word owing to the many deeds of violence committed in its name; "Equality" alone was still held in respect, and Napoleon was correct in his repeated assertions that the French cared far less for political liberty than for equality, a point which the Bourbons were too blind to recognize.* It was, to be sure, only the equality of all under one superior, but at least it was but one. This man had himself learned its value at the time when, through

* In 1804, shortly before he became Emperor, he remarked to Mme. de Rémusat: "One must needs have regard for people's vanity; the plainness of the Republic bored you people. What began the revolution? Vanity. What will put a stop to it? Vanity. Liberty is a pretext. Equality is the hobby. The people are pleased to have a man who has risen from the ranks for king."

it, the way was opened before him, a young lieutenant without a future, for the possible realization of his vast designs; and again when, through it, he, a man of ordinary family, obtained the hand of a lady belonging to the nobility; finally, when it had enabled him with no other claim than that of merit to become the ruler over a great nation.

The second revolutionary principle retained by the Consulate was that of conquest. Many historians have represented the striving for universal dominion as due entirely to Napoleonic ambition. Whether seeing therein a new and glorious proof of the grandeur of his genius, or condemning him for his criminal and insatiable greed, writers have concurred in imputing this tendency to him personally and in placing the responsibility for it upon his shoulders alone. But this view of the situation is hardly to be accepted, for ever since the year 1792 the revolutionary holders of power in France had pursued this course toward universal dominion. It was indeed at first intended that this should be the universal dominion of revolutionary ideas only, of the rights of man which they styled "universal." But when these ideas met with material resistance put forth by the old States, the opposition was overcome by armies consisting of hundreds of thousands of enthusiasts for these principles which pressed forward deep into foreign territory, calling the people to liberty and to resistance against hereditary rule. As Mohammed propagated his religion with the aid of the sword, and as the religious parties of the sixteenth century took up arms for their faith, so now did the believers in the new political dogma rush upon the neighbouring countries to convert while conquering. And when the question arose whether acquisitions made in war were to be retained in time of peace, it was decided by no ideal considerations, but by material need: the only hope of relieving the financial distress in France was by drawing upon the resources of these neighbours either by means of downright annexation or by creating a fringe of dependent republics on the borders of France and transferring to them a portion of the State's burden. It has already been seen how this motive of self-preservation determined the revolutionary government in

1795 to incorporate Belgium.* Some one at that time having offered a prize for the best answer to the question whether it would be advantageous or prejudicial to France to extend her borders as far as the Rhine, he was officially denounced in the "Moniteur" as suspected of high treason. Thus had the Revolutionary theory of the liberation of nations become in practice the conquest of nations. Conquests were no longer made in order to give liberty: liberty was now declared only in order to facilitate conquest. "When the Committee of Public Safety proposes peace," wrote Mallet du Pan in October, 1795, "this word must be understood to mean submission. Its invariable intention is to compel every State laying down its arms before France to become her ally, that is to say, her tributary and her imitator. Such princes of secondary rank who hope to escape this fate by means of treaties or capitulations strangely misapprehend the character of this Revolution." As will be seen, this system is identical with that pursued by Napoleon up to the year 1812.†

The greatest antagonist to the extension of the boundaries of France was now, as it had been in the time of Louis XIV., England. Should France stick to that policy to which she had been forced by the ideal purpose of the Revolution and to which she had been obliged to hold on account of material need, the consequence would be that Great Britain must also keep to her system of opposition by means of her ships upon the ocean and through her allies upon the Continent. For this reason, if reports of that time are to be believed, there was in France, as early as the summer of 1796, a clearly defined intention not only to land an army in the British Islands, but also to annihilate that country by closing to her commerce the ports of all Europe; Napoleon's

* See page 75.

† In August, 1801, the Prussian Envoy, Lucchesini wrote to Berlin: "Whatever advantages may accrue to the French government from exchanging the anarchy of the Directory for the Consular authority, there will be no change in foreign policy. The same ambitious plans and the same arbitrary connections will prevail, and if General Bonaparte is as well qualified for administration as he is to deal with enemies without and within, he is still too much of a conqueror to give France and, through her, Europe lasting peace."

"Continental System" was therefore also prefigured at this time. Even Bonaparte's Eastern plans had been evolved before his time by the rulers at Paris. At the same time that the descent upon England was planned, long before Bonaparte had turned his mind upon imitating Alexander the Great, the Directory was concerning itself about the source of Britain's wealth, India. Mallet du Pan writes in a report dated July 3d, 1796: "The incendiary activity of the Directory no longer knows any bounds. It is rousing Persia to rebellion, working up Constantinople, and peopling Hindostan with its emissaries." In a similar way the policy towards Germany afterward pursued by Napoleon may be found mapped out in all its details during the last ten years of the century. The idea of the secularization of the German ecclesiastical principalities originated with the Girondists, and in 1795 Sieyès was the author of a memorial containing a scheme for the indemnification and aggrandizement of the secular principalities at the expense of the ecclesiastical, a plan which, with slight alteration, was actually put into practice in 1803. The suggestion of the confederation of Rhenish princes under French protection which in 1806 became a reality will also be found to have had its origin in the diplomacy of the Directory of 1798, as was likewise the case with the design of driving back Prussia and Austria as far toward the East as possible in order to bring under French control the mouths of the Weser and Elbe and cut them off from English commerce. In a report to the Directory sent by Sieyès from Berlin in July, 1798, he says plainly that the German coast of the North Sea is "for France the most important portion of the earth's surface in view of the fact that by means of it the Directory may at its will close to English commerce all the markets and all the ports of the Continent from Gibraltar as far as Holstein or even to the North Cape."

It is evident that the Revolution had determined upon extending its influence and power to the furthest confines of the Continent. This intention was, to be sure, without system or method,—just as in the legislation of the interior one law was heaped upon another without regard to order or relation,—and it needed a man of extraordinary perspicacity and practical

insight to apply both system and method to this vague purpose. And here begins Bonaparte's direct participation in the policy of the Revolution. Up to this time he had been merely its disciple and advocate, as far as its interests coincided with his own, and except for the latter he recognized none. Neither his interests nor his ambition knew any bounds. Once master of France he would satisfy them by letting things take their course, and before him would open up the prospect of a universal empire such as perhaps no power on the globe had ever founded. He was like a swimmer whose destination is the river's mouth: he needs but to throw himself into the current to reach it. Even at the time when with Robespierre the younger he was considering the plan of offensive warfare against Italy he had begun to develop a policy of his own founded upon that of revolutionary conquest, and this had matured so that it could not now be abandoned without danger to himself and to the power which he had acquired.

History shows us monarchs whose lives are tragedies. But there are also nations whose story is a tragedy, where for centuries the people suffer and pine as the result of a single great crime, and the anguish is not lessened by the fact that it is shared by millions. France gives us an example of such a nation. Nothing can be more affecting than the fate of this people, so full of enthusiasm for the real good of humanity, overtaken in the course of a few years by all that was glaringly contradictory to humane feeling; yearning for peace, and condemned to long decades of warfare involving untold sacrifice. Immediately upon the overthrow of Robespierre's Reign of Terror the people had begun to clamour for peace with the rest of the world; this cry was repeated when the Convention was succeeded by the Directory; and again when Sieyès took his place in the government the same hope centred in his name. Now that Bonaparte had seized the rudder, the nation, so often disappointed, turned its gaze once more in hope upon him. Was it to be again in vain?

It has been asserted that by accepting certain restrictions Napoleon might have concluded peace at once in 1800. This is,

however, improbable. For since the Directory had become accustomed to making the "liberated" countries bear a portion of the state burdens and to having the contributions levied in hostile territory figure as a permanent item in the budget, it had indolently avoided the arduous and tedious labour of remedying the disorder in the finances. Napoleon's energy had brought about an amelioration, but in the few months of his rule nothing more could be done than merely to lay the foundation for his reforms. Capital was still withheld, the rate of interest was still very high, the revenue collected was still not much exceeding that of preceding years, and many arbitrary measures had to be resorted to in order to procure funds. Consequently, if the State was to continue in existence, it was unavoidable to draw for the present upon the allies for contributions together with the money extorted from conquered foes. To conclude peace at this time would have meant nothing less than the relinquishment of wealthy Holland, Switzerland, the conquered German territory beyond the Rhine, the Riviera, Malta, Egypt, and above all, the possibility of levying contributions; it would have meant to draw back within the narrow confines of a land whose resources were to a great extent exhausted or at least still inaccessible, where the disbanded army would only increase the starving population, and where the contrast between the misery of the poor and the wealth of unscrupulous upstarts who had taken advantage of the financial embarrassment to enrich themselves would have probably led to social revolution and civil war. Moreover, not all Frenchmen demanding peace meant thereby peace at any price or based upon the reverses of the preceding year, but upon terms dictated by new and glorious victories promised by the mere name of Bonaparte. One of the missions undertaken by the consuls on the 19th Brumaire was that of concluding an *honourable* peace. Barante says in his "Souvenirs": "There prevailed everywhere a desire for improvement and for national glory." Added to this there was in the army especially a craving for war and victory by means of which its reputation might be retrieved. It was in response to this desire that Bonaparte, on the first day of the Coup d'État, had spoken

to the soldiers not only of liberty and of peace, but also of victory.*

Finally, and this was the essential point, the First Consul himself stood in need of war in order to strengthen and maintain the power which he had so boldly assumed, according to the time-honoured method of securing obedience from the parties at home by employing abroad the forces of the State; he stood in need of war in order to acquire new personal glory and fame, and to silence the whispers about disaster at Acre and the whole futile expedition to the Orient; he stood in need of war, moreover, to satisfy his measureless ambition, which aimed at the acquisition of supremacy over all Europe in the same way that he had acquired it over France.

It was therefore only a matter of form when, on the 25th of December, 1799, he addressed letters to the King of England and to the Emperor Francis in which, without making any definite propositions, he simply expressed his desire for peace. Such advances of course could not be considered. England was holding Malta and Egypt in a state of blockade, and the fall of these two French positions was only a question of weeks; both of these acquisitions were of far too great importance to British interests for Pitt to give them up. He declined to enter into any negotiations for peace. Austria had indeed quarrelled with Russia. After the victories of the allied forces in Italy Thugut was not to be satisfied with regaining the former Austrian territory of Lombardy, but wanted also the three Legations and Piedmont, a purpose which was suspected by his Russian neighbour and to which Suvaroff opposed resistance upon his own authority. Thugut succeeded in procuring from the Court of St. Petersburg an order for this capable general to take command in Switzerland, while Archduke Charles, then stationed there, was forced against his own better judgment to pass over into Southern Germany. During the marches entailed by these changes of location Masséna succeeded in defeating a corps of Russians at Zurich and by means of this victory in regaining possession of the whole of Switzerland. Suvaroff returned to Russia.

* See page 172.

Austria was now absolute mistress of the situation in Upper Italy with the exception of Genoa, where the remnants of the French armies were collected, and this supremacy she hoped to maintain. Hence when Napoleon's letter reached Vienna Thugut also was unready to accede to its vague propositions of peace. He demanded first of all assurance upon the question as to "whether the First Consul would return to the actual causes of the war so as to prevent for all time their recurrence; whether he would abandon the very source of that mistaken policy, fatal to France herself and threatening the existence of the other powers; whether there existed any difference between the overtures of the new government and those of its predecessors; and, finally, whether General Bonaparte would bring the French public to recognize the general principles of international law which alone can bind nations together and teach them reciprocal respect for peace and independence." On February 28th Talleyrand answered by proposing to negotiate on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio, that monument of French offensive policy. Thugut knew then what might be counted upon.

How little Napoleon meant by his offers of peace is shown by the fact that on the very day on which those letters were dated he addressed the French soldiers in these words: "You are the same men who conquered Holland, the Rhine and Italy, and dictated terms of peace under the walls of astonished Vienna. Soldiers! it is no longer your frontiers which you are called upon to defend; you are now to invade the territory of the enemy." To the army of Italy, posted on the Riviera and which had just been placed under the command of Masséna, he addressed a proclamation in which the starving soldiers were consoled with the prospect of victories soon to follow, exactly as he had done in 1796.* In short, war was from the very first a foregone conclu-

* In this second manifesto Bonaparte displayed in its full perfection his incomparable skill in dealing with the common soldier. A demi-brigade had given evidence of discouragement: "Are they then all dead," he exclaimed, "those brave hearts of Castiglione, of Rivoli, and of Neumarkt? They would have died rather than desert their flags, and they would have recalled their younger comrades to honour and duty. Soldiers! you say that your rations are not issued to you with regularity.

sion with Bonaparte, and his only object in writing to the two sovereigns was to make the French people believe that it was he who desired peace, and the enemy who was forcing war upon him.*

But in order to make headway against the foreign enemy, those at home must first be overcome. La Vendée was still in revolt, but just at this time the favourable outcome of the campaign in Holland set at liberty a magnificent army of 30,000 men, which Napoleon further reinforced in order to give weight to a manifesto calling upon the insurgents to lay down their arms, offering full amnesty to those who obeyed, but threatening with annihilation all who continued in resistance to the law. The inhabitants of Vendée were taken entirely by surprise in this proceeding, coming from a man of whom they had scarcely any knowledge except as the conqueror of Toulon and the confidant of Robespierre. They were still further amazed when they saw this man compelling respect to the Catholic religion and setting the priests at liberty. The success of the manifesto was complete. Among all the bands in La Vendée, only three ventured to resist and they were forced to capitulate. By February, 1800, the province had been quieted and the Army of the West was appointed a new destination.

As for the rest of the French forces, the 120,000 men commanded by Moreau in Switzerland were equal in number to the Austrians in Suabia under command of the brave but otherwise incapable Kray, Archduke Charles having retired from the chief command, sick and wounded by Thugut's arbitrary proceedings.

What would you have done if you had found yourselves, like the 4th and 22d light infantry and the 18th and the 32d of the line, in the midst of the desert, without bread or water, with horse or mule meat as your only food? 'Victory will give us bread,' said they; but you—you desert your standards!" etc.

* There is in existence a communication from Talleyrand to the First Consul of precisely this time (the first weeks of the year 1800), in which he says: "It is always assuming a good position at the beginning of a campaign to manifest a warm desire for peace and to make every attempt toward its re-establishment. If the result of the campaign is favourable, one has acquired the right to show severity; if disastrous, one need not bear the reproach of having brought it on." (Bailleu, "Preussen und Frankreich, 1795-1807," I. 522.)

In Italy, however, Masséna had but 30,000 men with which to oppose the 80,000 Austrians under Mêlas, a general who had distinguished himself the year before at Novi by deciding the battle in favour of the Austrians; he was old, feeble, conscientious, but very deliberate. In order to counterbalance the enemy's superiority of numbers the First Consul gave secret orders in January, 1800, to Berthier, the Minister of War, to assemble a reserve army of 50,000–60,000 men, using as a nucleus the above-mentioned Army of the West. His plan for the ensuing campaign was masterly: Moreau was at the earliest possible moment to cross the Rhine at Schaffhausen, engage Kray in Germany, and force the Austrians back, while Masséna was to hold Mêlas before Genoa, retreating to that city fighting every inch of the ground. Bonaparte himself meanwhile designed to cross the Swiss Alps with the reserve army, penetrate into Lombardy and there cut off communication between Vienna and the Austrian army, which he hoped to surprise; the decisive blow would then be struck or the Austrians forced to capitulate. In pursuing this course he was, without the least doubt, carrying out hidden ends in addition to his acknowledged aim, which was to inflict defeats upon the enemy and obtain advantageous terms of peace. He was unwilling that France should owe that peace to Moreau, who, by a reinforcement of his army, would have been enabled, undoubtedly, to prevail over Austria. Nor was he perhaps willing that this honour should fall to Masséna. Peace must be the gift of Bonaparte himself alone. This is the reason why the head of the government determined, to the great surprise of every one, to take the field; this was doubtless his motive in being so conciliatory toward the insurgents of Vendée, in order to have done with them and be able to take to his own use the troops of which he stood in need; it was for the same reason again that Moreau was instructed to send into Upper Italy by way of Switzerland one of the corps of his army for his reinforcement at the risk of reducing the Army of Germany to a number inferior to that of the enemy.*

* Before deciding upon this course, Napoleon had planned to allow things to take their own course in Italy, to unite the reserve army with

Of all these designs and preparations no inkling had reached Vienna. There the Austrians had elaborated their own plan: Mélas was as promptly as possible to clear the Riviera of the French and then to direct a detached corps into Switzerland from the south, while Kray should attack Moreau's position from the north. The order to carry out this plan was communicated to Melas on the 24th of February, and its execution might have been begun in the early part of March, before Napoleon had come to any agreement with Moreau in regard to the detail of the campaign. It would then have been possible to shut Masséna up in Genoa by the end of the month before his reinforcements could reach him, and compel him to surrender at latest in the beginning of May; this accomplished, it would have been possible to turn northward with a considerable force where he might perhaps have encountered Napoleon's reserve army while still on the march. As it was, however, Melas, after long delay, did not begin the contest until the beginning of April, and did not succeed until the 21st in driving Masséna into Genoa, and then he wasted precious time in pursuing a French corps sent to the relief of Masséna. As a matter of fact the middle of May found Melas with 30,000 men just across the French frontier on the Var, while his subordinate Ott was still besieging Genoa with 24,000 men, and to the north 17,000 men in sundry detachments were scattered among the valleys of the Alpine foot-hills. No situation of affairs could have been more favourable to Napoleon. And he stood in need of such conditions for his audacious undertaking.

The equipment of the new French army had been excessively delayed by the lack of the commonest necessities arising from the mismanagement of the previous year. Moreau did not for a long time make his attack. Time was pressing, for Masséna that under Moreau, and, assuming command himself, with these superior forces to surround Kray's left wing, cut it off from communication and march at once upon Vienna—a manœuvre which he was five years later, in 1805, to execute with brilliancy. That he renounced this plan is due to the fact that Moreau with his excessive military ambition would not serve in a subordinate capacity and that, at that time, Bonaparte still had reasons for using tact in dealing with him.

could hold the enemy in check for but a few weeks. Accordingly Bonaparte determined to venture, without waiting for Moreau to take the offensive, upon taking up his march through Lausanne and over the Great Saint-Bernard to the Dora Baltea with but 32,000 men. Moreau was to send one corps as soon as practicable across the Saint-Gothard to the aid of Bonaparte. On the 14th of May the first columns climbed the pass, drawing behind them the cannon in troughs or cases made of hollowed logs, under the difficulties entailed by such a manœuvre, but with favourable weather and without serious accident. On the 22d of May the last detachment had crossed the heights. The irruption of an entire army at this point had been least of all expected by the Austrians, and their defences were insignificant. The impregnable Fort Bard alone made difficulties. "There the Consul took many a pinch of snuff," relates one of his grenadiers who later became Captain Coignet; "he had much to do with all his great genius." But eventually this obstacle also was overcome. The infantry and cavalry passed beyond the fort by means of a circuitous route, while the cannon with wheels wrapped in straw were conveyed past, under cover of the night, by the direct road, which had been spread with manure. During the last days of May a small band of the enemy was put to flight, Ivrea taken, and Napoleon's advance upon Milan begun. His entry into that city was made on the 2d of June. The venture had succeeded. Melas had been advised too late of the invasion of the French; he now sought to collect all available forces at Turin in order to maintain communication with Austria while conducting his retreat through Alessandria, Piacenza, and Mantua. But in this design also he was to fail. He got no farther than Alessandria, in the vicinity of which the decisive blow was struck.

In the first two weeks of May Moreau had defeated the Austrians at Stockach, Engen, and Moeskirch, driving them back as far as Ulm, and he was thence in a position to send to Napoleon the desired auxiliary corps. These reinforcements reached the army of reserves during the first days of June, bringing the aggregate number to ten divisions (about 60,000 men). Always bearing in mind his purpose of cutting off the retreat of the enemy,

Napoleon now advanced with five of these divisions, making his way across the Po between Pavia and Piacenza, and, after a successful encounter with Ott, who had finally taken Genoa, arrived June 12th at Tortona, a little town in the neighbourhood of Montebello. These troops were commanded by Lannes, Victor, and Desaix, who had just arrived from Egypt. Three other divisions were sent by the Consul to the Ticino and toward Piedmont to prevent the escape of Melas toward the north; two more were set to guard the Adda and the left bank of the Po. Having encountered no serious resistance on the march from Piacenza to Tortona and beyond, Napoleon was uncertain what direction Melas would take, knowing him to be then in Alessandria. He did not credit his antagonist with capacity for the bold resolution of facing the French army and cutting his way through. Pride had led him to esteem lightly the souls as well as the minds of his adversaries.

The Scrivia and Bormida rivers run parallel to each other northward to the Po; on the one lies Tortona, on the other, a few miles west, the fortress of Alessandria. The two towns are connected by the highway running from Turin by way of Asti to Piacenza and the east; between Tortona and Alessandria, but nearer to the latter, is situated the village of Marengo. A road running south from Tortona is joined at Novi by one running southeast from Alessandria; they form, united, the way to Genoa. The two corps under Lannes and Victor had advanced as far as Marengo, when Bonaparte, failing to encounter the Austrians in the open country, finally concluded that the enemy must have turned toward Novi in order to avoid him and secure a strong position near Genoa, where he could avail himself of the resources of the English fleet. In order to get light upon this question Bonaparte sent Desaix on June 13th with a division in the direction of Novi. He himself remained with another division and the Consular Guard in the vicinity of Tortona.* The army was thus cut up into three detached parts. Should Melas now attack with his 30,000 well-concentrated men, the issue might readily

* The Guard numbered at that time 1200 men, every one of whom must have been through four campaigns.

prove fatal to the French. And the following morning was to display the danger in this disposition. During the forenoon of that day, June the 14th, the Austrian general crossed the Bormida and pressed forward in the direction of Tortona. At Marengo he came upon Lannes and Victor, drove them back and out of the village, and after a struggle of six hours' duration compelled them by his superiority of numbers to give way. Napoleon now realized that the decisive battle was to be fought out on this occasion and that he had made an egregious blunder. He at once despatched an ordnance officer to Desaix commanding his return, and himself hastened to the field with his Guards and reserve division, where he succeeded in the early afternoon hours in stemming the tide of battle. But the conflict had not raged long before the French again began to give way and the retreat threatened to become a stampede. Napoleon sat by the roadside in nervous excitement, beating up with his riding-whip the dust through which his defeated troops fled past him. In vain he called to the soldiers to stand and hold out since the reserves were coming. It was but an empty promise. About 7000 men were already killed or wounded, and Desaix, the only remaining hope, was still beyond reach. There could be no question but that the battle had been won by the Austrians. Rejoicing in their victory, with shouldered arms, they marched, formed in an immense column, behind the fleeing French on the road that their valour had opened to them. Melas himself, slightly wounded, had already yielded the command to a subordinate and had ridden back to Alessandria. All at once appears Desaix with his division of fresh men, and these dash impetuously upon the dismayed Austrians; Napoleon makes one more attempt to impose a check upon the retreat, and is rewarded with success. Kellermann the younger, cheered by the sight of approaching help, turned about with his dragoons and made a furious charge upon the pursuing foe, who wavered, fell back, and finally took to flight in their turn. The pursuers became the pursued. The battle lost to the French at five o'clock was retrieved by seven. It had been lost by Bonaparte, as must be conceded by any impartial judge; the victory was due to the gallant Desaix. Hear-

ing the roar of cannon, he had halted to await new orders. It was due to this that he was overtaken by Napoleon's messenger and was able to reach the scene of battle before it was too late. But at the opening of the assault which was to save the day Desaix was cut down by a shot from the enemy, and the victor's laurel wreathed a brow cold in death.

Napoleon was for a long time unable to reconcile himself to the thought that he had been surprised on this occasion and that the battle had been won without his assistance. He repeatedly attempted by means of official reports on the battle to exalt the purely fictitious deeds of the commander-in-chief above the real services of Desaix and Kellermann. Even as late as 1805 he tried, through Berthier, to establish these claims, and he had almost convinced the nation of their validity until the concurrent testimony of eye-witnesses proved his assertions to be false.

But even if the victory gained at Marengo on June 14th, 1800, were not of his achieving, it was nevertheless he who had directed the whole campaign which had brought the foe into such precarious circumstances, and he justly reaped the benefit of its results. This battle was, according to the expression of one of the deepest thinkers of that time, "the baptism of Napoleon's personal power." The Austrians had lost more than 9000 men; a renewal of attack was not to be thought of. Melas asked for an armistice and the right of withdrawal without molestation, and on June 15th a convention was signed granting both requests upon condition that he retire with his troops beyond the Mincio and surrender to Napoleon all the country west of that river. The fruit of all the victories gained in 1799 had been lost in a single day. The Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics were again set up, and in Tuscany and Ancona alone were Austrian garrisons for the time being permitted.

After the battle Napoleon left Masséna in command of the army and went to Milan for the purpose of reaping pecuniary advantage first of all from the result of the war. The Cisalpine Republic was compelled to furnish two million francs a month and Piedmont a million and a half; public domains and property of the Church were confiscated and sold; the support

of the army was as a matter of course imposed upon the country. Moreau, who had meanwhile advanced further into Germany and occupied Munich, was ordered to levy contributions also, and Southern Germany was in like manner compelled to maintain the hostile army and pay in addition 40,000,000 francs. The financial object of the campaign had thus been attained, but the advantages which Napoleon himself derived were of no small importance. His position in France was now firmly established. That such had not previously been the case is proved by letters and comments written at the time. What was to be the consequence if he lost his life in Italy or even in case he were defeated was a question secretly discussed in Talleyrand's house by Sieyès, Carnot, Lafayette, Fouché, and others. The question became a burning one when the report, though entirely unfounded, was circulated in Paris that he had suffered a defeat. They were still wavering between Carnot and Lafayette in their choice for the next First Consul, when tidings of the victory at Marengo arrived and interrupted the consultation. Bonaparte was aware of what was taking place during his absence, and this fact unquestionably had no little influence in determining him to leave the theatre of war as early as June. Early in July he was again in Paris with the fixed intention not to leave the capital again for a long time, but rather to take advantage of the success at Marengo to bring about a speedy conclusion of peace. This he was determined to accomplish at whatever cost, for thus alone could he claim success and the glory of having secured for the nation the peace so ardently desired.

He had addressed while at Milan a second letter to the Emperor Francis proposing a conclusion of peace and again offering to treat upon the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio. But in Vienna they had not yet reached the point of having to accept such unfavourable propositions. Moreover, Austria had shortly before bound herself, in return for considerable subsidies from the British government, not to conclude a separate peace with France before the following February, but she was not without hopes that Bonaparte would depart from these

conditions and make proposals to which England also could be brought to accede. It was with these considerations in mind that the Emperor's reply to the First Consul was composed. General Count Joseph de St. Julien, who had just come from Italy, had been the bearer of Bonaparte's letter to the Emperor, and he was now entrusted with the delivery of the reply. Not finding the Consul in Milan the Count followed him to Paris. Here the messenger was made by Napoleon the object of a special intrigue. Talleyrand was appointed to persuade the Count that he was entrusted by the Emperor with full powers to negotiate for peace, and that failure to make use of these powers would lead to immediate renewal of war. St. Julien was completely taken in, and within a week the vain and stupid envoy was led to sign preliminaries which, entirely contrary to the spirit of the Emperor's letter, accepted as a basis the stipulations of Campo Formio and not only totally ignored all claims on the part of England, but even closed to her all Austrian ports.

Had Napoleon really supposed that his purpose could be accomplished at so slight a cost? Whatever may have been his hopes, this end was not to be reached for the present, though when once attained it was but so much the more assured. The Austrian court declined to ratify the preliminaries and put forth all its powers toward the equipment of troops for the continuance of the war. New troops were levied, and Kray, who had proved himself incompetent, was replaced by Archduke John, an extremely young man, who relates in his *Memoirs* that he had but recently learned to saddle a horse. His instructions were to follow implicitly the directions of Lauer, his chief of staff, and thus he had to assume the responsibility for all that officer's monstrous blunders. In Italy Melas gave place to Bellegarde, a general far less competent than himself. These changes had so little improved the condition of the Austrian armies that toward the end of September Emperor Francis was obliged to ask for an extension of the truce concluded with Moreau in July. According to instructions Moreau granted this request on condition of Austria's surrender of three of her

most important fortresses (Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt), and the withdrawal of her troops beyond the Inn. Napoleon had been beyond measure exasperated at the refusal of the Austrians to accept his preliminaries, and it was with the utmost difficulty that Talleyrand was able to calm him. Only the strong personal interest which he now had in a speedy conclusion of peace led him to consent to the presence of an Austrian diplomat at Paris for the purpose of negotiating new conditions of peace. Cobenzl, who had shown much skill in the negotiations at Passariano in 1797, was sent as the ambassador to France, but here he was most unfortunate in his efforts. Hitherto his talent had been able to adjust itself to circumstances, but the sudden revolution of conditions brought about by the fortunes of war was more than he could grasp; he persisted in demands which no longer corresponded with the actual relations of the powers, and renounced them only when Napoleon had already resolved upon a continuance of the war. The great contrast between revolutionary and conservative diplomacy was here again exemplified: Cobenzl, who was bound by Austria's agreement with Great Britain, demanded that an English diplomat should take part in the negotiation; Bonaparte, on the contrary, insisted upon a separate agreement with Austria so as to isolate England from her allies and close to her the Continental ports, so that he might meet her alone in combat. Cobenzl was not altogether disinclined to consent to such an arrangement provided that France pay a sufficiently high price, more especially in Italy. Ancient Austria and new France had met face to face; each was pursuing a policy of conquest, and neither could be successful without excluding the other. A solution of the problem seemed possible only in the total subjugation of one of the parties. Napoleon, who was perfectly informed as to the situation of the Austrian forces, resolved upon bringing about the crisis, and at the end of November, 1800, he declared the armistice at an end. Although Cobenzl still carried on negotiations with Joseph Bonaparte at Lunéville on the French frontier, the questions at issue were decided elsewhere.

When hostilities were resumed the French were posted on

the Isar, while the Austrians occupied an advantageous position on the further side of the broad Inn. Had they understood making use of their advantage they might at least have kept their opponents occupied longer than would have been agreeable to the chief ruler on the Seine. On the 1st of December, just as Moreau was making preparations for the difficult task of effecting a crossing of the stream behind which the enemy lay ensconced, his left wing was suddenly attacked and thrown back while on the march toward the Inn. It seemed beyond belief that the enemy should have abandoned their strong position, and yet such was the case. Moreau at once profited by the advantage so unexpectedly offered him, united the centre with the left wing at Hohenlinden, and now in his turn awaited the enemy while occupying a strong position. The onslaught of the Austrians was sustained by Moreau in front, while two of his divisions under command of Richepanse circumvented them and attacked them from the rear. Taken by surprise, the Austrians sought safety in flight, the Archduke barely escaping capture. The battle of Hohenlinden (December 3d, 1800) had been won by the French, the way to Vienna lay open before them. On the 25th of December Moreau signed an armistice at Steyer which was to lead to definite peace. On the 26th General Brune, who had succeeded Masséna in command of the Army of Italy, advanced from the south across the Mincio and a few days later across the Adige. Austria, with her policy of conquest and extension, had been vanquished.

At Lunéville the success attending the French arms had speedily made itself felt. Cobenzl had at last agreed to treat separately, he was even ready to sign for the German Empire as well, and was desirous of coming to an understanding with France in regard to a partition of Italy between France and Austria in accordance with a proposal of Joseph Bonaparte; but the events on the field put an end to all these agreements. Austria's diplomacy, like her army, was driven back relentlessly from one position to another: in November Cobenzl had still clung to the Oglio as the boundary of Austrian territory in Italy, by December he had already receded to the Mincio, and

in January he could make claims only as far as to the Adige. When finally the definitive treaty of peace was signed, February 9th, 1801, it contained stipulations which not only destroyed Austria's plans of conquest, but were even detrimental to her position as one of the Great Powers, while to France the result of the treaty was to be the confirmation of her revolutionary system of territorial expansion. The stipulations of the treaty of Campo Formio were therein established and in certain respects made still more severe. In Italy the Grand-duke of Tuscany, whose house was allied to that of Habsburg, was deprived of his estates. Compensation was to be made him in German territory, just as the Breisgau had been assigned to the Duke of Modena by the treaty of Campo Formio. Austria's last foothold in Central Italy was thus taken from her, and the entire peninsula surrendered to French influence. Moreover, that influence was now beginning to make itself felt in Germany also. As had been agreed upon in Rastatt, the Rhine throughout its course was to form the boundary line of France, and all temporal princes losing territory on the left bank were to receive indemnification in ecclesiastical domains on the right of the stream. The old scheme of secularization had thus been resumed, and Austria, whose power in Germany rested mainly on the ecclesiastical princes, had been constrained to sanction it. Napoleon had in the treaty secured to himself the right of superintending its execution, and French intervention in Germany was thus conceded by the head of the Empire. Provision for compensation to Austria by means of Bavarian territory as far as the Inn had been made in the treaty of Campo Formio, but of this there was now no further thought. Austria, thus defeated in Italy and threatened in Germany, must perforce relinquish all hope of conquest such as had animated Joseph II. Thugut, the representative of Austria's policy of extension, was deprived of his office upon the demand of Napoleon. On the 6th of March the Reichstag ratified the treaty for the Empire.

This peace of Lunéville was not, however, due exclusively to success in arms. It was at the same time the result of clever

diplomatic action. While the armies were yet in the field Napoleon had contrived to widen the breach existing in the coalition, and had succeeded not only in wholly separating Russia from Austria, but even in winning the good-will of the Czar for France. Prior to the last campaign Napoleon had offered to release about 7000 Russians captured in the last battles at Zurich and in Holland, and these he now fitted out with new clothing and equipments, and in addition offered the Czar the possession of the island of Malta. Paul, who regarded the mighty general as the subduer of the detested Revolution, was delighted and now became as much prejudiced in favour of Napoleon as he had been shortly before against the Directory.* The Consul had weighed carefully the consequences of this step. Malta could no longer be provided with supplies, and consequently could be held but a little while longer against the English besiegers. If the fortress capitulated, his offer of it to the Czar would be throwing the apple of discord between the two allies. And this was precisely the outcome. When, on the 5th of September, 1800, the French garrison at Lavallette surrendered and the English took possession of the island without regard for the rights of the Grand Master, the Czar abandoned his allies and seized upon all British ships lying in Russian harbours. He even proceeded to join with Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia in a "league of armed neutrality" against England's arbitrary proceedings on the seas. Napoleon's policy was never so successful as when dealing with a state represented by an absolute sovereign; some years later he played the same game with Alexander I., and with like success as rewarded his present transactions with the father of that monarch.

The annihilation of English maritime supremacy was the object upon which were now concentrated all the efforts of

* Without further confirmation it must still remain questionable whether Napoleon actually wrote to Paul I., as has recently been asserted by Lalanne ("Les derniers jours du Consulat," p. 4 f.), promising the restoration of the Bourbons and demanding only an Italian principality for himself.

French policy. From this time approaches were of necessity made toward the United States of America, with which ever since the Directory France had for mercantile reasons been upon a footing bordering upon warfare. To this state of affairs the First Consul put an end. Upon receipt of the tidings of the death of General Washington in December, 1799, he showed respect by ordering the French army to assume the badge of mourning, and a short time afterwards, September 30th, 1800, a treaty was signed at Morfontaine recognizing the absolute independence of the neutral flag.

In the same way in which he sought to win allies to his cause against England by land and by sea he was endeavouring to gain confederates on the Continent against Austria. Immediately after the Coup d'État Napoleon had sent to Berlin his aide-de-camp Duroc, in whom he had absolute confidence. His mission was to induce the Prussian cabinet to assume armed intervention in order to compel Austria to accept the conditions imposed upon her by France, and in particular the cession of the left bank of the Rhine. Frederick William III., who had been King of Prussia since 1797, while unwilling to accept exactly this rôle, consented at least to remain neutral and came to an agreement with Napoleon whereby he was to assist in bringing about relations between France and Russia and to consent to French acquisition of the Rhine boundary, receiving in return the promise from France that Austria should by the terms of the treaty of peace make no accessions of territory in Germany, that is to say, that she should not obtain an inch of Bavarian soil. Jealousy was accordingly the force which moved both of these nations to take sides with Napoleon: jealousy on Russia's part concerning accessions to Austria in Italy, jealousy on the part of Prussia of Austria's making gains in Germany. Their consent to the results obtained by the Revolutionary policy of conquest strengthened the power of the First Consul and enabled him to compel Austria to greater sacrifices than he could have demanded without this support. French supremacy on the Continent had received confirmation at the hands of the Great Powers themselves.

Napoleon at once profited by these successes to establish definitely the sphere of action of the country over which he ruled. His attention was turned first of all to Italy, where the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics were again recognized and guaranteed. The former had been very considerably increased by the annexation of Modena and the Legations; in both, French statesmen stood at the head of the government; both remained mere dependencies of France, and the will of the First Consul was supreme there as in France. Between these two countries lay Piedmont, whose destiny or that of its king had not yet been decided, with the exception of Savoy, which had been incorporated into France; but of its eventual fate no one felt the least doubt. Napoleon took advantage of the acquisition of Tuscany to place Spain under obligations to himself and thus gain a directing hand in the management of her policy. After the battle of Marengo he had succeeded in driving out of office in Madrid a ministry hostile to France. Affairs were then placed in the hands of Godoy, the paramour of the queen, who had received the title of "Prince of the Peace." This man was ambitious of power and friendly to the interests of France. Napoleon's object was attained October 1st, 1800, through the treaty of San Ildefonso, by which Tuscany, under the name of Kingdom of Etruria, was promised to the queen's daughter, who had married the Bourbon Prince of Parma. The transaction was completed by the signature of the Peace of Lunéville, and on the 21st of March, 1801, Spain declared herself ready not only to cede to France Parma and its dependency Elba, and to give up Louisiana, but, what was to Napoleon of greater importance, to constrain Portugal to sever its alliance with Great Britain and to close its ports to all English ships. A Spanish army reinforced by a French auxiliary corps was despatched across the Portuguese frontier, and on the 6th of June, 1801, John VI. was forced to sign the treaty of Badajoz, which closed all Portuguese harbours to the English, and by a special convention, September 29th. he was bound to pay France twenty million francs.

In Italy there yet remained Rome and Naples to be dealt

with. In the time of the Directory these two states had each been made a republic. Were these to be re-established? Napoleon followed, it is true, the course of development which France was undergoing, but always with the stamp of his own individuality and according to his own judgment. He was far too practical to act simply according to the theories of the "Idealogues," whom he openly ridiculed. It is clear, moreover, that as an autocratic ruler the preservation of the republican form of government was of no great moment to him. And he accomplished his purpose without setting up the republics again. During the recent war Russia had made special intercession for Naples, and, out of regard for his newly won friend, the First Consul was obliged to be lenient with the royal house of the Two Sicilies. On March 18th, 1801, he concluded with Ferdinand IV. the Peace of Florence, wherein the king agreed to the evacuation of the Papal States, which had been occupied by Neapolitan troops during the war, ceded to France his rights to the island of Elba and the principality of Piombino, besides binding himself to what we recognize as the two essential points of the policy of conquest pursued by the Consul: to close his ports to English ships, and to maintain at his own expense a corps of French soldiers in and about Taranto.

Nor did the States of the Church vacated by the Neapolitans come again under the administration of French functionaries. It was in this that Napoleon differed most essentially from his predecessors in authority. He was by no means religiously inclined and far removed from holding any positive belief. Among the writings of his youth figures one, composed no doubt in imitation of Voltaire, entitled "*Un Parallèle entre Apollonius de Tyane et Jésus-Christ*," in which the result of the comparison is in favour of the Greek philosopher.* But this in no wise pre-

* When in 1802 Lucien reminded him of this dissertation Napoleon ordered him not to speak of it inasmuch as, in case it were known of, his whole work of religious pacification might be thereby compromised. This was not among the writings of his youth which Napoleon himself consigned to the flames. This had been borrowed by Fréron and never returned. (Lucien, *Mémoires*, II. 114.)

vented his recognizing to the full the political significance of the Papacy. It has been seen how in 1797 he allowed the States of the Church to exist contrary to the wishes of the Directory. He was actuated to this policy by the fact that during the previous year by far the greater proportion of the French people had already openly professed faith again in the Catholic religion. "The people of France have become Roman Catholic again," wrote General Clarke to Napoleon in December, 1796, "and we have perhaps reached the point of needing the Pope himself to compel the support of the Revolution by the priests and through them by the country districts, which they have succeeded in getting again under their control. . . . Would not the attempt to overthrow him just at this time be incurring the danger of cutting off forever from our government a multitude of Frenchmen who are devoted to the Pope and whom we might retain?"

Napoleon was so entirely convinced of the justice of these observations that even at that time after the peace of February, 1797, he tried to induce the Pope to exhort the priests to obedience to the laws of the State. These plans were interrupted by the events of the 18th Fructidor. The reason for his present attitude toward Rome in 1800 was likewise to be found in the situation of affairs in the interior of France. Everywhere, in Paris as well as in the provinces, crowds flocked to the churches presided over by priests who had refused to take the oath of allegiance to the laws of the State, while those of the State Church priesthood remained empty. The significance of this Napoleon rightly appreciated. A great part of the general hatred toward the Directory arose from the antipathy they had shown toward satisfying the religious wants of the people. He was determined to be the object of no such hatred. Moreover, he needed to come to an understanding with Rome in order to bring about a definite pacification of La Vendée. He resolved upon making a compact with the Pope. To Pius VII., who had been elected in Venice, March 13th, 1800, he made the proposition, soon after the battle of Marengo, of assuring the continued existence of the States of the Church,—divested, indeed, of the Legations,—on condition that the Holy Father would lend his aid to the establishment of

an acceptable peace between Church and State in France. Pius VII. accepted these terms with alacrity and sent his Secretary of State, Cardinal Consalvi, to Paris, where, on the 15th of July, 1801, a concordat was signed. This abolished the religious laws of 1790 (new divisions of dioceses, election of bishops and priests by parishes, abolition of celibacy), and recognized the Pope as head of the Church; and accorded him the right to confirm the bishops nominated by the First Consul; on the other hand the alienation of the Church property was accepted by the See of Rome, the old maxim of the Gallican Church was acknowledged that the Church exists in the State, and not the State within the Church, and the agreement made that dignitaries of the Church should receive their remuneration, like officials of the State, at the hands of the government.

In restoring the States of the Church to Pius VII. Napoleon made no sacrifice, but rather secured through this means a marked advantage to himself. All-powerful as he now was in Italy, the Pope, as a secular prince, would of necessity assume a position of dependence toward him, and he thus attained a result which Kaunitz, Joseph II., and Thugut, with their schemes of conquest in the Apennine peninsula, had striven for in vain. Referring on one occasion at St. Helena to his attitude toward Rome at this time, he expressed himself in these remarkable words: "Catholicism preserved the Pope for me, and with my influence and our armies in Italy I did not despair of acquiring sooner or later, by one means or another, the control of this Pope, and then how vast would be my influence! What a lever I should have with which to move the rest of the world!"

Thus had Napoleon established his sway in western Europe after the conclusion of peace at Lunéville. Holland, Portugal, and Italy furnished their quota toward reimbursement of the French treasury; everywhere, extending far into German territory, French troops were sustained at the expense of neighbouring and dependent countries; from Holland to Sicily the ports were closed to ships and products of the powerful enemy across the Channel. In the Channel itself the First Consul collected a flotilla in order to keep the English in ceaseless fear of a descent of the French

army. And in fact there came a moment in which the crushing of this antagonist also seemed no distant possibility. The allied powers, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, took up arms against England, and the Czar Paul I. was so far carried away by his visionary ardour as to project an expedition which was to march by way of Khiva and Herat to India, there to strike the common enemy a death-blow. Napoleon's visions of universal supremacy took on more definite shape than ever before. Was not the French army yet in Egypt, whence it might with profit aid and support this Russian expedition against the Punjab?

But this dream was destined to last only for a moment.

During the night of March 23d, 1801, the Czar fell a victim to a palace revolution. His despotic arrogance had degenerated into insupportable cruelty toward those nearest to him. His son, Alexander I., succeeded him on the throne of Russia. It is said that upon the arrival of this news, which reached Paris on the 17th of April, Napoleon was thrown into a state of genuine despair. His magnificent schemes were all overthrown for the present, for it soon became known that Alexander had released all the English ships which had been seized in Russian ports and that he renounced all claim to the office of Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, that is to say, to possession of the island of Malta. Thus by a single blow Napoleon saw deferred into the remote future the fulfilment of those aims which had seemed so near through the friendship of one who was, it is true, partially demented, and was forced to content himself for the time being with advantages less brilliant than those upon which he had counted.

It so happened that, even before the unlooked-for death of the Czar, Pitt had, for reasons connected with the domestic politics of the kingdom, retired, March 14th, 1801, from the leadership of the British government. The peace-loving Addington succeeded him as prime minister and at once made overtures to Napoleon. Were these to be rejected? The French people were clamouring daily more loudly for peace, and their demand was no longer to be overlooked. The public was aware of England's proposition, and the First Consul could no longer justify his

policy of war, as he had done in the preceding year, by alleging Great Britain's unwillingness to treat. He accordingly accepted England's proposal, although solely for the purpose of taking the utmost advantage of his opponent's disinclination for war. In the course of her long contest on the seas England had made a number of valuable acquisitions. The Antilles, with the exception of Guadeloupe, and the factories at Pondicherry and Chandernagore in India had been taken by her from the French, while Holland had been compelled to give up Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope, and Spain had yielded Trinidad to her superior forces. In the Mediterranean Malta and Minorca had already fallen into her hands, and apparently the time was not far distant when Egypt also must be reckoned among the conquests of Great Britain. Relying upon the friendship of the "neutral" powers, Napoleon thought himself strong enough to compel England to give up all of these acquisitions. But a sudden end was put to all such aspirations on the part of Napoleon by the arrival of tidings of the death of the Czar, followed shortly by word from Egypt that General Menou, who had succeeded to the command of the army in Egypt upon the assassination of Kléber, had been defeated before Alexandria and driven back into the city. Upon learning of this the English showed themselves again less disposed to obtain peace at a sacrifice. Negotiations were broken off and each party strove to get the advantage of the other by means of military or diplomatic successes. England prosecuted every possible means for bringing about a reconciliation with the new Czar, and sent a corps of troops to Egypt which was there to join forces with the Turks in order to compel the French to capitulate. Napoleon on his part urged upon Spain the conquest of Portugal with a view to acquiring thus a territory which might be given to England as compensation for terms of peace of the most favourable character, just as he had delivered Venice to Austria in 1797. He further sought to secure to France the good-will of Alexander I. by sending to St. Petersburg his aide-de-camp Duroc, a man in whom he felt unlimited confidence.

In the midst of these conflicting interests it was England which was successful. In Egypt Cairo was surrendered in June,

and with its fall the capitulation of Alexandria was assured. On the Peninsula, too, the hopes of France were blasted, for there Spain concluded with Portugal the separate peace already mentioned guaranteeing independence to the latter country. It was now Napoleon who made the proposal to resume negotiations. To this England was not ill-disposed, for Nelson, who had but a short time before compelled Denmark to retire from the league of neutral powers, had been repulsed in an attack on the French Channel fleet. Concessions were made upon both sides, and on the 1st of October, 1801, preliminaries were signed at London according to the terms of which England was to retain of all her recent conquests only Trinidad, which had been taken from Spain, and Ceylon, which had belonged to Holland; the islands and ports of the Mediterranean were to be evacuated by her, and Malta was to be restored to the Knights of the Order of St. John. The French, on the other hand, pledged themselves to restore Egypt to Turkey, to guarantee the integrity of Portugal, and to withdraw their troops from the kingdom of Naples.

England might perhaps have obtained more favourable terms had the signing of the treaty been delayed, for but a short time after this event the tidings reached Europe that Menou had been obliged to surrender Alexandria to the combined forces of England and Turkey. This capitulation put an end to French occupation of Egypt and to one of the most glorious of Napoleon's dreams. For he never returned to a scheme of which he had made so unequivocal a failure. He was now definitively thrown back upon the Continent of Europe for the working out of his plans. It was, however, a triumph of no mean order, when England, which for a century had contested with her whole might every encroachment made by France upon the Continent as a direct detriment to her interests, was compelled to acquiesce at a time when Napoleon had far surpassed Louis XIV. in his most ambitious designs.

France and Russia, October 8th, 1801, signed a treaty of peace which contained the important stipulation that the two States bound themselves not to tolerate secret agitations of

the émigrés against their country. In this manner Napoleon renounced for the time being all support of the Poles, and the Czar that of the Bourbons (article 3). Three days later, in a secret compact which determined for Europe its immediate future and so was of equal importance with the treaty with England, these two powers engaged to regulate in common the compensations to be made to the German princes, and in the same way to decide the Italian question together so far as it was not already determined through the treaties of peace with Rome, Austria, and Naples. At the same time—October 9th, 1801—an agreement was signed between France and Turkey according to which all previous compacts between the two countries were made valid. Finally, a treaty full of promise to the Elector had been signed with Bavaria a short time before, and with it the last armed foe had been appeased.

The cry of Peace! rang out through the length and breadth of the land. All the nations rejoiced to see the end of a struggle which had become unendurable. To his fame as a hero of war Napoleon had added that of establisher of peace, and to him was accorded both at home and abroad an esteem without parallel—in France, where the people saw the hopes fulfilled which they had founded on him on his return, and in other countries, where the governments of the old States welcomed him as the subduer of the Revolution and cherished the firm expectation that, content with what had been acquired, he would by his power insure tranquillity to Europe. "This is no ordinary peace," said the English prime minister, Addington, "it is the actual reconciliation of the two foremost nations of the world." And Fox, having met Napoleon in Paris, returned to London full of enthusiasm for the great man. But even at that time there were far-seeing statesmen who felt less confident of this desirable outcome. When on the 27th of March, 1802, the Treaty of Amiens confirmed the terms of the preliminaries signed between France and England in the preceding October, the acclamations of joy with which the news was received were disturbed by the warning voices of the members of the opposition in Parliament with the reminder that "We have sanc-

tioned the possession of Italy by France and at the same time her supremacy over the Continent." Indeed, Napoleon himself but half concealed his ambitious designs. But a few weeks after the battle of Marengo he said to the Prussian envoy at Paris: "I desire peace for the sake of establishing securely the existing government of France as well as for the sake of saving the world from chaos." And these words were no empty figure of speech. Their true meaning is to be gathered from a semi-official pamphlet published in 1801 and entitled "*De l'État de la France à la fin de l'an VIII.*" Hauterive was its author, one of the most excellent of the officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Talleyrand's right-hand man. The following principles were therein advocated: At the time of the breaking out of the Revolution the political system of Europe had long since been impaired and was no longer worthy of being maintained; the war between France and the other powers was nothing but a consequence of this condition. France, victorious in this contest, had undertaken to establish in the place of the discarded system of the balance of power a new system of federation, and this purpose had been already partially accomplished. By reason of her military and financial resources as well as on account of her principles of government France was destined to become security for peace and prosperity, to be the director of this new European confederacy, and it was to the interest of all the other powers to yield themselves with full confidence to her guidance.

Such, in plain terms, was the political programme of the new France. At bottom it did not differ from that of the Revolutionary government, its predecessor. But if it had been the design of the Convention to create a federation of republics in Europe under French leadership, Napoleon's object was far less concerned with the giving of freedom to the nations than with securing the submission of their rulers to the hegemony of the State governed by himself. In his criticism of Hauterive's pamphlet, Gentz, the famous publicist and a man of genius, showed his discrimination by calling certain facts to the attention of the statesmen of the old system in 1801 in the following

words: "When it is said that France has extended her boundaries in all directions through her conquests, that her old inviolable territory has been surrounded by new defences, and that her influence upon all neighbouring countries has been increased to formidable proportions, the truth has been but partially stated. The actual fact is this: France in her present condition recognizes no boundaries whatsoever; all neighbouring States are now in fact, even if not nominally, her dependencies and property, or may become such upon the first convenient occasion whenever it may seem desirable to the men placed at the head of the government." No, the peace now prevailing over Europe was not a reconciliation of the peoples such as short-sighted ministers had been deluded into calling it, this was but a halting-place on the road to universal dominion along which Napoleon unremittingly advanced, impelled by revolutionary tradition as well as by personal ambition.

But in case he had determined to abide by revolutionary policy in relation to other countries, the question arises, the most important perhaps of any to the historian of those times: to what extent might and must this policy affect the governmental and social conditions of these other countries and nations of Europe whose organization differed so materially from that of the new France? The revolutionary armies had carried but little into foreign countries during the last few years of the eighteenth century beyond riot and disorder, for in France itself nothing else existed. Were the armies of Napoleon to introduce nothing better wherever they should penetrate? That depended upon whether he were really successful in restoring lasting conditions of order in the interior, in selecting from the chaos of revolutionary legislation such laws as were salutary, thus fulfilling the second great hope which the nation had builded upon him at the time of his return. This task he took upon himself, and he accomplished it, not for the sake of making the French people happy,—he never loved them enough for that,*—but in order

* See a most interesting scene in the "*Mémoires de Mme. de Rémusat*," I. 246, and the observation of Mme. de Staël (*Considérations*, II. 199): "He despised the nation whose approbation he coveted."

to create a secure foundation for the structure of his world-empire. For this purpose, and for this purpose only, should France herself become strong, powerful, and rich, for under these circumstances alone would she be equal to making the sacrifices demanded by his ambition. Neither he nor France could indeed foresee at the beginning of the revolutionary monarchy that these sacrifices made for the sake of an experiment which shaped the history of the world would in the end cost the lives of a million men and yet fail of attaining the object sought. It must be confessed that his predecessors in power, the Convention and the Directory, had sent almost as great a number of Frenchmen to their death without even procuring in compensation order and prosperity to the country. This at least Napoleon wholly accomplished. ✓

CHAPTER IX

THE NEW FRANCE AND HER SOVEREIGN

THE great work of reorganizing France was carried through by Napoleon with the aid of a large number of talented and experienced assistants, some of whom, as members of the Council of State, discussed the new measures and formulated them into decrees and laws, while others in the capacity of ministers and general directors carried them into effect with precision after they had been passed by the Chambers. The Council of State, which has continued to exist in France up to the present day, furnished the First Consul with an exact portrayal of the condition of affairs within the country; it put at his disposal the wealth of experience acquired by gifted men not only during the eventful ten years of the Revolution, but also, before that time, in the employ of the royal government; it enabled him to make use of the practical intelligence of men whose fitness for service of the State had been developed in the free atmosphere of the Revolution as fully as the military genius of Hoche and of Bonaparte. It is to these first Councillors of State, such men as Boulay de la Meurthe, Roederer, Chaptal, Berlier, Duchâtel, Defermon, Dufresne, Fourcroy, Cretet, Barbé-Marbois, Regnault de Saint-Jeand'Angély, to whom honour is due for having accomplished the final regulation of French finances, the reform in internal administration, the codification of the laws, the establishment of permanent institutions for worship and education,—in short, for having brought together all the valuable material from which arose under the eye of the most skilful of architects the commodious edifice of modern France. In their political past these collaborators of Napoleon's differed widely from one another. The Royalists were represented among them by Dufresne, the Girondists by Defermon, Radical members of the Convention by Fourcroy

and Berlier, Moderates of the time of the Directory by Regnaud and Roederer, and exiles of the 18th Fructidor by Portalis and Barbé-Marbois.

Napoleon had purposely chosen his men from different parties so that his reforms might not appear to be the work of any particular faction. They were divided into Commissions of Finance, Justice, War, the Navy, and the Interior. The First Consul presided at their deliberations, and such was the capacity of his intellect that he could enter into all the detail of affairs without becoming confused and was, on the contrary, ready at any moment to judge of the matter under discussion in its entirety from the point of view of the sovereign.

The second task of the public administration, the execution of the laws and decrees passed by the Council of State, was incumbent upon the ministers, and their measures were likewise as much under the supervision and control of Bonaparte as were the deliberations and resolutions of the Council of State. The names of the men to whom he entrusted the seven existing portfolios when taking up the reins of government have already been given, and here also the men were selected with a like regard to diversity of political faith. He said one day to his brother Joseph: "Where is the revolutionary who will lack confidence in a state of affairs in which Fouché is Minister of Police? and where is the nobleman, if he has remained a Frenchman, who will not hope to find his wants provided for in a country where a Périgord, a former bishop of Autun, is in power? I am protected on the left by one and on the right by the other. I mean that my government shall unite all Frenchmen. It is a broad road in which all may find room." To certain of the ministries Napoleon associated "*directions générales*," an institution still existent in the administrative organization of France. These "*directions*" included bridges and roads, public instruction, worship, the treasury, customs, registration fees, domains, the liquidation of the public debt, and sundry others from among which independent ministries were soon created.

Official communication between the First Consul and his ministers was made through the Secretary of State. This im-

portant office had been filled ever since 1799 by the faithful and capable Maret, who continued to execute his functions in that position almost up to the end of the Napoleonic rule. He was without an equal in his ability for giving immediate form and expression to the thoughts hurriedly let fall by his master and for following intelligently his hasty dictation. Maret was in reality a Cabinet Minister kept at the level of a clerk by the consummate superiority of Napoleon. It is from the office of the Secretary of State that there issued those innumerable letters addressed to all sorts of officials and persons which make up to-day the many quarto volumes of Napoleon's correspondence and bear witness to the indefatigable activity of master and servants.

The laws and ordinances with the execution of which the ministers were charged were transmitted by them to newly created subordinate officials, by whom they were introduced into the "departments." On February 17th, 1800, the law was promulgated which forms to-day the basis of French administrative apparatus. According to its provisions in every "department" the chief administrative officer is a prefect, in every "Arrondissement" a sub-prefect, in every "Commune" a mayor, —all three classes being appointed by the Chief Magistrate and subordinated to the Minister of the Interior. During the Revolution the government of the provinces had rested in the hands of elective councils, a system which had led not only to partiality and to irregularities of many kinds, but even to downright disobedience to the central authority, with the result that the Constitution of 1795 establishing the Directory totally abolished the autonomous municipalities. Napoleon now re-established these communal authorities; the officers, however, were not to be elective. The chief official of the commune was to be the mayor, appointed and paid by the State, while the members of the municipal council assisting him, who were advisers merely without votes, were to be appointed by the prefect from the list of notables. In like manner the sub-prefect had his district council and the prefect his general council, both appointed by the First Consul to regulate the direct taxes to be levied in the department, to make appropriations, and to bring to the attention of

the government the needs and interests of their jurisdictions. It was a system of rigid centralization which gave to the man placed at the head of government boundless influence upon the smallest details of the communal administration. It was, as Napoleon himself said, a hierarchy of "First Consuls in miniature," a bureaucracy resembling that established under Richelieu and Louis XIV., but with this distinctive difference, that its mechanism was not hampered and impeded either by the privileges and local tariffs of the provinces, nor by reason of the exceptional conditions of privileged classes and corporations; moreover, it did not govern a people filled with theoretical aspirations toward liberty, but one which had through practical experience grown heartily tired of it and who longed more than anything for the opportunity to live in tranquillity.

Early in March, 1800, the first prefects were appointed, being selected, just as the ministers and Councillors of State had been, with care to avoid making one political party more prominent than another; the royalist Count La Rochefoucauld figures beside the arch-Jacobin De Bry and the Girondist Doucet de Pontécoulant. There was no lack of work for all. During the year 1800 there were still no taxes collected and the amount of revenue due from the departments was scarcely known. The State was indebted to the lowest of its servants for half a year's salary; some among them even died of starvation. In the open country the most appalling insecurity prevailed. The highroads, fallen into disrepair, were the lurking-place of numerous bands of robbers, who pursued their calling up to the very outskirts of Paris, and whose misdeeds form the chief subject of report on the part of the officials. In a single department, that of Vacluse, not less than ninety cases of highway robbery and murder were committed within the year 1801. Many communities were driven by terror into making common cause with the brigands and affording them refuge. In the cities the state of affairs was not in the slightest degree better than in the country. Speaking of what was to be seen in Toulon, a Councillor of State writes: "No police in the city, no street-lamps, every night stores broken into and robbed, no pave-

ments, no cleanliness, no safety, no town taxes, no bread at the hospitals." Only with the greatest difficulty could the new government fulfil its most important duty, of protecting the life and property of citizens. Special tribunals were established in February, 1801, and these with the aid of the "gendarmérie," now reorganized by Napoleon, soon purged the land of the bands of criminals which had infested it. This police force had already undergone a reform in the time of the Directory, but its effectiveness was vastly increased and its zeal for duty greatly stimulated by being put under the command of a general of merit and experience. By 1802 cases of murder or highway robbery had already become rare. A law of February 17th, 1800, provided for the security of towns by instituting a commission of police in every commune of more than 5000 inhabitants and police "directions" in all such as included more than 100,000 souls. By a decree of July 1st, 1800, a prefect of police was established in Paris who had charge of both the political detectives and the city police force.

V Measures having thus been taken to insure protection to the life and property of citizens, the next step to be considered must be toward promoting or rather laying the foundations of general prosperity, for there was none at the time. The arbitrary financial legislation of the revolutionary governments, incessant war, which had put an end to all export trade, and the unstable paper-money system had combined to ruin industry and traffic. The manufacturer in Paris who had formerly employed from sixty to eighty workmen now contented himself with ten. The lace-making industry, once so flourishing in the North, the linen industry in Brittany, and the celebrated paper manufactory in the department of Charente were all practically annihilated, and the number of silk-manufacturing concerns at Lyons had diminished by one half. In Marseilles the amount of sales per month no longer equalled what it had been per week before the Revolution began. The harbours, more especially those on the ocean, had become choked with sand, their defences had fallen to ruin, the inhabitants were starving. Such business as continued to be carried on at all

was done at the Stock Exchange, where the vast and constantly fluctuating difference between real and fictitious values was a temptation to gambling or to speculation in army supplies, whereby the contractors and the officers whom they had bribed were enriched at the expense of the soldiers who were being driven to want and death by the unscrupulous conduct of the government. Only a complete reform of the administration of finances could secure respect for the government, money for its treasury and national credit, all of which were essential to any scheme for improving in a radical way the position of the substantial people of the country.

It is an exceedingly interesting historical study to see how France, almost overwhelmed during the rule of the Convention and Directory by a sea of worthless paper money, worked its way out in spite of everything and returned to normal economic conditions and a regulated standard of values. In order to re-establish the national credit, which had been exhausted through the innumerable debts contracted by the royal government, the revolutionary authorities declared the estates of the clergy and of the nobles who had emigrated to be the property of the nation, and issued notes or "assignats" based on these lands as currency. But in consequence of the general feeling of uncertainty the value of real estate decreased and the property became for the most part unsalable; the war, which in the intoxication of untried liberty had been declared against all Europe, consumed immense sums, and eventually the assignats, of which more and more were continually being issued, became worthless. In 1795 a louis d'or rose in value from 24 francs to 1800, and in February, 1796, to 8137 francs in assignats, so that a livre in gold was worth almost 340 livres in paper. The Directory had recourse to arbitrary enactments. The 24 billions of assignats in circulation were called in towards the end of March, 1796, and the holders received in exchange but one thirtieth of their face value in so-called "mandats territoriaux." These, however, were in turn nothing more than orders upon the national lands and, in spite of their enforced circulation, they fell at the end of a few weeks to one twentieth of their

nominal value, and in the following year to one hundredth. When finally the government was compelled to repeal the act forcing the people to accept them as currency, they disappeared entirely from circulation. They had only served to enable certain speculators to purchase from the Directory during the course of a year the larger part of the government lands, so that the State lost in this way most of its domains, having received in return in ready money scarcely one hundredth part of their value, which amounted to several billions. Sordid usurers, unscrupulous speculators, and a vast number of small contractors—estimated to number not less than 1,200,000—had thus acquired the estates of monasteries and of ancient families of rank, a change of ownership so rapid and so complete as to be unequalled either before that time or even in the nineteenth century, in spite of its rapid economic and social changes.

The original intention had been to pay the public debt of France with the proceeds of the sale of State property, but this, under existing circumstances, could no longer be thought of. In 1793 the Convention had already been obliged to decree that the outstanding public debt should be entered in the "Great Book of the public debt" as a consolidated fund irredeemable beyond the payment of 5% annual interest. In 1797 the annual interest had risen to over 250 million francs, of which, however, only one fourth was paid in cash, the remainder being in bonds upon the national estates, which had been added to by the confiscation of the Belgian monasteries. But the burden remained nevertheless far too heavy, and the Directory sought relief by retaining only one third of the national debt in the "Great Book," the other two thirds being paid to the creditors in land bonds. But since these bonds fell with the credit of the government to $\frac{1}{2}$ % of their face value before the end of the year 1798, the reduction of the debt had been in fact simple bankruptcy whereby the creditors of France were robbed of two thirds of their claims. But even the remaining so-called "consolidated" third was not paid in specie, but again in bonds. Under such conditions no further confidence in the government could exist among the solid men of the business world.

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The people replied by a refusal to pay taxes. The Directory resorted to forced loans. In 1800 the arrears had reached the sum of 1100 millions.

To reduce to order such a state of affairs required an iron determination.* But in the course of this single year a remedy was found for the most serious of these abuses, and provisions were made which prevented the possibility of a return to such conditions. On November 24th, 1799, "directions (boards of managers) of direct taxes" were established in every "department" such as are still in operation at the present time. Further, the assessment of taxes, which had hitherto varied from year to year, was now regulated upon fixed principles. "There is no real security of possession," said Napoleon, "except in a country where the rate of taxation does not vary every year." An exact survey of all real estate in France was another matter to which he turned his attention. In September, 1801, were appointed a "direction générale" of the customs and of the registration of landed property; the reorganized bureau of forestry in a single year almost doubled the revenue obtained during the preceding twelve months. The revenues and income from public property being at length regulated and entrusted to the management of the Minister of Finance, the department of expenses and of the national debt underwent a similar reform and was committed in 1801 to the care of a special "treasury department," at the head of which was

*Reference has already been made to the first steps taken by Gaudin, the new Minister of Finance. To enable the State to continue its existence during the first year of his administration he was obliged to make use of the old system of expensive loans and extortion of funds from adjacent countries. Seventy millions were practically repudiated, as he simply forbade the payment of the orders on the revenue which the Directory had issued to contractors, except within a given time and at their value in specie or short-time bills. It was important above all to regulate and assure the position of the landholders. With this end in view the Constitution of the year VIII had solemnly guaranteed to holders of national estates, no matter how obtained, the ownership of those lands (articles 93, 94). Other measures to be taken belonged to the province of financial policy.

placed the Councillor of State Barbé-Marbois.* To this department was submitted the control of the sinking fund (*caisse d'amortissement*), which had been since July, 1801, under the management of Mollien, a most capable man. It was this institution doubtless which did more than anything else toward raising the national credit. The Consulate had inherited from the Directory a residue of unsold national domains worth 400 millions. Instead of squandering these resources as his predecessors in power had done, Napoleon sought to make them more profitable. He assigned 90 millions to the sinking fund to be gradually disposed of, the proceeds being used to redeem state bonds so that they should continue to circulate at 50, to which point they had risen after the treaty of Lunéville. Napoleon could then issue new bonds at this rate of exchange and thus discharge floating debts and arrears of interest from former years. A further 120 millions of this national property were dedicated with their proceeds to the administration of Public Instruction, while 40 millions were to go to the support of disabled soldiers, thus relieving the budget. The victorious outcome of the war made it possible to leave the greater part of the army to subsist on foreign territory, which also aided to lighten the burden which the state had to bear.

In order to promote industry and trade the Bank of France was established on the 18th of January, 1800, with a capital of 30 millions, the state holding shares for 5 millions which had been taken from the security furnished by the Treasury officials. The Bank was given the privilege of issuing notes up to a certain amount; in return it bound itself to put its capital at the disposition of the Treasury. Ordinances were passed also regulating the affairs of the stock exchange, re-establishing the chambers of commerce suppressed by the Revolution, providing for frequent national expositions, etc. With confidence and good-will on the part of the people it would now be possible to

* This division of the administration of finances between two ministers was maintained until 1815. Napoleon attempted to justify this course by saying that a single minister offered him no such security. Where there were two, each acted as a constant check upon the other.

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restore equilibrium to the finances and, this accomplished, the lost credit of France would soon be recovered. The government having done all in its power to bring this about, the people no longer hesitated to do their share. Taxes were promptly paid in, and the financial undertakings of the government again met with the support of the substantial business men. Progress in this direction was marked after the signing of the peace of Amiens, which seemed to mean the dawn of a new era of universal peace.

But this entire organism would have been without lasting value if the rights and duties of individuals toward one another had not at the same time been definitely determined and made known to every one. The demand was imperative for a code clearly and precisely setting forth the law of the land, which the Revolution had completely changed. Up to 1789 there had been no uniformity of law in France. The North was governed principally by the customary law (*coutumes*) formulated in the sixteenth century, while in the South the Roman law (*droit écrit*) prevailed; in addition there were numerous local laws. Even before the Revolution the Chancellor Maupeou had pointed out the necessity for a reform of the judicial system and a codification and simplification of these manifold forms of law. But the Revolution, which followed with its ruling principle of "Equal rights for all," made an end of the diversity in French jurisprudence. A new national civil code was promised in the Constitution of 1791; in that of 1793 the promise was renewed and extended to include a code of criminal law to be likewise national, but in 1799 neither promise had yet been fulfilled, and in the night session of November 10th, in which Napoleon was invested with the supreme power, the two commissions were again instructed to formulate a code. And now at last through the strong will of a single man was accomplished what had been fruitlessly attempted by the many. On the 12th of August, 1800, Napoleon appointed a committee consisting of three eminent jurists, Tronchet, Bigot de Préame-neu, and Portalis (of the Council of the Ancients), with Maleville as secretary, to draw up a civil code. These men appor-

tioned the work among themselves and, taking as a basis a scheme which Cambacérès had at one time laid before the Convention, by the end of four months had finished the task. The proposed code was then deliberated upon in the Council of State, where it was revised by the jurists Boulay de la Muerthe, Berlier, Abrial, and the Consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun (former secretary to the Chancellor Maupeou), Napoleon himself frequently taking part in the discussion and settling disputed points. Those who were present bear witness to his penetrating observations and clear ideas, though these at times betrayed a point of view quite foreign to the jurist. The laws restricting the grounds for divorce and placing parents under obligation to support their children are with sundry others said to have been due to him.

Before the end of the year 1801 the Code had already been presented in three parts to the Council of State for discussion. The ordinances of the Chancellor d'Aguesseau enacted between 1737 and 1750 were found to contain many things of value which were incorporated among the new laws; the ancient "Coutumes" and the Roman law were also drawn upon so far as they did not conflict with the Revolutionary principle of Equality, for this spirit was dominant throughout the whole of this monumental work. The Revolution had abolished hereditary nobility, the civil code did not re-establish it; in the laws concerning inheritance it had set up as a principle that children of different age and sex should enjoy equal rights, and this also was approved by the civil code; the Revolution had granted, though not without hesitation, all rights of citizenship to the Jews, and these were confirmed without reserve by the civil code; it had introduced for all classes and for all religions registration of civil status [births, marriages, etc.], and civil marriage, both of which innovations were retained by the civil code; it had declared the marriage relation capable of dissolution, and the civil code abode by this decision. But whereas the National Assembly and the Convention had elaborated only certain portions of the laws governing individuals, the Consulate carried the work much farther and formulated a system of laws em-

bracing the whole civil life of the people. The merit for this belongs indisputably to the First Consul of France, and the book in which the laws of the land are inscribed is accordingly rightfully named the "Code Napoléon." The three parts of the civil code, adopted in turn by the Council of State, were, on the 21st of March, 1804, incorporated together into a single body of laws.

The codification of criminal law, of laws of procedure and of commerce was likewise undertaken, and the value of the result of these labours, so extensive that their branches cannot even be enumerated here, is proven by the wide circle into which they have been adopted.* For these books of the law were not to benefit France alone: wherever the power of Napoleon extended the new laws were carried with it, and when, later, a time came when the French people were driven back within their former boundaries, their laws remained a testimony to the former greatness of their country. Up to the present day the "Code Napoléon" is still in force in Rhenish Prussia, Rhenish Bavaria, Rhenish Hesse, and, with slight modifications, in the Grand Duchy of Baden, in Holland, Belgium, Italy, etc. It is only within a very few years that the French method of procedure in criminal cases, public and oral with the assistance of a jury, has ceased to prevail in the Prussian provinces on the Rhine. To this day the "Code de Commerce" is in force in Belgium and Italy, in Greece and the principalities on the Danube, and has served as a model in almost every land where laws of commerce have been framed. With these codes of law the principles of equality upon which they were based were also carried into foreign countries, where they exerted a civilizing and refining influence which was within a short time to change the face of the world in spite of all reaction against them. Who would deny the greatness of the man whose powerful hand brought into being and controlled such a lever!

* The deliberations concerning the "Code pénal" and the "Code d'instruction criminelle" were begun in March, 1801, and brought to completion in 1810. The "Code de procédure civile" was drafted in 1802, submitted to the "Corps législatif" in 1806, and put into operation in 1807. The "Code de Commerce" was elaborated between 1801 and 1807, and was put in force in 1808.

The rights and welfare of the existing generation provided for, Napoleon turned his attention to the education and training of the next. In the matter of public instruction, just as had been the case in all other branches of the administration, the Revolution, in seeking to better the condition of things, had abolished what was useless and had laid down excellent principles without having been able to establish much that was solid or durable. Its axiom of Equality had already been applied to the question of public instruction in the Constitution of the year 1791, in which the provision is made that "A system of public instruction shall be created and organized which shall be open to all citizens and shall be gratuitous in respect to those branches which are indispensable to all men." But in spite of excellent recommendations submitted by Talleyrand and Condorcet, much time elapsed before a general statute was passed. Not until October, 1795, was there a law providing for primary schools in each commune, central schools in the departments, and special schools preparing for ten different professions. But even in 1800 the primary schools were but rare, there was a scarcity of both scholars and teachers, and the Councillor of State when making report of these conditions proposed outright that the parish priest should be charged with the giving of instruction where such schools existed. At the central schools, where there were neither examinations nor diplomas, owing to the tempestuous spirit of the times, the mathematical and technical courses alone found a meagre following, the others remained entirely unattended. The same was true of the professional schools. The important creations of the Convention dating from 1794 could not gain life and vigour in these agitated times. The "Polytechnic School" counted but few pupils; the "Normal School," for the training of teachers, existed for less than a year; the "Medical School" amounted to little more than the faculty of former times and was still awaiting reorganization; the "Conservatoire des arts et métiers," an institution due to suggestion by the philosopher Descartes in the seventeenth century, which was intended for the instruction of working men by means of observation, remained totally neglected up to the last days of the

Directory. And here again the task remained to the Consulate of elaborating the plans as well as of building up the institution.

The month of December, 1799, already witnessed the establishment of a special sub-department for Arts and Sciences in the Department of the Interior, and this developed two years later into the "Direction générale de l'Instruction publique." May 1st, 1802, a new statute concerning public instruction was promulgated: primary schools were to be established in every country parish under supervision of the sub-prefect, the teachers to be appointed by the mayor; in the capitals of the departments there were to be secondary schools under supervision of the prefect, permission being at the same time granted to private persons to open and maintain schools subject to the approval of the government; further, there were to be 32 "Lycées" with classical and scientific instruction to which the better scholars of the secondary schools should be promoted and from which one fifth of the students upon completion of the course should be admitted into the upper schools for special instruction.* Inspectors were appointed to supervise the entire system of public instruction, and in order to put the new system at once into active operation the government granted no less than 6400 free scholarships, of which 2400 were awarded to the sons of meritorious government officials and military men. Success crowned the work. Within two to three years later 4500 elementary schools were in operation with more than 750 secondary schools, counting 50,000 pupils, and 45 Lycées.†

In issuing these decrees Napoleon's object had not been so much the disinterested advancement of knowledge as to train up for himself passably educated and completely docile subjects

* Of these special or professional schools the statute of May 1st, 1802, recognized nine: 1. Law; 2. Medicine; 3. Physical and Natural Sciences; 4. Mechanical and Chemical Technology; 5. Pure Mathematics; 6. Geography, History, and Political Economy; 7. Graphic Arts; 8. Astronomy; 9. Music and Composition.

† The first Consul did not prohibit, as did the Revolutionary governments, the clerical schools. The clergy established elementary and secondary schools, and the girls' schools were generally conducted by Sisters.

whose education need not be carried to a point whence they might presume to make unreserved criticism of his administration of the government. When in 1802 Fourcroy, the Director-General of Public Instruction, submitted to him an elaborate plan of education, Napoleon rejected it as being far too comprehensive with the observation: "A little Latin and mathematics is all that is needed." And yet, on the other hand, he was never found wanting in respect toward scholarship or its representatives. He took delight in associating with great artists as well as with learned men, and never ceased to confer honours and dignities upon those who had won his esteem by their talents or scientific attainments. As early as 1800 of the sixty senators seventeen were members of the Institute, and when on May 19th, 1802, the Legion of Honour was established for the purpose of recognizing service to the State whether military or civil, it was the naturalist Lacépède who was appointed by Napoleon "High Chancellor" of the new order.*

It ill accorded with this system of combining and centralizing all the forces of the State that one portion of the nation should be still debarred by law from returning to their native land. Those who were thus excluded were partly those émigrés who had left France of their own free-will at the beginning of the Revolution, and partly those who had fled a little later because of the terrorist measures and threats of the Radicals in power. Even under the Directory the law had been re-enacted which made return punishable with death. That no possible doubt might remain as to the strength and security of his new govern-

* According to the statute of 1802 the members of the Legion were compelled among other things to swear on their honour to combat every attempt to restore the feudal régime with its attributes and titles. The decoration of the order was exceedingly distasteful to the pronounced Republicans, some of whom made complaint to Napoleon. "I challenge you," he replied, "to show me a Republic, whether ancient or modern, in which such marks of distinction have not had their place. They are indeed gewgaws (hochets), but it is with gewgaws that men are led." It was at this same period that he said to Madame de Rémusat: "The fact is that it is very convenient to govern the French people by appealing to their vanity."

ment Napoleon repealed this law of proscription. The only difficulty lay in the fact that the property of the émigrés had in the meanwhile been confiscated and sold by the State, and the purchasers saw cause for alarm concerning their possessions in the return of the former owners. The new Constitution, as has been already stated, not only guaranteed the ownership of these estates to their purchasers, but for this very reason forbade the return of the émigrés. But in spite of all the First Consul advanced step by step to the realization of his design. In March, 1800, an edict appeared, in the first place, closing the list of émigrés and empowering the government to strike from it the names of those who would request it and renounce all claim upon their former possessions. This was followed by making vast numbers of erasures from the list,—Constitutionalists of 1789, thousands of banished priests, etc. Finally, after the conclusion of peace with foreign powers in April, 1802, a general amnesty was granted, always with the understanding, however, that present owners of national domains would be protected in their rights. Scarcely had this law been promulgated when the banished families began to flock back to France. Not less than forty thousand of them returned at this time. Thanks to this measure and to the Concordat, which put an end to schism within the country, the reorganization of France was practically completed.

But this task had not been accomplished without considerable resistance. The autocratic character of Napoleon's government became daily more pronounced and stirred up adversaries both within the Chambers and without. These showed themselves first among the Liberal Constitutionalists, who, under the leadership of Benjamin Constant, the intimate friend of Madame de Staël, arrayed themselves, in society as well as in the Tribune, in opposition to the tendency toward absolutism shown by the First Consul. But since, while opposing this, they at the same time attacked his beneficial and necessary constructive work, such as the financial and judicial laws, their opposition only served to confirm him in the course which he was pursuing. The implacable Jacobins and Terrorists took

the same position, and in their secret meetings, as Fouché learned through his agents, did not shrink even from the idea of assassinating Bonaparte. This plot, according to the testimony of the Prussian ambassador, failed only because of lack of funds with which to stir up the populace. And finally the opposition was augmented by the stiff Royalists, who had remained loyal through everything to Louis XVIII. and hated Napoleon because they saw in him the principal obstacle to the realization of their hopes. They were led by the indefatigable Georges Cadoudal, a leader of the Vendéans who lived abroad; they were encouraged in their resistance by subsidies from England. Their representatives in Paris were young Hyde de Neuville and Andigné. Hardly two months after the Coup d'État Bonaparte had said to them: "There is no further hope for the Bourbons. Range yourselves under my banner," he added, hoping to persuade them; "my government is to be the government of youth and of talent. Would you blush to wear the uniform worn by Bonaparte?" But these allurements were all in vain. Among the Royalists there were men who did not hesitate at the most extreme measures, and they proceeded to carry into execution what had been only planned by the Jacobins. On the evening of December 24th, 1800, as the First Consul was being driven to the opera, he narrowly escaped being killed by the explosion of an infernal machine, consisting of a barrel filled with gunpowder, bullets, and fireworks, which was set off in the little rue St. Nicaise and which killed several passers-by, but left him uninjured. This crime was at first supposed to be the work of the Radicals, and, with the assent of the Senate and of the Council of State, Napoleon ordered one hundred and thirty of them sentenced to deportation, one of the most distressing penalties. The real perpetrators of the deed were not discovered until later when most of them had already made good their escape, and only two could be brought to execution. The Terrorists were none the less carried off to the colonies, for, as Fouché observed: "It was not only a question of punishment for the past, but above all of insuring social order." A certain number of Radicals were deported without

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trial, among others three generals who made no attempt to conceal their Republican sentiments and who were said to have tried to stir up the army against the First Consul.

Napoleon had thus become an arbitrary ruler. His arbitrary acts had already begun when in January, 1800, he suppressed no less than sixty out of the seventy-three political newspapers published at that time and forbade the establishment of any new ones.* It was an arbitrary act, again, by which he defended himself against the opposition in the Tribunal in 1802. When that body rejected certain provisions of the "Code civile," in the elaboration of which Napoleon had himself participated, his first impulse had been to attempt a "Coup d'État" in view of the fact that the government had not the right to dissolve the Chambers; Cambacérès, however, succeeded in persuading him to resort to a less direct way of accomplishing his ends and to save appearances by means of a seemingly constitutional expedient. Article 38 of the Constitution of the year VIII provided that, beginning with the year 1802, one fifth of the membership of the Tribunal and the Corps Législatif should be annually renewed. The time appointed for this renewal had now come. Since the Constitution did not definitely prescribe the manner in which this should be accomplished, it was decided not to follow the logical and ordinary method of deciding by lot what members should yield their

* This decree was but a poor return on the part of Napoleon to those newspapers which four years before had received his instructions, as he took his departure for the campaign in Italy—"to write about him and about nothing but him,"—and which had as a matter of fact contributed in no small degree to his glory. This was however only the first step towards the actual re-establishment of the censorship which took place three years later. A decree of September, 1803, runs thus: "In order to secure liberty of the press (!) no bookseller shall henceforth offer for sale any work without its having first been submitted to a Commission of Revision, who will return it if it be found to contain no ground for censure." A similar regulation applied to new theatrical representations. The First Consul was encouraged in the adoption of these measures toward the newspapers by the attitude of the public, which, intent upon securing internal peace, was not exactly averse to seeing a rigorous course pursued in regard to a disputatious and frequently corrupt press.

positions, but to prevail upon the Senate to designate not only who should constitute the incoming fifth, but also who should step out. The Senate, threatened with the dreaded wrath of Napoleon, obeyed, and Tribune and Corps Législatif were purged in January, 1802, of the obnoxious element, consisting of such men as Benjamin Constant, Chénier, Chazal, and Daunou. Their places were filled by entirely docile persons who voted without protest in favour of all the bills which had been so fiercely contested by their predecessors; nor did they offer any opposition to other bills which had not before been submitted for consideration, such as the enactments in regard to the émigrés, the Concordat, and the Legion of Honour. The brothers of the First Consul attempted on one occasion to convince him that opposition was a necessity and cited England in support of their argument, whereat he replied: "For my part I have never yet seen the advantages of opposition of any kind. Whatever its nature, it serves only to lessen respect for the authority in power in the minds of the people. Let some one else come and govern in my place, and if he does not attempt as I do to put a stop to idle talk, he will see what happens to him. I tell you absolute unity of power is indispensable to good government."

But Napoleon had still greater demands to make from the new Chambers. The power which he wielded was far from extensive enough to satisfy him. It ill accorded with his vast designs that he should, in conformity to the constitution, hold authority for only ten years. And therefore he hated the Constitution of 1799 just as he had for a similar reason hated that of 1795. He yearned to rule over France and rule as other sovereigns ruled over their dominions, not bound and humiliated by a petty paragraph which confined his haughty ambition within a period which could be calculated to a minute. But the more passionately he fostered this design the more carefully he concealed his purpose, until toward the end of March, 1802, definitive peace with England had been concluded, when, sustained by his popularity, now greater than ever, he could with safety allow something of it to be divined. But the majority of the Senate showed how little they comprehended the situa-

tion by their proposal, in recognition of the great services rendered by the head of the government to the State, to continue his term as First Consul for another ten years. Napoleon was exasperated. He was on the point of flying into a passion and declining their proffer, when Cambacérès—or Lucien according to other authorities—again had an expedient to suggest: an appeal to the nation. He therefore replied to the Senators that he could not accept this offer without again consulting the people which had in former times clothed him with the supreme power. The question, however, as put by him to popular vote differed widely from the vote of the Senate, for it was formulated in these words: “Shall Napoleon Bonaparte be made Consul for life, and shall he be given the right to appoint his successor?”

And again his calculations proved correct. Three and a half millions of “ayes” against a few thousand “noes,” such was the nation’s response. Then the Senate recognized the course which it was called upon to pursue. It hastened to convey the thanks of the nation to the object of its choice, and two days later, by the *Senatus consultum* of August 4th, 1802, it very considerably increased the power in the hands of the First Consul. Henceforward he had exclusive right to pardon malefactors, to ratify treaties with foreign powers, and to appoint senators. The significance of this last prerogative will be perceived when the importance which the Senate itself had acquired is taken into consideration. It could, by means of special decrees (*Senatus consulta*), interpret, amend, or totally suspend the Constitution, suspend the court of assizes within certain departments, dissolve both Chambers, and reverse the judgments of the courts when they were held to endanger the safety of the State,—all of these at a nod from the man who now governed France as absolute master. A monarchy had been established, not indeed such as Napoleon desired it to be, that is to say, under the form of a hereditary power, but nevertheless established, and for the time being he was obliged to content himself with this result.* “I am henceforth,” said Napoleon,

* The French did not apparently hesitate to accept even the name with the new arrangement, for it was as a *Republican Monarchy* that the

"upon the same level with other sovereigns, for, when all is said and done, they hold their power only for life. It is not right that the authority of a man who directs the policy of all Europe should be precarious, or even seem so." When, two years later, he places the Imperial crown France upon his head, it is only the outward sign of a power now already in his hands.

That which made possible this decisive step toward his absolute sovereignty was the same element which had been Bonaparte's secret ally on the 18th Brumaire—non-partisan public opinion. All its sympathies were with the man who had put an end to anarchy, who had established order and prosperity and made peace with all the world. And it was above all to this last consideration that his popularity was due.*

But little did the French know the man to whose unlimited power they were committing the destiny of their country! He was no man of peace. He did indeed at the cost of indefatigable labour and unparalleled energy restore to France her lost vigour and power, but this was done with no thought of peace, but solely as preparation for a conflict in which the victor's reward was to be a dominion extending far beyond the borders of France.

new system was designated early in the year 1803 by the "Journal de Paris," the official organ of the government.

* Article II of the *Senatus consultum* of August 4th, 1802, is expressed in these words: "A statue of Peace bearing in one hand the laurels of victory and in the other the decree of the Senate shall bear witness to posterity of the gratitude of the Nation."

CHAPTER X

THE LAST YEARS OF THE CONSULATE. THE EMPEROR

THE general peace of 1802 brought France prosperity and respect. Innumerable foreigners journeyed to Paris to visit the places immortalized by the Revolution and to see the great man who had calmed the tempestuous waters. The centre of the world appeared to be removed to the banks of the Seine, where a well-regulated manner of life with its work and its social enjoyment had become the rule. These were no longer the days of mad intoxication such as those early in the reign of the Directory, when every one rejoiced to have escaped the horrors through which he had passed and yet awaited the morrow with uncertainty and dread. Excitement had given way to moderate and peaceful enjoyment; instead of bold speculation for disreputable gains, there were steady activity and honest earnings. Greater security than ever before was felt under the new government by the moderate law-abiding citizen, the same element which Napoleon had on the 13th Vendémiaire so mercilessly mown down with grape-shot that, according to his statements, gloomy visions of the scene still continually haunted his dreams. The unjust deportation of Jacobin deputies also carried conviction—as it had been intended to do—that the man who had been in control since the 18th Brumaire had no longer anything in common with the general commanding the forces of the Convention in 1795. Adherents to the royal cause had returned home in great numbers and had to some extent again come into possession of their property. The so-called “nouveaux riches,” who had become owners of extensive tracts of state property through speculation and stock-jobbing, gradually came to feel secure in their possessions as Napoleon was seen to depart more and more widely from the rôle played by Monk. To one ele-

ment, accordingly, personal power in Napoleon's hands seemed desirable as security against further Revolutionary excesses, while to another it seemed equally so as a guarantee against the return of the Bourbons, the aim of all being to make it possible for labour and enjoyment to continue undisturbed.

In the face of such material forces and interests what mattered it that a certain number of unyielding republicans bemoaned the loss of their unrestrained political liberty, or that the haughty nobility of the faubourg Saint-Germain should prefer to become subjects of a legitimate sovereign rather than of an ill-bred upstart? The great body of the people had wearied of political questions and gladly submitted to the tyranny of the new government which had re-established order and vouched for its continuance. The period of the Consulate is characterized by the absolute confidence placed in the man who had vanquished the foes of France both without and within her borders. Unlimited power in the hands of one individual was now as much in popular favour as the "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" of all had been a short time before. In reliance upon this feeling the new monarch of France might safely venture very far. It was only that he finally ventured too far that brought him to ruin before his death. To any one who had left Paris at the beginning of the Consular period and who, like the Councillor of State Miot de Mérito, returned thither at the end of a few years, the changes which had meanwhile taken place were astounding. The last traces of Revolutionary times had everywhere disappeared. In the place of the half-military, half-civil costume which fashion had imposed toward the end of the century, the mode of dress prevailing during the "ancien régime" had been resumed; instead of the sabre was worn the sword of ceremony, and boots had given way to stockings with buckled shoes. The returned aristocrats alone retained the garb of equality, the dress coat and trousers, as evidence of their impoverishment. Men no longer addressed one another as "Citoyen," but as "Monsieur," and in 1803 the official almanac even explicitly enjoined the use of the title "Madame" in place of "Citoyenne." Although the Revolutionary calendar was still in use, the Decadi had already

been replaced by the Sunday of old, and no one—least of all the First Consul—failed of attending mass on that day. The names of the streets had again been changed to those which they had borne before the days of the Republic, the “Palais Égalité” had again become the “Palais Royal,” the “Place de la Révolution” was again known as “Place Louis XV.” In fashionable literature the names of the foremost representatives of enlightened France, Voltaire and Rousseau, were repudiated because they were regarded as having been through their writings originators of the Revolutionary movement.

But it was in what immediately surrounded Napoleon that the change was most striking. The Tuileries, which he had occupied since January, 1800, as the residence of the chief magistrate, had been transformed into the palace of a sovereign. There a rigid etiquette was enforced and everything was regulated according to the rules of a court. Woman, to whom the democracy had conceded no political rights, was now given her place: Josephine had her days for giving audience just as her husband did. Everything, with the exception of the words “Consul” and “Republic,” was monarchical and centred in a single dominating personality.

In this court, where the usages of the old monarchy had been restored by command, and where aristocrats schooled in the ways of the world were preferably installed as officials of the palace, there was indeed much to recall the sudden elevation of its sovereign. People were to be seen there who, according to Talleyrand’s sarcastic comment, did not understand walking on waxed floors; officers with awkward wives of obscure origin and lacking in every grace; generals, better drilled than bred, obeying with awe and servility capricious behests resulting from a mixture of calculation and nervousness in a man who made it a principle to stimulate zeal by means of fear.

Napoleon was tolerant of no contradiction in his despotism, as indeed he refused to feel himself restricted in any respect even by such rules of conduct as all the world was agreed in accepting. “I am no ordinary man,” said he, “and laws of propriety and morals are not applicable to me.” It is said that he

even carried to such an extent his disregard of what was sacred to others that he was by his own wife taxed with incestuous relations with his sisters. In his nature he still remained gloomy and morose as he had been in earlier years. His successes had not made a happy man of the dreamer. There was at this time a tinge of sadness in his character which in later years developed into a surly ill-humour. "I am not fitted for taking pleasure," he was accustomed to say, and from what is known of his modes of diversion the truth of these words is fully corroborated. Madame de Rémusat, who had since 1802 filled the office of lady in waiting to Josephine, writes thus of him: "I have seen him go into transports at the murmur of the wind, and talk with enthusiasm of the roaring of the sea; tempted at times to think nocturnal apparitions not altogether beyond credence, he was in fact inclined toward entertaining certain superstitions. When he left his council-chamber to pass the evening in the drawing-room of Madame Bonaparte, he would take the notion sometimes to have the candles veiled with white gauze and, having enjoined profound silence, would amuse himself with relating or listening to stories of ghosts and apparitions; at another time he would listen to slow, sweet music executed by Italian singers to the sole accompaniment of a small number of instruments softly played. He would then be seen to sink into a reverie which was respected by all, no one daring to make a motion nor to stir from his place. Upon coming out of this state, which appeared to serve as a sort of relaxation to him, he was usually more serene and affable."

Ever since the attempt had been made upon his life Bonaparte shut himself off more and more thoroughly from the outside world. It was only during the review of troops in the court of the Tuileries that it was possible to approach him and present petitions. Whenever he rode out through the city he was always escorted by a large force of mounted guards, and his regular visit to the theatre called forth a special detail of police for whose accommodation even the first set of side-scenes opposite the Consular box were pressed into service. Out at Malmaison the walks throughout the park were constantly

patrolled by a competent force of men, and at no time did the First Consul return to Paris until after the police had searched the streets through which he had to pass. He was filled with a profound mistrust of every one. At times even his ministers were denied access to him; under such circumstances some young aide-de-camp was made the bearer of his commands to them. Since every action of his own was the outcome of calculation, he was always trying to scent out motives and designs in the conduct of others. Nothing seemed to him so trustworthy as the maxim of Macchiavelli, that in dealing with friends one must always bear in mind that they may become enemies. Entirely devoid of magnanimity himself, he ascribed nobility of purpose to no one. When, upon one occasion, a lost watch was returned to Bourienne his secretary, Napoleon was so impressed by this act of integrity that he freed the finder from military duty and interested himself in the welfare of his family. In regard to veracity his ideas did not differ from those which he held concerning honesty. It was not always advantageous, he thought, to tell the truth. He used to relate with pleasure his uncle's prediction "that he would some day govern the world because he was in the habit of lying on all occasions." With his estimate of mankind it is therefore not strange that he did not rely solely upon the faithfulness of the official police, but established in addition, particularly after Fouché was deprived of his office of Minister of Police in 1802, a number of secret police agencies under the direction of his most devoted generals: Duroc, Savary, Davout, Moncey, Junot, and others, who were expected to keep watch upon each other.

It was Josephine, the aristocrat by birth, who formed the link connecting the nobility of France with the court of the First Consul. Through her and her former relations with people of rank many a family of ancient name now became reconciled with the existing order of things and allied their interests with those of the new régime. On the other hand the brothers of the Consul, Joseph and Lucien, were distinguished by certain republican tendencies which were, however, not deep-rooted enough to prevent their being eventually overcome by the

resolute determination of the new Cæsar. Such at least was the case with Joseph. Lucien, who as ambassador to the court of Madrid had acquired a large fortune, had a falling-out with Napoleon because he persisted in contracting a marriage with the daughter of a tradesman instead of with the widowed Queen of Etruria, and refused to procure a divorce in spite of his brother's protests, a course which eventually brought about his banishment from France. At a later date he was pleased to make a display of his democratic principles, although there is little room for doubt that in 1801 he indulged the hope of being made a king.

The third brother, Louis, through Josephine's influence had been brought January 3d, 1802, to marry her daughter, the beautiful Hortense Beauharnais. The union, unwillingly entered upon by both parties, was no happy one and brought to a culmination the hostility existing between the two families, Bonaparte and Beauharnais. The cause of this discord lay in Josephine's sterility, which gave to Napoleon's stepchildren an importance resented by the Bonapartes and which was a hindrance in the path of their ambition. The fact has been established that the brothers and sisters of the Consul, particularly Lucien, began even at this time to talk of a divorce, and that Josephine, in her fear of being abandoned, even espoused the cause of the Bourbons.* Jerome, Napoleon's youngest brother, was leading at this time rather a frivolous life in the United States, where he married the beautiful Elizabeth Patterson of Baltimore, whom he, at the command of his superior, subsequently abandoned in Europe. He had been appointed by his brother to a position of importance in the navy, but he was to mount still higher. Of the sisters of the all-powerful Consul the eldest, Elisa, had been married in 1797 to Pascal Bacciochi, an Italian nobleman and an officer in the French army, to whom in 1803 was given the command of Fort

* See Jung, "Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires," II. 67, the letter written by Lucien from Madrid under date of April 4th, 1801, to Napoleon in which he alludes to the Infanta Isabella, whom the Queen of Spain was desirous of marrying "to the future lord of the world-monarchy."

Saint-Jean in Marseilles. She was a woman of fine intellectual ability, and with the aid of her brother Lucien assembled about her in Paris a circle of distinguished men of letters, among whom were Fontanes and Chateaubriand, whom she recommended to the notice of Napoleon and for whom she obtained his favour. The beautiful but frivolous Pauline had married General Leclerc, who with thousands of his fellow countrymen died, stricken with yellow fever, in San Domingo. When, in 1803, she returned to France, her hand was at once asked in marriage by the Prince Borghese. The ambitious Caroline, married in 1800 to Murat, the cavalry general, to whom she was intellectually far superior, was one of the most ardent of those who were intriguing against the Beauharnais family. Napoleon's mother, Lætitia Bonaparte, now lived in her own palace at the Capital, basking in the splendour of her son, not, however, as an experienced woman, relying so implicitly upon her good fortune as to fail to improve such a favourable opportunity for the acquisition of considerable funds against a possible evil day. She had remained precisely the same woman as in former years, even to retaining her Corsican dialect, a point which Napoleon keenly resented, since it was his will that nothing should act as a reminder of his foreign origin.* A kinsman who proved more useful was found in his uncle Fesch, the former abbé and more recently War Commissary to the Army of Italy. After having made his peace with the Church, an ecclesiastical member of the family was of no little value to the Consul. Fesch must needs resume the discarded cassock, and soon after the conclusion of the Concordat he was appointed Archbishop of Lyons and Cardinal.

Such was the court of the man who, to use his own words, directed the political course of Europe. Nor was this statement an exaggeration. Direct it he did in reality, ready to crush out by force of arms any sign of resistance wherever it appeared. He had concluded the general treaty of peace be-

* His alien birth was a source of real mortification to him. "To put it in plain terms," said he to his brothers, "I am very sorry to have been born a Corsican." (Jung, "Lucien Bonaparte," etc.)

cause this step was necessary to the furtherance of his own interests; to maintain it was in keeping neither with the revolutionary system which he had made his own nor with his own inclinations. There has been handed down from a reliable source the report of a conversation which he held with a Councillor of State shortly before he was invested with the Consular power for life. The Councillor having expressed the opinion that the maintenance of peace in Europe was above all necessary to the welfare of France, the Consul replied by asking whether he did not, then, believe in the enmity of the Powers who had signed the treaty of peace. The Councillor was obliged to acknowledge that England, Austria, and the others would doubtless remain hostile to France in the future as they had been in the past. "Well, then," said Napoleon, "what are the consequences? If these Powers are continually going to cherish war in their hearts so that it must break out some day, then the sooner it comes to that the better, for every day helps to dissipate in them the recollection of their last defeats, while it tends to diminish at home the prestige of our last victories. All the advantage in delay is accordingly on their side.* Bear in mind that a First Consul is not like one of these kings by the grace of God who look upon their State as a heritage. Ancient usages are to them an advantage and a support, while to us, on the contrary, they are a hindrance. The French government of to-day bears no resemblance to anything which surrounds it. Hated by its neighbours, compelled to hold in restraint within its domain sundry classes of evil-disposed persons, in order to preserve an imposing appearance in the face of so many enemies it stands in need of brilliant deeds and consequently of war. France must be first or utterly fail. I will tolerate peace if our neigh-

* How correct were these observations may be seen by the recently published despatch sent by the English ambassador Whitworth on the 1st of December, 1802. "Every added year of peace," so it runs, "while enfeebling the Consular government, will give strength and courage to those whose aim and interest it is to overthrow it. As a matter of fact in maintaining peace we are keeping up a state of war against this government which is more decisive and more deleterious in itself than open hostilities."

bours know how to keep it, but if they compel me to take up arms again before they become unserviceable through neglect or long disuse I shall regard it as to our advantage. . . . There is always a spirit of hostility existing between ancient monarchies and a newly-formed republic. . . . Situated as we are, I regard every peace as a brief truce and the ten years of my consulship as destined to be an uninterrupted warfare." *

To any one reading with attention these utterances spoken during the summer of 1802—whether the words are exactly quoted or no—it will be clear that Napoleon was determined upon carrying out by force of arms the programme for the hegemony of France formulated by Hauterive in 1801. But was this after all the ultimate aim to which he aspired? Was it really his only concern, as he asseverated, to procure this hegemony for the French government, or did he have a purpose deeper than might be disclosed to a member of the French Council of State? Perhaps he had already at this time conceived in secret the idea which he imparted two years later to a circle of intimate friends: "Europe cannot be at rest except under the rule of a single head who will have kings for his officers, who will distribute his kingdoms to lieutenants, making of one King of Italy, of a second King of Bavaria, of a third Landamman of Switzerland, of a fourth Stadholder of Holland, each having his position in the Imperial household with title of Chief Cup-bearer, Grand Master of the Pantry, Grand Master of the Horse, Grand Master of the Hounds, etc. It may be objected that this plan is nothing but an imitation of the constitution of the German Empire, and that there is nothing novel in the idea; but there is nothing in existence which is absolutely new, political institutions only revolve in a circle, and it is often necessary to return to what has been already tried." It is plain that he was no true Frenchman at heart, fond as he was of representing himself as such, especially during the years of the Consulate. Had he been what he pretended he would have been content with securing for France the leading position

* Miot de Mérito, *Mémoires*, II. 226.

among the Powers. But that was precisely wherein he failed the nation which had put its trust in him. Possessing no spark of French patriotism or of ambition for France, from the time when he had been forced to give up his little native country he had recognized no national limits to his ambition, gigantic in truth, since it embraced the whole world, and yet at the same time infinitesimally small, since it was to serve only to satisfy the inordinate passion for glory on the part of a single individual.* To any one so resolved upon war there can be no difficulty in bringing it about without appearing a direct aggressor. And indeed Napoleon's conquests in time of peace were most efficacious in preparing the way for war, and finally even brought about the outbreak.

In the later months of the year 1801, when the preliminaries concluded with England and the treaty with Russia had established universal peace, Bonaparte had already begun with indefatigable activity to take advantage of the need felt by all the nations of Europe for a time of recuperation, and to make the acquisitions necessary to his system. For, as a result of the recent strife, the temporary exhaustion felt by the Powers had made possible the turning of the balance of power in favour of the conqueror. It behooved him above all to bring those countries lying within the sphere of French authority more directly under his control by means of their internal organization; for, being for the most part furnished with strictly republican constitutions modelled upon that of France in the time of the Directory, they, with their continual changes of party government, were not always to be relied upon. It was therefore essential to modify

* According to Lucien, to conquer Europe for his own sake and not for that of France had already been determined upon by Napoleon in 1802. Referring to that year, Lucien says in his *Mémoires* (Édition Jung, II. 165): "I am not one of those who have believed and who persist in believing that my brother Napoleon made war contrary to his choice at any time in his career. I was too well acquainted with what he thought at bottom, particularly at the time of which I speak. And, to be quite candid, his designs, which were far more ambitious than patriotic and which made war a personal necessity to him at that time, were revealed to me almost without attempt at disguise."

these constitutions to correspond with the new one which France had adopted in 1799.

This was at once put into operation in Holland. With the concurrence of the ambassador of the Batavian Republic a new constitution was elaborated in Paris according to which the five Directors were superseded by a President bearing the ancient title of Grand Pensionary, while the two Chambers gave place to a legislative body of deputies with limited powers. This new constitution was forced upon the Dutch people by its own Directory, which had been bribed by France and which was most forcibly supported by French troops (October 17th, 1801). At the plebiscite which was then held 50,000 of the people voted against the change; the remainder held their peace. This silence was construed by Napoleon to mean acquiescence, and the new constitution was announced the free act of the Batavian people. This was done as a matter of form in order to satisfy the demands of Article 11 in the Treaty of Lunéville, which read: "The contracting parties mutually guarantee the independence of the said Republics (Batavia, Helvetia, Cisalpine, Liguria), their inhabitants being vested with the power to adopt whatever form of government shall to them seem good."

In the Cisalpine Republic matters stood exactly as they had in Holland. Here also was still in force a republican constitution similar to that of France under the Directory, and here also the power was made to pass entirely out of the hands of the Councils into those of a single executive body, which was far easier to direct from Paris than had been the fluctuating mass of parties in the Chambers. In September, 1801, Napoleon had already conferred with certain men in Lombardy who were in his confidence; the next step was to arrange for the elaboration of a constitution according to his directions, which duty he assigned to Maret. The result of these labours was sent to Milan in order that it might there be secretly deliberated upon. According to it a single President was in this case also to be put at the head of the government. The authorities in Milan consented to everything, asking only that Napoleon would do them the favour to appoint the proper persons to the offices of State. And again

the First Consul tried to conform with the provisions of the before-mentioned Article in the Treaty of Lunéville by inviting to Lyons the most prominent representatives of the three classes into which the people were divided according to the constitution—the landowners, the scholars, and the tradespeople (posidenti, dotti, commercianti). At this place and with the concurrence of these deputies men were assigned to the principal offices with the exception of a single one, that of the Presidency. This Napoleon was reserving for himself. Talleyrand had been charged with the arrangements for bringing this about. The wily minister made use of the occasion of a review of the returned Egyptian troops, which attracted most of the strangers outside the city, to assemble the few deputies who had remained,—possibly a third of the whole number,—when a trial vote was cast. The choice fell upon Melzi d’Eril, whereupon Talleyrand gave the Italians to understand that a far better selection might be made. They grasped his meaning and resolved upon offering the Presidency to Napoleon, while Melzi should be vice-president. On the 26th of January, 1802, the First Consul declared himself ready to accept this position. His first official act was to change the name “Cisalpine Republic” to the “Italian Republic”—a clever stroke, for already many hearts had been fired with enthusiasm by the words of Alfieri: “Italia virtuosa, magnanima, libera et una.” The name was taken to signify a complete programme of national unity and independence. And who was better fitted to make this dream a reality than the victor of Marengo?

But this was after all nothing but a decoy. Napoleon’s real designs were most clearly shown by the fate which overtook Piedmont. This country lay at the portals of France and formed a sort of bridge leading to the Republic of Lombardy. The French had occupied it ever since their last victory over the Austrians, and had not evacuated it after the conclusion of the Treaty of Lunéville. During the lifetime of Paul I. of Russia, who had drawn his sword among other things in defence of the legitimate rights of the King of Sardina, Napoleon contented himself with simple occupation of the territory in order to avoid giving offence to his new-found friend. Hardly had the Czar breathed his last,

however, before Gen. Jourdan—the Jacobin of the 18th Brumaire and now the docile tool of the new monarch—was forthwith commissioned to proclaim to the Piedmontese that their country was to form a French military division and to be portioned off into six prefectures. This was exactly the procedure of the Convention in former days when it set about the annexation of German possessions along the Rhine. For the formal incorporation of Piedmont the First Consul waited until the definitive peace with England should be concluded. During the negotiations leading to that end his plenipotentiaries received the strictest injunctions to tolerate no interference of any kind on the part of Great Britain in Continental questions, and actually so absolute was England's need of a time of respite however short that this sacrifice was made to it; the Treaty of Amiens contained no word in behalf of Victor Amadeus, King of Sardinia. As soon as all had been made safe in that quarter Napoleon proceeded without delay to take formal possession of the coveted territory. On September 4th a *Senatus consultum* dated at Paris declared Piedmont a French province with six departments, of which one was to bear the glorious name of Marengo.

At the Court of Vienna the greatest consternation prevailed at this rapid extension of French authority in Italy. Count Ludwig Cobenzl, the successor of Thugut as Minister of Foreign Affairs, writes at this time to the Austrian ambassador at Paris: "How may any portions of Italy, not now belonging to France, hope to escape her domination? More rapid and devastating in times of peace than in war, where are the ravages of this torrent to cease?"* It was to be a long while before the course of "this torrent" would be arrested. To the south of Piedmont was the Ligurian Republic, territory of the old ducal city of Genoa. The Constitution here again was out of date, and on the 26th of June, 1802, a draft of a constitution prepared in Paris was delivered to the Genoese by the French ambassador Salicetti, the same person whose name is associated with Napoleon in his youth. This

* Archives of Vienna.

constitution was gratefully accepted by the government while announcing to the people of Genoa that "it was meet that he who changed the face of all Europe should also give a new form to the Ligurian Republic." Even before this time, in December, 1801, the little Republic of Lucca had been provided from the Tuileries with a constitution placing at the head a Gonfalonier who, like the Dutch President, was to hold office for a brief period lest he should acquire lasting importance, the real ruler being the political agent of France. No less dependent upon France was the kingdom of Tuscany-Etruria, where Napoleon appointed his generals Clarke and Murat as guardians to the incapable young king, after whose death, in 1803, they continued in like office to the queen, while even the details of the military organization were determined upon in Paris. Finally, in August, 1802, when the British had withdrawn from it, the island of Elba, relinquished by Spain, was declared a French province. For the sake of making it appear in this case also as if he proceeded according to the will of the people, the Consul summoned to Paris a delegation from Porto Ferrajo, which on its arrival at the capital was sumptuously entertained by the Minister of the Interior, while to each of its members was presented a purse of several thousand francs, whereupon these gentlemen expressed in a speech ready prepared for the occasion the gratification felt by their countrymen at being united with France.

Thus by midsummer of 1802 the whole of Upper Italy as far as Austrian Venetia had come to be directly or indirectly under the sceptre of France. Piedmont alone was insufficient to furnish uninterrupted and adequate communication with these territories. During the course of the last campaign Napoleon had learned the value of communication by way of the Swiss Alps, and, with his mind always intent upon the renewal of hostilities, he determined upon securing these permanently for himself. He accordingly demanded of the Republic of Helvetia the relinquishment of the district of Valais through which ran the highway over the Simplon, for which he proposed to give in exchange the Frickthal, ceded to him by the Emperor Francis in the Treaty of Lunéville. But the in-

habitants of Valais were averse to any scheme of incorporation with France, and Napoleon was discreet enough not to insist upon it. He never hesitated to employ roundabout means to reach an end when it proved unattainable by the more direct way. So he contented himself for the time being with seeing Valais separated from Switzerland and formed into a republic by itself with a president of its own (August 30th, 1802). Actual independence was here entirely out of the question, for by Article 2 of its constitution the entire republic was at the outset put under the "protection" of the French and Italian Republics, while Article 7 exempted the government from the duty of guarding its passes, and Article 9 directly forbade the inhabitants to open any roadway leading beyond the country without the consent of France. The rest of Switzerland was moreover quite as much under the supremacy of its western neighbour. As far back as the time of the Directory Helvetia had already been indispensable as a connecting link between French annexations in Italy and those along the Rhine, and if Napoleon was to maintain the offensive position of the Revolution,—and in this he had no choice,—he could not give up his supremacy in this mountain country. For this reason it was generally supposed in Europe at the time of the Consulate that he would place himself at the head of the government here as he had done in Lombardy, and it is asserted that such was for a time his intention. But in the way of carrying out such a programme there were two obstacles,—first, the Treaty of Lunéville guaranteeing to Switzerland its nominal independence, and second, an admonition from Russia to the First Consul requesting him to respect the independence of his neighbours and thereby help to dissipate the apprehensions of Europe. Any design which Napoleon may have entertained of securing the presidency of Switzerland for himself was promptly given up, but in the withdrawal of his troops which followed he nevertheless insured his own power in the country by stirring up into open warfare the dissension which existed between the Federalists of the aristocratic party and the liberal Centralists, affording him the opportunity of appearing on the scene as a party concerned and armed

mediator.* The Old-Federalists had already asked aid from England and Austria, and a British agent had already reached Berne with a view to operating here against French influence, when Napoleon suddenly intervened. At his command 30,000 men under Gen. Ney were again marched into the country, and a delegation of fifty deputies of Switzerland summoned to meet the Consul in Paris, where they were granted an "Act of Mediation." In this the aspirations of both parties were taken into consideration; it was acceptable to the Federalists, since it granted to every canton its own constitution, and to the Liberals because it upheld the principle of equality among all citizens. A diet composed of representatives of all the cantons and presided over by a Landamman was to regulate the foreign affairs of the State (February 19th, 1803).† By this clever artifice the First Consul obtained his much-desired end, for throughout the entire course of his rule in France Switzerland remained at peace within and, while inaccessible to all approaches from other powers, was absolutely submissive to the influence of France.

The spread of Napoleon's power found, as has been seen, no great obstacle in the Alps, one of the natural boundaries of France. Was the second of those boundaries, the Rhine, destined to be held in any greater respect?

After the Treaty of Lunéville as after that of Campo Formio there yet remained unsettled the question of indemnity to those German princes who had lost to France a part or the whole of their lands along the left bank of the Rhine. After ✓ Campo Formio the Congress of Rastatt was empowered to solve

* As early as April 30th, 1801, he had submitted to delegates of both parties a rough draft of a constitution intended to give satisfaction to both, but they had been unable to come to an agreement upon the subject.

† Jomini in his account, "*Précis politique et militaire des campagnes de 1812 à 1814*," II. 224, says that "the 'Act of Mediation' was the work of the best heads of Switzerland and not that of the First Consul." This statement is correct to this extent, that Napoleon instructed Haute-rie, Director of Foreign Affairs, to submit to him the result of the propositions made by both parties.

this problem, when renewed war deprived its decisions of validity. This question was now taken up again. It had been determined in Rastatt that the secular princes who had suffered these losses should receive compensation in the shape of ecclesiastical territories lying on the right bank of the Rhine. This was confirmed by the Treaty of Lunéville. Napoleon's motive in this was exactly that of the Revolution, which had done away in France with the political significance of mortmain and which carried across the boundary into Germany the principle of universal secularization of Church property. There was in Germany a class of ecclesiastical and consequently non-hereditary princes who were moved by no interest of family to try, like the secular princes, to obtain all possible independence and sovereignty for their houses. They had for that reason always been firm supporters of the feudal empire, and their Catholic faith had retained them as partisans of Austria and its ruling house. Now, should these principalities be subdivided among the secular, that is to say the dynastic, States, the old imperial constitution would be shaken, the Empire would lose its staunchest adherents, the tendency to disintegration would prevail, and, as a result of this subversion of the order of things, there would, at the best, arise a confederation in place of the Empire. The only possibility of maintaining the Constitution of the Empire lay in preserving to the princes of the Church all property not needed to indemnify those princes who had been deprived of their lands; but it would fall inevitably if all of the ecclesiastical principalities were secularized. The Revolutionary governments of France had each adopted as a principle the necessity for the secularization of all. In the year 1795, when for a moment a general treaty of peace was under consideration in Paris, this project was brought by Sieyès before the Convention Committee of Public Safety, his proposal being the complete dismemberment of German ecclesiastical principalities for the benefit of secular princes, and this scheme was doubtless submitted at a later date to the consideration of Napoleon and his ministers.* The famous abbé had in those earlier days

* How important a part in foreign politics during the Consulate and

established the principle that the ruling German powers, Prussia and Austria, should be kept at the greatest possible distance from the Rhine, while along the river there should be tolerated only States of secondary importance. Against encroachments from the two other powers these States would be protected by France, to which country they would be faithful adherents. But to such a plan, according to Sieyès, the ecclesiastical principalities were not adapted, since they as elective principalities without dynastic interests furnished no guarantee of permanent alliance. Consequently they ought to be secularized, as had already been done with some of their number at the time of the Peace of Westphalia.

And while this was the view of the situation taken by France, that of the two ruling German powers was not directly opposed to it. In so far as Prussia was concerned, the secularization which had been a part of the Treaty of Westphalia had very considerably strengthened the power of Brandenburg, and the greatness of this State in the past accordingly rested upon the very principle which was now being promulgated by the Revolution. Moreover, the House of Brandenburg was just then interested in seeing indemnified on German soil the ejected hereditary Stadtholder of Holland, who was a relative. Austria, on the other hand, in demanding for herself in the Treaty of Campo Formio an ecclesiastical principality,—the Archbishopric of Salzburg,—had already conceded to France the right to assist her in acquiring it.* Later, in the Treaty of Lunéville, a stipulation was made to the effect that the Grand Duke of Tuscany also was to receive compensation in Germany for his loss of territory, for which purpose Salzburg was again set aside with Berchtesgaden. The fact was that in Vienna the interests of Austria outweighed those of the German Empire, as had once before been the case, under Joseph II., when the scheme had

the Empire is to be ascribed directly to Sieyès is a question which will be more closely examined later.

* Article 5. The French Republic will use its good offices to enable His Majesty the Emperor to acquire for Germany the Archbishopric of Salzburg, etc.

arisen for the general secularization of the ecclesiastical principalities of Germany. Consequently neither of the great German powers was opposed on principle to this solution of the problem—a fact of decisive importance. Another of equal weight was that the question had ceased to be such as to involve Germany alone. By this policy of assigning German territory to princes not themselves German,—such as the Stadtholder of Holland and the Grand Duke of Tuscany,—and recording the agreements in international treaties, German questions of indemnification had become the common concern of all Europe. It is therefore not surprising that France, which had won for herself the first place among the nations, should assume in this case the predominant part, and that the question should be decided, not at the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon, but at the Tuileries. The various German dynasties at once hastened to open direct negotiations with the First Consul. Then followed a scene of courting and enlisting the good-will of Talleyrand and his officials, a buying and selling of favour and protection, a disgraceful driving of bargains in which the glory of the Empire and honour of the nation were sacrificed on account of a few scraps of land. At length, on the 20th of May, 1802, a separate treaty was concluded between France and Würtemberg by which the latter was promised a considerable increase of territory from ecclesiastical sources; the House of Würtemberg being related to that of Russia, it was hoped that the assent of Alexander I. would thus be obtained to the whole transaction. Three days later followed a similar treaty with Prussia which awarded likewise to Frederick William III. extensive “indemnification” taken from Church possessions.* On the 24th of the same month a treaty with Bavaria was signed at Paris, which was soon followed by settlements with Baden and Hesse. Upon the strength of these agreements there was devised in Paris a comprehensive scheme of general secularization which left undisturbed only the single Archbishopric of Mainz. To

* The ecclesiastical territories named in this treaty are Hildesheim, Paderborn, Eichsfeld, Essen, Werden, and Quedlinburg, all of which were already mentioned as the share of Prussia in Sieyès’ project of 1795.

this on June 3d, 1802, Napoleon obtained Russia's consent with her promise to assist France in securing its adoption at the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon.

Austria had purposely been kept in ignorance of these proceedings. Her ambassador at Paris first learned through the "Moniteur" of the fact of the agreement with Russia and of the scheme for indemnification. Emperor Francis protested, not because as Head of the Empire it was his duty to protect its constitution and honour against foreign intrusion, but because the portion of the spoils accruing to Prussia was too large and that to Austria too small. But it was in vain that his troops were sent to occupy the territory of the bishopric of Passau, which had been allotted to Bavaria. The German princes had, for once, made common cause with France, and Napoleon's categorical summons forced the Austrian Court to yield. Further, the Austrians were forced to accept with such grace as they could the dispositions according to which the Grand Duke received in exchange for Tuscany not only Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, but Brixen, Trient, and a portion of the bishopric of Eichstädt as well, while, as a return for these losses, the Austrians were compelled by a treaty with France dated December 26th, 1802, to confirm all the changes made in Upper Italy. Meanwhile the Diet at Ratisbon had been brought to accept the scheme for indemnification presented by France and Russia; it was ratified February 25th, 1803, by formal enactment. The temporal power of the German princes of the Church had ceased to exist; the foundations upon which rested the ancient constitution of the Empire had been demolished.

Thus had the nations beyond the Rhine also been made to feel Napoleon's political power, while the small neighbouring German States, particularly those in the south, had been brought into a certain attitude of dependence toward his government. In the diplomatic campaign which he had been carrying on against Austria Napoleon had come off victorious at every point; the power on the Danube had been completely isolated, its conclusive defeat being marked by the treaty of December, 1802. If his persecution of the conquered power now ceased, the cause lay

solely in the fact of new developments in another quarter demanding his attention.

The treaty with England signed at Amiens had, it is true, brought about a condition of affairs making it possible for arms to be cast aside for a moment, but it had given no promise of lasting peace. There were voices, as has before been observed, raised in the British Parliament emphatically denouncing the abandonment of Italy to Napoleon, thereby giving him the mastery over the Continent. While the preliminaries of peace of October, 1801, were greeted with rejoicing by the English people exhausted by the long and expensive war, the ratification of the same in March, 1802, met with far less enthusiasm. And for good reason; for the expectations of the English of being able to make use of the cessation of hostilities for the benefit of their commerce proved by the end of a few months to be but an illusion. Napoleon had not only refused to accede to the renewal of the Treaty of Commerce of 1786, but, in order to protect French industry, by the imposition of high duties he had practically closed to English goods the ports of France and of her dependent States, Italy and Holland. Thus it was that manufacturers and merchants on the British side of the Channel had come to desire war, which would at least be less prejudicial to their interests than this peace which was working their ruin. And what if the First Consul were to be successful in extending still further the French federative system, thereby restricting to a yet greater degree England's commercial sphere on the Continent? In 1798 he had menaced her colonial existence with his Egyptian expedition, and now his attitude was equally threatening toward her industries. And now, as had then been the case, it was a matter of life or death to the island nation. Further extension on the part of her rival must be prevented and her utmost endeavours put forth to lessen the ascendancy of France.

Napoleon was himself convinced of the probability of a rupture with England, to judge at least by what he said to the Austrian ambassador as early as May, 1802; but so absolute did he take to be England's need of peace, since she had intervened

in favour of neither Italy nor Holland when the treaty was drawn up, that he counted nevertheless upon a somewhat longer season of peace in that quarter. In any case he began to put into operation a comprehensive economic experiment which could succeed only under that supposition. This was nothing else than a vast colonial scheme which, while it was to have San Domingo as its principal base, was also to include the Antilles and the American territory of Louisiana, which had been ceded to France by Spain. Obstacles to this plan presented themselves on both sides of the Atlantic.

At the time of the last war a remarkably intelligent negro, on the island of San Domingo, Toussaint Louverture by name, had distinguished himself in his leadership of the negroes, opposing so determined a resistance to the English that they had been obliged to withdraw. He had then assumed authority and founded a severe but excellent government. According to the Constitution with which he provided the island, the suzerainty of France was to be maintained as strictly nominal, while he himself, as president for life, should rule independently. (Evidently Napoleon had already made disciples.) Under this government San Domingo flourished. Its coloured inhabitants, though freed from slavery, were nevertheless kept at work by the authority of their president; commerce released from restriction, brought rich returns to the country. But all this was utterly irreconcilable with the colonial scheme which Napoleon was meditating and of which Talleyrand was perhaps the instigator. The Constitution was accordingly rejected by the First Consul, who sent his brother-in-law, Leclerc, with an army of 25,000 men to the island to re-establish its commercial dependence upon France. This army, it may incidentally be remarked, which was assigned by Napoleon to operate at such a distance in a noxious climate, was selected, doubtless not without design, from those bodies of troops which had been under the command of Moreau in the recent war and who were among the most faithful adherents of his cause and of the republican system. Leclerc, like Richépanse, who had been sent to Martinique, was under orders to re-establish slavery among the negroes; Toussaint, at the head of his people,

resisted, and it was only at the expense of extraordinary courage and perseverance on the part of the French that he was at length forced to surrender on condition of amnesty to himself and his followers. But the expedition proved nevertheless a failure. Every day hundreds of brave soldiers were carried off by yellow fever, so that in July, 1802, after seven months upon the island, Leclerc had only 8000 men left under his command. He feared a new onslaught on the part of Toussaint, who had retained his rank as general, and recommended to Napoleon that the redoubtable leader of the San Domingans be summoned to France and there kept in confinement. This was done, and toward the close of March, 1803, Toussaint ended his days in the fortress of Joux, a victim to the harsh climate and to ill treatment by his custodians. But on the other side of the ocean Leclerc also died, smitten by yellow fever, nor, in spite of considerable reinforcements, was his successor able to re-establish French supremacy in the island, so that before the end of the year 1803 the French were obliged to abandon it altogether. The second of the bases of operation in Napoleon's colonial scheme came, likewise, to naught, for the United States of America entered a threatening protest against the expansion of French influence in Louisiana. And now, in addition, peace with England was on the point of rupture earlier than Napoleon had counted upon, robbing his scheme of that most essential consideration, safety of traffic upon the sea.

During the course of the year 1802, while France was engaged in the San Domingo enterprise, public opinion in England had taken a more and more pronounced attitude against France, and so marked had this feeling become that finally even the peace-loving ministry of Addington was compelled to yield to the pressure. The stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens had not yet all been fulfilled; an important pledge yet remained in British keeping—the island of Malta, that highly-prized halting-place on the route to India. In view of the encroachments of France upon the Continent England had delayed the fulfilment of her compact to restore the island to the Knights of St. John, and now rather regarded its possession as a desirable compensation for

Napoleon's expansion. The situation was aggravated by the scathing attacks of English newspapers upon the ruler of France, and by the fact that when he demanded a cessation of this journalistic persecution, the London government waived responsibility, referring him to the legalized freedom of the press in England. It was a time of suspense in which the hostility of feeling on both sides increased from day to day. But Napoleon did not long remain undecided. His next step was to threaten. Should this foreign power be intimidated by threats he would derive this advantage, that his prestige in France and in Europe would be enhanced by just so much; but in case England really meant war, the colonial scheme must of course be given up, in which case, however, there opened up the alluring prospect—since England would not remain without allies—of a profitable war upon the Continent, a prospect which, as has been seen, was continually kept in mind by the First Consul.*

A pretext was found in the autumn of 1802, when England made complaint of a violation of the neutrality of Switzerland through the entry into that country of the French army under Ney. Hereupon Napoleon dictated to his Minister of Foreign Affairs instructions for the guidance of the French ambassador, Otto, in London, and these reveal in the germ his entire future policy. In regard to Switzerland, the matter was to be considered closed. The establishment of British hirelings in the Alps would not be tolerated by him. In case war were threatened upon the further side of the Channel the question would arise of what sort it was to be. A mere naval warfare would be of little advantage to England on account of the paucity of spoils. It would, it is true, blockade the French ports, but it would at the same time bring about a counter blockade, since, upon the outbreak of hostilities, all the coast from Hanover to Taranto would be guarded by French troops. And what if the First Consul were to assemble the flat-boats of Flanders and Holland, thus providing means of transport for a hundred

* Napoleon had already announced to the Austrian ambassador in May, 1802, that a rupture with England would necessarily involve war upon the Continent.

thousand men with which to keep England in a perpetual state of alarm over an always possible, and indeed even probable, invasion? If, on the other hand, the London Cabinet should conclude to rekindle war on the Continent, Napoleon would thereby simply be compelled to proceed to the conquest of all Europe. "The First Consul is but thirty-three years of age," concludes this document, "up to this time he has destroyed none but states of secondary rank. Who knows, if he were forced to it, what length of time he would require to change once more the face of Europe and to resuscitate the Western Empire?" (October 23d, 1802.)

It was but a feeble echo of this strain which was transmitted by the ambassador in London, and, for the time being, peace was preserved. Talleyrand and the other ministers as well as Napoleon's brothers were unreservedly in favour of the avoidance of open warfare. The Consul alone, irritated by the continued refusal to evacuate Malta and the defiant tone of the English press, allowed himself to be impelled to war. He now definitely gave up his colonial plans and himself sought to precipitate matters. He ordered copied in the *Moniteur* a report made by General Sebastiani, whom he had sent on a secret mission to Egypt. This report was to the effect that the British had failed as yet to evacuate Alexandria; also that, while existing hostilities continued there between the Turks and Mamelukes, 6000 French soldiers would be sufficient to reconquer the country. If this report was published with a view to exasperating England, no doubt could remain as to its having accomplished its purpose.* The prospect of seeing the route to India again imperilled was intolerable to the English, and any thought of renouncing the possession of Malta was from now on out of the question with them.

But Napoleon carried matters yet further. In the annual

* Sebastiani himself bears witness that this was the intention, for he recounts somewhat later that after his report had been read the Consul exclaimed: "Well, we shall see whether that is not enough to drive John Bull to fight. As for me, I have no dread of war." (*Mémoires de Lucien*, II 165.)

report which he submitted to the legislative body in February, 1803, the subject discussed was the conflict between the two parties into which the English were divided, those in favour of peace as opposed to those who were hostile to France. A half-million of soldiers, said he, must be kept in readiness by France against the possibility of victory by the second of these parties. England alone, however,—so the report went on,—was not sufficient to cope with France. British national pride was touched to the quick by this new insult. George III. promptly offered an ultimatum requiring, among other things, the indemnification of the King of Sardinia and the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland on the part of France. These terms were rejected. Toward the middle of May, 1803, the ambassadors of both countries were recalled. War was declared.

Hostilities had meanwhile already begun. For weeks before that time England had given chase to all French merchantmen who had ventured out relying upon peace, and Napoleon made returns by putting under arrest all such Englishmen as were living in France. Soon after British squadrons were sent to blockade the French ports, whereupon Napoleon began to carry out to the letter the plan of campaign which he had mapped out in his instructions to Otto. It consisted, as has been seen, chiefly in three acts: the first being to blockade England in her turn by making inaccessible to her ships the coast of the Continent "from Hanover to Taranto," all of which should be guarded by French troops; the second step was to threaten an invasion by the gathering of an expeditionary army on the Channel; and third, in case the British power should be successful in kindling a war on the Continent in which her allies should be opposed to France, it was his purpose to make the Continent tributary to himself as far as the weapons of France could be made to carry. This programme was further accentuated by the order now issued by the Consul reviving the celebration of the birthday of the Maid of Orleans for the sake of nourishing the spirit of jingoism toward the ancient enemy of France.

Before the month of May had expired a French army corps

was ~~marshalled~~ into Hanover, which territory belonged to the King of England, and the troops of the Elector without much show of resistance capitulated. By means of this occupation the ships of the enemy were debarred from the mouths of the Weser and Elbe rivers, thus closing to British trade the most important avenues of communication with Northern Germany. The consequences soon became evident. "You have dealt England a fatal blow," writes Napoleon to General Mortier; "many houses have become bankrupt." He admonishes him to be personally watchful to prevent any possible British consignment of merchandise finding entrance. Soon after this, in June, a second army corps under command of Gouvion Saint-Cyr penetrated into the kingdom of Naples and, contrary to the terms of the treaty, occupied the ports of Taranto, Brindisi, and Otranto.

The two extremes of the cordon being thus made secure, all that remained between was now closely and inseparably attached to the policy of France. First in turn came the Batavian Republic. It was compelled by treaty to provide sustenance for French troops to the number of 18,000 men and to hold in readiness for service a force of 16,000; in addition, five ships of the line and a hundred sloops carrying cannon were to be furnished for the naval war. In return Napoleon guaranteed to the republic the integrity of its territory, and promised to restore to it any colonies which might be lost during the course of the war and (circumstances permitting) with the addition of Ceylon (June 25th, 1803). Switzerland was the next to pledge herself in favour of France. An offensive and defensive alliance with her powerful neighbour imposed upon her the obligation to raise an army of 16,000 men, which was to be increased to 28,000 in case France were attacked; that is to say, that a large proportion of the military force of the nation was put at the service of a totally foreign interest. Finally Spain and Portugal also were induced to enter the league. With Spain it had become a question of no slight significance. When, in the spring of 1803, Napoleon definitely renounced his colonial enterprise, he came to the conclusion that Louisiana, which had

been acquired from Charles IV., would prove to him nothing but a burden. The territory was coveted by the United States, and Napoleon now offered to sell it to that country. The offer was accepted, and for the sum of 80,000,000 francs Louisiana became a part of the United States.

But Spain in her treaties with France had reserved to herself the privilege of reclaiming Louisiana, and Napoleon's violation of the agreement aroused such intense excitement at Madrid that Godoy, the Prince of Peace, considered for a time the advisability of opposing resistance to this neighbour, especially in view of the fact that, instead of the 25 ships and 28,000 men which the Court of Madrid had agreed in 1796 to hold in readiness for the service of France in the event of war, the Consul now demanded vast subsidies of money, 6,000,000 francs a month, enforcing his requisition by means of an army gathered at Bordeaux.

But Bonaparte would accept of no gainsaying. He made complaints to the king concerning the Prince of Peace, not even forbearing to make allusion to the scandalous relations existing between the latter and the queen. The expedient proved effectual. The minister humbled himself, and on October 19th, 1803, the treaty was concluded according to the wishes of Napoleon. Spain was thus ranged among the enemies of England and forced to undergo the experience of having war declared against her by the British Cabinet in the year 1804. Naturally Portugal could not remain unaffected by all that was thus taking place, and she was compelled to purchase neutrality by the payment to France of 1,000,000 francs a month. In February, 1804, Genoa also was put under obligation to furnish 6000 sailors to her powerful neighbour for use in his naval warfare.

While the Consul in these ways prepared the "blockade" of England, he was assembling on the coast of the Channel near Boulogne an imposing army, which he thoroughly equipped and exercised—whether as mere demonstration or with a view to actual occasion—in what was requisite to accomplish with success the transit across the Channel. Flat transport-boats were built in great number, and the field-soldiers practised in

the duties of the sailor. It was a gigantic apparatus which was here displayed for the consternation of John Bull. But it was not to be brought immediately into action. The enemy from without was, unfortunately for him, not the only one against which Napoleon had to do battle. In the interior of the country arose another enemy which was not to be subdued with army and navy. Against this foe he now turned. In this case also he was destined to conquer, and, with his genius for making everything contribute to his end, his prostrate antagonist was made to serve but as a stepping-stone to new greatness.

After the death-blow had been dealt to the Jacobin party in the decree of proscription issued in 1801, there remained but two political factions who followed with irreconcilable vindictiveness the existing system of personal government and its representative: there were, first, the Moderate Republicans, the citizens of the 13th Vendémiaire, who recognized General Moreau as their leader; and, second, the Ultra-Royalists who had been driven out of the country and who regarded the capitulation of Vendée in 1800 as only a truce which they were determined to disregard at the first favourable opportunity. The last-named had their headquarters in England, their head being Charles d'Artois, the brother of the executed monarch, Louis XVI., while among their most active agents were Pichegru and Dumouriez. These two parties had remained quiescent during the continuance of peace, but, now that war had again broken out, they had imbibed fresh hope. There even arose at this time a kind of coalition between them, although this was only of an outward character. Pichegru went to Paris and made advances to Moreau. To the latter, who was indispensable to the accomplishment of their purpose, was to be accorded a temporary position of power, that he might then play the part of the English General Monk and prepare for the Bourbons a way of return to their native land. The conspiracy was based upon the supposition that it was going to be possible to do away with Napoleon. This time he was to be more surely dealt with than had been the case on that Christmas evening in the rue Saint-Nicaise when the infernal machine failed to accomplish its purpose. To carry out this plan for assassination,

Georges Cadoudal, a leader among the Vendéens, came secretly to Paris and put himself there at the head of trusted partisans whom the many years of civil war had transformed into veritable political bandits. The plan was for a sufficient number of them openly to assail the First Consul when he drove through the streets surrounded by his body-guard, to seize him and—so it was asserted in the "Moniteur"—to kill him and, with his death, overthrow the government. Certain English ministers were initiated into the plan, and sanctioned it at least in so far as it went toward bringing about the downfall of their hated enemy.* But Napoleon received warning in time to avert the threatening danger. His London agents had revealed the plot to him before any one of the conspirators had so much as set foot upon French soil. One by one, then, as they reached the country they were put under arrest and the whole extent of the conspiracy ascertained, though not without application of coercive measures. Moreau, also, was taken into custody. At the end of a prolonged trial Cadoudal, with a number of his assistants, was sentenced and shot; Pichegru was discovered strangled in his prison cell; Moreau, whose collusion with Pichegru could be proven,—though there was no evidence of any understanding with Cadoudal,—was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, but, though judgment had already been pronounced, Napoleon insisted upon a revision of the case, and the penalty was changed to banishment to America. But the essential point lay in the fact that the cause of the Bourbons was apparently compromised, and that Moreau, the only dangerous rival to the First Consul, lost his influence in the army as a consequence of his connection, however slight, with the conspirators, while Napoleon's popularity with the non-partisan mass of the people was only the further increased by the danger which had threatened him.

But he himself undid no small part of this favourable impression through an act which defies all attempt at justification. Cadoudal had asserted during the course of his trial that the royal princes of France were cognizant of the projected assault, and

* On the character and degree of the complicity of the English government see Rose, "Life of Napoleon I.," I. 416-17.—B.

that they had been intending to be present when it was perpetrated. Artois was the person thus denoted, he having as a matter of fact been party to the scheme with the declared intention of being present in Paris. From this of course it was clear that certain members of the House of Bourbon were abettors to the crime; but this was not true of all, not, for instance, of the Condés, who disapproved of the conspiracy and had refused all participation in it. To this branch of the Bourbons belonged the young Prince d'Enghien, the last scion of his line. Love for his cousin, Charlotte de Rohan, had drawn him to Ettenheim in the grand duchy of Baden, which modest town still belonged to the diocese of the Cardinal de Rohan and had served as residence for him and his niece since he had been ejected by the Revolution from Strasburg. Here the prince was secretly married to the lady of his choice, and here he lived upon a pension granted to him by England, it being his desire, now that war was about to begin, to show his gratitude either by fighting in the ranks of the English or by doing service upon the Continent in some such way as by organizing a corps of volunteers from among the discontented elements always to be met with in Alsace and neighbouring garrisons. His offer was, however, refused by the British government, and Enghien had to content himself with remaining inactive in his exile. It so chanced that England was just at this time secretly sending out agents into Switzerland as well as into Southern Germany, in the effort to stir up feeling against France, and of these machinations exaggerated reports were carried to Paris. One of these rumours now associated the name of the young prince with these emissaries, among whom it was claimed that the feared and hated émigré Dumouriez had been discovered. From this Napoleon concluded that Enghien also could not be entirely unconcerned in the conspiracy against his person, and conceived the idea of taking him into custody, since he had been unable to get possession of the Comte d'Artois. It was of little consequence to Napoleon that, in order to carry out this scheme, it would be necessary to invade foreign territory and violate the law of nations. On the 15th of March General Ordener crossed the Rhine with a few hundred dragoons, laid

hold of the prince, who was just making ready ~~to start on a~~ hunting excursion, and carried him off to Strasburg, whence he was at once conducted to Paris by a competent escort.

While he was yet on the way the ultimate fate of the prisoner was being deliberated upon in privy council. Napoleon expressed the opinion that he should be tried before a court-martial; Cambacérès advised against this course, while Lebrun, when questioned, made an evasive reply; Talleyrand and Fouché, however, counselled strongly in its favour, and the First Consul accordingly decided upon it, although there was no difficulty in convincing himself from the prince's papers that he stood in no sort of relationship to the conspirators, while the hated "Dumouriez" turned out to be a person of very small consequence by the name of "Thumery." These revelations did not, however, change Napoleon's decision, for he was determined upon sacrificing one of the Bourbons for the sake of terrifying the others from any further attacks.

On the very evening of Enghien's arrival in Vincennes a military tribunal of carefully selected judges was there convoked. The accused was subjected to a trial in which he denied connection of any kind with Pichegru and the others, but on the other hand, proudly asserting the truth, he declared that, since the commencement of hostilities, he had, as a matter of fact, sought to engage in the service of England and had hoped to have a part to play on the Rhine, while the fact that prior to this time he had fought against France was known to all. This was sufficient to induce the judges to pronounce a sentence which would, as they knew, give satisfaction to their lord,—and one not altogether without semblance of justice, since the Revolution in each of its phases had threatened with death open warfare on the part of a Frenchman against his native country, and the law in question had never been abrogated. Doubtless it was to this also that Napoleon had reference when he met his wife's entreaties for leniency toward the prisoner with the reply: "I am the man of the State, I am the French Revolution, and I shall uphold it." Hardly had the verdict of the court-martial been signed by the colonels composing it, before the prince was led

out in the darkness of the same night—March 20th, 1804—to the castle moat; there he was placed in front of a grave already prepared, and shot by a company of gendarmes. According to all authentic accounts the last of the Condés died like a true hero.*

At the tidings of this crime mute horror took possession of every one. A member of the family which for centuries had governed France had been sentenced and executed in its capital at the nod of a foreigner! The massacres of the Reign of Terror it seemed, then, had not yet come to an end even under this government which had understood drawing up such excellent codes of law. If the prince had even really been in collusion with the conspirators against the head of the state, his fate would have been more comprehensible. But this was not the case. It had been necessary first to abduct him from a foreign country in order to slay him. Moreover, the deed had not been commanded in the heat of blind, tumultuous passion at the criminal assault, but after long and quiet deliberation such as is given an act of the state. With the words "my policy" Napoleon had expected to be able to silence every objection raised against his severity, and this policy he characterized in this wise: "At least they will see what we are capable of and henceforth, I hope, they will let us alone." But he was unable to convince any one. Even the classes which were closely bound to him through regard for their material interests did not remain entirely unmoved. On 'Change stocks fell very considerably, and the Consul was obliged to expend millions in order to sustain prices and to abate the excitement.

Up to this time, besides the respect rendered to his genius, Napoleon had elicited the sympathy of many. But this was

* A moment before his death the prince put into the hands of the commanding officer a ring and a lock of hair to be delivered with his last farewell to the Princess de Rohan. This wish of the condemned was allowed to remain unfulfilled. The relics were deposited with the records of the trial among the archives of the Paris Préfecture de Police, whence Napoleon III., in the early years of his reign, ordered them removed to the imperial chancery. Since then they with the papers have vanished. (Lalanne, "*Les Derniers Jours du Consulat*," p. xiii.)

now withdrawn, and his rule was henceforth tolerated solely with a view to the advantages to be derived from it. Obedience might still be counted upon, but affection no longer accompanied it, and what he yet held would be withdrawn whenever the French ceased to feel that their interests were best served through him. Their confidence in this respect, however, had not been impaired by the crime of Vincennes. "The trial of General Moreau, and above all the death of the Duc d'Enghien, brought about a revulsion of feeling, but opinions still remained unshaken," says Madame de Rémusat in her *Mémoires*; and Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, whose excellent account of these events has recently been made public, says in the course of it: "If the character of the French nation had not at all times given to its acts the stamp of fervour rather than of steadfastness, one would suppose that the First Consul in his act of tyranny toward the Duc d'Enghien would have lost a large and important part of the confidence, the enthusiasm, the devotion, and the attachment upon which his present authority rests and upon which his future dignity must be founded. But it is possible that he knows the French better than they know themselves; perhaps he has been taught by the example of Cardinal Richelieu, who ordered the execution of a Montmorency, that in France just those most daring political acts tend rather to secure than to shake the supreme power."

The conjecture of the Prussian diplomat was in many respects correct. We have watched through all of their phases Napoleon's efforts to secure a monarch's power. Two years before he had contented himself with the consulship for life; but it was no part of his plan to stop at that. In May, 1802, the Austrian ambassador had already seen enough to lead him to notify the home government that supreme power for life was to be conferred upon Napoleon with the title of "Emperor of the Gauls," and at precisely the same time the Prussian chargé d'affaires announced to his superiors that the Consul was intending not only to change his title, but also to make the supreme power hereditary in his family. In March, 1803, the Englishman Jackson made a note to the same effect in his diary,

and from that time the idea of an "Empire des Gaules" never again disappeared below the surface. Napoleon himself played in this case exactly the same part that he had played on former occasions. This time also he wished to be sought. And again was found just the person needed to bring this about. Fouché, who had never ceased to repine at the loss of his lucrative position as Minister of Police, hoped to recover it if he could bring about the fulfilment of the First Consul's secret desire. An admirably adapted pretext was furnished by the conspiracy against Napoleon's life and the danger to the peace of the interior of the country threatened in his removal. After his escape numberless congratulatory addresses had poured in from the départements, corporations, etc., and upon the ground of these demonstrations Fouché came to an agreement with a tumber of senators in regard to a new amendment to the constitution, for the power of amendment since 1802 had been acknowledged to belong to the Senate. Upon this body also the deepest of impressions had been made by the danger in which the Consul had been involved. A subversion of the existing government would unquestionably have deprived the senators of their lucrative positions by putting an end to the corrupt munificence of Napoleon. But with this self-interested consideration was associated another less unworthy. It was undeniable that a Coup d'État with the civil discord which would follow was far more readily possible while the system of government was dependent upon a single individual and its overthrow could be accomplished by the removal of one person only. The matter assumed a different aspect if the office of the chief ruler were made hereditary, so that a legitimate successor could at once step into Napoleon's place and continue to rule according to his maxims; heredity would in this wise of itself give promise of greater stability, since it would prevent further attempts at assassination by making them vain and fruitless. The establishment of a hereditary revolutionary-monarchical power was thus at once demanded by the common interest and by the personal advantage of the senators, and for that reason even the crime of Vincennes did not prevent this act of legislation,

and a week had scarcely elapsed after that miserable proceeding before a deputation from the Senate presented itself before the First Consul and addressed him in these words: "You have founded a new era, but it is your duty to perpetuate it; the result attained is as nothing if not permanent. We cannot doubt that this great idea has already received your consideration, for your creative genius embraces everything and overlooks nothing. But do not longer delay. Everything urges upon you the necessity for this step, the state of the times and recent events, conspiracies and plots of the ambitious, and, in another way, the spirit of anxiety which agitates every Frenchman. You have the power to master both times and events, to disarm the ambitious, to calm and tranquillize all France by giving to it institutions which will cement the edifice which you have erected and which will continue to the children that which you have given to the fathers. The ship of state may not be exposed to the danger of losing her pilot without an anchor to protect her against shipwreck. Citizen First Consul, be assured that the Senate speaks thus here to you in the name of every citizen."

The senators were not mistaken. When their proceeding became known there were many more voices raised in commendation than in disapproval. "Not that any movement of affection toward the First Consul had favoured this new accession of greatness to him and his family," says Miot de Melito; "on the contrary, at no time had he been less beloved; but so urgent was the need of rest and stability, so disquieting the future, so great the dread of terrorism, so much to be apprehended seemed the return of the Bourbons with their many wrongs to be avenged; that the people seized eagerly upon everything that could avert these dangers against which no other means of defence could be devised.*

* Other witnesses concur with Miot in these assertions. The Prussian envoy reported at Berlin: "The event is everywhere expected, and however considerable may be the number of persons who are jealous or discontented with an enterprise contrary alike to the wishes of the Royalists and to the principles of the Republicans, Paris and all France will hardly make their true feelings apparent in this case. The universal demand is

But to Napoleon it was not enough that the new dignity should be conferred upon him by the Senate. The subjection of this body to the ruling power was for his purpose far too notorious. He wished to receive it as the offer of those who had previously opposed the idea of a monarchy.

He doubtless reasoned that he would thus provide beforehand against opposition of any kind and at the same time prevent any possibility of confusion between his rule and that of the kings of France. For, it would be argued, it would not be possible for him to kill one of the Bourbons to-day and to appear himself on the morrow as planning to usurp their inheritance. Consequently the initiative must come from the Tribunal. A member of that body, named Curée, was induced, by the promise of one of the richly endowed places in the Senate, to make the following proposition which had been formulated in the Cabinet of the Consul: 1st. That Napoleon Bonaparte be entrusted as Emperor with the government of the French Republic; 2d. That the imperial dignity be declared hereditary to his descendants. A second tribune, an exile of the 18th Fructidor, was commissioned to second the motion. In the session of April 30th, 1804, Curée presented his proposal, and there appeared but a single individual who argued against its acceptance—Carnot; all the others voted in favour of it. The legislative body also was then assembled in all haste for a special session and cast a similar vote. Thereupon a new Constitution was elaborated under the direction of Napoleon by a government committee which included Talleyrand and Fouché with the Consuls. This constitution was then discussed in the Council of State and finally transmitted to the Senate for sanction. In the solemn session of May 18th, 1804, it was then adopted by that body—"this change being demanded by the interests of the French people"—by a vote in which there were but four dissenting voices, one of them that of Sieyès; the new Constitution of France was then delivered over to the First Consul for tranquillity, the guarantee of present possessions is the object of desire, with the prospect of a future undisturbed. The new order of things affords hope of this."

at Saint-Cloud, where it was published upon the same day as the fundamental law of the state. The Republic had an Emperor.

This Constitution of the year XII was not of those which impose limitations to the power of the monarch. Nor had that by any means been the intention in its preparation. In the Senate only the suggestion was brought forward in an excessively timid fashion. Importance was attached chiefly to the question of the hereditability of the chief power of the state. To the Emperor, who was himself childless, the right was conceded to adopt as his own the children or grandchildren of his brothers, in which case the power was to pass to them on his decease. But should Napoleon die without sons, whether the issue of his marriage or adopted, his brothers Joseph and Louis and their descendants were to succeed him in the imperial office. These possible heirs were proclaimed French princes. The civil list of the Emperor was fixed at the figure named in the royal constitution of 1791; that is to say, a yearly income of 25 millions of francs. The imperial throne was to be surrounded by six grand dignitaries, who were to enjoy the same honours as the princes and, like them, were to be addressed as "Your Highness" and "Monseigneur"; these were the Grand Elector (Grand Electeur), the Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, the Arch-Chancellor of State (Archichancelier d'Etat), the Arch-Treasurer, the Constable, and the Lord High Admiral. Then followed the high officers of the Empire; that is to say, sixteen marshals and a number of great civil functionaries; these, like the six grand dignitaries, were all members of the Senate. Besides this House of Lords, which Napoleon did not consider as possessing either national or representative character, there yet remained the legislative body and the Tribunat. Indeed, to the first of these they went so far as to restore the power of speech, of which, however, they might make use only behind closed doors and in the privacy of the three sections (the juridical, the administrative, and the financial) into which it was to be divided. No syllable of its proceedings was to reach the public.

Shortly after the promulgation of the Constitution followed the nominations. The two Consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun,

were appointed grand dignitaries, the former Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, the latter Arch-Treasurer. Joseph Bonaparte was elevated to the post of Grand Elector, and Louis to that of Constable. Talleyrand, who had taken a prominent part in the establishment of the new constitution, had also set his hopes upon one of these offices of grand dignitary, largely because it yielded a yearly income of a third of a million francs (\$65,000), but he was disappointed; he remained Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, according to the provisions of the constitution, the office of minister and that of grand dignitary could not be filled at once by the same person. Fouché, on the contrary, received the reward he had been working for; he was again made Minister of Police, and from thenceforth stood in the front rank among those with whom the Emperor took counsel. Fourteen generals were appointed marshals of France: Jourdan on account of his victory at Fleurus in 1794, Berthier for his services rendered as Chief of the General Staff, Masséna for Rivoli, Zurich and Genoa, Lannes and Ney for divers brilliant actions, Augereau for Castiglione, Brune for the affair on the Helder in 1799, Murat for his management of the cavalry, Bessières for his command of the Guards, Davout for his deeds in Egypt, and in addition to these Bernadotte, Soult, Moncey, and Mortier.

The court of the new Emperor was, moreover, organized on quite as magnificent a scale as the state. It included a Grand Almoner (Cardinal Fesch), a Grand Marshal of the Palace (Duroc), a Grand Chamberlain (Talleyrand), a Grand Master of the Hounds (Berthier), a Grand Master of the Horse (Coulaincourt), a Grand Master of Ceremonies, and in addition to these a perfectly endless train of Prefects of the Palace, court ladies, and minor functionaries. Napoleon showed marked preference in securing for these positions persons bearing names of ancient lineage. Nor did he fail in finding descendants of noble families eager to enter his service. At the court of the little Brienne cadet who had once been the target for the jeers of the young nobility now figured a Salm, an Arenberg, a La Rochefoucauld, and a Montesquiou. He had forgiven them now, but not, to be sure, until he had brought them completely into subjection.

Among the court officers that of Master of Ceremonies became of special importance. This was bestowed upon a converted émigré, Monsieur de Ségur, who had at one time represented Louis XVI. at the Russian court. With his experience of the old court life de Ségur soon became one of the most sought after and one of the most harassed of men. For etiquette had become a matter of profound study at the Tuileries. Enormous volumes on the subject of ceremonial during the reign of Louis XIV. were consulted, extracts made from them, and formal dress-rehearsals instituted. Madame Campan, formerly first lady-in-waiting to Marie Antoinette and now principal of a school for young ladies, was summoned to court and taken into counsel. Naturally the new empire of the parvenu provided ample material for secret ridicule and all manner of witticisms at the capital. Among other things it was said that Liberty had made but a brief appearance in Paris; entering by the "Barrière de l'Enfer" she had vanished again by way of the "Barrière du Trône." A caricature devised by some satirist represented a woman well known about town who had been condemned for the theft of a diadem; she was now making an appeal to the new Emperor asking whether such a transgression be really deserving of punishment and soliciting a new trial. These were, however, only occasional voices finding but little popular response. When the question was put to the French people, not as to whether Napoleon should be Emperor,—that appeared to be a matter of course,—but as to whether the imperial dignity should be made hereditary in his family, there were but two thousand five hundred "noes" against three million five hundred "ayes." *

France had thus declared itself in favour of the hereditability and permanence of the Revolutionary Monarchy with all its consequences. Now the most momentous of these consequences was war. In the constitution of the year 1804 the most striking feature is the distinction made between "Empire"

* These were the figures given in the "Moniteur." A detail not without interest is the fact that from among two hundred Paris lawyers only three voted "yes."

and "État" (Empire and State). What constituted the State of France was well recognized; the Revolution had marked out its boundaries with the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees. But what was the extent of the Napoleonic Empire? Where were its boundaries? Had it, indeed, any?

This uncertainty was an earnest of war instead of that peace which was so ardently desired. As long as the Empire shall last it will continue to be at war, and when it ceases to be victorious, it will disappear. When the time came for selecting the design for the new seal of state the committee in charge proposed as a heraldic device a "lion in repose." These words Napoleon crossed off with heavy strokes and scrawled hastily above them: "an eagle in flight."

CHAPTER XI

THE WAR OF 1805

BUT a few weeks after his elevation to the imperial dignity Napoleon betook himself to the camp at Boulogne, there to distribute crosses of the Legion of Honour to officers and soldiers who had distinguished themselves in the recent war. The same insignia were used in decorating the common soldier as the officer who commanded him, a most remarkably judicious measure, observing the Revolutionary principle of equality and at the same time flattering the ambition of the lowliest. To appreciate the pride which was engendered by this popular decoration, held as it was in respect by the whole nation, one should read the narrative of Captain Coignet, who received the cross as a simple trooper. From henceforth this feeling of pride crowded out every other sentiment in the army. To the enthusiasm for liberty which had animated the soldiers of Revolutionary times now succeeded the love of glory and the striving to distinguish oneself and to be distinguished. The commanders, likewise, became as amenable to Napoleon's will as were the rank and file of the army. Now was the time when he first spoke to them of the "Empire of Europe" of which the various countries were to fall to his generals as fiefs, bringing before their eyes glorious prospects of magnificence and riches. It depended only upon them whether they would help him and themselves to obtain all this. And they needed no further urging. It was thus that the republican army became imperialized, and faithful to the spirit of imperialism does it remain as long as a single ray of glory rests upon the "Little Corporal." Said Joseph Bonaparte at this time, speaking to the Prussian ambassador: "It is this great train of forces, always kept in the hope of advancing at the sound of his voice and in his footsteps

to the acquisition of fresh laurels and further riches, which constitutes the real power and security of my brother."

The army on the northern coast, one of the finest and best ever at Napoleon's disposal, was placed under the command of Marshals Bernadotte (who occupied Hanover), Ney, Soult, Davout, Augereau and the General of Division Marmont. The infantry was unceasingly practised in sea-service on the flat-boats, and everything appeared to indicate that England was to be made to suffer in her own territory for the serious losses which she had inflicted, since the reopening of hostilities, upon the commerce of France and Holland and their colonies. There were officers in the army who regarded the enterprise as extremely hazardous, while others, on the contrary, considered it practicable; the latter, according to Marmont, constituting the greater number. The crucial question, however, yet remains as to whether Napoleon planned actually to make the expedition across the Channel, or whether, in accordance with the instructions forwarded to Otto in October, 1802, it was his intention merely to keep England "in constant fear" of an invasion. The latter presumption is not lacking in support of a weighty character. It has already been seen how gladly he avoided this enterprise in 1798 on account of the innumerable difficulties involved. These difficulties were doubtless yet before his eyes. He said on one occasion to his brother Joseph that he had no thought of conducting the expedition in person, but was intending to entrust it to Ney, who was, moreover, not to be sent to England, but to Ireland. The most complete uncertainty prevails in his letters concerning the time which would be required for making the passage. When Fulton submitted to him his project for a steamboat which would have made him independent of wind and weather and assured his superiority to the English upon the sea, their own element, his response was simply to dismiss the inventor as a "charlatan" without investigation of the matter. Finally he asserted in later years that there had never been any serious intention of making the invasion. Further, the observations noted down by keen-sighted persons of his time—Madame de Rémusat, Miot

de Melito, General Hulot, and the diplomatists Lucchesini and Metternich—contain more than one passage indicating doubt as to whether this project, announced with so much rhetorical pomp and devised with all possible care, ever had been intended for actual execution. In any case the outcome of it was that action was postponed from the autumn of 1803 to the spring of 1804, and then again to the following autumn, being destined even then to non-fulfilment.*

✓ But even thus a double purpose had been accomplished. In the first place the steps taken had been really successful in arousing the fears of the English. An army of volunteers had been organized and drilled at great expense for a war of defence; the coast was fortified and a large part of the British fleet held inactive in the Channel. In the second place it had been possible for Napoleon, under pretext of this invasion, to assemble a powerful army which might, if occasion offered, be put to use on the Continent. In January, 1805, at a session of the Council of State in which the budget was under discussion the Emperor made the following statement: "For two years France has been making the greatest sacrifices which could be asked of her, and she has borne up under them. A general war upon the Continent would demand no more. I have the strongest army, the most complete military organization, and I am now placed just as I should need to be if war were to break out on the Continent. But in order, in times of peace, to be able to assemble such forces,—to have 20,000 artillery horses and entire baggage trains,—some pretext must be found for creating and assembling them without allowing the Continental powers to take alarm. Such a pretext was furnished by this projected invasion of England. I am well aware that to maintain all these artillery horses in time of peace is to throw thirty millions to the dogs; but to-day I have twenty days advantage of all my enemies, and I

* Lucchesini, for instance, writes, May 17th, 1804: "I cannot often enough repeat the statement that, with circumstances as they at present are, the secret desire of the First Consul is for a Continental war. It relieves his honour from being compromised by all the ado that has been made in announcing this invasion.

could be a month in the field before Austria would have bought artillery horses. I should not have been able to say this to you two years ago, and yet that was even then my sole aim." *

Such, then, were the military preparations made for the Continental war so long planned by Napoleon, but the diplomatic proceedings have yet to be considered. Napoleon's first political steps taken after the outbreak of hostilities with England were distinctly offensive in nature. The occupation of the German Electorate of Hanover implied at bottom a violation of peace with the German Empire, and, had that Empire not been at the point of dissolution, this act would in itself have sufficed to bring about open warfare. But under these circumstances the head of the German Empire had become indifferent to such attacks as were not aimed directly at Austria. In Prussia, to be sure, the Minister, Haugwitz, had advised that the Prussian troops forestall the French in the occupation of Hanover, but the other councillors of the cabinet and Queen Louise were opposed to this step, while Frederick William III. himself declared that not until a Prussian subject had been killed on Prussian soil would he depart from his neutrality. There was indeed still a German Empire, but a German policy had long ceased to exist.

But the occupation of Naples was destined to entail more serious consequences than that of Hanover. This affected Russia, and that in more than one respect. In the first place the Consul had pledged himself, in the secret treaty of October 11th, 1801, to leave unmolested the kingdom of Queen Caroline, and this agreement he had now violated. In the second place the occupation of Taranto put a check not only upon the English on the island of Malta, but also upon the Russian troops on the island of Corfu, where they had been stationed since the war of 1799. Finally, the French position on the Adriatic was of special significance, since it favoured the plans which Napoleon cherished in regard to the Orient, these being diametrically opposed to those of the Empire of the Czars. And here again the policy was

* Miot de Melito, who heard the Emperor make this speech, quotes the above in his *Mémoires* (II. 258).

nothing else than the continuance of that of the Directory, whose secret alliances with the factious elements of the Balkan Peninsula were instrumental in precipitating the last war with Russia. Already the diplomatists were making announcement in their reports of Napoleon's designs in regard to the Morea, nor were they mistaken in their surmises, for we have, for instance, his letter of February 21st, 1803, to Decrès, the Minister of the Navy, in which he commissions the latter to fit out a ship with arms and munitions for the rebellious Suliots as well as for the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus who were at war with the Turks. At Ragusa, whose Senate had established relations with Bonaparte during the course of the campaign in Italy and had since remained entirely devoted to him, the French Consul, Bruyère, had been commissioned to bribe the Bishop of Montenegro to deliver into the hands of the French the mountains and the Gulf of Cattaro, a scheme which was discovered by Austria in June, 1803, and reported at St. Petersburg. There Alexander had resumed the policy of Catharine II. which aimed not only to conquer Constantinople, but had other aspirations equally high, her ambition having been to establish an ascendant position on the Mediterranean. The Czar was much offended at these machinations of Napoleon's, and the effects soon became apparent. The Consul had no wish to break with the Czar; on the contrary, he had counted from the outset upon Alexander's preserving a neutral attitude and had chosen him as arbiter in his quarrel with England. But the Czar, wishing to remain entirely unhampered, had refused that office and had instead proffered his services as mediator. Yet the conditions which he proposed at Paris and London in August, 1803, already clearly indicate a prejudice on his part against France. He did indeed demand that England should evacuate Malta, in exchange for which that country should receive the island of Lampedusa, but on the other hand, according to his proposition, France was at the same time to evacuate Hanover, Switzerland, and Upper and Lower Italy, retaining only Piedmont, for which the French were, however, at last to indemnify the former king. Such a programme was clearly designed with a view to resistance against

the encroachments of Napoleon. He refused the acceptance of these terms, whereupon Markoff, the Russian ambassador, left Paris. The rupture between the two powers had taken place.*

At the first sign of troubled relations with France, Russia had taken steps toward winning Austria and Prussia to her cause, but at first without success. Prussia remained neutral for reasons already given, and it was not until the following year, May 24th, 1804, that she consented to form a defensive alliance with the Czar, to be in force only in case Napoleon should attempt to extend his power beyond Hanover or directly attack Prussia. Frederick William then directed his efforts in Paris to prevent either of these contingencies, and he received satisfactory assurances there, June 1st, 1804.

Austria, on the other hand, had been too much weakened by the recent war to think so soon of taking up arms again. Although Russia's change of policy was welcomed with lively satisfaction in Vienna, the Austrians were determined not to be led into assuming an offensive attitude toward France, but were, on the contrary, ready to make advances toward Napoleon and to yield more than he required in order to make certain of leaving him no pretext for hostile action. At the very opening of hostilities between England and France Francis II. had closed his ports to ships of both nations, a measure particularly disadvantageous to the English. To Madame de Staël, the enemy of

* Although the real cause of the breach has for years been known, one nevertheless frequently meets in the most recent books with the assertion that the animosity of Alexander I. toward the Corsican was due to his indignation at the execution of Enghien. Now in the Memoirs just published of Prince Adam Czartoryski, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in the year 1804, there is a document clearly setting forth Russia's Oriental policy of that time: "The body of the territory of Turkey in Europe should be divided into small states with local governments all united in a federation over which Russia might be assured of decisive and legal influence through the title of Emperor or Protector of the Slavs and of the Orient which should be conferred upon His Imperial Majesty. . . . Austria, in case it should be necessary to procure her assent, might be appeased with Croatia, a part of Bosnia and Wallachia, Belgrade, Ragusa, etc. Russia would have Moldavia, *Cattaro*, *Corfu*, and, above all, Constantinople and the Dardanelles with the neighbouring ports, giving us the ascendancy there."

Napoleon, was refused permission to reside in Austria. The same precaution was taken in respect to the Duc d'Enghien, who, in the winter of 1803-4, wished to travel to England by way of Vienna. Books were forbidden in which the ruler of France was attacked. The wearing of Bourbon orders was prohibited to French émigrés, and approach within a limit of fifty miles of the French and Swiss boundaries was interdicted to them. When the princes of South Germany had begun to incorporate the knights of the Empire and the latter sought protection of Austria and actually obtained a re-enforcement of Imperial troops on the Austrian frontier France categorically demanded the abrogation of that measure, and to this the Cabinet of Vienna at once acceded. Again, when the territory of the German Empire was trespassed upon in the arrest of Enghien, the Emperor Francis, at the instigation of Russia, made at first some feeble remonstrance, but, when it was learned in Vienna that the execution of the Prince had taken place, the court contented itself with saying that public policy sometimes imposed "harsh necessities," and declared the affair to be one in which France alone was concerned. Even Napoleon's title of Emperor was cheerfully acknowledged, though on condition that Napoleon should in return sanction the Empire of Austria, newly constituted August 10th, 1804, pronounce it upon an equality with France, and yield precedence to Emperor Francis II. as head of the German Empire. After some hesitation Napoleon consented to these terms. No one knew as well as he for how short a time existence was yet to be vouchsafed to the German Empire, and, as if to show how small a value was to be attached to this formal concession, he betook himself just at this time—September, 1804—by way of Belgium to Aix-la-Chapelle, to hold court in the old imperial palace of Charlemagne among his German subjects and to receive their homage. Did it not seem like an insult to Austria to demand of her sovereign, who yet wore the crown of the Carolingians, that the document in which he recognized the new French Empire should be sent to precisely this place? But Austria was ready to make this concession also for the sake of peace, and promptly at the time

appointed her ambassador made his appearance at Aix-la-Chapelle.

Against such compliance all the pressure which could be brought to bear by Russia and England was futile. It was in vain that Friedrich Gentz again called attention to the revolutionary and subjugating character of French policy and showed that the Empire itself was nothing but the Revolution again under another form. For, said he, it was not in opposition to the revolutionary powers that Napoleon had reached his new dignity, but thanks alone to their aid. He had not commissioned the army to proclaim him Emperor, but had founded his elevation upon the popular sovereignty of the Revolution, so that it was nothing else than giving sanction to the Revolution to accord recognition to the new Empire. The most determined resistance must be opposed to it, and, above all, Austria and Prussia must stand and act together. But to this view of matters the authorities in Vienna could not, for the time being, be aroused. They would be content if France only did not interfere with interests specifically Austrian. The occupation of Hanover might, so far as they were concerned, make difficulties for Prussia; they had no objection to seeing their ancient adversary put to some trouble; and if Russia's schemes in regard to the Orient were deranged, that was, after all, nothing to the disadvantage of Austria.

But the calm of neutrality was to be vouchsafed for a short time only to the Court of Vienna. Soon after his elevation to the Imperial throne Napoleon made direct assault upon the sphere of Austrian interests, and just at the point indeed where that power had always been most vulnerable—in Italy. Austria still owned territory in the northern part of the peninsula, and every new encroachment there was a threat to her possessions. Meanwhile the following events had taken place. In May, 1804, the new Emperor of the French had already said to the *Chargé d'Affaires* of the Italian Republic that it was not fitting that he should at the same time be Emperor and President of a Republic, and in case he were to continue to assure to this Republic the benefit of his rule the Consulta of Milan might

consider the matter and submit to him its proposals. The Austrian ambassador had been apprised by Melzi in Milan of this new development, and the question was now debated in Vienna as to what designs Napoleon had upon Italy. It soon became clear that here also the aim was to establish a hereditary monarchy by means of which Italy was to be bound permanently and more closely than ever to France. But this was directly contrary to Austria's designs, since she was determined on no account to yield forever the hope of regaining her ascendancy on the peninsula. In the treaty of peace with France of December, 1802, she had, it is true, recognized Napoleon's presidency for life, but that did not preclude the possibility of carrying out these plans for the future, while the establishment of a Bonaparte dynasty in Italy would put a definite end to any such prospects. So thoroughly disquieted were the Austrian authorities over this matter that Cobenzl even declared that the future fate of the Republic was the touchstone whereby Napoleon's real intentions might be discovered; should he do away with the independence of Lombardy he would proceed to make all Italy tributary to himself, nor rest content until he had extended his sway over North and South Germany and conquered the Morea and Egypt. It was this danger which now roused Austria from her lethargy and led her to draw closer to Russia, whose support in case of need would be indispensable.

November 6th, 1804, the two powers concluded a treaty which was, however, purely defensive in character and was to come into force only in case France were to be guilty of making further encroachments whether in Germany, in Italy, or in the Orient, but which, in case of victory to the allies, was to assure extension of the Austrian boundary to the Adda and the return of the Archdukes to Tuscany and Modena, as well as the re-establishment of the kingdom of Piedmont. The question of the Papal Legations which had been so much disputed was left to agreement between the two contracting parties. To guard against sudden invasion the Austrian garrisons in Venetia were re-enforced on the pretext of establishing a sanitary cordon.

While the eastern powers were thus arming themselves against

further encroachments on the part of France, Pope Pius VII. was making preparations in Rome for the journey to Paris for the coronation of Napoleon. This ceremony had seemed necessary to the Emperor in order to lend glory and splendour in the eyes of the world to his self-imposed dignity. Only under protest and after prolonged controversy in regard to the form of oath to be administered had the vicar of Christ at length consented to undertake the arduous winter journey in order to anoint him who had but shortly before been accounted guilty of a bloody crime. His decision was doubtless influenced by two contrary emotions, fear and hope: fear of bringing upon himself by refusal the wrath of the mighty potentate, and of being thus eventually despoiled of the States of the Church; and hope of obtaining new possessions, perhaps regaining the long-desired Legations, and having Europe see how the most powerful of her rulers, the adherent of the Koran in 1798, would bend his knee before the Bishop of Rome. Nor was the Pope alone in his decision, for the majority of the College of Cardinals, and with them the gifted Secretary of State, Consalvi, were in favour of the journey's being undertaken, and before the end of November, 1804, the Pope arrived in Paris. But here he at once became aware that every token of subordination, even to the most trifling details, was being carefully avoided by Napoleon.* In one matter only did he yield submission. Josephine, who had long been in dread of a separation, had revealed to the Pope that she had been united with her husband by civil marriage only and obtained from the Holy Father his promise that he would make the coronation conditional upon the previous consummation of a religious marriage. The Empress hoped thus to bind her husband irrevocably to herself, a

* Savary relates in his "Mémoires" that in the drive with the Pope from Fontainebleau to the capital the Emperor even took the seat of honour in the carriage, and this assertion has been accepted by Lanfrey and repeated in his biography. Other authorities, however, make statements to the contrary. Consalvi in his "Mémoires" makes complaint only in a general way of "little inconsiderate acts" on Napoleon's part toward his guest which were intended to remove from his mind any illusions which he might entertain in regard to his own superiority of position.

hope later doomed to disappointment. For the time being, however, she was in so far successful that the church marriage was solemnized in secret by Fesch on the day before the coronation of the Imperial couple, which took place December 2d in the cathedral of Notre-Dame. It was observed that Napoleon kept the Pope awaiting his appearance, and that instead of allowing the pontiff to place the crown of golden laurel upon the imperial brow, as had been arranged, the candidate himself seized the diadem and set it upon his head before Pius could reach it. Not even in this formality would he yield pre-eminence to any one. The Pope recognized that his hopes had been but vain. The rôle which he had been called upon to play in Paris had been detrimental rather than advantageous to his prestige. This indeed he did accomplish: that the French bishops, who had sworn fidelity to the Civil Constitution and were therefore classed as heretics, were brought to return to the fold of the Roman primate; but of his other demands there was granted and assured only one, and that of very secondary importance: the re-establishment of the Gregorian Calendar with the understanding that, beginning with January 1st, 1806, the Revolutionary Calendar should be abandoned. The saints of the Church and their festal days again obtained recognition and honour in France. To this Napoleon had no objections. Was not his own precursor and ideal, Charlemagne, also of their number?

And now that the papal benediction had consummated the establishment of the Empire the Italian question had also in its turn to come up for solution. The Italians were well content that the Republic should remain in the form of a kingdom under French dominion, but they protested against further payment of tribute and demanded assurance that the territory of the state should not suffer diminution and that French officials should be superseded by natives of the country. It had been Napoleon's original plan to turn over this vassal kingdom to one of his brothers, Joseph or Louis, but both refused the dignity, being unwilling to renounce their claims upon the throne of France; these two men, who but ten years before had been

at a loss where to look for daily bread, now spurned a crown. Exasperated at this unlooked-for opposition to his wishes, the Emperor determined upon himself assuming the title of King of Italy and entrusting to a viceroy the government in his stead. This post was to be occupied by Eugène Beauharnais, who, together with Murat, was now raised to the rank of Prince of the Empire and Grand Dignitary of France. This project was disclosed to a body of Italian delegates who had come to Paris, whereupon they, on March 5th, 1805, officially and formally offered the crown to Napoleon. On the following day he announced to the Senate that he accepted the office, and on May 26th crowned himself in the cathedral of Milan with the iron crown of Lombardy as King of Italy. He is alleged to have pronounced at that time in a strikingly menacing tone the ancient formula: "God has bestowed it upon me; woe to him who shall lay hands upon it!"

That which had been so much dreaded in Vienna had thus come to pass; for no doubt existed in the mind of any one there but that Napoleon meant by "Italy" something quite different from the territory comprised within the limits of the Cisalpine Republic. Henceforth he proceeded in a manner more than ever disregardful of every Austrian interest. Hardly more than a few weeks had elapsed after the coronation in Milan before he conferred upon his sisters the territories of Piombino and Lucca, and introduced into Parma and Piacenza the French code of laws, finally arousing the greatest excitement throughout Europe by taking away the independence of the Ligurian Republic through the simple process of incorporating with France the land and city of Genoa. All of these acts were in direct conflict with the treaty of December 26th, 1802, to which Austria had been forced to submit, while the erection of the kingdom of Italy and its union with France was in addition a flagrant violation of the Peace Convention of Lunéville, which had expressly provided that the territories of Austria and France should remain separated from one another by intermediary states. From this time Francis II. trembled not only for the influence which he had hoped to regain in Italy, but for what

had been left of his possessions there,—for Venice. And indeed tidings were soon brought from Milan to the intent that Napoleon was planning the acquisition of that territory also, and proposed to offer Servia and Bosnia to Austria in compensation. As an offset to the sanitary cordon established by Austria, Napoleon posted two armies, each numbering 30,000 men, at Verona and Alessandria, and they, under the guise of manœuvres, rehearsed again the battles of Castiglione and Marengo. To an Austrian general who came to present salutations Napoleon made answer by alluding to the Austro-Russian alliance, adding that he had no dread of war, knowing how it should be carried on.

While Napoleon was thus challenging Austria in Italy, Russia and England were most actively engaged in endeavours to force Emperor Francis into declaring war. In England Addington's peace-loving ministry had been forced to give place during the preceding year, 1804, to that of Pitt with its aggressive policy, the first act of which was to organize a coalition against France. It was not long before the British Cabinet had established an understanding with Sweden, where reigned Gustavus IV., one of Napoleon's bitterest foes, and this step was soon followed by a treaty of alliance with Russia, dated April 11th, 1805, which had as its basis a general uprising of the Continental States against the dominion of the Corsican. It was part of the project to induce Prussia and Austria to enter the coalition. But all attempts to persuade Prussia ended in failure. Frederick William felt peace to be sufficiently assured to Northern Germany by the defensive treaty entered into on May 24th of the preceding year; he refused to make attack upon France; indeed, under the influence of Hardenberg, he allowed himself to become involved with Napoleon in negotiations having for their object the acquisition of Hanover. With Austria, however, the efforts were successful. It was certainly no slight demand upon this power to change from the attitude of defence which she had hitherto assumed to one of aggression against Napoleon. For at that time the Austrian army numbered hardly more than 40,000 men under arms without a single

battery completely equipped with horses, to say nothing of the deplorable state of the finances. Archduke Charles, the only veteran commander at the disposal of the government, had, just at this critical time, instituted a radical reform of the army requiring for its execution a series of years of peace, and he advised strenuously against war with a man whose superiority on the field he acknowledged without reserve. But England and Russia made every effort to quiet these scruples, the former by offers of large financial support, and the latter by promises of re-enforcement to the Austrian forces from the Russian army and of securing the co-operation of Prussia even should it prove possible only through coercion. But, in spite of all, the two powers were unable to persuade Austria to the decisive step until Pitt had declared that the English subsidies were available only for the expenses of a war which should be begun before the termination of the year 1805, and Alexander I. threatened to withdraw from the project entirely in case there were any further hesitation. It was a sort of diplomatic surprise which placed the Austrian Cabinet where it must choose between the two alternatives of regaining, by aid of a coalition of the great Powers, its former possessions and status in Italy, including possibly even a part of Bavaria, and, in case Prussia continued to withstand the advances of the Powers, Silesia likewise;—or of losing this powerful support and being exposed entirely alone to the attacks of Napoleon. Under such constraint, on July 7th, 1805, Francis II. resolved upon entering the coalition, and gave orders for the mobilization of the army. General Mack, who was regarded as a genius in matters of organization, and who, in opposition to Archduke Charles, was convinced of the practicability of putting the Austrian army in marching order within the allotted time, now received commission to accomplish this feat. War on the Continent, then, was no longer a matter of doubt. This outcome was satisfactory to England, as relieving her of the fear of French invasion; it was equally so to Russia as a means of turning Napoleon's attention from the Orient; and France was about to engage in a conflict ardently desired by her sovereign as an excuse for abandoning the haz-

ardous project of invasion in favour of certain triumph elsewhere, while Austria had nothing to lead her to take part beyond her sanguine hopes of victory and of territorial acquisitions.

England's negotiations with the Powers on the Continent had remained no secret to Napoleon. To avoid the appearance of being the aggressor in the coming war he had addressed a letter in January, 1805, to George III., exhorting him to the maintenance of peace, which in contents and purpose closely resembled that former document by means of which he had so dexterously brought about the war of 1800.* The reply was to the effect that England must first come to agreement with the Continental Powers with which she was maintaining confidential relations. This was equivalent to open acknowledgment of the project of a coalition. Moreover, in February Pitt had demanded and received from Parliament the sum of five and a half million pounds sterling for secret purposes; this was a subsidy for Austria's assistance. Napoleon might therefore feel assured that the Continent was making preparations for resistance against him. In spite of this, it was, according to his correspondence, his intention to make a descent upon England in the middle of August with the combined Spanish and French fleets. Or was this only artifice, with the intention, perhaps, of keeping England in suspense up to the last possible moment and of lulling to rest the uneasiness of Austria? That remains to be seen.

On July 16th the Emperor issued orders to Admiral Villeneuve to join forces with the Spanish squadron at Ferrol, to assemble with these the squadrons at Rochefort and Brest, and under favourable conditions—Nelson having been lured away to the West Indies—to make his appearance in the Channel. This letter contains a very remarkable postscript: the Admiral, in case of change in the situation through unforeseen contingencies, was rather to return to Cadiz.†

* See page 194.

† The passage reads literally: "If, in consequence of battles sustained, of considerable separation of ships, or of other contingencies which have not been foreseen, your situation should be considerably altered, . . . in

On July 20th Berthier received instructions to prepare for embarkation a part of the army at Boulogne for use in any exigency. But, strange as it may appear, it was at just about this time that Napoleon began systematically to force the war with Austria. By August 2d Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador, announced to the home authorities that French newspapers were filled with affronts toward Austria and Russia, and that the Emperor—as he had long surmised—appeared to be inciting the Continental war. This conjecture proved correct, for on the following day Napoleon instructed his ambassador in Vienna to demand of Francis II. that he should withdraw to their cantonments in Bohemia and Hungary the troops garrisoning Venice and the Tyrol. Failure to comply would be regarded as an indication that he was not desirous of remaining at peace with France. This summons was repeated some days later, couched in more pressing terms, and again on August 13th, in the most peremptory manner possible. On that same day Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand that he was determined upon attacking Austria, and upon being in Vienna before November, in order to advance thence against the Russians, when he should be satisfied with nothing less than compliance on the part of the Austrian government with a demand to disband the army. He must have assurance on this subject within two weeks, or else—and this was to be imparted by the minister to the Austrian ambassador—Emperor Francis should not celebrate the Christmas festival in Vienna.*

The fortnight's respite allowed to the Austrian Cabinet

this case, which with God's help will not arise, it is our wish that, after having raised the blockade of our squadrons at Rochefort and Ferrol, you should come to anchor preferably in the port of Cadiz."

* In this letter is to be found amongst other statements the following: "The explanations made by Monsieur de La Rochefoucauld [the French ambassador at the Austrian court] in Vienna, and my first communication [of the 3d instant] have opened this question; the communication which I sent you shortly afterwards [of the 7th instant] has continued this question, and this which I send you to-day [of the 13th instant] should close it. You know that it is one of my principles to pursue the same course as the poets do to prepare a dramatic conclusion. Impetuosity does not lead to the desired end."

passed, but Villeneuve did not make his appearance in the Channel. He had in fact found in his way the obstacles which had been anticipated, and had supposed himself authorized to turn back to Cadiz. Napoleon pretended the utmost wrath at this conduct on the part of his admiral. As a matter of fact it could not have caused surprise and must on the contrary have been a source of satisfaction to him. On the very next day after the arrival of Villeneuve's despatches, August 23d, he charged Talleyrand to prepare the manifesto declaring war against Austria. In it he was to take as key-note the allegation that Emperor Francis had thrown his troops into Italy and the Tyrol just at the moment when the French forces were being embarked for the invasion of England. That was, to be sure, absolute falsehood, for the Austrian preparations dated from months previous and had also been observed by Napoleon for that length of time, while the embarkation of the army at Boulogne was not carried out until August,—the last orders dating from the 20th to the 22d. Moreover, he had been negotiating with Prussia as early as the middle of July to arrange to have the troops of Frederick William relieve his own in the occupation of Hanover, which is evidence in itself that he was even at that time counting upon the march toward the east. These facts tempt one to think that this whole proceeding of embarkation was nothing but a pretext for the sake of giving some apparent basis to his accusation against Austria, and of being able to say in his manifesto that the course pursued by Vienna had hindered him in his great undertaking against England and compelled him to carry the war into Austria.*

On the evening of August 27th the Emperor signed the official marching orders directing the steps of the entire army toward the east. Three days earlier, on the 24th, Marmont had already received secret commands to proceed by forced

* Later, in 1811, he went through the same manœuvre when he wrote to Decrès, the Minister of the Navy, in these words: "It is even my intention to embark 20,000 men upon the vessels, frigates, and transports of these two squadrons, and to keep them thus embarked for a month or six weeks, so that the menace may be real." See also, in regard to 1805, Piau des Loches, "Mes Campagnes," p. 137.

marches to Mainz. The camp at Boulogne was broken up. The Continental war had begun.

Down to the most recent times the statements of General Daru have been recounted and believed, according to which the idea of a Continental war was first conceived by Napoleon after the arrival of the despatches from Villeneuve and the plan of campaign dictated extemporaneously at a single stroke as if moved by sudden inspiration. That forms a part of the Napoleonic legend. The war had been for years foreseen and the manner of its execution of course maturely weighed and resolved upon. But even in this case Napoleon's foresight and calculation are none the less amazing. For events were to prove him correct in his reckoning: November, 1805, actually did find him in the heart of Austria, and his opponent did not, as a matter of fact, celebrate the Christmas festival in his capital. There has probably never been another man who understood measuring with such precision his own forces against those of the rest of the world. People have thought that they saw in this something preternatural. But Napoleon formed no exception to the rest of humanity. It was only that in him certain human attributes were developed to an extraordinary degree which lent to his personality something surpassingly great, even gigantic. He could still see clearly when the sight of others was dim, and what was to most people mere chaos presented itself to his eye in clear and distinct outlines. General Rapp recounts in his *Mémoires* a characteristic occurrence. One day Cardinal Fesch wished to make some expostulations in regard to the policy which the Emperor was pursuing. Hardly had he uttered a couple of words, however, when Napoleon led him to the window and asked him: "Do you see that star?" It was broad daylight. "No," replied the Cardinal. "Very well, then; so long as I remain the only one who can perceive it will I go my way and permit no manner of comment." Thus with a firm and steady hand, generally without others suspecting his designs, did he trace out his course into the future.

While the French army was advancing toward the Rhine as quietly as possible under forced marches such as had until then

been unheard of even under Napoleon's leadership, Austria was also making preparations for the contest, and on September 3d, 1805, issued a declaration of war against France. On the same day Cobenzl, the minister, informed the French ambassador that Austria was assembling her forces "in order to aid in establishing in Europe a state of affairs conformable to the treaties which France had broken in violation of international law." On September 8th the troops of Emperor Francis crossed the Inn. It would be natural to suppose that Austria would have informed herself exactly by this time in regard to the strength of the Boulogne army, and have concluded that it would take the most direct route, so that Germany would be made the principal field of operations. But such was not the case. Instead of this Italy was the point always kept in mind in Vienna even from the military standpoint. A plan of campaign sketched by Archduke Charles had been adopted as early as July for the guidance of the Austrian forces, and according to this three armies were to be stationed in Italy, in the Tyrol, and on the Inn, and operations were to be begun by the strongest of these, the one in Italy. This army, under the command of Archduke Charles, was to establish itself securely in Lombardy, while the German army, having effected a junction with the Russians, was to advance into Southern Germany, and the third, under Archduke John, through Switzerland. In particular it was decided to press forward as rapidly as possible through Bavaria and beyond the Iller, so as to carry the war into foreign territory and to make sure of the troops of Elector Maximilian Joseph of Bavaria, who was friendly to France. No engagement, however, was to be ventured before the arrival of the Russians, but rather, if necessity demanded, the army was to retreat behind the Inn. According to the military convention between these two powers the Russians were to set forth toward Austria in three distinct armies and in such manner that the van of the first, numbering something over 50,000 men, should reach the Inn on October 16th. At the decisive point, therefore, the forces were insufficient on account of their separation. Archduke John, who had taken part in the deliberations, says in his Me-

moirs: "Austria counted upon the Russian auxiliary troops already on the march, and, though knowing perfectly at what time they were to be looked for on the Inn, failed to take precautions in the intervening time during which her active and indefatigable adversary might appear with his mobile and well-equipped forces." This was perhaps a cardinal blunder, but another of equal importance was committed in failing to appoint to the command of the German army the general who had formerly on several occasions defeated the French on German soil—in sending Archduke Charles to Italy, while Mack, as Quartermaster General to the Emperor, was to conduct operations at the point of critical interest. The young Archduke Ferdinand of Modena-Breisgau was with the army solely as representative of Francis II. and under instructions to submit without reservation to such dispositions as should seem good to Mack. The last-named was well known to Napoleon; an irresolute character, puffed up with conceit, who considered himself vastly the superior of any adversary and who now, on account of his skill as an organizer, possessed the unlimited confidence of his sovereign. It was after the Neapolitan campaign of 1799, when Mack had been sent to Paris as prisoner of war, that Napoleon had made his acquaintance and expressed himself in regard to him to Bourrienne in these words: "Mack is one of the most mediocre men that I have ever seen in my life; presumptuous and vainglorious, he thinks himself efficient in every respect. It would please me to have him sent some day as opponent to one of our good generals; that would be something worth seeing. He is self-important and that leaves nothing more to be said. Unquestionably he is one of the most incapable men in existence. To add to this he is usually unlucky." And now this insignificant creature stood opposed to the all-powerful commander himself.

Mack proceeded on the assumption that the French would leave a strong army behind on the shores of the Channel to protect the country against an invasion of the English, while another army would have to be left within the country itself to prevent a threatening revolutionary movement; Napoleon would therefore

not be able to appear in Germany with any very considerable forces, nor before the arrival of the Russians upon the scene of action.* Relying upon this supposition, Mack hurried forward with troops hastily collected, poorly equipped, and deficient in numbers, to take advantage of the possibility of invading France before the forces of the enemy should be concentrated. Moreover, following Napoleon's example, he had resolved upon supplying the armies by means of requisitions, a step which from the outset produced tremendous confusion. The course of wisdom would have been to await behind the Inn the coming up of the Russians, but, his desire of securing the aid of the Elector's troops being allowed to override all other considerations, he pressed on into Bavaria, where his hopes were after all doomed to disappointment. For the Elector Maximilian Joseph, though bound by ties of kinship to Russia, was more firmly linked by his interests to the cause of France and, after some wavering, allowed himself to be won over by the latter. He ordered his troops to retire before the Austrians, concluded an alliance with Napoleon, whose army then in passing through absorbed that of Bavaria. This step shattered the plans of the Austrians, but Mack hastened onward nevertheless, hoping to gain the bank of the Iller and fortify it, since he assumed that the enemy would advance through the Black Forest.

When, on September 19th, Archduke Ferdinand came to take command, he found the bulk of his army, about 60,000 men strong, on the march between the Inn and Munich, while trustworthy information announced to him that Napoleon had set out from Boulogne with the entire army of the coast, amounting to 150,000 men, and might appear on the Iller by October 10th. This was radically different from all that Mack had assumed. Under these conditions the Austrians by advancing farther would involve the risk of being still more widely separated

* The English did as a matter of fact plan a descent upon Quiberon and asked for the Austrian General Radetzky as head of the general staff. The unfounded report of a revolt against Napoleon in France had long been spread abroad by their agents. According to Radetzky's *Mémoires*, recently published, this was one of the causes which induced Mack's premature advance into Germany.

from the allies who were following them, and thus overpowered in their isolated condition. This fact was promptly recognized by the Archduke, who ordered the army to halt. But Mack induced Emperor Francis, who was just then for a short time with the troops, to order the command to halt recalled, and in the last week of September the principal force of the army was actually assembled on the Iller, so as to rely upon Ulm as a support if the enemy should advance by way of Stuttgart, or upon Memmingen in case he should come by Strasburg and through the Black Forest. He counted particularly upon Ulm, which place had, upon his recommendation, been surrounded in 1796 with new defences. It never crossed his mind, however, that, should the French troops stationed in Hanover and Holland but march southward, his line of retreat must inevitably be endangered.

At the same time that the Austrians were gathering on the Iller, the principal body of Napoleon's army was crossing the Rhine between Kehl and Mannheim. They had marched by night as well as by day almost without sound. To give tidings of its movements was strictly forbidden to the newspapers. It consisted of five divisions of cavalry commanded by Murat and five army corps under orders of Ney, Lannes, Soult, and Davout. Two other corps, under Marmont and Bernadotte, advanced from the north toward Würzburg. A seventh, under Augereau, constituted the reserve in Alsace. Auxiliary troops furnished by Southern Germany increased the size of the army by 28,000 men. All told Napoleon had at his command more than 200,000 warriors, a splendid and imposing army upon which he never wearied of congratulating himself. The commanders of the various corps were for the most part no older than himself, and Davout even a year his junior, while Marmont was but thirty-one years of age; but all were experienced soldiers and completely devoted to the man who was their leader. The "Italian Army," cut off as it was from the "Grand Army," was expected to carry on its operations alone under the command of Masséna.

Hardly had the Emperor learned, by means of the field tele-

graph and excellent spies, that Mack was marching upon Ulm while the Russians were still far from reaching the Inn, when he determined upon passing to the left of the Black Forest and crossing the Danube below Ulm, so as to thrust himself between the Austrians and their allies and defeat each of them separately. Murat with the cavalry reserve was commissioned to confirm Mack in his illusions by demonstrations in the Black Forest, making it apparent that the French were coming from that quarter and masking the advance of the four corps along the left bank of the Danube. This manoeuvre was carried out with the utmost precision. On October 7th Davout, Soult, Lannes, and Ney reached the Danube, their corps forming a line reaching from Heidenheim to Öttingen, while Bernadotte had followed the direct road from Würzburg to Ingolstadt through the Prussian principality of Ansbach, Marmont being stationed a little to the west at Neuburg. Two days later the army had crossed the river and now advanced from the east upon Ulm. Bernadotte and Davout alone remained behind to keep watch upon the Russians, who were, moreover, not yet in sight. To prevent the possibility of the enemy escaping into the Tyrol Soult was ordered to seize Memmingen with his corps.

Of these movements Mack did not remain in ignorance. He was kept informed of them by Schulmeister, a spy serving both of the contestants and who acquired a certain notoriety during the Napoleonic wars. But, instead of realizing that the French army was bent upon his capture, Mack deluded himself with "nothing but a dream,"—as he himself later denominated the insane notion,—that Napoleon was on the retreat toward France, whither he had been recalled by the danger of revolution and the fear of an invasion of the British.* The Austrian

* The opinion, frequently expressed, that Schulmeister misled Mack into the supposition that the enemy was retreating into France has been proved erroneous. French discontent with Napoleon was in Austrian governmental circles a fixed idea having important political consequences. (Cobenzl to Kutusoff, October 12th, 1805, in Angeli, "Ulm und Austerlitz," *Militärzeitung*, 1878, p. 302.) Schulmeister's reports were correct. It was not until Mack sent him to Stuttgart "to gather information concerning the revolt of the French against their Emperor" that this

troops, thought he, could do no better under such circumstances than to remain concentrated at Ulm, whence they could harass and pursue the flank of the French as they hurried past. The idea was in itself an absurdity; for him, Mack, to pursue Napoleon, and that with an army which had in its haste been obliged to forego all that was most essential; which through forced marches and countermarches had lost almost all power of endurance and possessed only a feeble reserve artillery with entirely insufficient ammunition, and among whose regiments there were several which marched absolutely barefoot and had at their disposal nothing but the cartridges in their pouches! It was in vain that Archduke Ferdinand, who appreciated the distress and danger incurred, opposed this foolhardy project; in vain that all the generals of inferior rank protested against it; Mack obstinately persisted in maintaining that the French army was in retreat.

Meanwhile the various French corps, like the fingers of a grasping hand, were encompassing the enemy; they threw back into Ulm every advanced division, and finally bombarded the city and called upon it to surrender. The victory gained by Ney at Elchingen on October 14th effectively contributed to this result. It was with the utmost difficulty that the Archduke, acting upon his own responsibility, succeeded in cutting his way out with two battalions and eleven squadrons by way of Göppingen to Nördlingen and thence into Bohemia. Not until then did Mack rouse from his dream. On October 16th he declared himself ready to enter upon negotiations, and on the 17th they were concluded. If within a week—so read the terms—there arrive no relief, the army at Ulm shall be prisoners of war with the exception of the officers, who shall be allowed to go free upon parole; an entrance shall be opened to the French, enabling them to station a brigade in the fortress. But, as if this ignominy were still not sufficient, Mack, in an interview with Napoleon, allowed himself to be persuaded into agreeing that the capitulation should take effect as early as October 20th.

wary man gave up the cause of Austria as lost and thenceforth served Napoleon alone

On that day three Austrian corps, still numbering 23,000 men, laid down their arms before the enemy. "The shame which overwhelms us," wrote the Austrian Captain de L'Ort in his journal, "the mire which clings to us, leaves spots which can never be cleansed. While the battalions were defiling past to lay down their arms, Napoleon, in the simplest garb, surrounded by his marshals adorned with gold and embroideries, conversed with Mack and several of our generals whom he called to himself after they had filed past. The Emperor, in the uniform of a common soldier, wearing a gray cloak scorched at elbows and skirts, a hat without any distinctive mark crushed down upon his head, his arms crossed behind his back and warming himself at a camp-fire, talked with vivacity and presented an aspect of good-nature." He had won an almost bloodless victory. "I have accomplished what I set out to do," he had written on the preceding day to Josephine, "I have destroyed the Austrian army by means of marches alone." And, in fact, except for the corps of Kienmayer, which was advancing along the Inn, the re-enforcements which had drawn near from the Tyrol but had now again withdrawn thither, and for the small detachment with which the Archduke had made his escape, Austria had lost all her forces upon the scene of operations north of the Alps.*

Naturally the catastrophe at Ulm had its reactionary effect upon the other army divisions. Archduke Charles found himself compelled to abandon his secure position behind the Adige in order to withdraw his troops from Italy with the least possible loss. A successful encounter with Masséna at Caldiero on October 30th and 31st enabled him to make an orderly retreat, even though not without considerable losses, and to effect a junc-

* Mack made an attempt later to justify himself. He endeavoured to lay the blame upon the conduct of the Archduke, upon that of his generals, or the violation of the Ansbach territory on the part of the French. But investigation soon disclosed the frailty of these subterfuges and recognized in him alone the culprit. He was deprived of rank and honours and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. History has since that time wholly and unreservedly confirmed this judgment of condemnation.

tion at Marburg on November 20th with Archduke John, whose continuance in the Tyrol had likewise become impossible. The fate of Mack had thus overthrown the entire Austrian plan of campaign: from his attitude of offence Emperor Francis had been reduced to that of defence, and his remaining hopes now depended solely upon the Russians, since Archduke Charles was three times as far away from the capital as was the enemy, and want of supplies necessitated his approach to the Hungarian frontiers. It was a hard fate to be obliged to rely upon foreign troops for defence. Moreover, the alliance with Russia had already ceased to be of a very deep-seated nature, since Alexander at heart resented Austria's aspirations toward domination in Italy as much as ever Paul I. had condemned them. Still for the present the common danger continued to hold the allies closely bound to one another.

But almost at the same moment that the coalition against France received so rude a blow upon the Continent, it gained upon the seas a victory which must remain forever memorable. Villeneuve had remained with the combined French and Spanish fleets ever since August in Cadiz, followed unremittingly by Napoleon's resentment. Writing to the Minister of the Navy after his departure from Boulogne, the Emperor said of the Admiral: "Villeneuve is a wretch who ought to be ignominiously dismissed; lacking all gift at combination, without courage and without general interest, he would sacrifice everything to save himself." It is easy to recognize now how far from genuine was this wrath and how glad the Emperor was, in secret, to be at last rid of the project of invasion. To his hard heart it was not a matter of the slightest importance that his selection of a scapegoat should be an innocent man. To the admiral, whom he ought to have discharged if his guilt had really been so great, he now gave orders to sail from Cadiz toward Naples to the support of Saint-Cyr, and to attack the English on the way at any time when he should have the advantage in point of number of ships. Villeneuve represented in reply that his squadron was in the worst of condition, that the Spanish ships in particular were manned chiefly by sailors who had never been

through a naval manœuvre, leaving the chances in battle very much against him. All quite without avail. He had to set sail and to prepare forthwith for combat, since Nelson confronted him almost immediately after leaving port with but twenty-seven ships of the line to oppose to Villeneuve's thirty-three. The British vessels were, to be sure, admirably equipped throughout and manned by experienced seamen under command of the admiral of greatest genius belonging to the foremost seafaring nation in the world. The result was inevitable. Nelson departed somewhat from the usual form of attack, a fact which did not escape Villeneuve, but with his inferior material he was unable to meet the blow, and thus was lost to Napoleon the naval battle at Cape Trafalgar on October 21st, 1805. Of the French ships eighteen fell into the hands of the enemy, eleven fled back to Cadiz, while the remaining four beat out to sea and were eventually captured like the first. More than seven thousand Frenchmen fell in this furious battle, the English losing hardly a third as many, though among them was one man who more than equalled a fleet in value—Nelson himself. Villeneuve did not long survive him. Tormented and crushed by the wrath of his sovereign,—who could not forgive the admiral for the error which he had himself committed,—life became insupportable, and he committed suicide upon his return from captivity. It is said that the Emperor would never allow the 21st of October to be recalled to his mind, and that the victims of this disaster never received any but ungracious recognition at his hands. And it must be admitted that at Trafalgar more had been decided than the outcome of a battle. The fate of an entire continent hung upon the fact that henceforth British supremacy on the seas was incontestable and a direct invasion of England was therefore scarcely to be regarded as a possibility.

This circumstance overclouded the success at Ulm. New victories would have to be won to re-establish the glory of the Empire. But Napoleon, knowing as yet nothing of the defeat and loss of his fleet, hastened to pursue the Russians, who had indeed reached the Inn and there united themselves with Kienmayer's corps, but upon hearing the fate of Mack had at once

begun a retreat. It was his hope that these forces of the enemy would make a stand against him on the Traun or on the Enns, whence, having beaten them, he would proceed in triumph straight toward the capital and there dictate terms of peace. But Kutusoff, the leader of the Russians, whom Emperor Francis had appointed general-in-chief of the combined army, sought before all else to retire where he could effect a junction with the second Russian army advancing under Buxhoevden; he was not to be overtaken, and eventually slipped across the bridge at Krems to the left bank of the Danube, whence he proceeded in a northeasterly direction toward Brünn by way of Znaim. Murat with his cavalry had pressed the most closely on the heels of the enemy, being unremittingly urged to haste by his brother-in-law. But he now drew down upon himself bitter reproaches for hastening on to Vienna instead of following up the foe upon the other bank of the river. From the convent of Melk Napoleon wrote him on November 11th: "You received orders to follow close upon the Russians. . . . I try in vain to find an explanation of your conduct. . . . You have lost me two days and have thought only of the vainglory of entering Vienna. But no glory is to be gained where no danger is."

The Emperor saw at once that this course had imperilled an unprotected division marching on the farther side of the river under command of Mortier, which as a matter of fact came near being wiped out by the Russians on that very day near Dürnstein. It made no amends for this reverse that at the same time Davout near Leoben came upon an Austrian corps commanded by Merveldt which had separated from Kutusoff at Steyer in order to protect the approaches to the Alps, and forced it into a retreat which soon became a flight toward Graz.

But in spite of all Napoleon found means of turning the new situation to account. If Murat was now on the march to Vienna, he must make sure there of the passages across the river and thence make his way, followed by two army corps, northwestward toward Znaim, there to cut off from Kutusoff the way into Moravia. Since haste was a prime consideration, much depended upon preventing the Viennese from destroying the Tabor

bridge. To the accomplishment of this task Murat showed himself fully equal. On the 13th he entered the city and marched directly through it to the bridge which spanned the arm of the river in three divisions. The garrison, under command of a Prince of Auersperg, was drawn up on the opposite bank with orders upon the first approach of the French to set fire instantly to the arches, which had been covered in advance with inflammable materials. But Murat succeeded in deluding the Austrian commander into the belief that negotiations for a suspension of hostilities had been concluded, offering an immediate prospect of peace. Auersperg and his officers, with the exception of Kienmayer, believed these assurances the more readily as General Bertrand pledged his word of honour as to their truth. The bridge was not fired, the French passed over it, and the Austrian General barely got his troops away along the road to Brünn.

The statements made by Murat were nothing but a trick. It was true that Emperor Francis had opened negotiations on November 3d, but these had come to naught in view of the demands of Napoleon, which had been nothing less than the cession of Venetia, the Tyrol, and Upper Austria, and the hopes of the Austrians again depended solely upon Kutusoff's effecting a junction with the second column and then striking a decisive blow with the combined forces which should compel the enemy to give way.

To Napoleon, on the other hand, everything depended upon getting the Russians between two fires. One part of the French army were in pursuit of them, while Murat operated against their right flank with the corps of Davout and Lannes. It seemed for a time as if this plan were going to be successful and that the decisive moment was at hand. Kutusoff, who clearly recognized his situation, had retreated by forced marches, but in consequence his troops were in urgent need of some days of rest. He was, it is true, far in advance of the French who were pursuing him, but he was notwithstanding in imminent danger from the corps advancing from the south. This must at all hazards be evaded. For this purpose Bagration, one of Kutusoff's

generals, was detailed with some thousands of men to intercept and detain Murat on the road by which he was advancing, and so protect the repose and further advance of the main army. To the north of Hollabrunn, Murat, who had with him at the time only a part of Lannes' corps, came upon the enemy and, thinking himself confronted by the bulk of the hostile forces, did not venture to attack until re-enforced. To gain the time necessary for the remainder of the corps to come up he made pretence of proposing an armistice, and to this Kutusoff, to whom nothing could have been more opportune, consented, though purposely delaying his reply. A document was thereupon drawn up according to which the Russian pledged himself—with no less fraudulent intention—to march out of Austria as soon as Napoleon should have ratified the treaty. The Russian had thus gained the days of respite needed by the army. When the tidings reached Napoleon at Schönbrunn he was beside himself with rage at this successful stratagem on the part of the enemy which had enabled him, by leaving Bagration behind, to escape to the north, where at Porlitz, near Brünn, he effected a junction with the Viennese garrison and another at Wischau with the second Russian army. It was no consolation that on November 16th Bagration was overcome by Murat with a force greatly superior in number to the Russians, who were thereby forced to retreat. The name of Hollabrunn was not to be inscribed on the Arc de Triomphe in Paris.

Napoleon had not accomplished his purpose. Kutusoff had escaped and might now, protected by the cannon of Olmütz, safely await re-enforcements, which had been already brought within no very considerable distance by General Essen, while a force of 45,000 men under General Bennigsen was advancing from Breslau. In Bohemia Archduke Ferdinand had assembled a corps which formed in a manner the right wing of the Russo-Austrian position. Archduke Charles was marching toward Marburg with the intention of reaching Vienna by way of Körmend and Raab. Moreover, the political situation of the allies had also changed materially for the better. Prussia

seemed at last convinced in spite of all. The absolute disregard of formalities on the part of the French before marching through the territory of Ansbach had suddenly changed the feeling of Frederick William III. The neutrality upon which he prided himself as the supreme achievement of his political course had been violated and his self-esteem thereby much injured. He now assented to Russia's urgent petition for passage for her troops, and allowed himself to be persuaded by Emperor Alexander, who came to Berlin toward the end of October, not indeed into immediate participation in the war,—from that he was held back by Hardenberg,—but at least into making a compromise according to the terms of which Prussia was to demand of Napoleon the liberation of Naples, Holland, and Switzerland, the disunion of the Italian and French crowns, and the indemnification of the King of Sardinia,—in short, the restriction of the French system of expansion,—and, in case of refusal, to enter the coalition with a contribution of 180,000 men (November 3d, 1805). Count Haugwitz was despatched to lay the matter before Napoleon. He was given until the middle of December to decide the question, the Prussian army standing equipped ready at any moment to take part in the conflict. The convention had this great advantage for the Russians now at war, that, in case of being beaten in Moravia, they could retreat into Silesia and there be supported by an army of about 50,000 men.

As will be readily seen, Napoleon's situation was by no means favourable. He had hoped to dictate terms of peace in Vienna, and now instead he had been obliged to extend his line of operations far beyond what he had purposed and to detach many of his troops to serve as protection to his flanks. Ney had marched toward the Tyrol, Marmont toward Styria, Davout toward the Hungarian frontiers, and Bernadotte toward Bohemia, so that there now remained at his immediate disposal only the corps of Murat, Lannes, and Soult. Fully appreciating the situation in which he thus found himself, he learned just at this time of Prussia's sudden change of policy and of the defeat at Trafalgar, and realized that his most earnest efforts must now

be directed toward finding some relief from these accumulated difficulties through division among his enemies. In spite of the refusal of Francis II. to conclude peace on the before-mentioned conditions, Napoleon had not broken off all relations with the headquarters of his opponent, and after the seizure of Vienna had even addressed himself once more to the Emperor of Austria with such result that the Austrian diplomat Stadion came accompanied by General Gyulai to the French headquarters at Brünn with a view to entering upon negotiations. They were commissioned to act in conjunction with Haugwitz, the Prussian negotiator, who now approached with intentional slowness. It is a matter of profoundest interest to study the way in which Napoleon set to work to prevent this co-operation. His first step was to send the Austrian ambassadors to Talleyrand at Vienna under pretence that he was himself about to repair thither; meanwhile he issued orders to have Haugwitz detained at Iglau and at the same time sent his adjutant-general, Savary, to Alexander I., who had now joined the Russian army, to ask for an armistice and a parley, in which—as he intimated to the adjutant of the Czar—he purposed to surrender Turkey to Russia. Should Alexander consent to the proposed terms and conclude peace, Austria might be harassed to the uttermost; should he not, a new basis would of course have to be found upon which to treat with Austria. The latter alternative was the outcome of his diplomacy. The Czar remained firm, and on November 30th Napoleon directed Talleyrand in writing to cease to demand from Austria the whole of Venetia and the Tyrol, but merely the districts of Legnano and Verona for the kingdom of Italy, and Augsburg, Eichstädt, the Breisgau, and Ortenau for his South German allies. But Stadion also remained immovable, at least he would not enter upon negotiations without the co-operation of Haugwitz. The latter had, however, received from his king oral instructions to preserve peace whatever the circumstances, and having observed in Brünn preparations for an early encounter between the armies, was evidently determined to learn the outcome before committing himself and was not to be coerced into premature action.

Beyond saying to Talleyrand, in conversation with him on December 1st, that his sovereign ardently desired peace and was ready to make contribution toward its re-establishment, he would give no indication of his mission.

But while Napoleon thus vainly strove to improve his situation, the adversary himself took steps which helped him out of his predicament. With his reduced forces Napoleon had not dared to follow up the Russians beyond Brünn and attack them in their secure position protected by a stronghold. What had been, however, beyond his most sanguine hopes now took place: the Russians came to him. To their misfortune the Czar had set himself at the head of his troops, and this young prince, devoured by ambition, was urgently desirous of winning the glory of having defeated a Bonaparte in the field. His plan was to take the offensive in spite of the fact that the only rational course lay in standing upon the defensive until the arrival of the re-enforcements, the nearer approach of the Archdukes, and until Prussia should be ready to take part in the action. There were indeed at the headquarters of the allies many who uttered warnings, but there were also numbers who advised the step. Kutusoff was in favour of further delay, but nevertheless too truly a courtier to offer decided opposition to the wishes of his sovereign; glad to be relieved of the responsibility, he gave his acquiescence to Alexander's project. Among those foremost in promoting the same was the Austrian Colonel Weyrother, who had been assigned to the Czar as chief-of-staff—a second Mack in point of immoderate ambition and self-conceit. He had already on a former occasion as adviser of Wurmser and Alvinczy found himself confronted by Napoleon during the Italian campaign, and later he had occupied toward Suvaroff the position which he now filled toward Alexander. It was Weyrother's proposition to advance against the enemy, overpower his right flank, and cut off his communication with Vienna. This scheme might possibly have met with success at a later day with Archduke Charles near at hand. Its execution was now, to say the least, premature. Weyrother, however, insisted upon a decision and, in secret with Alexander, elaborated a plan

of battle, Emperor Francis—who was also with the army—being kept in complete ignorance of it all.

For Napoleon, on the other hand, nothing could be more important than to defeat the allies at the earliest possible moment,—before the Russian re-enforcements should arrive, before Archduke Charles should advance farther north, and before Prussia, as he now also began to fear, should decide upon taking active measures.* He was therefore all the more astonished to learn that the foe was advancing to meet his wishes. When he heard through a deserter on November 27th of the forward march of the Russians he was at first completely incredulous. Ségur relates in his "Memoirs" that "to Berthier this seemed so improbable that he gave orders for the arrest of the bearer of the tidings, but his story was almost immediately confirmed by advices from Marshal Soult, who had been attacked at Austerlitz." Napoleon at once gave orders for his advance-guard to retire with all haste before the enemy, in order to infuse into the latter a yet greater degree of confidence, while he took up his position on both sides of the highway between Brünn and Austerlitz, his army extending southerly to Sokolnitz and Telnitz. He next drew to himself all available troops; Davout and Bernadotte were summoned, and by December 1st the latter had already reached the convent of Raigern.† Napoleon then proceeded to mark out his plan of battle also. The movement of the enemy against his right wing had not long remained unobserved by him, and it was upon this that he based his scheme of

* "Bonaparte's interests demanded that no time should be lost; ours, that time should be gained. He had every occasion for venturing a decisive battle; we, for avoiding the same. Your Imperial Majesty will recall that I, at the time, repeatedly made representations to that effect and imparted them also to every one who would listen to me. The right course was to wear out the enemy by means of skirmishes, always keeping the bulk of the army beyond his reach; to conquer Hungary and establish connections with the Archduke." (Czartoryski to Emperor Alexander, April, 1806.)

† "If you are about to give battle," said Napoleon once at about this time, "assemble all your forces, omitting none whatever; a single battalion sometimes decides the day."

action. As he said to his generals, this which he was resolved to gain was to be no ordinary battle, but a decisive action which should not permit of the enemy's withdrawing and gathering anew; for every orderly retreat of the Russians which left them in fighting trim, since it did not improve his own situation, might prove ruinous to him. For this reason he refrained from occupying the secure position which offered itself on the plateau of Pratzen, but left that to the enemy, even inviting attack upon his right wing by advancing it and exposing its flank in order to confirm Alexander in his purpose to surround it and thus induce him to make a wide circuit involving the weakening of his centre; this enfeebled centre was then to be broken through and the battle thus decided. It was therefore with boundless satisfaction that on December 1st he saw the Russians already making actual dispositions for executing this flank movement. "That is a wretched move!" exclaimed he to those about him, trembling with joy and clapping his hands. "They are walking into the trap! They are delivering themselves over! Before to-morrow evening this army is mine!" And of a truth, on December 2d, the "sun of Austerlitz" witnessed before its setting the destruction of the allied armies. The attack upon their centre, stripped of all cavalry, had been undertaken with great vigour by Soult and had proved completely successful. The hostile line was broken, the left wing entirely severed and put to rout, the right thrown back upon Austerlitz. The Russians had suffered the loss of about 20,000 men, and the Austrian corps under Liechtenstein in the neighbourhood of 6000. The former, cut off from their line of retreat toward Olmütz and having parted with all artillery, munitions, and baggage, moved in confusion along the road toward Göding and Holitsch. "Neither regiments nor army corps existed any longer in the army of the allies," says Czartoryski, "there remained only hordes of men going off in disorder, marauding as they went and thus increasing still further the desolation of the country. In the villages as we passed along was to be heard nothing but the confused cries of people seeking in drink forgetfulness of their misfortunes."

One of the most brilliant of victories* had been won for France. "Soldiers," said the victor, addressing his troops, "I am satisfied with you! In the battle of Austerlitz you have justified all my expectations of your intrepidity; you have adorned your eagles with immortal glory. . . . Soldiers, when the imperial crown was placed upon my head by the people of France I relied upon you for preserving to it always that refulgent glory which alone could give it value in my sight. . . . When everything shall have been accomplished necessary to the assurance of happiness and prosperity to our country I will lead you back to France; there you will be the object of my most tender care. My people will look upon you with joy, and it will be enough for any one of you to say, 'I was at the battle of Austerlitz,' to draw forth the reply, 'Here is a brave man.'"

Napoleon had been wholly correct in saying that the victory of December 2d was to be no "ordinary" one. The result of the battle was to bring peace. Shortly before, as has been seen, he had been driven by his dangerous position to modify his demands in proposing terms of peace. The situation of affairs was now totally changed. On December 3d Napoleon was already writing to Talleyrand at Vienna: "All negotiations have become null and void, since it is evident that they were nothing but a stratagem intended to lull me to sleep. Say to

* Military writers are wont to date from Austerlitz a new epoch in the history of warfare. Jomini said that the great field-battles of our day date from 1805. A recent historian of the Napoleonic wars carries out the idea thus: "In this first of the Napoleonic battles are at once recognizable all those characteristics which distinguish more modern battles from those of the period of Frederick the Great. In the latter the entire army was set in motion as a whole and could and must remain throughout the course of the battle within the grasp of the commander, capable of manœuvring according to his wishes. Were its close relations broken up at any point, its cause was lost. In modern battle the centre may be broken through while victory is carried off by the encompassing wings; one wing may be annihilated while the other crushes the enemy; indeed in a well-conducted battle some such success is always yielded to the enemy upon some portion of the field, in order to be able to bring to bear a superior force at the point selected for administering the decisive blow." Yorck von Wartenburg, "Napoleon als Feldherr," I 241.

Monsieur de Stadion that I have not been duped by their artifice, that it was for that reason that I sent them back from Brünn, and that now that the battle is lost the conditions can no longer remain what they were."

At the headquarters of the allies it was agreed upon that Emperor Francis should ask for a conference with the conqueror and demand an armistice. The request was granted, and on December 4th the interview took place at Nasiedlowitz on the highroad between Austerlitz, where Napoleon had taken up his residence, and Holitsch, whither the allied monarchs had retired.

Much that is false has been circulated in regard to this meeting. The Emperor of the French conducted himself in a manner by no means brusque and discourteous, as has been narrated, but was on the contrary most affable and gracious. He was prepared to grant the desired suspension of hostilities in case the Russians would at once return homeward. The question of peace was also discussed. Were Russia willing to conclude peace at once without delay in company with Austria,—though with the proviso that its territory should be closed to the British,—Austria should be released from any cession of lands whatsoever; but should Russia choose another course, a separate agreement would necessitate to Austria the surrender of Venetia to the kingdom of Italy and of the Tyrol to Bavaria. The latter condition,—in regard to the Tyrol,—at the earnest entreaty of Francis, Napoleon consented to set aside. Upon his return from the conference the Emperor of Austria at once acquainted his ally with the demands made by the victor, at the same time assuring him that he was ready to continue the struggle if Russia would stand by him. But to that Alexander was in no wise to be persuaded. Inconsiderate as he had been in bringing about the danger, he was just as little inclined to take upon himself the consequences of his folly. But neither was he willing to make peace under the conditions offered, since English commerce was nothing less than a vital question to Russia. There remained then nothing but for him to place in safety the fragments of his army. The answer which he sent to Emperor Francis was that Austria might no longer count

upon him, and on December 6th he took his departure. On the same day the armistice between France and Austria was signed.*

In the negotiations for peace Austria had now, besides her own forces, only the friendly offices of Prussia to count upon. But these also were to be denied her. Napoleon had taken the precaution to have inserted in the instrument regulating the armistice a clause to the effect that while the treaty should be in force no foreign troops should set foot upon Austrian soil, and then forthwith proceeded to enter into negotiations with Haugwitz alone. If now Haugwitz remained faithful to his secret orders to maintain peace with France, nothing could be done with the ultimatum which he was charged to tender to Napoleon. On the other hand, Napoleon was now no longer willing to allow Prussia to maintain a neutral position, but demanded that she should form a close offensive and defensive alliance with himself. According to this proposal Frederick William would be bound to surrender to France the part of the duchy of Cleves situated on the right bank of the Rhine, the fortress of Wesel, and the principality of Neufchâtel, and to Bavaria the margraviate of Ansbach; he might retain Hanover, already occupied by his troops; the British were to be denied access to its shores; further, he was to recognize the "kingdom of Bavaria" in the extent to which it should attain through Austrian concessions. This compact was signed by Haugwitz on December 15th, 1805, and thenceforth Austria had lost her Prussian support. She was now given up defenceless and alone to the will of the conqueror.

* Even in the most recent publications one meets with the statement that immediately after the battle Austria drew away from Russia, whereas in point of fact it was the Czar who left his ally in the lurch. This is testified to even by authorities emanating from the Russian camp, such, for instance, as J. de Maistre and Czartoryski. The bold reproach which was later made by the Russians in official form against the Austrians—that they had not fought bravely at Austerlitz—met with cutting irony from Napoleon in the "Moniteur." "Those who saw the battle-field," said he therein, "will testify that at the spot where the chief collision took place the ground was covered with Austrians, while at other points it was covered only with Russian knapsacks."

The question now was whether Napoleon himself desired to bring about peace at once, or whether he would profit by favourable circumstances to continue the war against Austria, subduing her still further with a view to putting an end forever to her power. In his military surroundings there was no lack of voices, notably that of the self-seeking Murat, who counselled taking the latter course. Talleyrand, on the contrary, was emphatically of the other opinion. He was an avaricious man, certain of rich pecuniary returns in case of an agreement being brought about, and he skilfully persuaded the Emperor to decide upon terminating a war which he had, moreover, advised against from the outset. "It is to the interest of France," said he to Napoleon, "that I want to sacrifice the interests of your generals, in regard to which I feel not the slightest concern. Reflect that you lower yourself in taking the same ground as they, and that you are too great to be merely a soldier." These words produced the desired effect, and Napoleon declared himself ready to conclude peace. The negotiations were allowed to proceed, but now he would no longer consider the imposition of less rigorous conditions. When Prince Johann Liechtenstein, the new negotiator of the Austrian Emperor, arrived in Brünn Napoleon had ceased to be satisfied with his former exaction of the Italian territory of Venice, but now required Venice with the same extent in which it had been ceded to Austria in 1797, that is to say, including Istria and Dalmatia. Shortly after he repudiated the promise which he had made to Francis II. on the Austerlitz highway, and demanded the Tyrol for Bavaria. This was followed within a short time by further requirements—the district of the Inn and Austria's consent to the dispossession of the Royal House of Naples. Before the great battle Napoleon would have contented himself with a war indemnity of five million gulden (\$2,000,000); fifty million francs (\$9,500,000) was his present demand, from which he was with difficulty persuaded to abate ten millions. "Every hour witnesses the birth of new exactions," wrote Liechtenstein from Pressburg, where he had been negotiating with Talleyrand ever since December 20th. Perplexity and discouragement prevailed at Holitsch, where Em-

peror Francis awaited the outcome. In his despair he even considered for a time taking up arms again.* But Archduke Charles was most strenuous in his advice against such a course, having been convinced ever since the capitulation at Ulm that Austria could have no hope of success except by means of the pen, and Francis yielded to his representations. Cobenzl, the Minister, who was singled out by public opinion as the obstacle to agreement with the enemy, was compelled to resign his office and was succeeded by Count Stadion. Soon afterwards, on December 26th, the treaty of peace was signed at Pressburg.† Before its ratification Archduke Charles was commissioned to make efforts in a personal interview with Napoleon to obtain more moderate terms. The conference took place, but was productive of no result, and on New Year's Day, 1806, the

* Napoleon declared at a later date, in conversation with the Bavarian Minister Montgelas, that his army, "weakened by its victories, was very unfavourably located, between the fortress of Olmütz—which it was hardly possible to besiege in winter-time with the hostile army close at hand—and the Austrian capital, populous, ill disposed, and difficult to control; that thereafter its dispositions seemed unsafe and badly supported, all the more so because Russia, still hostile, might at any moment order an advance of her forces; and finally, that, though Prussia had indeed signed a treaty, it had not yet been ratified, and through its relations with the two emperors that power might have prepared for him embarrassments of the worst order. It was, therefore, when the circumstances were rightly considered, a matter for self-congratulation that the Austrian court offered so little steadfast opposition and so eagerly desired the termination of the war. (Montgelas, "Denkwürdigkeiten" (1887), p. 124.) Radetzky also bears witness in his Recollections that at the time Vienna was in a ferment.

† Recent Austrian historians have named December 27th as the date of signature to this instrument, but this is inexplicable. The following passage from Napoleon's letter of December 25th, 1805, to Talleyrand directing the Minister to sign the treaty on the following day, may be quoted for its illustration of Napoleon's character: "Finally—should it be impossible to append your signature at once—wait and sign it upon New Year's Day; for I have my prejudices and am very glad that the peace should date from the renewal of the Gregorian calendar, which betokens, I hope, as much good fortune to my reign as it has enjoyed under the old one [i.e., the Revolutionary calendar]. To sum up: sign to-morrow if you can, or else on the first day of the year."

monarch of Austria set his name to one of the most onerous treaties which that power has ever concluded. Emperor Francis delivered back all that he had received in the Treaty of Campo Formio as belonging to Venice, both the Italian territory and all its dependencies, and Venice, Istria, Dalmatia, and Cattaro were united with the kingdom of Italy. It was only with great reluctance that Napoleon left to him Trieste, which, according to Joseph Bonaparte, he had intended to use as a base in a new undertaking against Egypt and India. Austria, furthermore, gave her assent to all the changes and establishments in Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, Lucca, and Piombino, and acknowledged as kings the Electors of Bavaria and Würtemberg, to the former of whom she gave up the Tyrol with Vorarlberg, Brixen, Trent, Passau, Eichstädt, Burgau, and Lindau, besides counties and possessions of lesser importance; while to the latter she relinquished five cities on the Danube with their territories, the counties of Hohenberg and Nellenburg and a part of the Breisgau. Baden received another portion of the Breisgau, the Ortenau, the city of Constance, and the island of Mainau. The King of Bavaria was to surrender Würzburg to the Archduke Elector of Salzburg, who was in his turn to pass on this territory to Austria.

The Austrian Power was thus crowded out of Italy and Germany, while the French sphere of action now extended at the south as far as the Balkan Peninsula; Austria had been compelled to give up about 23,000 square miles of territory, more than two and a half million souls, and nearly fourteen million gulden of annual income, and for this enormous loss she received compensation amounting to almost nothing. In regard to this point, indeed, Talleyrand was not of the same mind as his lord. He had interceded in behalf of Austria and written to Napoleon even at the opening of the campaign: "At the present day the Turks are no longer formidable, they have themselves everything to fear. But the Russians have taken their place; Austria is still the chief bulwark which Europe has to oppose to them, and it is against them that we ought now to fortify her." He proposed later, during the course of the

negotiations, to indemnify the power at Vienna with Moldavia, Wallachia, Bessarabia, and Northern Bulgaria. But his proposition was not received with favour, either by the Austrians—who rightly foresaw in it only a cause of dispute and wrangling with Russia, and were at the same time not yet ready to give up definitely their position as one of the Great Powers of Central Europe—or by Napoleon, whose plans included the curbing of the power of the Czars also at some future day beneath his own sceptre. This was the great gulf separating him from Talleyrand, as from all patriotic Frenchmen: they desired, of course, a strong, national, predominating France, but at the same time admitted the existence of a system of counterbalancing powers, while the Emperor saw in all Europe nothing but his own personal domain. In France the Revolution was extinguished and no one had any further sympathy with its spirit of conquest; but in Europe this spirit was yet alive, embodied in a single man, to be sure, but this man, with mighty power, arrogated to himself dominion over the entire Continent.

CHAPTER XII

NAPOLEONIC CREATIONS. BREACH WITH PRUSSIA

THE battle fought on December 2d, 1805, is one of the four pre-eminently decisive in effect upon the career of Napoleon as a monarch. Marengo had secured to him his control over France, Austerlitz established his ascendancy in Europe; the work of Austerlitz was undone at Leipzig, and what Marengo had given was finally lost at Waterloo. For a moment his entire scheme of personal dominion throughout the world had wavered in the balance in Moravia. For the most important effect of the successfully conducted retreat of the Russians was to put in question Napoleon's prestige with his army, upon whom alone he might depend for the realization of his dream. The masterly manœuvres at Ulm, the surprise of Vienna, and the seizure of the bridges of the Danube were regarded as mere premises lacking a conclusion, and in the army voices were already raised in criticism. Then came the victory, thrust upon the Corsican by the astounding foolhardiness of his adversary, which removed the danger which had threatened his standing among his troops.

Nor was the army alone in feeling this effect; throughout the French people public opinion was again, by this victory, turned to the Emperor's favour. No war had ever been more unpopular in France than this. The rigidly enforced conscription had been endured with ill-concealed impatience, and a serious financial crisis following close upon it had reawakened the scarcely laid doubt as to whether the prevailing system and the man who represented it really gave promise of abiding protection to material interests; the expedition against San Domingo began to be recalled as a very expensive venture which had cost 50,000 men and 60,000,000 francs; the loss to com-

merce with the East consequent upon the naval war was computed, as also the deficit resulting to France through the rapid occupation of the colonies by Englishmen; even the most zealous champions of the Napoleonic system were not wholly averse to entertaining the thought of Joseph in the seat of power should Napoleon lose his life in battle. But every such consideration was put to flight when word was received of the sudden victory and peace so soon after extorted. The French as a people were far too proud, too vain, not to lay claim to a man who gave commands to monarchs, who made and unmade kings, and through whom the name of France had been exalted beyond any point ever reached under any of her former rulers. According to the testimony of an eye-witness: "The French, transported by the tidings of such a victory, leaving nothing to be desired since it terminated the war, were again fired with enthusiasm and there was no need for encouragement to popular rejoicing. The nation identified itself once more with its successful army. This moment I regard as the culmination of Bonaparte's prosperity, for the mighty deeds of their monarch were at this time approved and adopted by the greater part of the people." Napoleon was extolled by the national public bodies in most extravagant terms. According to them his renown had overshadowed all other immortal names, and admiration and wonder could but blush to remember previous objects of regard, etc.

The French people while thus acclaiming the conqueror were acting under a twofold delusion. In the first place they did not suspect that this continental war had been long planned by the Emperor, the campaign carefully devised, and the crisis brought about by his own machinations, but believed the statements published by his obedient creatures, that he had been the party threatened and attacked and that his people could not enough admire the ready art with which he had been able to make a defence against the conspiracy of all Europe. The second error of the French people consisted in regarding Napoleon as their Emperor who vanquished the enemy in order to insure glory, prosperity, and peace to the country to the left of the Rhine,

while he had in reality long since ceased to be the Emperor of France except in name. To those acquainted with Napoleon's secret intentions before the campaign it will be no matter of surprise that he made use of his victories to advance interests quite unrelated to the exaltation of the power of the French state or the diminution of that of Austria, interests entirely incomprehensible except from the standpoint of one aspiring to establish an empire not limited by the Gallic boundary-lines.

During the negotiations with the Austrian envoys, upon one occasion before the battle of Austerlitz, the kingdom of Naples had come under discussion. After that event the subject was not again touched upon. Napoleon now considered himself strong enough to carry out his intentions throughout all Italy without the consent of the Court of Vienna. Hardly had the signatures been appended to the treaty of peace at Pressburg when he announced on the day following—and, characteristically enough, in a mere military order issued to the army—that the Bourbon dynasty in the kingdom of Naples had ceased to reign. The pretext for this step had, it must be acknowledged, been furnished by the Neapolitan court itself. Pressed by both English and Russians, Queen Caroline had determined upon risking all to gain all and, setting aside the promise made to France in August to remain neutral, opened the port of her capital to Russian and British troops. This had taken place in the midst of the war, and hence Napoleon's course in sending Masséna with a large body of troops across the Neapolitan frontier was capable of justification according to the laws of war. The outcome of it was that the effects of the victory of Austerlitz made themselves felt here as elsewhere, for the Czar, still crushed by his defeat, recalled his troops from Naples to Corfu, and the English, following his example, also evacuated the port and sailed for Sicily, leaving to the mercy of the exasperated foe those whose fate had been confidently put in their keeping. No answer was received to the letter in which the queen made submission to the Emperor imploring his clemency, and, in the middle of February, 1806, Joseph Bonaparte, who had put in an appearance with the army, took, as Imperial Vice-

roy, immediate possession of the capital whence the legitimate reigning family had shortly before taken flight. Only a few weeks later, before the end of March, and the Bourbon troops which offered resistance on the peninsula had been overcome and Sicily alone was left under dominion of Caroline and the English.

On March 30th. 1806, Napoleon apprised the Senate by letter of his determination to set his brother Joseph upon the throne as monarch of Naples and Sicily. This meant, as the letter itself implied, that the kingdom would henceforth be included within the sphere of Napoleonic power, since it expressly stated that the new king of the Two Sicilies should remain a Grand Dignitary of France. In view of this the law providing that the two crowns, the French and the Neapolitan, should never be united upon one head might as well never have existed.*

Together with this decree there were submitted to the Senate several others concerning Italy. One of these dealt with the question of incorporating the Venetian territory with the kingdom of Italy. Another had as its object the assignment of the principality of Guastalla to the Princess Borghese and her husband. Still others disclosed an entirely new and special purpose on the part of the head of the State. Napoleon, that is to say, proposed to found within the limits of the newly-conquered Venetian territory twelve titular duchies: Dalmatia, Istria, Friuli, Cadore, Belluno, Conegliano, Treviso, Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and Rovigo, and four similar ones in the kingdom of Naples: Gaëta, Otranto, Taranto, and Reggio, one in the principality of Lucca, and three in Parma and Piacenza. One fifteenth part of the revenue from these lands was to serve as endowment to the incumbent. Besides these Napoleon reserved to himself domains in Venetia amounting in value to 30,000,000 francs, and in Lucca amounting to 4,000,000, and in addition 1,200,000 francs annual tribute to be furnished by

* Louis Bonaparte and Murat, the Emperor's brother-in-law, likewise retained their French dignities upon becoming European monarchs at this time; that is to say, they remained subjects of him who bore the title of Emperor of the French.

the kingdom of Italy and 1,000,000 by Naples. These titled estates and these funds were intended for use as rewards for conspicuous acts of service. The recipients of these favours—and who these were to be will shortly appear—acquired thereby, it is true, no prerogatives of any kind, but title and revenue were assured to the heirs in direct male line. This new feudal system had little more than the name in common with the ancient and obsolete one and should not be confused with it. Of especial significance, however, was the international element in it, for, according to it, citizens of one state could be transferred with their claims to another, French marshals and officials might acquire a legitimate share in state revenues of Italy, and but little later in those of Poland and Germany also—an additional proof that Napoleon's idea of an empire had long since been extended beyond the boundaries of France. Madame de Rémusat, speaking in her "*Mémoires*" of the new nobility, pauses to remark: "Our country came before long to seem to Napoleon nothing more than a great province of the empire which he had resolved upon bringing into submission to himself."

But in nothing did this imperial design disclose itself more clearly than in Napoleon's conduct toward the Pope. After the expulsion from Naples of the legitimate Royal House the entire Italian peninsula had become subject to the will of the conqueror with the exception of the States of the Church. It soon became evident, however, that herein also the rule was to be carried out, and all misgivings on that score received but too speedy confirmation in the bestowal of the Neapolitan principalities of Ponte Corvo and Benevento upon the French dignitaries Bernadotte and Talleyrand, without regard to the suzerainty of the Pope. It yet remained to be seen whether Pius would consent to play a rôle like that of Joseph Bonaparte as vassal king under Napoleon. Acceptance of this arrangement would mean possible continuation of the temporal power of the Pope, rejection, supposably its sacrifice to the design of the great potentate for a world empire. That the Pope could not be counted upon as a docile tool in the hands of

the Corsican had already been shown in the recent war when Pius, demanding for himself unconditional neutrality, had raised a protest against the French, who, disregarding his attitude, occupied Ancona on their way toward Naples. Far from submitting quietly to such abuse, he had publicly affirmed that as the father of all believers, to observe political impartiality was his duty. In addition to these acts of contumacy Pius, adducing the decisions of the Council of Trent, had refused in June, 1805, Napoleon's request to dissolve the marriage of his youngest brother Jerome with Miss Patterson, an American.

Such perversity on the part of the pontiff exasperated the Emperor, who considered himself, in contrast with his republican predecessors, to have made sufficient conciliatory advances. After his victory over the coalition he had the statement promulgated at Rome that he had occupied Ancona because the military forces of the Papal See would have been insufficient to hold the port against the English or the Turks,—i.e., against Protestants and Infidels,—and because he, Napoleon, regarded himself as protector of the Church. Notwithstanding all this, Pius still refused to comprehend and, with unruffled suavity, requested the return of the Legations as compensation for his good offices at the time of the coronation. And this time Napoleon spoke in terms quite unmistakable. Writing February 13th, 1806, he says: "All Italy is to be subject to my law. I shall in no wise interfere with the independence of the Papal See, but upon condition that your Holiness shall show toward myself in things temporal the same respect which I observe toward your Holiness in things spiritual. . . . Your Holiness is sovereign of Rome, but I am its emperor." And to Fesch, who was now his representative at the Papal court, he gave orders to demand the expulsion of all subjects of England, Russia, Sweden, and Sardinia, and the closing of the port of Rome to ships of these nations, adding that Joseph had instructions to uphold him by force of arms. The Roman pontiff was, moreover, to trouble himself no further with political affairs, since his protection had been assumed by Napoleon against the whole world. "Say to him," he continues, "that my eyes are

open and that I do not allow myself to be imposed upon except in so far as I desire; say to him that I am Charlemagne, the Sword of the Church, their Emperor, and that I propose to be treated as such."

Among those surrounding Joseph at this time was Miot de Melito, who says that Napoleon spoke freely in his correspondence with his brother in regard to his real intentions. He had thoughts of going to Rome in order to have himself crowned as Emperor of the West, which would imply the entire relinquishment of temporal power on the part of the Pope, who would have to be satisfied with the chief spiritual authority alone and a few million francs income as compensation. This scheme had been confidentially revealed in Rome, but the cardinals had declared against it and were resolved rather to die than to live under such conditions. The strictest secrecy was maintained about the whole matter. Only to the second letter above mentioned did Pius reply to the effect that Napoleon was indeed Emperor of the French but in nowise Roman Emperor, and that any such close relation with himself as he demanded would deprive the Papal See of its authority in other countries. One concession, however, was made to the oppressor: Consalvi, the Pope's Secretary of State, having been indicated by Napoleon as the moving spirit in the resistance to him, was deposed from his office. Relations remained strained and eventually resulted in complete rupture. For the present, however, the Emperor turned his attention to the extension of his system in another direction.

✓ Holland was now the objective point. This state, having once come within the sphere of French influence, had been obliged to undergo the same changes in its constitution as France itself. Eventually, as has been seen, the Batavian Republic had been established there with a sort of consular constitution having a Grand Pensionary at its head. Ever since June, 1803, this government had sided with Napoleon in times of war. Two years from that date, while the main army was fighting under Napoleon in the east, his brother Louis was given the task of defending the country against the English and Swedes.

No engagement took place, the battle of Austerlitz making it unnecessary, and Louis returned to Paris to the disgust of his imperial brother, who was planning to set him also upon a throne and had fixed upon that of Holland as best adapted to his purpose. In January, 1805, it had already been rumoured at The Hague that the French Emperor was intending to set up a monarchy again in Holland. Louis, to whom the idea of becoming a king in Holland was as little attractive as that of mounting a throne in Italy, was unwilling to give encouragement to such reports by remaining in the country. But with Napoleon objections of that kind on the part of his brothers were no longer allowed to stand in the way of his designs. The banishment of Lucien served as a warning to the perverse; the choice lay between exile and implicit obedience. Like Joseph, Louis ended by choosing obedience and declared himself ready to assume the crown of Holland. As for the Dutch, scant regard was vouchsafed to their preferences. One who feels himself sufficiently superior to laws and treaties to treat them with disdain has no need for anything more than a pretext for proceeding as he thinks fit. The Grand Pensionary Schimmelpenninck, having discovered what was being plotted in Paris, sent thither a deputation of Dutch notables with Admiral Verhuell at their head to avert the threatened danger. On March 14th, 1806, Napoleon wrote to Taileyrand in regard to the matter: "I saw M. H. Verhuel this evening. Here, in a couple of words, is what I have reduced the question to: Holland is without executive power, she must have such, I will give her Prince Louis. A compact shall be made according to which the religion of the country shall be respected; the prince will retain his own and each part of the nation will retain its own. The present constitution will remain in force, with the only difference that in place of a Grand Pensionary there will be a king. Indeed there is nothing to prevent giving him the title of Stadtholder. . . . In all foreign relations, in the government of the colonies, and in all affairs of state the acts will be in the name of the stadtholder or king. Make me a draft of this scheme and send a clever person to The Hague to attend to this business. . . .

This is a matter upon which my mind is made up—either that or incorporation with France. The arguments to be brought to bear with the Dutch are that otherwise I will not see that a single one of the colonies lost to England is restored to them when peace is made. On the other hand, if my terms are accepted, I will not only assist them to regain all the colonies, but even give them to understand that I will add Friesland besides. As you see, not a moment is to be lost.” It was useless for the deputies to refer to the treaty of 1803, in which Napoleon had solemnly promised them the reacquisition of the colonies in return for their support of him during the war, to say nothing of Ceylon, which under favourable circumstances he was also going to procure for them. It availed nothing to adduce the treaty of 1795 with its first article reading: “The French Republic recognizes the Republic of the United Provinces as a free and independent power and guarantees to it that liberty and independence.” Napoleon was not to be moved, and when the negotiations at The Hague began to drag, since the people were absolutely opposed to the idea of a monarchy, he threatened them with measures so severe that they at length yielded to his wishes. The same people which in former times had laid waste its own country in order to save it from the cupidity of Louis XIV. now complied without resistance. The Dutch Council of State authorized the Grand Pensionary to sign a treaty with France according to which Louis Bonaparte became king of Holland (May 24th, 1806), and on June 5th a deputation announced at the Tuileries that “after mature deliberation” it had been decided that for the future a constitutional monarchy was best adapted to the needs of the country, and that the mission of the deputation was to beseech the prince to found such an one. To this solemn address the Emperor replied in words no less impressive, and Europe counted one more amongst her list of kings. After the audience, it is true, Napoleon threw aside the mask and called upon his little nephew, Louis’s son, to recite to the Empress and the ladies of the court the fable about “The frogs who desired a king.” After all did the people of these nations deserve anything better than the mockery of

this solitary upstart who belonged to none of them and yet had subjugated them all?

Nor were the Germans to be spared the ignominy of being counted among the nations tributary to the Corsican. In his correspondence with the Pope there is frequent reference to Germany, and its perusal leaves the impression that the writer did not regard himself as other than lord of that nation also. In his letter of February 13th, 1806, for instance, he blames the advisers of the head of the Church as the cause of Germany's persistence in religious anarchy. "If your Holiness," he proceeds, "would recall to mind what I said in Paris, religion in Germany would be organized and not in its present wretched condition." This is a part of the same letter in which Napoleon declared himself to be Emperor of Rome, Emperor of the West, and Charlemagne, who likewise had held sway over Frankish, Italian, and German lands. And in point of fact did matters not stand very much as he thus claimed? In 1805 the princes of Southern Germany, as if feudal vassals, had followed the call to arms of this foreigner who promised them protection and profit and who led them against their own imperial sovereign, who was no longer in a position to extend such protection and whose aim was rather toward the weakening than upbuilding of the secular states of the Empire. Upon the re-establishment of peace Napoleon rewarded his German adherents with enlargement of their borders, elevation of rank as princes, and the conferring of "sovereignty." The 14th article of the Treaty of Pressburg ran as follows: "Their Majesties the Kings of Bavaria and Württemberg and His Serene Highness the Elector of Baden will enjoy complete sovereignty over the territories ceded to them, as also over their former states, including all rights proceeding therefrom and which have been guaranteed to them by His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, in like manner as similar privileges are enjoyed by His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria and His Majesty the King of Prussia in respect to their German lands. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria pledges himself not to hinder, either as Emperor or Estate of the Empire, the

execution of decrees which they may have made or may make in consequence." Certainly from that side everything had been made safe. But so much the more felt was the pressure soon brought to bear by the overpowering authority proceeding from the west. When, in February, 1806, the King of Bavaria ventured modestly to make objections to having his troops detailed from Germany to join the French army in Italy, he met with the humiliating response that he need not flatter himself that Bavaria had been elevated to a kingdom out of consideration for himself, this change having been made solely as a result of the French system. Accordingly what in respect to Austria was designated as "sovereignty" was shown in respect to France to be nothing else than vassalage.

But in order to secure permanency to these conditions and to make certain of the fidelity of his German adherents Napoleon resolved upon two measures. The first consisted in uniting with his own the families of the South German princes. As early as 1804, soon after his coronation as Emperor, he had meditated establishing a relationship with the ancient reigning houses of Germany, and had at that time proposed at the Electoral Court a marriage between his stepson Eugene and the Princess Augusta of Bavaria. Indeed it appears from the recently published Memoirs of the Bavarian Minister Montgelas that he had already at this time taken steps in Munich toward bringing about an offensive and defensive alliance, and had held out to Maximilian Joseph hopes of elevation to the dignity of king in case of the consummation of this marriage, upon which it is evident that Josephine had set her heart. This proposal was at the time neither accepted nor rejected by the Elector, and decision of the question merely postponed. But immediately after the opening of negotiations at Pressburg Napoleon returned to the subject. The Elector might indeed still hesitate, but he could no longer refuse, and on January 14th, 1806, the marriage of the Viceroy took place. The same princess had been before this time sought in marriage by the hereditary Prince of Baden; he was now promised the hand of Josephine's niece, Stephanie, who, however, accepted this engagement only

with reluctance, being loath to leave Paris, where, according to report, she was on terms of intimacy with the Emperor.* And so also with the third court of South Germany. Ever since October, 1805, a family alliance had been meditated and agreed upon: Jerome was to marry Katharine, the only daughter of Frederick, King of Würtemberg, a project which was carried out in 1807, the bridegroom having meanwhile himself been made a king.

The second method of subjecting Western Germany permanently to his will was suggested to Napoleon by the designs of the governments preceding his own. This was to consist in uniting the southern and middle German states in a special league independent of Prussia and Austria, and in subordinating this league by treaty to the control of France. This was a French idea of long standing, having been formulated in the seventeenth century and later adopted by the Revolution. In the correspondence between Talleyrand and Sieyès in 1798 there is frequent reference to the advisability of founding a third German state of this kind, the control of which should remain in the hands of France. Later, after Napoleon had divided up the German ecclesiastical states according to his own good pleasure, he took up this scheme with Talleyrand. Both then had interviews in Mainz with the Archbishop, Dalberg, the only one of the clerical electors who had escaped the general secularization. "They represented to him," wrote the Bavarian Minister Edelsheim to the Russian ambassador in Vienna, "that, since France could not tolerate constant encroachments from Austria and Prussia upon the possessions of the other German princes and states, it was an urgent necessity that a firm and imposing confederation should be formed against enterprises of that nature, a confederation to be composed of all the states of the Empire, exclusive of the two powers already mentioned, and to be able in case of need to furnish 150,000 men. Should the princes be so blind to their own interests as to be unable to come to an agreement in the matter, Napoleon would make over to the

* Indeed until our own day the belief has survived that Kaspar Hauser, the mysterious foundling of Nuremberg, was her son and Napoleon's.

Elector of Bavaria the entire country lying between the Rhine and Austria, since he would rather deal with three powers than with these small and good-for-nothing states powerless through their disunion."

Now, whatsoever else may be made a matter of reproach to these "small and good-for-nothing states," it cannot be said that their princes were "blind to their own interests." Accordingly when the victor of Austerlitz renewed his proposition somewhat later he found Little Germany quite ready to accede to his demands. Indeed it did not wait for advances to be made. In April 1806, Dalberg addressed a memorial to Napoleon which serves in a measure to explain to us the latter's allusions in his letters to Pius VII. "The worthy German nation," this document reads, "groans in the misery of political and religious anarchy; be thou, Sire, the restorer of her constitution." And what did Dalberg mean by this? Religious anarchy was to be dispelled through the establishment of a national German church of which he was to be the head, and he actually succeeded in furthering this plan so far as to induce Napoleon to write to Fesch at Rome that if the Pope did not yield the religious affairs of Germany would be regulated with Dalberg as primate.

As for temporal affairs, the Electoral Arch-Chancellor desired, as he wrote to the French ambassador Hédouville, "that the Western Empire should live again in the Emperor Napoleon such as it had been under Charlemagne, composed of Italy, France, and Germany." For the time being, at least, Napoleon himself could desire nothing more. He appointed to Talleyrand and Labesnardière the task of preparing the draft of a federal constitution, and had it signed on July 12th, 1806, by the ambassadors of the different states party to it. And now, just as had been the case four years previous, German emissaries courted favour and consideration at the hands of the minister, offering unstinted gold to obtain the promulgation of a political existence to which honour was a stranger. In this all did not meet with success. For when the document came to be signed it was discovered that a long array of principalities

and dukedoms, hitherto subject only to the German Empire, had been absorbed into the territories of the princes of the Confederation and made subservient to them,—had been mediatized,—that is to say, a foreign ruler, without a shadow of right and acting purely according to preference, had done away with a number of political units in Germany for the benefit of others whose submission to his will he thereby purchased. Among the most highly favoured were Bavaria, Würtemberg, and the new “grand duchy” of Baden, Nassau, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Dalberg, now “Prince Primate,” to whom fell the city and territory of Frankfort on the Main. In addition to these the Confederation included several smaller princes who, through bribery or other means, had protected themselves against mediatization. Among these were Arenberg, Liechtenstein, Salm, Hohenzollern and Von der Leyen. The Elector of Hesse did not join the Confederation. In his place a new sovereign was appointed: the Duke, or rather now “Grand Duke,” of Cleves and Berg, those strips of land which had been ceded by Prussia and Bavaria in the preceding year and which had been transferred by Napoleon in March, 1806, to his brother-in-law Murat. In the first two articles of the Act of Confederation these princes declared that they were separated wholly and forever from the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, that they thereby formed a special alliance under the name of the Confederation of the Rhine, and should recognize no further claim upon themselves put forth by the ancient imperial power; that they were independent of foreign powers with the sole exception of France, whose Emperor, as Protector of the Confederation, was to determine upon the admission of new members to the same, to appoint the Prince Primate, and direct the equipment of the troops of the Confederation. Each of the princes had a specified quota of troops to furnish: Bavaria 30,000, Würtemberg 12,000, Baden 8000, Darmstadt 4000, Berg 5000, and Nassau, together with the remaining small states, 4000 men—forces over which Napoleon from that time assumed absolute control and made use of in all his wars, for, as set forth in Article 35, an alliance between the French Empire and the states of the Con-

federation of the Rhine had been entered into according to which "every Continental war involving any one of the parties to the treaty became at once common to all the others."

The military forces of the conqueror had thus been increased by an army and the territory under his political authority enlarged to the extent of fifty thousand square miles with eight millions of souls. On August 1st, 1806, the official communication of the Constitution of the Confederation was made to the Diet of Ratisbon by the Confederation and its Protector with the declaration that the old Empire was to be regarded as no longer existing.

The question now was as to what attitude the two great German powers would assume toward this new order of things. Austria's monarch was still Emperor of Germany, and the dissolution of the Empire had been resolved upon entirely without his foreknowledge. To this empty title, to be sure, no importance had for a long time been attached in Vienna, not since 1802, when foreign influence had made itself felt in German affairs and, with the help of the Germans themselves, had become paramount in the politics of the Empire. The defence of Italy had been undertaken with zeal, but there would have been much greater reluctance to entering upon a war for the benefit of Germany. Moreover, in the Treaty of Pressburg,—particularly in the before-mentioned Article 14,—the abdication of the German Emperor had already been indirectly announced. and such delay as was occasioned at the Court of Vienna was due to the hope of securing compensation of some kind for the renunciation of the imperial diadem. But Napoleon had no thought of purchasing. His method was to demand categorically of Vincent, the Austrian ambassador to Paris, that his master should resign without further ado and recognize the Confederation of the Rhine. Without even awaiting the arrival in Paris of the delegate from Vienna sent to negotiate in the matter, the official act was signed at the French capital and the Austrian cabinet thus confronted with an accomplished fact. Francis II. had no choice but to deliver through his envoy at Ratisbon a note bearing the date August 6th,

1806, to the intent that he regarded as dissolved the ties which had until then united him with the German Empire, and that he resigned his crown. The old German Empire was no more.

In this interview with Vincent Napoleon had assumed a severe and threatening tone and intimated that his army was standing in readiness to enforce his demands at any moment by overrunning Austria. Nor were such words without foundation in fact, for the victorious host had not by any means returned to France, nor even so much as completely evacuated Austria, for a powerful garrison was maintained within the frontier fortress of Braunau. This last fact was the result of circumstances involving all Europe. It has been seen to what a degree the ire of Russia had been roused against Napoleon through the intrigues of the French in the Adriatic and Ionian seas, where Russia had schemes of her own. Anxiety in regard to Napoleon's intentions in the East was further aroused at the Russian court by his demand that Dalmatia and Cattaro should be included with Istria in the territory promised to him in the Treaty of Pressburg. This led to Russia's withdrawal from Naples in order to establish herself more securely at Corfu and thus be prepared to close the Balkan Peninsula against French influence, and, with the same end in view, a Russian squadron cruising in the Adriatic received orders to occupy the Gulf of Cattaro. It was urged that the time appointed for delivering the same to the French was passed and that the coast therefore was now to be regarded as belonging, not to Austria but to France, that is, to the enemy, whereupon the Austrian commander promptly relinquished the place to the Russians. At this Napoleon was fairly beside himself with rage, and, insisting upon his treaty with the Court of Vienna, he demanded of the latter that it should drive out the enemy in order to deliver to him the Gulf, threatening to retain his troops in Braunau until after this should be accomplished. All appeals made by Austria to Russia to induce her to give up the Gulf were unavailing; nothing but evasions were to be extorted from St. Petersburg. Napoleon, however, carried out meanwhile to the letter his

threat of maintaining troops in Southern Germany, a fact which hastened in no small degree the accomplishment of his project for a confederation of the states of the Rhine.

The true importance of this military occupation of Southern Germany lay in the fact that through it not Austria alone, but also the state of the Hohenzollerns, the second great power in Germany, was held in check. When last mentioned Prussia was in a predicament. The narrow-minded determination of its sovereign to preserve the peace with Napoleon, coupled with circumstances resulting from the battle of Austerlitz, had compelled Haugwitz to sign the Treaty of Alliance at Schönbrunn, December 15th, 1805. This outcome was not without its drawbacks. For one thing the covenant binding her to an offensive and defensive alliance with Napoleon made Prussia appear quite too thoroughly a partisan of France, a circumstance which could not but be prejudicial to her standing as a European power; furthermore, through the immediate transfer of Hanover to Prussian administration entanglements with England must inevitably follow. To avoid these difficulties Haugwitz, upon his return, himself proposed to the king that he should not ratify the treaty exactly according to its original wording, but in a somewhat altered form. In place of "offensive and defensive alliance" the word "alliance" alone was substituted, while it arranged that Hanover should be delivered to Prussia only upon the cessation of hostilities between France and England, being meanwhile merely occupied by Prussian troops. The aim was thus to make sure of the Guelph Electorate without becoming involved in a European war on its account. With the document thus modified Haugwitz took his departure for Paris, and such misgivings as to its reception by Napoleon as had been harboured at home by Minister Hardenberg were dispelled by the arrival just at this time—about January 20th, 1806—of a letter from Talleyrand to Laforêt, the French ambassador at Berlin, telling of the readiness of the Emperor to come to an agreement with Prussia. Actuated by these welcome tidings he even went so far as to advise disarmament, a proposal which was so promptly carried into effect that before

the end of January the greater part of the Prussian army had actually been disbanded.

But affairs had meanwhile taken an unexpected turn in Paris. Far from being ready to accept the emendations made at Berlin, Napoleon was determined upon having Prussia absolutely upon his side in order to make her weight felt in the approaching negotiations with England. For this reason he not only rejected the treaty in its altered form, but declared as null and void the agreement of December 15th, since it had not been ratified within the stipulated time. In its place he forced upon the envoy another document which contained, indeed, no allusion to an "offensive and defensive alliance," but imposed conditions far harder than those of the Treaty of Schönbrunn: Prussia had now to cede Valengin in addition to Neufchâtel, and to renounce all claim to compensation for Ansbach, which had been turned over to Bavaria; furthermore, she was to recognize and to defend just as before the integrity of Turkey, to take immediate possession of Hanover, and to close to England the ports on the North Sea, the mouths of the rivers flowing thereinto, and the port of Lübeck. Disaster was plainly written on the very face of such a document, for if the defence of Turkey was more than likely to provoke a quarrel with Russia, the closing of these ports must inevitably mean war with England. Yet in spite of all Haugwitz affixed his signature to this treaty on February 15th, 1806, nor did Frederick William refuse to ratify it. With his army upon a footing of peace and the French troops stationed in Southern Germany no choice was open to him.*

* An Austrian officer, travelling at that time upon a secret mission in Southern Germany, writes from Munich, March 31st. 1806 "Moreover, the truly admirable position held by the French army in respect to Prussia seems not to have been accorded sufficient attention. With his army so extended that the two extremes touched Austerlitz at one end and Bregenz at the other, Bonaparte withdrew his forces from Austria in columns by a flank movement. All of a sudden, through Augereau's move [upon Frankfort], the army was placed in a threatening attitude, having Frankfort as its centre with the Upper Palatinate and the Weser at the extreme ends and leaving it in possession of all streams and heights

And now followed the result to which all these events had been leading. Prussia's occupation of Hanover had been accepted at the outset by England without any token of hostility, but the closing of the ports of the Elbe, Weser, and Ems engendered the wildest excitement. At once, early in April, 1806, without waiting for a formal declaration of war, the British ministers, certain of the absolute concurrence of Parliament, sequestrated all Prussian merchant-vessels lying in her ports,—there were some hundreds of them,—and gave chase to those upon the open sea. This alone involved a loss of many millions to Prussia, without taking into account the vastly more grievous loss which must inevitably be sustained by Silesian commerce as a result of the closing of the northern seaports. All this calamity for the sake of Hanover, the possession of which was after all not so sure a thing as had been assumed by those in Berlin who favoured the idea of an alliance with France. What would happen if, for instance, England and France should come to a reconciliation? Would Napoleon, out of consideration for Prussia, be deterred from returning the Electorate if the question of peace depended upon it? And indeed indications all pointed to some such adjustment of differences.

The victories of the Emperor had not unnaturally awakened a feeling of deep uneasiness in London. It was with true heaviness of heart that ~~Pitt~~ witnessed the peace made with Austria, the Russians returning home, and the disintegration of the coalition which, at bottom, had been of his making. Ailing as he was in body, he completely succumbed to these unexpected blows, and died January 23d, 1806. Shortly before his end, as his glance chanced to fall upon a map of Europe, he gave orders to roll it up, since there would be no occasion to use it during the course of the next ten years. It was as a true prophet that this man of genius quitted the scene. There was from which Prussia could be intimidated. Berlin, it was reckoned, could be reached in ten marches, and they counted upon but one battle between Würtemberg and Breslau. Prussia, whose attention was kept occupied with negotiations during all these manœuvres, awoke too late to a realization of her situation and was compelled to subscribe to all conditions imposed upon her."

in the Grenville ministry, which succeeded that of Pitt, an element friendly to France, led by Fox, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This man has already been noticed as an enthusiastic admirer of the hero of the 18th of Brumaire. He now made approaches to the government at Paris in a manner smacking of the romantic, by giving information of a conspiracy against the life of the Emperor, which, although apparently nothing more than a concoction of his own brain, was received graciously by Napoleon, who was well pleased to accept the pretext as genuine and made a courteous reply. Shortly afterwards Lord Seymour, Earl of Yarmouth, one of the Englishmen arrested in Paris at the opening of the war, was commissioned by the London cabinet to open negotiations with Talleyrand. By June, 1806, these had been entered upon. It was scarcely feasible to withhold Malta from the victor of Trafalgar if he were to be asked to give back the conquests he had made, and Napoleon's minister made a direct offer of the island to the Englishman, proffering in addition—as though no treaty of alliance between Prussia and France had ever existed—the return of Hanover to its hereditary sovereign. The possession of Sicily, moreover, was to remain in the hands of its Bourbon king, provided England would acknowledge Joseph's sovereignty at Naples.

Of all this no word reached Berlin for some time. Nevertheless the king could not overcome his distrust of an ally who imposed upon him conditions so hard. He turned to Russia for countenance and support. Duke Charles of Brunswick was despatched on a secret mission to St. Petersburg, there to obtain above all else a promise from Alexander I. to respect the integrity of Turkey, lest in the end Prussia be driven to making war against him. But such an assurance was not to be gained. So much progress only was made toward an understanding between them that the two sovereigns exchanged declarations according to which the Czar promised to use all his powers to preserve the state of Prussia independent and inviolable, while Frederick William bound himself not to make war against Russia if perchance hostilities should arise in consequence of an attack upon Turkey by France (July 1st, 1806). The surest

guarantee of tranquillity to Prussia would indeed have lain in the establishment of peace between France and Russia, and for a time it seemed as if this were to be the actual outcome. Alexander, having heard of negotiations between Napoleon and England, was determined, in case they should result in reconciliation, not to be left alone to sustain the war against the formidable Emperor. For this reason the Russian ambassador Oubril now betook himself to Paris, and there indeed, on July 20th, 1806, concluded a separate treaty according to the terms of which Russia was to relinquish Cattaro and withdraw to the Ionian Islands, in return for which France was to evacuate Germany within three months and also release the recently occupied Republic of Ragusa. Both parties acknowledged the independence and integrity of the Porte. King Ferdinand was to receive the Balearic Islands as compensation for his former kingdom of Naples and Sicily. To this treaty, which reminds one of that which Count St. Julien was once inveigled into signing, there was lacking nothing but the signature of the Czar.

But with neither Russia nor England was peace to follow in spite of all these negotiations. For scarcely had the Russian envoy arrived in Paris, as a preliminary to the establishment of amicable relations, when Napoleon began to retract, one after the other, every concession he had made to England and finally insisted upon the cession of Sicily to Joseph. The effect of this was to disconcert Fox, and when the Constitution of the Confederation of the Rhine became fully known, giving France ascendancy upon the Continent and at the same time surrendering further territory to French commerce, he gradually withdrew altogether from the agreement, and the negotiations were at length brought to a close without result. His death also followed shortly after, and with him disappeared almost the last man across the Channel upon whom Napoleon could count as disposed toward reconciliation. From thenceforth he was never to find another in all Great Britain.

It was just at this time, too, that the war party in Russia regained the ascendancy. Alexander, who did not relish the idea of having his hands tied in the Orient nor of being beguiled

out of the possession of Cattaro, refused his sanction to the treaty signed by Oubril.* Moreover, a deep impression had been made upon him in learning of the disruption of the ancient German Empire, of which he had been pleased to regard himself as the guarantor. He had it announced in Paris that he would conclude the treaty of peace only upon condition that France would renounce all claim upon Dalmatia and Albania, restore Sicily to King Ferdinand, and finally indemnify the King of Sardinia for the loss of Piedmont. He was perfectly aware that Napoleon would never consent to such terms, and it was with the same breath that he gave orders to mobilize the army and push it forward to the Prussian frontier.

During all the time that these changes were taking place in the political situation of the Great Powers, Prussia had been bending in sorrow and anguish beneath the yoke of her alliance with France. It is said that after the signing of the compact tears were more than once seen in the eyes of the king. Had not certain possessions been given in exchange for uncertain? The relinquished districts, such as Ansbach, had been forthwith occupied by the French, and yet to this insatiable ally even these promised to be insufficient. In the immediate vicinity of the new duchy of Berg there were three abbeys to which there were rich coal-fields appertaining; these had fallen by inheritance to Prussia in 1802 and no longer belonged to Cleves

* In the negotiations between Oubril and the French it is noticeable that he definitely refused to treat for peace in conjunction with England. It was in vain that the British ambassador used his persuasions; he was acting under orders. It is even yet not entirely clear to what cause should be ascribed this determination on the part of the Czar. No mistake, however, will be made in assuming that Russia was unwilling to reveal to England her posture of attack in regard to Turkey. Certain it is that Paget, the English ambassador at Vienna, "upon his knees" entreated Count Rasumoffsky, the representative of Russia, to evacuate the Gulf of Cattaro, and all to no avail. (Martens, "*Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères*," II. 504.) Oubril learned to his cost how thoroughly the Czar was resolved upon keeping this port, for, having allowed himself to be cajoled in Paris into promising its relinquishment, he lost favour with his prince and was deprived of his office and dignities.

except in the matter of provincial representation. In spite of this fact, Joachim I.—as Murat was now called—simply ordered his troops to occupy these territories, and was brought to evacuate them only by dint of positive reclamation by the Prussian government. Essen, the property of one of these abbeys, formed the connecting link between Cleves and the Prussian county of Mark. Now Napoleon's policy aimed likewise at the acquisition of this county, since it was essential to his plans to strengthen Murat's jurisdiction in order to establish a firm foothold for himself in Northern Germany such as he had already obtained in the south. With this in view the French ambassador in Berlin received explicit instructions to incite Prussia to open warfare with Sweden in order to take from her Swedish Pomerania, while Prussia herself should relinquish the county of Mark to the Duke of Berg. It was with difficulty that the court at Berlin was able to resist these demands. To add to his other offences Napoleon did not give up to his brother-in-law the fortress of Wesel belonging to Cleves and situated on the right bank of the Rhine, but—in direct violation of the Treaty of Paris—occupied it with his own troops in order to secure also a military point of support in the north.

At the conduct of France in this matter, taken with the vexatious tone adopted by her in the documents which were interchanged, fears began to make themselves felt in Prussia that Napoleon was but seeking a pretext for bringing about a rupture of the peace in order to extend his power beyond the Prussian boundaries. By the beginning of July the question was already under consideration whether it were not best to make military preparation against such a contingency. Tidings arriving from Southern Germany ill calculated to calm such fears seemed to confirm the advisability of being in readiness. Napoleon himself assumed the task of announcing in Berlin the founding of the Confederation of the Rhine, only seeking to moderate the impression which such tidings must create by proposing that Frederick William III. establish a similar league on his own account in the north. Hardly, however, had this suggestion been taken into consideration in Berlin, before it had to

be rejected again; for, late in July, Lucchesini sent word from Paris that Lord Yarmouth had confided to him that the Emperor was about to restore Hanover to England. Hanover! without which Prussia could have no hope of holding a position of importance in Northern Germany, for the possession of which she had made such tremendous sacrifice of territory, possessions, and esteem, and of which Napoleon had but just asseverated that he had no thoughts of denying her! Was there then any respect in which reliance could be placed on Napoleon? Moreover, other alarming reports began to pour in from all sides. From Westphalia General Blücher sent notification that the French were being re-enforced in Wesel and on the Lippe, a fact which could have but one signification—an attempt to take the Mark and Westphalia from Prussia for Murat. From Ratisbon and Munich news came that French troops had occupied Würzburg, and tidings from everywhere agreed that they were advancing upon Saxony and Prussia. What was to be believed of all this? Could these reports actually be true? And why not? In their weakness the people could not but feel wholly at the mercy of this power advancing totally regardless of cause or right, and, as if in a fever, the one thought prevailing was but to escape in some way from this helpless condition. Even Haugwitz advised—as he had before done in 1803—to arm and prepare for war, and this time—feeling himself injured and deceived in the conduct of France—the king yielded. Lucchesini's despatch had reached Berlin on August 6th; four days later Frederick William wrote to the Czar asking his support and saying that Napoleon had offered Hanover to England without equivalent, and this to all intents and purposes meant that he had resolved upon annihilating Prussia. For, should the Emperor actually deprive the state of the Electorate, he must be prepared to see Prussia's king at the head of all his other enemies in the next war, and so, in order to avert this danger, Napoleon intended to avail himself of so favourable an opportunity as the present to destroy him singly. On August 9th orders to mobilize the army were issued in Berlin, and the French ambassador was notified that preparations were being made

for war because various measures taken by Napoleon must be regarded as aimed against Prussia; for even were they nothing more than demonstrations, the necessity was nevertheless laid upon the country of making a counter-display lest, as had occurred on a previous occasion—in February—it be forced to suffer under the constraint of such demonstrations.

And was Prussia justified in these forebodings? Did Napoleon really want war? Yes and no. He wanted war because it constituted part of his system. Ever since the time of the Directory the revolutionary policy had been planned upon the idea of some day crowding Prussia, as also Austria, as far as possible toward the east. Of Napoleon particularly it is said that he had borne a grudge against Frederick William III. ever since the latter's equivocal attitude in the previous year, and that, in February, 1806, the King of Bavaria had already been led by Napoleon to entertain hopes of Bayreuth, although it was certain that Prussia would be no more willing to part with it without a struggle than with Hanover. But it is quite another question whether it was Napoleon's plan to make war just then in the summer of 1806 against the principal power of Northern Germany. It would seem, indeed, rather unlikely that he had any such intention. True, his army was maintaining in Germany an attitude of offence toward Prussia also, but its location there—aside from the financial importance of sustaining troops at foreign cost—was on account of Austria. After the consent of Francis II. to the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, followed by the conclusion of the treaty with Oubril involving in its conditions the evacuation of Germany by the French, Napoleon really made preparations for withdrawing his troops. On August 17th he wrote to Talleyrand and Berthier in regard to the matter and instructed the latter to send home the Austrian prisoners of war. Hearing just at this time of the mobilization of the Prussian army, he simply laughed at it as the outcome of an unjustifiable alarm. Even as late as August 26th he wrote to Berthier at Munich: "The Berlin cabinet is seized with a panic of fear. It imagines that in our treaty with Russia there are clauses which will de-

prive Prussia of several provinces. To that must be attributed the absurd military preparations which it is making and to which no attention should be paid, it being my unfeigned purpose to recall my troops to France." But a week later the question had taken a totally different turn. News had arrived from St. Petersburg that the Czar refused to accept the treaty of July 20th, and at this the preparations suddenly assumed a new meaning in Napoleon's estimation, since, from the coincidence of the two facts, he concluded that there must be an understanding between Russia and Prussia, especially as, simultaneously with the Russian courier, there arrived General Knobelsdorff from Berlin demanding in the name of his sovereign the evacuation of Germany. It was further assumed in Paris that England also had given up all thought of making peace with France, so that it is not astonishing that Napoleon should infer the existence of a new coalition similar to that of the preceding year, except that in this Austria was replaced by Prussia. Under this supposition—which was moreover a mistaken one—he at once countermanded the marching orders issued to the army in Germany and refused to Knobelsdorff the fulfilment of Frederick William's request so long as the Prussian army should remain upon a footing of war. Prussia must begin by laying down its arms.

With his cold, clear glance the French Emperor surveyed the whole situation. He saw but two possibilities before him, and these he submitted to his ambassador at Berlin in a letter of September 12th, 1806, in which he wrote: "Either Prussia has taken up arms simply from fear,—in which case, since there no longer exists any cause for alarm, the troops will be disbanded, especially as they occasion great expense,—or else Prussia has meant so to place herself for the time being that agreements which she has already made or proposes to make with Russia, England, and Sweden shall come to light. In the latter case the policy of the Emperor demands that he should take advantage of the favourable time of year to reach Berlin before the Swedes and Russians, to scatter the Prussian army as he has scattered the Austrians, to attack his enemies before

they can unite, and overcome them singly. The question reduces itself, then, to these two conditions; it admits of no third. 'Possibilities,' 'probabilities,' 'persuasions,' 'inmost convictions' are in the eyes of His Majesty nothing more than idle fancies by which he does not allow himself to be misled. If perchance . . . any hypothesis besides those mentioned might be admitted, it could only be this, that the same Providence which has always hitherto guided the Emperor has decreed that Berlin shall fall beneath his blow on the anniversary of the day upon which he entered Vienna."

Everything now depended upon whether the King of Prussia would accede to the demands of the Corsican. He had in reality taken up arms "from fear," but the same fear withheld him now from laying them down again. And besides this fear was concern for the position of the state as a power which seemed to be threatened in Hanover, so recently acquired; concern for the honour and majesty of the throne; and, finally, respect for a popular sentiment demanding resistance to France, which now for the first time made itself plainly felt.

For there was no denying that among the German people there was growing up a reaction of the nation against Napoleon's system of international conquest. Through the absolute arbitrariness with which the Emperor had cast off the republican forms of the Revolution he had made himself enemies of the democrats of Southern Germany, those who, even at the time of the Directory, had been full of enthusiasm about the "liberating" policy of France; his despotism and boundless ambition had exasperated those who valued the independence of their nation, who clung to their hereditary dynasties, and who regarded with disfavour their diminution. To be sure, besides those who were so opposed to Napoleon there were millions who, destitute of political sentiment of any kind, lived only for material gain and enjoyment, and would therefore prefer slavish tranquillity under the iron hand of the foreign power to the struggle for independence and freedom of action; and then again there were serious-minded men in whom the principle of equality had engendered sympathy with France, who saw their ideal in the

cosmopolitan union of the nations however brought about, and who therefore felt no antipathy to Napoleon, regarding him as the instrument through whom this was to be accomplished. But it was against just such as the last-mentioned that some of Germany's best thinkers now entered the arena in the early part of the year 1806: Schleiermacher, with his sermons upon the value of nationality; Fichte, with his speeches addressed to German warriors; Ernst Moritz Arndt, with his book on "The Spirit of the Times" and his crushing denunciation of the Corsican's ambition for universal dominion. Thus it was in the north. In the south appeared pamphlets and fugitive compositions deploring unreservedly the contemptible attitude of the nation. For it was felt to be ignominious and disgraceful that, in spite of the conclusion of peace, Napoleon should leave his army as a matter of course to domineer and support itself upon German soil. The French Emperor was aware of this new popular movement and did not underestimate it. but he hoped by means of a solitary example of inexorable severity to paralyze it at a blow. Consequently he instructed Berthier to proceed according to martial law against the Nuremberg publishers of these political libels, that is to say, to summon them before a military tribunal and have them shot at the expiration of twenty-four hours. As he wrote to the Major-General, August 5th, 1806, "the sentence will mean that wherever there is an army, it being the duty of the commander to provide for its safety, such and such individuals convicted of having tried to excite the inhabitants of Suabia against the French army are condemned to death." This might, perhaps, have been reasonable in time of war and in a hostile land, but here, in the midst of peace and in the country of an ally, such a proceeding was nothing else than absolute barbarity. It was not to be long ere a victim was found. One of the pamphlets, entitled "Germany in her Deep Abasement," had been written by one Yelin of Ansbach and was not at all an incendiary document. A Nuremberg bookseller, Palm, had published and circulated it and was now on that account arrested and, declining to save himself by flight, was shot in Braunau on August 25th,

1806. A tempest of indignation and despair swept over all Germany. What the execution of d'Enghien had been to the nobility the murder of Palm now was to the people. It was this occurrence more than any other which fostered the German hatred of the French, so that Frederick Gentz in writing from Saxony to Starhemberg, the Austrian diplomat, could say: "The war is to be a national war to the full intent of the word; within a short time all Germany will be taking part in it. The recent crimes of the French, and most of all that one of which the news has just filled all minds with horror, have incensed the nation to such a degree that, following upon the first success scored by the Prussians, a repetition of the Sicilian Vespers will everywhere be seen."

Even the leading circles of Berlin could not shut themselves away from these floods of popular feeling. Opposed to the "Frenchmen,"—as the peace-loving adherents of a neutral policy had been dubbed,—there had existed here for several years a "war party" which had counselled a close defensive alliance with Austria in 1804 and had been unreservedly in favour of joining the coalition in the following year. The hour of triumph had finally arrived to these advocates of resistance; who numbered among them such men as Stein, the Minister of Finance, Generals Blücher, Rüchel, and Pfull, the scholars Johannes von Müller and Alexander von Humboldt, with many others. Indeed, even at court, among those nearest to the king, the party counted its supporters: Queen Louise, the Princesses William and Radziwill, Princes Louis Ferdinand, William, Henry, and the Prince of Orange—all acknowledged adherence to it and urged that the state should rise warlike in self-defence rather than continue to sink peacefully into decay. But that which produced the deepest impression upon the mind of the tranquillity-loving king was the fact that, especially in the army, a feeling of positive antipathy to France was making itself evident, taking in some cases the form of serious deliberation and in others that of arrogant presumption; it turbulently demanded the dismissal of Haugwitz and idolized Hardenberg, who had drawn upon himself the hatred of Napoleon, even in

some cases overstepping the bounds of discipline. This had been hitherto unheard of in the Prussian army, and so overcame Frederick William with astonishment that for a moment he considered abdicating the throne. Of disarmament in response to Napoleon's demand no thought could now be entertained. A refusal was sent in response to it, and, solely for the sake of gaining time, Prussia renewed her demand in Paris for the withdrawal of the French army, this time in the form of an ultimatum, giving Napoleon until October 8th to return a decisive answer.

Only with reluctance and justifiable apprehension had the king allowed himself to be persuaded into this course. Russia he might indeed reckon upon as friendly, but support from the Czar could not, under the most favourable circumstances, reach the seat of war before the end of November. With England the existing quarrel must first be settled before there could be hope of receiving from her the subsidies indispensable to the course now entered upon. There remained as an ally only Saxony, which was exasperatingly slow about making her preparations for war, while the Elector of Hesse, selfishly regarding only his own interest, remained neutral. For the rest Prussia had but her own forces to rely upon. These Frederick William did not overrate.* During the long years of peace which had elapsed the defects in the military administration had become ineradicably fixed; the army was practically without a commander, for the only person qualified for the position—the Duke of Brunswick—was irresolute and enfeebled by age and—as a contemporary justly observed—“better fitted to receive than to issue orders.” So situated it certainly was an act of colossal

* Montgelas says in his “Memoirs” that “the King was by nature and principle opposed to all warlike undertaking and yielded rather to impulse from without than to any fixed conviction of his own. He feared Napoleon's superior genius and had little confidence in his own army, which seemed to him not in condition to carry on war with success. It is almost beyond question that he betook himself to the army with the idea that he should lose a battle and thus be furnished with a pretext for concluding peace, since then the most incredulous would be convinced that resistance was impossible.”

audacity for the Prussians to set themselves up against the ever-victorious leader of the French, and for a long time he himself could not be brought to believe that they had any such intention and simply designated the undertaking as insane. On September 10th he wrote to Berthier: "Say in strict confidence to the King of Bavaria that if I have a quarrel with Prussia—which I consider most unlikely—but if ever she should be guilty of such madness, he shall have Bayreuth." Within his inmost soul, however, there was nothing he so much dreaded as that Frederick William should, after all, decide to disarm and so deprive him of the favourable opportunity for overcoming him while single-handed. The Prussian army, especially its cavalry, enjoyed an excellent reputation throughout Europe, and Napoleon, who shared the general opinion of it, was not without disquietude. So much the more, therefore, did it behoove him to be on the alert to catch and destroy this army by itself. To accomplish this end the Prussian envoy to Paris was detained there in suspense without explanation, while the French ambassador to Berlin was directed to allow himself to be drawn into no agreement of any kind, but rather to feign illness if no other way of escape presented. And for this end the available forces had already been started weeks before in all possible quietness and secrecy in the direction of the Rhine and toward Aschaffenburg, in order to reinforce the army in Germany by 100,000 newly levied troops. For this it was that the Emperor himself suddenly left Paris on September 25th, without notifying the Senate, and journeyed in haste to Mainz, where he issued the final orders. The war had begun.

CHAPTER XIII

FROM JENA TO TILSIT

THE good opinion of the Prussian army which Napoleon entertained impelled him now to proceed with still greater caution than in the preceding year against the Austrians. For in this army he saw the creation of the great Frederick whom he so warmly admired, and its generals, if observant, might have acquainted themselves with his strategic manœuvres during the campaigns of 1800 and 1805 and have prepared themselves for defence against them. He wrote to Soult that he had disposed his forces so as to outnumber those of the enemy, because he proposed to leave nothing to chance and meant to attack the adversary with twice as many men as he could muster wherever he should make a stand. It was with eight corps (including the Guard) under command of the most trusted leaders, a strong cavalry reserve under Murat, and a Bavarian auxiliary contingent,—in all with about 200,000 men,—that he planned to attack Prussia, and that from the direction of Southern Germany on the line between Bamberg and Berlin, which he had weeks before ordered studied in detail by French officers. He expected to make this advance between the Thuringian Forest and the Erzgebirge with a force and rapidity which, with the heart of the Prussian kingdom so seriously threatened, should impel his opponent, whom he supposed in Thuringia, to withdraw to Magdeburg in order to hasten thence to the protection of the capital. These were still his plans when he wrote from Strasburg to the King of Holland. His line of retreat would be toward the Danube in case the enemy should meet him earlier than he had planned for, and, should this way be cut off through an advance of the enemy toward Southern Germany, he would pass over and beyond him along the line between Leipzig and Frank-

fort to the Rhine, which river was to be defended by his brother Louis from Wesel to this point, while a special corps under Mortier was to stand guard in the vicinity of Mainz. Thus prepared against all contingencies he could push forward his whole army toward the east without leaving occupied the space between the Rhine and Franconia. For to him that was the point of supreme importance,—and this he had learned from experience in the preceding year,—to keep all parts of his army directly under control “as a major does his battalion.” On October 5th, 1806, he communicated his orders to the various corps of the army: they were first to march in three columns toward Coburg, Lohenstein, and Hof, whence they were to proceed toward Gera by way of Saalfeld and Schleiz under his direction. Meanwhile the whereabouts and purposes of the enemy must be clearly ascertained.

But as to these his opponent was, alas, almost as much in the dark as Napoleon, and at the Prussian headquarters there was no appearance of a fixed plan of action. Only a year previous an army of 250,000 men had been levied; the present enumeration revealed scarcely the half of that number, and in any case it was vastly inferior to that arrayed against it. The King had entrusted the supreme command to the Duke of Brunswick, the same man who had commanded the German army in 1792 and 1793, but, unwilling to absent himself from the field of honour, he joined the army in person. The fact of his presence was not without unfortunate consequences. His military surroundings prejudiced him against the measures taken by the commander-in-chief and, as a result of the weak and irresolute character of the Duke, it soon became a question—as it was expressed by one of the officers present in a letter of October 6th—“whether ‘headquarters’ was to be regarded as meaning the King or the Duke.” This officer was none other than Colonel Scharnhorst, chief of the general staff at headquarters. He had already, weeks before, elaborated a plan of attack whose high value has found appreciation in later criticism; the army, according to this, should cross the Thuringian Forest in order to gain the plain beyond, where the excellent cavalry might be

used to the best advantage. The army would thus have been two weeks ahead of the enemy in making its way to this region, giving promise of a successful encounter. But the King clung with such pertinacity to the thought of peace that he was ready to sacrifice anything rather than appear to violate it. He was desirous of waiting until after October 8th, which was the date set for the reply of France to his ultimatum. But no reply arrived. Instead of it came the French themselves, making the execution of Scharnhorst's plan impossible. For the advanced position along the Thuringian Forest was senseless unless the army were taking the offensive, while, in consequence of this period of waiting, the Prussians were forced upon the defensive, to which the position which they then held—with their centre under Brunswick at Erfurt, the right wing under Rüchel at Gotha, and the left under Hohenlohe at Weimar—was thoroughly unfavourable. When it was learned, then, that the French were marching upon them in the east, it was the opinion at headquarters—that is to say, of Scharnhorst and Brunswick—that it was best to venture an attack of the entire army upon Napoleon's flank; but in this also the commander-in-chief was not allowed to have his way. It was only after prolonged discussion that it was decided to send Hohenlohe ahead to the Saale, where his troops engaged on the 9th at Schleiz the French middle column, and on the 10th at Saalfeld, their western column. It was here at Saalfeld that Prince Louis Ferdinand, who commanded the vanguard, was killed—an event more demoralizing in its effect upon the army than the loss of the battle. Several of the generals demanded categorically the removal of the commander-in-chief, attributing to him all the mistakes in the conduct of the war, whereas the only one which could really be ascribed to him lay in having yielded to obey where he should have commanded.

While matters were thus shaping themselves in the most unfavourable way for the Prussians, Napoleon had been acquainting himself, on his way to Gera, in regard to his opponent, whose principal force he concluded to be at Erfurt. He at once recognized the possibility of outflanking him. On October 12th

he gave orders for the whole army to abandon its northward course and wheel about to the left in the direction of the Saale, this being the same manœuvre which he had executed the year before after crossing the Danube, and in 1800 when beyond the Po. Before the close of the same day Murat reached Naumburg with his cavalry. When word of all this was brought to the Prussian headquarters indescribable consternation prevailed. No hope of escape from being surrounded by the enemy remained to the Duke except in decampment that very night. But, as if the necessity for this step were not obvious enough to the most undiscerning, it was not until after nine precious hours had been wasted in discussion that it was put into execution, during all of which time the enemy was inexorably drawing nearer. So it was that Davout, hastening ahead toward the west with his corps, encountered at Auerstädt the main body of the army under Brunswick while on the march, and that at Jena Napoleon with the bulk of his troops came upon Hohenlohe, who was to conduct the rear-guard and protect the retreat of the army toward the north.

At both points battle was waged on October 14th. Napoleon had for days been longing for such an encounter. He supposed himself to be now in face of the principal force of his adversary, and, drawing to himself all the corps at his disposal, he attacked Hohenlohe with a number vastly superior to those opposed to him. Early in the morning, while it was yet dark, Napoleon rode up to the troops commanded by Marshal Lannes, who were to be the first to come under fire, and reminded them of the victories of the previous year, saying that matters now stood exactly as they had at the time when they captured Mack. This corps then, in company with the advance-guard under Ney, so stout-heartedly withstood the attack of the entire hostile army as to enable the Emperor to hold the Guard in reserve until the arrival of fresh forces.*

* It was on this occasion that from the ranks of the Guard there suddenly resounded behind Napoleon an impulsive cry of "Forward!" whereat the Emperor rebuked the over-confident speaker with the observation that he should wait until he had commanded in twenty battles before venturing to advise him.

With these the task of overcoming the enemy was soon accomplished. Hohenlohe, recognizing the greatness of the danger, had sent to summon the assistance of Rüchel with his army, but the latter was prevented from coming to his rescue by a contrary order from the commander-in-chief, and when, later, he arrived in spite of it upon the field of battle, Hohenlohe had already been overpowered and there was no possibility of changing the outcome of the battle. Napoleon's cavalry threw itself upon the Prussians as they began to give way, and the army turned and fled in wild confusion.

While this was taking place near Jena, Brunswick had joined battle with Davout at Auerstädt, and, in spite of the advantage which Prussia here enjoyed in point of numbers,—she had 35,000 against 33,000 of the French,—in this action also she was defeated. The advantage had been with the Prussians in the early part of the battle, and victory must have been theirs had General Kalkreuth brought his reserve force of 18,000 men into action. He failed to do so because he received no orders to that effect, and no orders could reach him because the general-in-chief, mortally wounded, was no longer able to issue commands and there remained no sort of unity of direction. It had thus become impossible for the troops to clear the way for themselves through Naumburg, and the King, who now assumed supreme command, ordered a retreat to Weimar, where he hoped to find the detachments of Rüchel and Hohenlohe intact; the wiser course, which would have been to swerve toward the north, he refused to consider for a moment. But instead of finding comrades he came upon the enemy; it was a moment of most cruel disappointment and at the same time of great personal danger. Headquarters and the remnants of the army were soon in irrepressible flight before the pursuing French. Instead of reassembling, the army dissolved almost completely, desertion became general, and discipline a thing of the past. Of the original 130,000 soldiers there soon remained only 10,000 of the regular troops, who, conducted by Hohenlohe, described the arc of a great circle through Nordhausen, Magdeburg, and Neu-Ruppin to Prenzlau in the

Uckermark [northern Brandenburg], where they were finally brought to capitulation by Murat, who asseverated to the German general that his corps was surrounded by 100,000 French soldiers, a statement as completely without foundation in fact as the romance he had invented the year before of a conclusion of peace when the question involved was the taking of the bridges over the Danube at Vienna. Other smaller detachments surrendered likewise, that of Blücher, however, not without heroic resistance—a notable exception. Added to these disasters came the deliverance to the enemy of all the most important fortresses throughout the land, and the haste manifested in their surrender by those in command was a disgrace without parallel in history. Thus it was at Erfurt and again at Magdeburg,—whither had fled for safety a reserve army which had suffered defeat at Halle,—and the same was true of Stettin and Cüstrin. “Those were days of horror,” wrote Captain von Gneisenau to a friend; “better a thousand times to die than experience them again. These will make an extraordinary page in our history.”

There being now nothing further to bar the way, Napoleon, surrounded by pomp and splendour, rode triumphantly into Berlin on October 27th, 1806. As Coignet reports: “The Emperor was proud in his modest apparel, with his little hat and penny cockade. His staff, on the contrary, was in full uniform, and to the foreigners it was a curious thing to see in the most meanly clad of them all the leader of so fine an army.” On the previous day he had stood beside the tomb of Frederick II. in Potsdam; the effect of the admiration which he professed for the dead hero was, however, marred by his act in taking thence Frederick's sword and sash and sending them as a gift to the Invalides at Paris.

Arrived at Berlin he computed the measure of his victories. They had delivered into his hand all Prussian territories as far as the Vistula, and it was not exaggeration when on November 12th he proclaimed to the world at large from the residence of the Hohenzollerns: “The entire kingdom of Prussia is in my power.” The only question was whether it would so remain.

Prussian arms could, it is true, no longer hope to avert the downfall of the Fatherland, for, except for a little band of 15,000 men and a few fortresses in Silesia and on the Baltic Sea, the armed forces of the country had been dispersed and annihilated. But there were other enemies still left to Napoleon. One of these—Russia—had already declared itself Prussia's friend and champion, while another—England—might become such at any moment. For it was part of the Napoleonic system that his policy must always embrace the whole continent and therefore never could deal with one opponent alone.

On the day after the battle, the aid-de-camp of the conquered king had arrived at the French headquarters with an appeal for peace. This Napoleon declined to grant, saying that he had already gained too great advantages not to follow them up as far as Berlin; peace would there more easily be determined upon. Frederick William then sent Lucchesini to him with full powers to sign preliminaries of peace. Hanover, Bayreuth, and all territory west of the Weser, besides a handsome sum of money as war-indemnity, were what they were prepared to pay for the privilege of being left undisturbed. But the conditions imposed by the enemy were far beyond anything conceived by Prussia. He demanded all territory to the left of the Elbe up to Magdeburg and the Altmark, 100,000,000 francs war-indemnity, and, over and above this, Prussia's consent that Saxony and the German countries beyond the Elbe should become identified with the Confederation of the Rhine. Lucchesini and von Zastrow, the Prussian minister, had agreed without undue delay to accept these harsh terms, a resolve to which they were the more readily brought by a rumour which had gained currency that the Emperor was about to re-establish the ancient kingdom of Poland, of whose lands Prussia now owned vast stretches, including Warsaw and Posen. But by this time Napoleon had concluded to impose conditions even more severe. Hohenlohe had meanwhile capitulated, and the French columns had reached out even as far as the Vistula. Success so vast ought surely to be employed to some better advantage than simply to make peace with Prussia alone! The

Emperor increased his demands, and finally stopped talking of peace altogether; for the present he would grant nothing but a suspension of hostilities, and that only under the most oppressive conditions: the French were to occupy the whole country up to the Bug River, eight fortresses were to be surrendered,—Danzig, Kolberg, Thorn, and Graudenz among them,—while the Russians, who were already standing upon East Prussian soil, were to be ordered out of the country by the King. Even this was agreed to by the envoys who signed the treaty on November 16th. But the King would none of it. He recognized that in such conditions the aim was none other than the complete disarmament of Prussia and separation between the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg. Relying upon Russia's aid, he determined to risk resistance to his mighty foe. When Napoleon learned of Frederick William's refusal to ratify the treaty, he drafted a proclamation embodying for the House of Brandenburg the same deadly intent as had been conveyed in the Decree of Schönbrunn in respect to the Court of Naples: that it had ceased to reign. This difference, however, existed between the two occasions: at the time of the former, toward the end of December, 1805, the decisive victory had already been gained, and in this case the battle was yet to be fought. For the time being the proclamation was not made public.

For Napoleon everything depended upon vanquishing the ever-advancing Russians. This task he did not confide to his army alone. He proceeded at once with a scheme for playing off the Poles against the empire of the Czar. Under his protection there arose a committee of insurrection at Warsaw, and a deputation of the high nobility from Posen, which appeared in Berlin on November 19th, received from him the assurance that France had never acknowledged the partition of Poland and that he himself, as Emperor of the French, would feel a deep interest in seeing the national throne re-established. On November 25th he repaired in person to Posen in order to stimulate the insurrection to a yet greater degree. Many were the tokens of homage bestowed upon him as the liberator of the Fatherland, and he was unsparing in his use of encouraging words until

an enrolment of volunteers was under way in Warsaw which furnished a national guard of 60,000 men. Not that he had the slightest intention of furthering the ideal aim of the Polish nation; sentiments of that kind had long before ceased to appeal to him, and, as he was shortly to make evi~~lent~~ in Spain, he was fast reaching the point where he was no longer able even to understand them. In Poland he saw nothing more than an instrument convenient to the furtherance of his policy, one which should now be made to serve his ends against Prussia and Russia, but which he was resolved to set aside as soon as its utility to himself should be exhausted. A single unfortunate feature in these plans lay in the fact that Austria, like the other two states, now included extensive Polish territories, at that time reaching northward to the Bug River, and would necessarily be affected by a national uprising upon its borders, while Napoleon had every reason for remaining on the best possible terms with the power on the Danube in order to be safe from attack upon his flank. Accordingly, through General Andréossy, his ambassador at Vienna, he had the suggestion made to Stadion, the Austrian minister, that Austria should exchange her Polish provinces for Prussian Silesia. But Russia, likewise on the alert, had at the same time sent Pozzo di Borgo, a fellow countryman of Napoleon's, as her envoy to the Viennese court. Austria, thus approached by both of the rival powers, declined to listen to either and remained neutral, contenting herself with pushing a corps of observation gradually forward toward the Prussian frontier, partly to prevent a revolt in Galicia and partly in order not to be unarmed while watching further developments in the northeast.

Napoleon was now prepared to play a second trump against Russia in the shape of the Eastern question. It has been already repeatedly intimated that it was Napoleon's purpose to include Turkey in his system of universal sovereignty of Europe; this was really the ultimate cause of hostilities with Russia. It was, then, but natural that after his victorious campaign of 1805 he should take up this plan again. In January, 1806, the generals of his suite had already begun to make conjectures that he was meditating an expedition to Turkey, and by the

following May the Prussian envoy reported to his government that the Emperor was planning alliances with the Porte, with the Republic of Ragusa, and with Persia, and that General Sébastiani had imparted to him Napoleon's conviction that Russia would have to be crowded back behind a barrier erected between the Baltic and the Black Sea. This same Sébastiani was sent soon after this on a special mission to Constantinople; he was instructed, in case the Czar should refuse to make peace with France, to incite the Porte against him, and he was actually in so far successful as to induce the Sultan, Selim III., against the letter of an earlier treaty, to dispossess the Woiwodes of Moldavia and Wallachia, who were partisans of Russia, whereat the Czar, who had long been waiting merely for a pretext, sent an army down to the lower Danube. On November 11th, 1806, Napoleon wrote from Berlin to the frightened Grand Seignior that all Prussia was subject to him and that he was following up his advantages at the head of 300,000 men, adding that Fate had ordained the continuance of the Turkish Empire and had chosen himself as its saviour; that now was the moment for advancing to the Dniester with an Ottoman army, whilst he was himself operating against Russia from the region of the Vistula. Of course his object was simply thus to divide the Russian forces so that they might not all stand opposed to him at once and at the same time to fasten Austria's political attention upon the Danube, since Vienna could not view with unconcern any encroachments of Russia upon Turkish territory. In both attempts he was successful. Alexander I. declared war against the Porte and despatched 80,000 men against that power, and through the progress of the Russian troops upon the lower Danube Austria actually was prevented later on from making a close alliance with her northern neighbour against Napoleon. The attempt to entice Vienna with Silesia as bait had indeed miscarried, but the same end had been reached by awakening her apprehensions in regard to Russia.

But Great Britain, the most powerful enemy of Napoleon's policy, was just awakening to the fact that her formidable opponent had laid in ruins a state upon the Continent. On

November 21st a decree was issued from Berlin to all the world declaring England to be in a state of blockade and closing to her the Continent as far as it lay within the circle of Napoleonic supremacy. It will be remembered with what precision Bonaparte had devised this programme back in 1802 upon the first indications of renewed hostilities. "If England attempts to kindle war upon the Continent, her course will compel the First Consul to conquer all Europe." These had been his words in that memorable letter written by Talleyrand to Otto.* The Emperor was well on his way toward the fulfilment of that threat, and Great Britain must, of course, suffer the consequences. "The British Isles," so reads the decree of Berlin, "are from the present time in a state of blockade; all commerce with them is forbidden; letters and parcels bearing an English address shall be confiscated, as also every English warehouse upon the Continent, whether upon the territory of France or that of its allies; the same shall be true of all English merchandise; all English vessels, as also those coming to the Continent from English colonies and bonded ports, shall be refused entrance to any European port. Any English subject found upon French soil shall be made prisoner of war." This decree was preceded by the statement that, since the English had arbitrarily extended the rights of war upon the sea to cover also private property, the Emperor had concluded to repay them on land with the same coin. To the mind of this extraordinary man, with a determination knowing absolutely no bounds, his purpose stood clearly defined. Europe was to be rendered submissive to himself to enable him as its lord to close it against England. Great Britain's commerce and industries must in consequence stagnate and fall into decay, and if it should ever become possible by land to divert from her the stream of riches flowing in from India, the proud island realm would be conquered and would have no choice but to submit to him who alone remained to sway the sceptre over land and sea.† This goal was indeed

* See p. 266

† There can be no question that the Emperor was constantly intent upon India. His brother Joseph testified to that effect in conversation

still far distant, and the men upon the chess-board of Europe must first be moved about with skill and artifice until the last king was checkmated; but the end seemed not unattainable, and it was with a mind filled with these designs that Napoleon led his army against the Russians. And were not these the same forces whom he had with but little trouble vanquished the year previous? Moreover, since that time the self-confidence of his troops had but increased as a result of new triumphs over the dreaded Prussian army. He, then, if any man, was justified in the belief that the destiny of a world lay within his clenched fist.

On November 27th, 1806, the day upon which Napoleon reached Posen, the advance-guard of Murat's cavalry came upon Russian troops at Blonje to the west of Warsaw. General Bennigsen commanded the most advanced of the two Russian armies, General Buxhōwden the other which was approaching. Before the French armies, which were being hurried forward by forced marches, General Bennigsen withdrew to Warsaw and finally across the Vistula and Narew to Ostrolenka, where he thought best to wait until the second column should come up before again moving forward. This junction of forces took place before the middle of December, whereupon he pushed forward with his troops as far as Pultusk and the Ukra. The Russian army was re-enforced by an East Prussian corps, 13,000 men strong, under L'Estocq, who took up his position to the east of Thorn, constituting a sort of right wing to the formation. General Kamenski was commander-in-chief of the united forces. The French occupied Warsaw and Thorn and crossed the Vistula on a line between these two points: the corps of Bessières, Ney, and Bernadotte turned eastward from Thorn, while Murat, Davout, and Lannes marched toward the north from Warsaw; between them Augereau and Soult advanced toward the Ukra, which they crossed under fire from the enemy and in the presence of Napoleon, who had come up by way of Warsaw, with the Prussian envoy at that time, and Napoleon himself told his physician O'Meara at St. Helena that in 1806 after the war with Austria he had planned an expedition to Hindustan. In the same year three agents were sent to Persia in the interest of France.

The Emperor, who now conjectured the principal force of the enemy to be at Golymin, west of Pultusk, decided upon attacking it from in front at that point with two corps, while Lannes with his corps should march to the right upon Pultusk and thus prevent the retreat of the Russians across the Narew, Soult and Bernadotte meanwhile directing their course around to the left, toward Makow, in order to cut off the road to Ostrolenka. Like all plans previously conceived by Napoleon this was based upon the idea of annihilating the enemy; it resulted in complete failure. The body of the Russian army was located, not at Golymin, but at Pultusk, where, on December 26th, it sustained an indecisive battle against Lannes, making possible its retreat across the Narew, and the forces with which Napoleon engaged on the same day at Golymin proved to be nothing more than the rear-guard of the hostile army and which, though beaten, was allowed to draw off toward the north without pursuit. With the enemy situated in this wise Soult's flank movement was rendered absolutely objectless. The Russians had thus escaped the encompassing arms of the French army, while the latter had no other gain to show than that of a few square miles of barren land.

What a change from the tales of victory during the last few months! And such unvarying success made Napoleon imprudent. For lack of caution was clearly manifest in attempting to fall upon the enemy without arranging—as ever before—to keep the army concentrated, and again to base a double encircling manœuvre upon a supposition which had not been proved a certainty. Moreover, there were also attendant difficulties of which it is evident that the Emperor had scarcely estimated the full importance beforehand. The tract of country in which these encounters were taking place had shortly before been occupied by the Russians, who on their departure had carried with them everything transportable and destroyed the rest, so that the French who followed came only upon desert places affording nothing in the way of food or shelter. Hunger confronted them. The requisition system had to be abandoned and storehouses established, and, as has been repeatedly testified

by eye-witnesses, the only thing which saved the army from starvation was the spirit of speculation among the Jews. To add to their other misfortunes, the marshy soil was now softened by a sudden thaw, making the task of reconnoitring more than ever difficult and hampering all movements of the army. The entire region was like a sea of mud over knee-deep in which the gallant soldiers waded and, weak from hunger, dragged themselves laboriously forward, while the artillery stuck fast in the bog and became useless. On the march toward Pultusk there were outbursts of direst despair, and many a valiant soldier, who but shortly before had courageously faced death in battle, now took his own life. Even the Emperor's own coach could go no further over roads so seemingly without bottom; a horse had to be led up to the carriage door, so that he could ride on to Pultusk where, a few days before, Lannes's soldiers, up to the thighs in mire, had braved the fire of the enemy for eight long hours. Along this road, as his troops passed before him, the Emperor saw the depth of misery to which they were reduced and overheard complaints uttered against their will by even those most loyal to him—the soldiers of the Guard.* This made a deep impression upon him. A year before—it was on the day before the battle of Austerlitz—he had spoken amongst his generals of his former plans in respect to the East. One of them ventured to express the opinion that the scheme might even now be resumed, since the army was after all on the way toward Constantinople; but he was checked by Napoleon: "I know the French," said he. "Long expeditions are not easily put through with them. . . . France is too beautiful; they do not like to get so far from it or to remain away for so long." How much more unhappy, then, their lot here under conditions so absolutely desperate, with every manœuvre hampered and

* It would be a mistake to accept the assurances of Savary and Rapp that in the reproaches which the troops allowed to reach the ears of the Emperor there existed in reality nothing more than the rough jokes of a body of soldiers. They were meant in all seriousness. Coignet, for instance, relates that the Guards, upon the return to winter quarters, met with sharp reproof that they had not held out more courageously in time of adversity.

every art of warfare laughed to scorn!* On December 2d, the anniversary of Austerlitz, in an order of the day he had reminded the troops of the victory in Moravia. "Soldiers," said he, "we are not going to lay down our arms until universal peace shall have established and secured the power of our allies and shall have restored to our commerce its liberty and its colonies. Upon the Elbe and the Oder we have gained Pondicherry, our enterprises in the Indies, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spanish colonies. Who would give to the Russians the right to control Destiny? Who would give them the right to frustrate plans so appropriate? They and we—are not both the soliders of Austerlitz?" But what cared these brave warriors in the swamps of Poland for Pondicherry and the Spanish colonies? Were France, perchance, in danger, or even only her glory and her extent, the appeal would not have been in vain. Moreover, it seemed as if the Russians of Pultusk really were no longer those of Austerlitz. They had fought and endured quite as valiantly on December 26th as had the soldiers of the invader. And Napoleon recognized that he durst not overstrain the bow which constituted his only weapon. Therefore, instead of following in pursuit of the retreating enemy, he allowed the army to move into winter quarters. Along the Vistula from Elbing to Warsaw depots were set up for each army corps, but the troops themselves remained on the farther side of the river, pushed forward to a line running from the Frische Haff through Willenberg and Ostrolenka to Warsaw. The difficulties attending the commissariat had made necessary this unusual extension.

But this time of repose did not continue for long. The Russians had retreated in two columns in the direction of Grodno and Bielostok, and later united under command of Bennigsen near Szuczyn. Through the retreat of their allies the Prussians under L'Estocq had likewise been crowded toward the East into the vicinity of Angerburg, so that communication with Dan-

* The Duke of Fézensac alludes repeatedly in his "Souvenirs" to the impossibility of collecting sufficient intelligence by means of reconnoissance, and describes the extraordinary hardships attending the performance of the duties of an orderly.

zig was entirely cut off and even the route to Königsberg lay exposed to sudden attack by the French. And such an attack was actually attempted. Ney, whose corps was encamped between Thorn and Willenberg and had suffered great privation, acting upon his own responsibility set out with his troops toward the north in the early part of January, 1807, in order to find better quarters for them and, if possible, to capture Königsberg—a move which greatly vexed Napoleon, by whom he was sharply reprimanded and ordered back to his post. In the course of this excursion the Marshal had, however, chanced upon the Prussian corps, the consequence of which was that Bennigsen had arisen with his entire army to destroy Ney while on the march in an exposed condition, and to force Bernadotte, who occupied the region about Elbing, back across the Vistula and thus re-establish communication with Danzig. His expectation was, then, while giving protection to the fortresses and being at the same time supported by them, to acquire a strong position. By this stroke Napoleon might perhaps be induced to give up his threatening position at Warsaw and concentrate his forces farther West.

The news of this offensive movement on the part of the enemy reached Napoleon in Warsaw, whither he had repaired from Pultusk in order to gain some repose for himself also. The capital of the former kingdom of Poland was doing its utmost to please and flatter him. the women being by no means the most backward in their complaisance, and it is alleged that Napoleon gave no cause for being considered prudish. But at the news of Bennigsen's proceeding he tore himself at once away and promptly determined upon his course of action. He, also, would assume the offensive. With his army united in a compact mass he would strike northwards, break through the enemy's long line of march before it could concentrate its detachments for battle, and scatter its various corps. Fortunately for Bennigsen, this plan was revealed to him through a letter from headquarters to Bernadotte which was intercepted. Acting upon this information, he hurriedly collected about himself all his detachments and tried to evade the collision with the French

by turning northward in the direction of Guttstadt and Landsberg. During his march forward he had directed the Prussian corps to describe the arc of a great circle about Freistadt to the west of Mohrungen, and this body of troops had now in like manner to hasten toward the north so as to escape the French and be enabled to unite itself with the Grand Army. Napoleon's purpose was thus already frustrated. He might, it is true, still overtake the enemy, but he could not surprise him; he might conquer but not annihilate him. With five corps he pressed on beyond Willenberg; a sixth remained behind on the Narew to keep watch; a seventh under Bernadotte, who had received no orders, could only follow far in the rear. It was not until February 7th. when they reached Prussian Eylau, that they came upon Bennigsen, who now drew up his forces for battle and on the same day repulsed the foremost detachments of the French under Murat and Soult. Meanwhile, however, came up the body of the French army with the exception of Ney, who had kept behind L'Estocq's corps in order to hinder its junction with Bennigsen. On the morning of February 8th the hostile armies were drawn up opposite one another for battle. The forces were about equal in number, from 70,000 to 80,000 men on each side; the Russians had the advantage only in point of artillery. The snow blown by the icy north wind did not yet cover the victims of the previous day's encounter, but already the struggle had recommenced, and this was to be bloodier than any of the battles yet fought. After a prolonged artillery combat Napoleon proceeded to the attack. He was prepared, if need be, to sacrifice his left wing in order to triumph the more decisively with his right. Augereau, who formed the connecting link between the centre and Davout, here rushed forward upon the central point of the Russian line much as Soult had done at Austerlitz. But how different the result! There the enemy gave way, while here he not only stood his ground, but drove back the assailant with heavy loss. Grape-shot fell like hail upon the corps advancing toilsomely in the face of the snow-storm, and, as it wheeled, the Russian cavalry fell upon and put to the sword half of the devoted band. On charged the horse-

men of the enemy, headed direct for the cemetery of Eylau, where Napoleon had taken up his station, insomuch that his suite already called for horses in order to remove headquarters to a place of safety. But the Emperor is said to have impatiently motioned his disapproval and contented himself with ordering forward a detachment of the Guard, at sight of which the troop of horse, now quite out of breath, turned to the right-about. But it was only with the greatest difficulty, and using as a screen 80 squadrons which Murat assembled for a mighty attack, that he was able to fill the gap thus made in his position. At this point Davout entered the lists and pushed his way relentlessly forward against the left wing of the Russians, and this he succeeded in turning completely so that it faced northwards, whereupon he proceeded to cut off the enemy's line of retreat. Bennigsen's army seemed lost when suddenly appeared Scharnhorst with a few thousands of L'Estocq's Prussians, the remainder having been left behind in combat with Ney; this last-comer immediately turned upon Davout and forced him back a long distance. Orders to take part in the battle had not been received by Ney until noon, and by the time he reached the left wing darkness had already put a stop to the hideous carnage.

The losses mounted up into the tens of thousands. Weeks afterward there yet remained mounds of unburied dead, and untold numbers of wounded, suffering from hunger as well as from their injuries, sought a miserable shelter in the roofless houses of Eylau or in abandoned ammunition-wagons. Augereau's corps had suffered such frightful loss as to make it necessary to disband it altogether. And all this sacrifice had been made for nothing! For the battle had remained indecisive. Napoleon for the first time had failed to win. In the first few hours after the battle he had even considered retreat, and wrote to Duroc that it would soon be necessary to transfer headquarters to Thorn, and that consignments of funds might be retained in Küstrin and Posen, since it was possible that he should retire to the left bank of the Vistula "in order to secure quiet winter quarters sheltered from the Cossacks and from that swarm of light troops." But Bennigsen ordered it otherwise.

At midnight he decamped with his Russian army, and on the morning of February 9th the French found a clear field before them. Napoleon at once accepted this as a concession of victory to himself. Scharnhorst denounced it as "a sin and a shame." Napoleon, however, unhesitatingly and at once laid claim to the proffered laurels; his bulletin, giving a garbled report of the manner in which the battle had gone, announced to all the world his triumph, and, rather for the sake of confirming his statements than with any hope of deriving profit from the expedition, he despatched Murat a few days' journey in pursuit of the retreating enemy.* This done, however, he withdrew his entire army behind the Passarge and had them there resume winter quarters, since he felt himself too weak to follow up the enemy. For the losses incurred in battle had not been alone in reducing the strength of his army. Many thousands, driven by hunger and want, had dropped from the ranks and were roving over the country, extorting, from the wretched inhabitants by dint of craft or violence the little yet remaining to them. And such was the effect of this example of levying contributions without authorization that the number of such marauders was estimated by one of the generals as reaching nearly 60,000.† Others may have been intimidated by the

* The hand of the Bonaparte of old is at once recognizable again in the letter written by the Emperor to Cambacérès in which he directs him to insert in the "Moniteur" that the Russian army was wholly disbanded; and again in the 61st bulletin, where he says that Königsberg may congratulate herself that it did not come within his plans to follow the Russians up closely; and still again when in several letters written on the same day he gives different figures as the number of lost: 3000 wounded in his account to Cambacérès, 7000 to 8000 in that intended for Daru. The truth was that there were three times that number.

† This is the number according to Fézensac. How terrible was the destitution may be learned from Coignet's narrative. The Emperor himself wrote of it to Joseph and to Talleyrand. In a letter to the former he says: "We are living here in the midst of snow and mud, without wine, without brandy, without bread." France, to be sure, was not to be informed of their situation, and therefore one of his letters to Fouché contained also a statement to the effect that "the sanitary condition of the army was perfect, that it was supplied with provisions enough for a

indomitable valour of the Russians, which excited even Napoleon's admiration at Eylau. Others there were, as Baron von Gagern claims to have personally known, who openly resented the abominable slaughter of human beings for the sole purpose of ministering to the insane ambition of a single individual. Thus situated, the Emperor resolved upon acquiring a firm position in regions where it would be easier to care for the troops and to assemble re-enforcements so as to march against the enemy, when the awful winter should have passed, with forces greater than his. He would, no doubt, have even better preferred to withdraw to the other side of the Vistula, as he was counselled to do by his generals, including even the pliable Berthier. But that would have looked like retreat before the Russians, whose commander-in-chief had not neglected to proclaim himself victor of Pultusk and Eylau. Therefore there must be no further concessions; the army had to remain posted between the Vistula and the Passarge facing eastward, with Ney's corps as van-guard pushed forward as far as Allenstein on the Alle, while another under Masséna still remained unchanged in position on the Narew. This arrangement afforded the advantage,—and it was the only gain resulting from the last battle,—that the Russians were thus cut off from the route to Danzig, whose fortress was now most zealously besieged.

✓ Napoleon selected Osterode as the place for his headquarters. And even here for weeks at a time there was not more than just enough to support the army, and he and his officers frequently subsisted upon what the soldiers tracked down and brought back. At first he had to be satisfied with a barn as dwelling-place until something more suitable could be found. It was not until early in April, when he moved into the castle of Finkenstein, that his surroundings became in any wise comfortable. Nevertheless he endured the misery of the hard winter with a cheerfulness of spirit which was an example to his officers, while physically the toils of the campaign seemed rather beneficial to him than otherwise; he later asserted that he had never felt whole year, and that it was absurd to imagine that in a country like Poland there could be any lack of bread, meat, and wine."

better in his life. Osterode was the scene of much animation. Innumerable messengers came and went. Here the Emperor developed a marvellous rapidity of execution, and Savary was not without grounds for the assertion in his Memoirs that Napoleon would have required at the least three months in a large city for the business which he accomplished in less than one in this little hole of Osterode, where he had everything immediately at hand and could at once set it in motion. And there was plenty of occasion for unceasing labour, for Napoleon's political situation corresponded with the military outlook and was not a whit more encouraging. Turkey had not been successful in overcoming Russia and in compelling her to put forth a great display of forces upon the lower Danube; on the contrary, the advantage there lay entirely upon the side of the northern power, so that the Czar might consider transferring half of the corps from that expedition to the northern theatre of war. From Austria, whose attitude had remained uncertain, came tidings of armament which were exaggerated by the envoy Andréossy in his reports into readiness for war. The Swedes were advancing upon Stralsund, and a way must be found for warding off or at least paralyzing their attack. England was announcing to the world at large that she was on the point of sending an expeditionary corps to the North Sea coast of the Continent, which made it necessary for France to post an army of its own under Brune at the points threatened. Even Spain, heretofore so submissive, seemed about to raise difficulties. To add to these perplexities, at the news of the retreat to the Passarge rentes had fallen at the exchange in Paris, and with them confidence in the Emperor. Without question, then, Napoleon had plenty to do if he were going to improve his situation or even to prevent being attacked during the next few weeks which he needed for strengthening his army.

His first step was to renew advances to Frederick William. Immediately after the battle of Eylau—as if Scharnhorst's valorous deed had brought Prussia to life again—that state acquired new importance in the eyes of the would-be conqueror, and from the battle-field itself he wrote to Talleyrand at War-

saw, directing him to re-establish relations with the Hohenzollerns. Indeed, so much in haste did he feel to have this accomplished that the way via Poland came to seem too long, and a few days later he sent his aid-de-camp, Bertrand, direct to the King at Memel to offer him the restitution of all his territory as far as the Elbe if he would conclude a separate treaty of peace with France. But Frederick William held stanch to his ally, and notified his adversary of this determination by a special messenger, whereupon Napoleon declared himself willing even to take part in a congress relative to the negotiation of a general peace, provided only—and to him that was the important point—an armistice should be agreed upon relegating the French behind the Vistula, but the Russians behind the Niemen. But this also he was unsuccessful in obtaining. Instead, Prussia and Russia allied themselves only the more closely by a treaty signed at Bartenstein, April 26th, 1807, according to the terms of which England, Sweden, Austria, and Denmark should be solicited to unite once more with the original parties to the treaty in forming a great coalition of liberation with the object of driving out Napoleon from Germany and Italy. Under no circumstances, however, was either Russia or Prussia to conclude a separate peace with France.

Rebuffed by Prussia, Napoleon turned to Austria. He commissioned Andréossy to demand from that country that it should at last make a positive declaration of its intentions; he was, moreover, to state that the Emperor of the French was still willing and ready to conclude an alliance for the sake of which he would give up Silesia, which had been nearly completely conquered by his troops,—meaning those of the Confederation of the Rhine,—and even, in case of necessity, to exchange Dalmatia for some equivalent. But Austria turned a deaf ear to these proposals also. Vienna, where Archduke Charles was foremost in counselling against taking part in the war, was prepared to offer nothing beyond her mediation, and submitted the following as basis for the same: a readjustment of German affairs, the integrity of Turkey, the division of Poland as heretofore, and the participation of England in the negotiations.

(April 3d, 1807.) And even to these conditions Napoleon was disposed to accede, if for nothing more than the sake of having nothing to fear from Austria during the next few weeks; but to the mediatorial proposals of Vienna Russia and Prussia replied with a pressing invitation to take part in the Treaty of Bartenstein. This again Emperor Francis felt called upon to refuse, considering that it would be better to wait until Napoleon had been defeated before taking the step, while Russia, being too weak to bring about this result unaided, wanted Austria's help precisely on this account. It was, then, vastly to the advantage of France that Austria decided upon remaining neutral. "This was," says Montgelas in his Memoirs, "at all events the greatest service ever rendered to Napoleon, for he would never have been able to resist an attack from Austria." The French Emperor could hardly bring himself to believe in such good fortune and felt by no means secure in respect to his right flank.

So much the greater his zeal, therefore, in attempting to instil new life into the Turkish forces and in organizing in the East a great coalition against Alexander. He tried to bring about an agreement between the Porte and Persia, so that the latter also might take up arms against Russia. "Persia also must be roused"—were his directions sent to Sébastiani—"so that it shall direct its energies against Georgia. Prevail upon the Porte to give orders to the Pasha of Erzerum to march with all his forces against that province. Maintain the good will of the Prince of the Abkhasians, and persuade him into taking part in the great diversion against the common enemy." Even this seemed to him not enough. Toward the end of April there arrived at Finkenstein a messenger from the Shah, and with him Napoleon concluded a treaty in which he bound himself to compel the evacuation of Georgia by Russia and to send cannon and artillerymen to the King of kings. The latter was in return forced to pledge himself to break off his relations with England, to confiscate all British merchandise and to refuse entry into her ports to all British vessels, to stir up the Afghans and the peoples of Candahar against England, and to send an

army against India. "And if"—so reads Article 12—"the Emperor of the French should desire to send an army by land against the English possessions in India, the Shah of Persia, as a good and faithful ally, shall grant them free passage through his dominions, in which case a special agreement shall be made in advance stipulating as to the route to be taken by the troops, the supplies and the means of conveyance to be furnished, as well to what auxiliary troops it would be expedient for His Majesty the Emperor of Persia to unite with this expedition." Truly a marvellous spectacle, this—of a man in the midst of such embarrassments, where the advance of a single Austrian army corps might mean catastrophe, making agreement with an Oriental monarch concerning the most distant object of his aspirations. This is precisely what constitutes historical greatness: the ability to keep the ultimate aim in view even in adversity, and to see over and beyond present calamity into the far-distant future.

But the matter of paramount importance was after all for him to strengthen his army with fresh troops at the earliest possible moment so that his opponent, who was likewise making ready, might be outnumbered and so remain during the engagement now imminent. For this purpose he summoned from France and Italy everything available in the way of military forces, replacing them there with 80,000 men of the levy of 1808 accorded him by the Senate, which in the last months of the preceding year had granted his demand for the levy of 1807. From Spain and from the Confederation of the Rhine he likewise demanded new auxiliary troops. He was thus enabled not only to create a reserve army in Germany to keep watch upon Austria, but to increase the corps laying siege to Danzig and make to his main army the addition of from 160,000 to 170,000 men—a figure to which Russia was far from attaining. And when, on May 24th, the proud fortress on the Baltic was brought to yield, another detachment which had been engaged there was released to swell the command upon the Passarge.

And while the French army was thus increasing in strength the winter drew to a close. It had been a terrible enemy to the

invaders, but, on the other hand, a faithful ally to their opponents, the only trouble being that they had not been able to appreciate it at its true worth. During the long weeks of cold Bennigsen had taken not a single serious step to hinder the enemy's task of replenishing his army. In February, having begun to follow the French, he had been advised to make an onset also upon them at this time, so as to drive them behind the Vistula, or at least to protect Danzig by contesting their control of the Frische Nehrung; but he neglected everything of this kind and contented himself with forming plans of attack, sometimes upon Ney, who occupied an advanced position, and again upon Elbing, each of which he would in the end discard, so that Scharnhorst was persuaded that the Russian general was resolved not to risk the loss of his reputation of having never been defeated by a Napoleon. It was only when Danzig had fallen and the enemy stood opposed to him stronger than ever, when the advent of favourable weather had made the roads passable and the maintenance of the army less difficult, when the ground was once more in fit condition for precise reconnoitring and for rapid manœuvre, when Napoleon had determined upon his own method of attack,—in short, when it was entirely too late,—that Bennigsen began to bestir himself. Now he proposed to fall upon the advance-guard under Ney, annihilate it and then proceed with his forces against the main body of the army. But the intrepid Marshal fought his way most gloriously back to the main army. With this the Emperor was now, in his turn, moving forward, contriving at the same time to slip in between Bennigsen and the Prussian corps and driving both before him. The situation was again as before Eylau.

Napoleon's design was to outflank the enemy upon the left while holding his attention absorbed at the front and, the victory gained, to drive him back against the Russian frontier. There was this peculiarity about the plan—and it has been for this reason condemned by the greatest military critics—that it left a way of escape open to the enemy, while, if the encircling movement had been carried out by the right wing, the Russians would have had no choice but to take the road to Königsberg, where

they could have been utterly destroyed through the numerical superiority of the French. The question arises whether, perchance, Napoleon did not intentionally avoid the annihilation of Alexander's army. There may have been a revival of an idea which had often occupied his mind and which had found expression even before the battle of Austerlitz,—of coming to terms with the Czar. And that is by no means an improbable explanation of his conduct at this time. Certain it is that at Eylau the Russian army had greatly impressed him, and he was assuredly obeying something beyond the mere inspiration of the moment when he wrote to Talleyrand on March 14th: "I am of the opinion that an alliance with Russia would be most advantageous if it were not for the absurdity of it and if any reliance could be placed upon that court." There was besides this a special reason for such a course, for just at this time—in the early part of June, 1807—Napoleon's purposes in regard to Turkey came to shipwreck. The Sultan Selim III., as the result of a mistrust but too well justified, had refused the offer of a French auxiliary corps of 25,000 men under command of Mar-mont, while his own general had conducted the war against Russia in an indolent fashion, not preventing the enemy from pressing forward as far as Orsowa, and it was but a short time after this that the janizaries, opponents of all reform, had stripped the Sultan of his power and set up as his successor on the Bosphorus Mustapha, of whom Sébastiani wrote on June 1st that he was hostile to France and that no influence was to be obtained over him. Under such circumstances was it not perhaps the part of discretion to execute his designs upon Turkey by uniting with Russia for the present rather than by striving against her—that is, to come to terms with the Czar at the expense of the ungrateful Moslem who so little understood assuming the rôle of a willing tool for the furtherance of French policy? And would it be expedient, if this were the end in view, to attempt the destruction of the Russian army?

But be this as it may, the fact remains that the Emperor sent one portion of his army to the left, northwards, to surround the enemy, another detachment under Victor against the Prus-

sians, leaving Ney and the Guards to protect the rear, while he himself with three corps tried to overtake Bennigsen. In the last he was, indeed, successful on the evening of June 10th at Heilsberg, but here the enemy had entrenched itself strongly and repulsed the French as they approached. Only the fear of being surrounded on the north then compelled the Russian, in spite of his victory, to draw farther back along the right bank of the Alle, while Napoleon, grown cautious, awaited the coming up of Ney and the Guards, whom he had summoned before following Bennigsen upon the left bank. On June 14th the latter reached Friedland on the route from Bartenstein to Wehlau. At this point he crossed the river in order to attack the French while on the march, hoping to demolish the vanguard under Lannes and break through the line. The manoeuvre was, however, so slowly executed that while the action with Lannes was yet in progress the other French corps had time to come up and be set in battle array by Napoleon. The Russian had now no choice but to accept battle,—and he lost it, not, however, without valiant defence. For Ney, who advanced with his command against the left wing of the Russians, was at first thrown back and the battle was saved to the French only by the audacious act of Napoleon, who, recognizing the danger, rushed with his reserve corps through the midst of the fleeing soldiers to renew the attack. A heavy cannonading brought the Russians upon this side to yield, and at this Bennigsen was compelled to order the retreat of the centre and right wings through Friedland and across the Alle. But now the French pressed on in pursuit from everywhere, so that the crossing of the river could be but imperfectly accomplished, and one detachment of the Russian troops was perforce left on the further side of the river to destruction by the enemy's cannon. On the same day the Prussian corps also sustained defeat by itself at the hands of the encircling army; it was driven back under the very ramparts of Königsberg, and escaped only with greatest difficulty and almost disbanded to Tilsit on the Niemen, where, on June 18th, Bennigsen also arrived on his retreat. The latter, having crossed the river, destroyed the bridges behind him.

On the day following this victory Napoleon wrote to Josephine: "My children have appropriately celebrated the anniversary of Marengo; the battle of Friedland will contribute to the fame and glory of my people as much as the other. The entire Russian army put to rout, 80 cannon seized, 30,000 men killed or captured, 25 of their generals killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, the Russian Guard demolished—this makes a sister worthy of Marengo. Austerlitz, or Jena!" This account was to some extent exaggerated. Bennigsen's army had, it is true, been thoroughly scattered during the action, but by the time it reached Allenburg in its flight it had already gathered again, so that it was able to proceed thence in tolerable order. Their losses were, indeed, so great that the general-in-chief proposed to the Czar to enter into negotiations for peace, but his intention in suggesting this course was only with a view to securing time for re-enforcement. For, in the first place, he was certain of finding on the farther side of the Memel L'Es-tocq's corps of Prussians and a reserve body of Russians under Labanoff, and, in the second, the army had not been crowded away from its line of operations, so that Napoleon might still look forward to the possibility at any time of a new engagement against which he also was having preparations made to the west of Tilsit. The worst feature of the situation lay in the attitude of complete dissatisfaction prevailing throughout the Russian army and particularly among the officers, who almost without exception belonged to the party headed by the Grand Duke Constantine and who condemned "fighting for foreign interests." And this feeling manifested itself with a freedom defying all discipline. It is even claimed that Alexander was pointedly reminded of the fate of his father. Even in the days immediately after the battle there is said to have been carried on a correspondence between Constantine and Murat in consequence of which Prince Labanoff was sent on June 19th to conclude a truce with Napoleon. The latter demanded as a condition the surrender of certain Prussian fortresses which had not yet fallen, among others Kolberg and Graudenz. Having no power to regulate the disposal of these strongholds, the envoy turned homeward, but the Emperor at once sent Duroc after him commissioned to say to the adversary that Napoleon was ready for

a cessation of hostilities even without these concessions if Russia would enter into negotiations for a separate peace. This offer was made known to the Czar, who agreed to accept it. On the 21st the truce was signed, and on the 24th Labanoff returned to Tilsit with written instructions for proposing an alliance and an interview between the two sovereigns.

This course was, indeed, directly contrary to the wording of the Treaty of Bartenstein signed on April 26th, and in reality treachery to Prussia. But in regard to that the Czar did not greatly concern himself. After all, as he might have argued, had not that treaty remained practically nothing more than a pious wish? Supposing he had formed the plan now as in 1805 of marching as it were at the head of the legitimate powers of Europe against the usurper in order to compel his descent from the pinnacle upon which he had placed himself, would it not be but too evident that Europe was not supporting him?

England had taken up arms in a way far too half-hearted and incomplete to be able to take an active part in the conflict, and now had become in addition obdurate in the matter of money, for to Russia's appeal for an indispensable subsidy of 6,000,000 pounds she had returned a refusal. On the other hand British supremacy on the sea bore heavily upon Russian vessels and occasionally made itself very grievously felt. Nothing more was needed to create an aversion to England in the mind of the Czar. But if England had acceded only conditionally to the Treaty of Bartenstein, Austria, as has been seen, had refused absolutely to give it adherence. It was only after the possibility of a separate peace between France and Russia had been brought to the attention of the Court of Vienna that an envoy was despatched to Alexander, there to reawaken hopes of Austria's co-operation; but he came too late. In view of the neutrality of the power on the Danube Gentz had already in April counselled the Czar in a memorial to conclude peace with Napoleon and save for the future his forces which now, without assistance from Austria, were being uselessly squandered. These representations are said to have made a profound impression upon the young monarch.* In

* Martens, Recueil, VI. 419. Gentz advised the Czar to impel

the case of Sweden, too, there was an obstacle to perfect agreement. This state had, to be sure, taken part in the war against Napoleon. But Finland was still a Swedish province, and Finland lay in the path of what was called the "natural expansion" of Russia. And herein lay the element of discord in Russian politics: that in fighting in behalf of the ancient order of things in Europe she was defending a cause to which her own interests urged destruction and those who are prone to condemn the character of Alexander as vacillating and untrustworthy will do well to lay the blame not upon him alone, but upon the political aim of his empire as well. He was now personally under pressure from that party which demanded peace, and under this combination of circumstances it is not a matter for astonishment that he should accept the proposals of the enemy.

He further expressed a desire for an interview with Napoleon to which the latter readily consented.* On the 25th of June took place the meeting between the two Emperors. Upon a raft in the middle of the Niemen was erected a magnificent tent in which the interview might go on without witnesses. Both monarchs were conveyed thereto in small boats accompanied by the acclamations of their respective Guards lining the opposite banks of the river. The conference lasted for more than an hour, dur-

Austria to take part in the war by declaring in Vienna that he would otherwise share with France what no one would assist Russia in defending. Alexander appears to have followed this advice, for, toward the middle of the month of May, his ambassador, Pozzo di Borgo, had a conversation with Stadion in which he represented to him that, in case of Austria's refusal, peace might very possibly be agreed upon without the co-operation of that power: "which would remain excluded from a system established under circumstances which she alone would have caused to be so unfavourable."

* This is at least according to what Napoleon himself wrote to Talleyrand on June 24th, 1807. (This is confirmed by the instructions of the Czar to Labanoff in which he said: "I like to entertain the hope that we shall easily come to an agreement with the Emperor Napoleon if we can confer without any intermediary." Taking the hint, Napoleon proposed a personal interview through Duroc, June 24th. Martens, *Recueil des Traités et conventions conclus par Russie avec les puissances étrangères*, XIII. 298, 299.~B.)

ing which time the retinue remained waiting outside of the tent, and within this hour the face of the world was changed. Of exactly what took place on this occasion we have no direct record. It was alleged by some that they caught the opening of the conversation. According to these accounts Alexander accosted Napoleon with: "I hate the English as thoroughly as you do, and I will second you in everything you are willing to undertake against them"; to which Napoleon replied: "In that case there will be no difficulty in adjusting matters between us, and peace is made." And naturally! For why continue at war if he could now obtain peacefully that which he had determined by conquering and overmastering Russia to compel her to give—her accession to the blockade of the Continent in case England should refuse to accept the conditions imposed? Assuming that this was to be the outcome, he now doubtless resumed the project of a march upon India which had never ceased to occupy his mind and to participation in which he had won over Alexander's father in his day. Concessions were furthermore made upon both sides. The Corsican agreed to sacrifice the integrity of Turkey;—that point which had been the cause of contention between the two powers in July, 1806,—renounced the idea of a re-establishment of ancient Poland, and assigned Finland to Russia, in return for which the Czar declared himself ready to accept all changes which Napoleon should make in the south, in Italy or in the Iberian peninsula, a basis for agreement being thus furnished with which both parties were, for the time being, content. It is indeed open to question whether all these considerations were brought up during that first interview, but it is certain that they were zealously discussed during those weeks of familiar intercourse between the two sovereigns. On June 26th Frederick William also was granted an interview with Napoleon, though only in the character of a protégé of the Czar's and not as a sovereign of equal rank pleading his own cause.

✓ Two weeks were thus spent together in Tilsit before the treaty of peace was signed. Napoleon displayed his utmost graciousness of manner so as to captivate the Czar, and a prince

so vain could not but be gratified and allured by the fact that the victor offered to him, the vanquished, the homage of his friendship. Both sides were, moreover, obliged to yield upon certain points which held concealed the germs of future discord. Napoleon, to be sure, no longer laid stress upon the re-establishment of Poland, but he was none the less opposed to having the duchy of Warsaw fall back into the possession of Prussia; he had involved himself too deeply with the Polish patriots to admit of that. He even went so far at first as to suggest that Poland be united with Prussian Silesia to form a kingdom which should be assigned to his brother Jerome, but he soon recognized that the time had not yet come for his purpose of extending his power as far as the Vistula, and withdrew his proposition. Silesia remained the property of Prussia, and the duchy of Warsaw fell to the King of Saxony, though with the provision that it should not be incorporated with his state. Only the Polish crown lands, of some 27,000,000 francs value, Napoleon reserved to himself for future use in rewarding his generals. For Jerome a compensation was provided by uniting the Prussian territories west of the Elbe with lands from the electorate of Hesse and duchy of Brunswick to form a kingdom of Westphalia.*. On the other hand Alexander had counted as a certainty upon securing Constantinople, and had been likewise obliged to yield. At last, on July 7th, 1807, matters had reached a point where it was possible for the diplomats Talleyrand and Kurakin to append their signatures to the documents.

Of these there were two, a peace convention and a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. In the former were taken up and dealt with all stipulations involving Prussia. It was herein

* Westphalia was to consist of the states of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, the Alt-Mark, and the territory of Magdeburg to the left of the Elbe, the territories of Halle, Hildesheim, and the city of Goslar, the petty state of Halberstadt and Hohenstein, the territory of Quedlinburg, the county of Mansfeld, the Eichsfeld, the cities of Mühlhausen and Nordhausen, the county of Stolberg, the states of Hesse-Cassel, the former Hanoverian principalities of Göttingen and Grubenhagen with Hohenstein and Elbingerode, the bishoprics of Osnabrück and of Paderborn, Minden, Ravensberg, and the county of Rittberg-Kaunitz.

stated that: "Out of regard for His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and wishing to give proof of his sincere desire to unite the two nations by the links of an unalterable trust and friendship," the Emperor of the French now restored to Frederick William his territories lying east of the Elbe except for the circle of Kottbus, which was to go to Saxony, and the Polish provinces of South Prussia and New East Prussia, of which the circle of Bielostok was to fall to Russia, while the remainder went to make up the duchy of Warsaw just mentioned. The Czar, moreover, recognized Joseph as King of Naples, and pledged himself to recognize him as also Lord of Sicily as soon as a compensation should be found for its legitimate prince. Russia also gave her acquiescence to the establishment of Louis as King of Holland, and that of Jerome as King of Westphalia, as well as to the Confederation of the States of the Rhine. Cattaro and the Ionian Islands were to be Napoleon's in return for the release of Danzig. He undertook to mediate between Russia and Turkey, while Alexander was to bring about peace between France and England.

Thus was it with the peace convention. The question was here still left open as to what was to take place in case England and Turkey did not consent to the conditions imposed by the mediating powers. To this the answer was contained in the second instrument—the secret treaty of alliance. In this the contracting parties pledged themselves to mutual support whether offensive or defensive, the first object of their attack being England if that power should not have accepted by November 1st, 1807, the Russian terms of peace, which demanded nothing less of Great Britain than that she should restore to France and her ally all conquests which she had made since 1805 and grant complete independence upon the sea to all flags, upon compliance with which conditions Hanover should again be hers. The Porte was to be next in order in case the mediation of France should have led to no satisfactory result within three months of the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit. In the first event Russia pledged herself to break off all relations with England, to use her power in the system of Continental blockade, and, in combination with France, to compel

likewise Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, and Austria to take part in the war against England's commerce. In the second event Russia and France were to unite their forces to snatch from Turkey all her European possessions with the exception of Constantinople and Roumelia. Should Denmark, Portugal or Sweden offer resistance to the demands of the allies, the country so resisting should be invaded by war conducted by both powers; should Sweden alone refuse to comply, Denmark should be constrained to carry on the contest against her.* In a special agreement, which was probably only verbal, a division of Turkish territory is said to have been arranged; but although Napoleon showed a disposition to favour the designs of the Emperor of Russia, he would not consent to having the project clearly and distinctly formulated.

Two days later, on July 9th. 1807. peace was likewise signed with Prussia. It was without avail that, unmindful of the repeated affronts which had been offered her through Napoleon's bulletins, the young and beautiful Queen Louise appeared before the powerful enemy to her country to entreat for it a fate less hard, or at least the restitution of Magdeburg. She could obtain nothing beyond mere civilities and vague promises to which the Emperor paid not the slightest regard next morning. His stipulations in regard to Prussia remained precisely as had been before agreed upon with Alexander. It is scarcely necessary to say that the unhappy country was obliged to bind itself to keep all ports closed against England and, in case John Bull should fail to comply with the terms of peace imposed, to enter into a league with France and Russia for the purpose of carrying on war against him.

These were the essential points in the Treaty of Tilsit. An attempt has been made to see in this a division of the mastery of Europe according to the principle that Napoleon yielded to the Czar the eastern half of the Continent, while reserving to himself

* The authentic wording of the treaty of alliance has here been followed. Since the publication of the German edition of this book, when the text of the secret treaty was for the first time published complete, it has been published by Vandal, "*Napoléon et Alexandre I.*," p. 515, and by Martens in his *Recueil*, XIII. 322.

undisturbed dominion over the west. But the facts in the case would not bear out this idea in all particulars. In spite of everything the difference between victor and vanquished is clearly discernible in the documents. Napoleon made not the least show of withdrawing from Turkey, and through his alliance with Persia he still maintained a firm foothold in the East. Moreover, the duchy of Warsaw was now ruled by one of the princes of the Confederation of the States of the Rhine,—for such had the new “king” of Saxony become in December, 1806,—and was thus under direct influence of his policy. Here was a card which might be played against Russia at any time when he should feel so inclined. And Russia herself was at the mercy of France, at least in the matter of her industries, from the moment in which the war against England's commerce began. No! In the treaty of July 7th, 1807, there was nothing which looked like renunciation or change of purpose on the part of Napoleon. His concessions to Russia meant nothing more than a pause on the way to universal dominion. As far back as 1803, when war with England had become inevitable, the First Consul is said to have made approaches to Alexander I. with proposals culminating in a combined attack upon Great Britain and which were probably similar in nature to those of Tilsit. Cobenzl, the Austrian minister and a clear-sighted diplomat, at that time expressed himself in regard to Napoleon and his purposes in these words: “Never has any one laid himself more open to the suspicion of aspiring to a universal monarchy, and a man must begin by being one of two to finish by being the only one.”

CHAPTER XIV

THE SITUATION OF AFFAIRS IN FRANCE. BAYONNE AND ERFURT

It would be, however, not only a mistake, but an injustice to Napoleon's powers of penetration, to assume that he had allowed himself to be persuaded by the demands of his external policy alone to the conclusion of peace with Alexander in 1807 instead of abiding by his original intention of unshackling Poland and, in alliance with that hereditary enemy of Russia, extending his own dominion by conquest to the farthest borders of the Continent. That which more than aught else determined him to arrest his course at the Niemen was consideration for public opinion in France, knowing that he durst not forfeit all favour and kindly feeling on the part of his people; for he was already on the highway to such an outcome. The French had refused their sympathy with the war of 1805, and it was only through the marvellous victories of the Emperor, coupled with many an addition to the contents of the state's treasury, that they could be reconciled to it. But when, a year later, these cruel wars broke out afresh, the people began to see that their soldiers were no longer fighting in the interests of their country, but were wasting their blood only for the sake of the boundless ambition of this foreigner; that his policy was not, as he pretended, the policy of France. Henceforth no success however great could alter the popular feeling. A contemporary relates that even the victory of Jena made absolutely no impression in Paris. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with the Empire steadily increased, though in secret. But however anxiously concealed from the innumerable spies in his employ, the facts still came to Napoleon's ears; here it was the audacious joke of some idler on the boulevard which was reported, there the cutting witti-

cism of an inhabitant of the Faubourg St. Germain, or perchance a newspaper article not discreetly enough revised:—nothing escaped the vigilance of his informants. But even without special reports of this kind he would have been aware that the French people, whose sons he had demanded to fight his battles, no longer made the sacrifice with the conviction that it was for the good of the nation, but that it was inwardly threatening to turn completely from him. Such a symptom as this he was too discerning to underestimate. Although he felt himself able to cope with any popular uprising through the mighty army which he had attached to himself personally, he had nevertheless learned too much from the Revolution not to reckon the current of popular sentiment as a distinct and important political factor. It was appalling to consider what would become of him if France should eventually cease to honour his drafts upon the future. Such an eventuality must on no account be allowed to occur. And it was because he knew the craving for peace existing among the French people and its horror of incessant war that he made peace with Russia and, even before leaving Tilsit, took steps for spreading abroad in France the report that the war of blockade was nearing its end. Then he returned to Paris to prove himself the solicitous administrator and bring about forgetfulness of his career as a conqueror.

Here he was greeted with an enthusiasm outwardly similar to that of a year previous; there were illuminations and acclamations, speeches and addresses somewhat more bombastic even than those of the former occasion, which had even then been lacking in spontaneity. For instance, the President of the Court of Appeals declared to his face that Napoleon had ceased to belong to ordinary human history, but should be classed among the heroes of antiquity. He listened with a serious countenance to such disquisitions, and was doubtless no less serious in his contempt for an orator capable of such servility. At the opening of the Corps Législatif he read a speech from the throne in which he expressed to the French the pride and satisfaction felt in the nation by its monarch, and in the Council of State was drawn up a report setting forth the blessings conferred by the

imperial government. Such reports had repeatedly been made before this under the Empire. The first time was toward the close of 1804 and the second in March, 1806, after the Peace of Pressburg, in both of which cases the key-note had been the same: that Napoleon was indefatigably intent upon promoting the well-being of his people, but was nevertheless constantly interrupted in this task by disturbances from without. The result had been that France had turned with fury against these antagonists and hailed with acclamation the commander who promptly and brilliantly overcame them. So had it been even in 1805, but at present matters wore a different aspect. The next year, in order to be believed when asserting that the Emperor had no further plans of conquest and no longer desired the bloody laurels which others had compelled him to pluck, the Minister of the Interior had to seek an entirely new fundamental principle for use in his public declarations. This new theme was soon found, and now the story ran: that even if Europe had been so wicked as to force war upon the Emperor, he had not been prevented by it from the fulfilment of his duties as a ruler, especially as the war itself had been carried on solely in the interests of France. This text was further varied by the Minister in his representations of 1807, in which he said of Napoleon that: "While he was seeking out the soldier in his tent amidst the snows of Lithuania, his eyes were resting in France upon the cottage of the poor, upon the workshop of the mechanic; . . . while, as for us, we realized his absence only in hearing of his exploits." True, certain branches of industry had suffered, but this was nothing but a passing inconvenience, for the war in progress was a war for commercial independence, and every conquest made in it by the Emperor was a future gain to French traffic. Moreover, it was no small merit on the part of the monarch to have removed to such a distance the scene of operations that, "while the rest of Europe was writhing in the torments of war, France, serene and confident in her power, could look into the future with the feeling of security which is the result of a happy past, desiring peace without being tired of the war and aspiring to that high destiny which has been pre-

pared for her by him in whom she has placed her confidence, her glory, her affection. This expectation of a great people has been fulfilled, her fondest hopes surpassed. The hour of prosperity has come, who will venture to prophesy its termination?"

Though essentially hypocritical, these assurances did nevertheless contain two statements not unsupported by fact: in the first place Napoleon did himself consider the commercial war against England to be an enterprise actually conducive to the welfare of France, and in the second, even during the course of the war he had not, as a matter of fact, dropped from his shoulders the burden of the administration in France. For Cambacérès, though appointed Napoleon's representative, was such in form only, and the couriers to Warsaw, Osterode, or Finkenstein were charged with questions in regard to even the most insignificant details. From such a distance it was nevertheless impossible to undertake any very vigorous measures, and it was only now upon his return that the undivided attention of the monarch could be accorded to affairs of the interior. Napoleon well knew how little had been accomplished by the fine words of his minister; France must be convinced by acts and deeds that only under his own guidance could she be assured of prosperity and honour.

He demanded at once upon his arrival to be furnished with the figures as to the exports and imports of French commerce, and to be informed how Italy and the Confederation of the Rhine could be made serviceable to it. The new commercial code was published. The bank was ordered to reduce the rate of discount. To check impoverishment and to help the needy state workshops were opened in all departments for those who were in distress, and work renewed upon public constructions planned and begun after the victorious campaign of 1805; these included roads over the Simplon and Mont-Cenis, new canals, telegraph lines for the acceleration of correspondence, the restoration of the Basilica of St. Denis,—particularly the crypt which was used as the tomb of royalty and which had been destroyed by the Revolution,—the founding of a new city in the Vendée,

the erection of monumental arches of triumph in Paris, the continuation of the quais on the banks of the Seine, the embellishment of the capital by a wide street running from the Tuilleries to the boulevards (the Rue de la Paix), the completion of the Louvre, the laying out of a park on the Rue de Rivoli, the building of the Pont des Arts, the Pont d'Austerlitz, and the Pont d'Jéna, the raising of a column of triumph on the Place Vendôme, besides many other works of the same order. All these provided labour for many hands, and prevented general distress, so that it was possible to forbid beggary.

Among public abuses there was one especially which had fixed Napoleon's attention even before the outbreak of the war with Prussia. This was the condition of unremitting poverty prevailing among the peasants of the eastern departments, the cause of which was eventually found to lie in the exploitation of the people by the Jews through usury. For, ever since the National Assembly in 1791 had accorded to the Israelites civil rights similar to those of all other Frenchmen, there had poured in from foreign countries to the eastward streams of Jewish tradesmen who had settled in the departments on the Rhine and here for the most part carried on a business of usurious money-lending. Especially after public security had been re-established by Bonaparte in the interior did they mass themselves in the German-speaking provinces. According to an official account submitted to Napoleon by the Minister of the Interior in April, 1807, the sums demanded upon mortgages by the Jews since 1799 amounted, in the Alsatian department of the Upper Rhine alone, to more than 23,000,000 francs, and Marshal Kellerman set at something more than 70 per cent the rate of interest customarily extorted by them. Most of them were successful in evading military service. For a moment Napoleon had thought of declaring null and void all debts upon mortgages at usurious rates, but upon further consideration vouchsafed to apply measures somewhat less severe. An assembly of Jewish Rabbis—a sort of revival of the great Sanhedrim of Jewish history—was to take counsel together to find a remedy against this evil, and, in fact, a series of resolutions

was drawn up by this body in Paris, March, 1807, forbidding their fellow believers to exact usury as sinful and urging the youth of the nation to learn handicrafts. Thus stood matters at the time of the return of the Emperor from his campaign. These resolutions seemed to him, however, to offer too little guarantee, and he ordered elaborated an exceptional law bearing upon the Jewish population, which was to remain in operation for a first period of ten years and of which the essential features were the following: Interest at more than 5 per cent should be reduced by the proper authorities, while that at more than 10 per cent should be declared usurious and the debt cancelled; no Jew might carry on business without a license from the proper authorities, and none lend money upon a mortgage without an act attested before a notary; Hebrews not yet resident in Alsace at the moment when this decree was put in force—it was promulgated March 17th, 1808—could not establish themselves there; in other departments they were allowed to settle only on condition of becoming landowners; every Israelite must perform military service and was debarred the privilege of hiring a substitute. It is not to be denied that this law was contrary to the Napoleonic Code, but it was effectual. Reports from the eastern departments showed improvement even within a few years, and Napoleon was enabled to allow of exceptions being made to a constantly increasing extent until the state of complete equality before the law was again attained.

The Emperor's concern for the material prosperity of the French was closely allied with his financial policy. Up to this time he had carried on his wars without substantially increasing the taxation and without assuming debts. "As long as I live," he wrote on May 18th, 1805, to Barbé-Marbois, "I shall issue no paper." No method seemed to him so certain to mitigate the aversion felt by the people toward his wars as to prove that they demanded no pecuniary sacrifice. The system of requisitions in foreign countries had until now made it possible to abide by this policy, and it was further relieving the country of a heavy burden to have the greater part of the standing army remain, even in peace, without its borders. But this was, after all, far

from sufficient, for in 1805 a painful experience had been undergone. The taxes had not been increased at the opening of the war, but money was nevertheless an imperative necessity. It had therefore been derived at this time from the cash advanced to the government by an association of financiers, with the banker Ouvrard at their head, who had been accustomed to discount the assignments by the receivers of taxes of the income due in the course of the ensuing year. This same company managed incidentally also the financial affairs of the Spanish crown by advancing the subsidies exacted by France from Spain, taking repayment with substantial interest upon the arrival of the silver fleet from America. But the war now declared upon Spain by England prevented the conveyance of the ingots, plunging the company into difficulties from which it was to be extricated only by aid of the Bank of France, which was, for this purpose, compelled to exhaust its supply of ready money. A crisis was the immediate consequence, bringing in its train bankruptcy to many important houses; capitalists throughout the country became uneasy. It was just at the time that Napoleon was negotiating for peace with Austria in December, 1805. His presence in France became indispensable, and, as Montgelas asserts, it was this consideration more than any other, according to his own later testimony, which impelled him to the conclusion of the Treaty of Pressburg, an opportunity which the Austrians might easily have turned to account by occasioning delays which would have caused serious embarrassment to Napoleon. But such a predicament must never again befall. On that occasion the proclamation of peace, the newly established confidence of the people, and the 40,000,000 francs of Austrian war-indemnity had averted disaster. Now, after the second victorious campaign, the millions exacted from Prussia, Poland, and Westphalia were taken to establish not only a war-treasure, but likewise a "Service Bank" (*Caisse de Service*) which should make unnecessary the assistance of bankers in the future, and even furnish advance moneys upon the taxes. There was further established a treasury board (*cour des Comptes*) which was to assume control of the administration of finances.

The Emperor was thus enabled to demonstrate to the French people that his wars not only demanded no new sacrifices on their part, but that they might with their results actually be advantageous to the public finances. Nor was the encouraging aspect of affairs delusive, for the material situation of the country continued to make real improvement. Commerce did indeed suffer from the blockade, while the advanced prices of sugar and coffee bore hard upon all classes, but, on the other hand, the exclusion from Europe of English manufactures was helping to build up French industries. Hopes of universal peace and the re-established credit of the state contributed to raise the price of government 5 per cents to 93 in 1807, a point to which they were destined never again to rise during the reign of the Emperor.

But Napoleon knew only too well that a people of so high a grade of intelligence as the French craved not material prosperity alone, but was sensible of other needs which were not to be satisfied with money and bread. Precisely what these were he was confident that he knew. When in 1797 at the close of the Italian war he for the first time considered making himself master of France and set that as his goal, he expressed himself in confidence to Miot in the following words: "The French want glory and the satisfaction of their vanity, but as for liberty they have no realization of what it means." And from that time he had adopted this maxim as his guide. From every battlefield he had sent to assure them of the glories of their arms and thus ministered to their national pride. His next care was to make provision for their personal vanity. On August 12th, 1807, he addressed to Cambacérès a most extraordinary epistle in which he said: "Since it is part of human nature for a man to wish to leave to his children some token of the esteem in which he has been held, as well as to provide for them a suitable and sufficient inheritance," he reserved to himself the right to confer other titles of nobility upon such as had rendered service to the state in the same way as the titular duchies had been founded in the previous year. Ministers, senators, Councillors of State, presidents of the Corps Législatif, and archbishops as well,

should be granted the right to the title of Count, which might be transmitted to their heirs in accordance ~~with the laws of~~ primogeniture provided the testator could entail with it a yearly income of 30,000 francs; the presidents of the electoral colleges and courts of justice who were appointed for life, the attorneys-general, and mayors of the most important cities of the country should be made Barons and might likewise transmit the title by entail if endowed with a yearly income of 15,000 francs; the members of the Legion of Honour might transmit their knighthood with an income of 3000 francs, while a Grand Dignitary must be able to leave an income of 200,000 francs to his heir in order to preserve to him the title of Prince. Now all this was diametrically opposed to the laws of inheritance as set forth in the Napoleonic Code. The Emperor, however, tried to make the matter acceptable to the Senate by clearly pointing out to that body that no manner of political privilege was associated with these hereditary titles any more than with the new feudal duchies, and that the fundamental law of equality thus remained absolutely inviolate. Allured by the title of Count, the senators yielded consent, and in March, 1808, the law went into effect.*

*Shortly after his promulgation of the decree respecting the new nobility Napoleon expressed himself to Madame de Rémusat somewhat as follows: "Liberty is a need felt by a class small in number and gifted by nature with abilities above those of the common run of humanity. It can thus be restrained with impunity. Equality, on the contrary, pleases the multitude. I do not in the least offend against it in bestowing titles which are accorded to such and such persons without regard to the question of birth, which is just at present out of fashion. These titles are a sort of civic crown; they can be earned by good works. Moreover, clever men will give to those whom they govern the same impulses which they themselves have. Now my own impulse is altogether upward, and a similar one is needed to give a like impetus to the nation. . . . Not that I fail to see that all these nobles, and especially these dukes that I create and upon whom I bestow such enormous dotations, are going to become somewhat independent of me. Decorated and wealthy, they will attempt to escape my grasp and probably assume what they will call the spirit befitting their rank. Still they will not run so fast but that I shall know how to come up with them well enough." In later years, however, after his fall, he did characterize it as a mistake after all to have made his

But these distinctions accorded to civil functionaries were trifling as compared with those which Napoleon allotted to his companions-in-arms. Now began the bestowal of the long list of Italian titles upon his marshals: Soult became Duke of Dalmatia; Mortier, Duke of Treviso, Savary, Duke of Rovigo; Bessières, Duke of Istria; Duroc, of Friuli; Victor, of Belluno; Moncey, of Conegliano; Clarke, of Feltre; Caulaincourt, of Vicenza; Masséna, of Rivoli; Lannes, of Montebello; Marmont, of Ragusa; Oudinot, of Reggio; Macdonald, of Taranto; Augereau, of Castiglione; Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo; Davout, Ney, and Lefebvre had acquired ducal titles in Germany: those of Auerstädt, Elchingen, and Danzig respectively; while Berthier had secured for himself the principality of Neufchâtel.* With these titles were presented rich estates from the domains which the Emperor had reserved to himself from Poland, Italy, and Germany, and which were to be hereditary with the titles according to the laws of primogeniture. For the time being the Emperor dispensed 11,000,000 francs among these favourites, one half in cash and the rest in securities. Berthier was the recipient of a million, while Ney, Davout, Soult, and Bessières each received 600,000 francs, Masséna, Augereau, Bernadotte, Mortier, and Victor each 400,000, and the others 200,000 francs.† Provision was further made for the entire victorious

instruments independent through wealth. Berthier, the one whom he had endowed the most splendidly of all, was the first to desert him:

* Besides these military dukes there were also created a certain number from amongst the civilians: Cambacérès was made Duke of Parma; Maret, of Bassano; Lebrun, of Piacenza; Fouché, of Otranto; and Champagny, of Cadore.

† The incomes of the marshals were some years later increased to a considerable extent, so that Berthier, for instance, as Prince of Neufchâtel, Vice-Constable, Marshal, and Grand Huntsman, was annually in receipt of 1,355,000 francs; Davout, Duke of Auerstädt, and Prince of Eckmühl, of 910,000 francs; Ney, Duke of Elchingen, and after 1812 Prince of Moskova, of 728,000 francs; Masséna, Duke of Rivoli, and after 1809 Prince of Esslingen, of 683,000 francs. As for the civilians, under the Empire the emoluments of the office of Minister averaged not less than 200,000 francs, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs received even more. Ambassadors, who were called upon to represent the power of

army. Of the 18,000,000 francs which was employed for this purpose 12,000,000 fell to the rank and file, and was so apportioned that the wounded received a triple share, the remaining 6,000,000 being distributed among the officers. Such soldiers as had lost a limb in the campaign were allowed pensions of 500 francs, while officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, who had particularly distinguished themselves were granted annuities up to 10,000 francs. Naturally the object of all this was but to make the more certain the loyalty of the army the less confident the Emperor became of his grasp upon the sympathies of the other part of the French people. It had been, moreover, for a long time his endeavour to denationalize the army as far as possible, so that it should not cease to serve his international schemes. On this account also—and not alone for reasons of finance and foreign politics—did he leave the Grand Army in Germany and Poland, which countries it was to evacuate only when Prussia should have paid off the exorbitant sum which he had demanded as war-indemnity. Only the Guard had been allowed to return home, where it had been given strict orders to hold itself to the greatest possible extent aloof from civil life.

In his care for the material interests of the French, for their thirst for glory, and for their vanity, Napoleon felt that he had done enough for this country of France which he had once cynically called his mistress and which was so devoted that she was ready to sacrifice for him her treasures and her blood. He still held firmly to his idea that liberty was no requisite of the common people, but only a pretence of those whom he disdainfully styled "Ideologists," upon whose shoulders he laid the blame of the anarchy of the Revolution, and against whose influence upon public opinion he waged war with all his force. Hence arose his measures against the press, against newspapers and books, which became from year to year more severe; hence his solicitude to

the Emperor in the most splendid manner at foreign courts, were furnished with a salary more than sufficient, as, for example, in the case of Caulaincourt, who was now sent to Russia with an annual stipend of from 700,000 to 800,000 francs.

withhold from all publicity the discussions of his laws, hence his attempts against the independence of the judiciary which could provide a refuge to the opponents of his system of compulsory benefits, and hence also his plan for protecting the coming generation from all temptations of unrestricted mental activity by means of a correct and uniform method of instruction. In all of these directions he displayed an indefatigable zeal which must not be passed over without comment in an historical sketch.

Mention has already been made of Napoleon's antipathy to Madame de Staël, whom he compelled to leave France and eventually sentenced to perpetual banishment "because," as he intimated, "she inspired thought in people who had never taken it into their heads to think before or who had forgotten how." He wrote from Finkenstein to Fouché that, much to his satisfaction, she was no longer talked about.* Chateaubriand, who, in 1802, had dedicated his "Génie de Christianisme" to the "Restorer of Religion," had brought himself into disfavour with the Emperor by an adverse criticism of the d'Enghien episode and was likewise soon after obliged to leave his native country because his influence in the salons of the opposition party in Paris seemed dangerous. An article on Spain which he wrote in the "Mercure de France" shortly before Napoleon's return in 1807, and which contained allusions not to be misunderstood, had the further result of depriving him of his property. A still harder fate would have been his but for the friendship of Fontanes, who, like many another, had gladly put his talents at the service of the all-powerful Emperor. Jacques Delille, the author of "l'Homme des Champs" and "l'Imagination" and the translator of the *Æneid*, escaped unscathed only on account of the high esteem in which he was held and the uncensurable nature of the matter of which he treated. His example was followed by a number of poets who carefully avoided every political and social problem and confined themselves to subjects of an indif-

* Madame de Récamier and Madame de Chevreuse shared the same fate as Madame de Staël. Even when stricken with mortal illness Madame de Chevreuse was not allowed to return to Paris that she might consult her physician, and died in exile.

ferent or inferior order which, as if in compensation, they treated in a masterly way, and it is perhaps safe to ascribe in some measure at least to that time of restricted thought and hampered imagination the high value already attached in France to the art of pleasing expression and perfection of form in and for itself. Upon the stage, to which the Emperor devoted special attention, he wished to see no subjects presented which dealt with "times too near the present"; they must in any case belong to a period before Henri IV., for which popular character he entertained the most decided aversion. "I see," said he one day, "that you are playing a tragedy of Henri IV. That period is not yet distant enough to fail to awaken the passions. What the stage requires is antiquity." Not until Mozart's "Don Juan" had been demonstrated to him to be not dangerous to "l'esprit public" could authorization be obtained for its production. Drama and comedy casting reflections upon modern life were in like manner interdicted, "because," as Madame de Rémusat explains, "no one dared to exhibit upon the boards the weaknesses and foibles of the various classes of society when all society had been renewed by Bonaparte, whose work had to be respected."

With such a fate for "belles-lettres" no one could doubt as to what would be that of the daily press. The beginnings of newspaper censorship under the Consulate have already been considered. Under the Empire there remained at the end of a short time but four independent papers in Paris: the "Citoyen Français," the "Mercure de France," the "Journal des Débats," and the "Publiciste." Even the names were displeasing to the Emperor, who wanted nothing to do with "Citoyens" and "Débats," and, in fact, the "Citoyen" was compelled to change its appellation to "Courrier Français," while the "Journal des Débats" had to become the "Journal de l'Empire." These papers stood in constant danger of being suppressed. When, in 1805, they ventured upon one occasion to make some observations in regard to the luxury displayed at court, the editors were informed "that the Revolutionary times were past and over and that there now remained but a single party in France,

which would never suffer the newspapers to say or do anything contrary to its interests." A year later Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand: "It is my intention to have the political articles for the 'Moniteur' written by officials in the Foreign Office, and after I have observed for a month how these are done I shall forbid the other newspapers to discuss politics otherwise than in imitation of the articles in the 'Moniteur.'" But when, as a result of these restrictions, the contents of the Paris papers became destitute of force or meaning he was no better satisfied than before. He wanted to be extolled.

And just as he had prohibited all critical discussion of his government in literature and periodical publications did he want to impose silence also in the Tribune, the one body to which the right of discussion still legally remained as provided for in the Constitution. He determined to make this impossible even behind closed doors. Accordingly at its last session in December, 1807, a decree of the Senate was submitted to the "Corps Législatif" pronouncing the dissolution of the Tribune, the members of which were appointed to office among the various sections of the "Corps Législatif," while its president was called to the Senate, and, further, fixing the age limit for membership in the "Corps Législatif" at forty years. Napoleon, who was himself at that time but thirty-eight, knew full well how much youth was disposed to be precipitate in dealing with political projects, and wished to see only sedate and tranquilly-disposed men in this body, which for appearance' sake was still called legislative, but was such only in name. His will alone gave laws to France, all else was mere unessential form. Hence he was able to issue a decree by which he evaded the irremovability of judges, guaranteed by the Constitution, by requiring every judge to pass through a period of five years' probation before he could be recognized as definitely irremovable, the final decision to come from a commission of ten senators appointed by the Emperor. Hence it was, also, that imprisonment for political offenders again became a possibility. And everywhere the Senate co-operated with obsequious assiduity, heedless of the concealed aversion of unprejudiced minds for

such boundless servility. What mattered it to the senators that their conduct was regarded with contempt as expressed, for instance, by Joseph Chénier in his "Tiberius" where, speaking of the Roman senators, he says:

"They daily seek their own opinion in mine eyes,
Reserving to the wretched their hireling insolence,
Flattering in their discourse, in their very silence cringing,
Fearing to think, to speak, perform an act.
'Tis I must blush for them, since e'en to blush
They lack the courage"?

But Chénier was sufficiently mindful of his own advantage to keep his "Tiberius" secure in his own possession under lock and key, while his "Cyrus" eulogized the Emperor. And what mattered it that the words "despotism" and "tyranny" were whispered about? They were only whispered, and for that very reason could not be far-reaching in their effect. As one day Suard, one of the most respected publicists, was speaking to Napoleon in terms of admiration regarding Tacitus and his descriptions of the Roman emperors, his Majesty replied: "Excellent, but he ought to make clear to us how it was that the Roman people tolerated and loved even the bad emperors. That is the point upon which it was of consequence to inform posterity." And here he hinted at the real foundation of his own power, for he was perfectly aware that the moment was not yet come when France could get on without him. He made frequent comparisons of his own government with that of the Roman emperors, especially with that of Diocletian. "You who are so well acquainted with history," said he to Narbonne in 1814, "are you not struck by the points of resemblance between my government and that of Diocletian, by this close-woven net which I spread to such a distance, by these ubiquitous eyes of the Emperor, and by this civil authority which I have known how to maintain in all its force in an Empire absorbed in war? I have many traits in common with Diocletian from Egypt to Illyria, only I neither persecute the Christians nor abdicate the imperial throne." * Madame de Rémusat lamented

* Villemain, *Souvenirs*, p. 177.

to Talleyrand upon one occasion at about this time that, although she had no choice but to remain at the French court, she could not help hating the Emperor for his evil qualities,—for he sowed discord between friends and between man and wife, and made the most of the weaknesses of his attendants, so that he might govern them, thus divided, all the more surely. To this replied the diplomat, who was also far from being kindly disposed toward Napoleon: "Child that you are, why is it that you are always putting your heart in all that you do? Trust me, do not compromise it by feeling any attachment for that man, but be assured that, with all his faults, he is still very necessary to France, which he knows how to uphold and to this object each of us ought to contribute all in our power. . . ." Therein lay the secret of the Emperor.

With such precautions, then, Napoleon might rest content that not so much as a breath of adverse criticism would reach the mass of the French people to disturb the respect and esteem with which it regarded his government. But besides this he had for a long time cherished the idea of protecting the rising generation from the outset against any assaults of that kind by bringing them up to believe in imperialism, much as the Jesuit schools trained its disciples to ultramontaniam. Beginnings toward the establishment of such a system had already been made in the time of the Consulate and have already been alluded to; they were now completed by the institution of the "University." A special circumstance added its weight to the furtherance of this project. In 1804 the great diocesan seminaries had been founded in conformity with the stipulations of the Concordat. Only a short time afterwards the clergy had associated with them the so-called "little seminaries," which, like the state "lycées," or colleges, were preparatory to the higher professional studies. These ecclesiastical schools, like the secondary schools of the state, were open to all and were the better attended as the instructors made the most of their opportunities for finding fault with the methods of teaching as well as the morals of the imperial institutions. But criticism was not to be tolerated by Napoleon, who now proposed to have

the entire administrative organization regarded as his personal achievement, and a plan was maturing in his mind for ridding himself with the least possible delay of this competition in the education of the French youth. On May 10th, 1806, he issued a decree that a corporation should be established under the name of the "Imperial University," to which should be given exclusive charge of public instruction and the whole educational system. In the report made by Fourcroy, the Director of the Section of Instruction, occurred this statement: "His Majesty desires a corporation whose teachings are not exposed to every fever of fashion, which shall keep on when the government rests from its labours, and of which the management and the regulations shall be so national in character that none will inconsiderately lay hands upon it to interfere in its workings. If this hope should be realized His Majesty expects to find in this corporation a guarantee against the pernicious theories of universal revolution. His Majesty proposes to carry out in a state containing 40,000,000 inhabitants all that has been enjoyed by Sparta and Athens and what the religious orders have striven with but imperfect success to attain." On March 17th, 1808, this statute, having been elaborated, was promulgated without authorization of the legislature. From this time the university included all branches of public instruction now monopolized by the state—all institutions of learning from the primary school up to the faculties of the learned professions.* It was provided with its own budget in the form of an endowment of 400,000,000 francs in government stocks, and this was to be separate from the state budget, "so that education might not have to suffer under the temporary distresses of state finances." At the head of the corporation, formed of the entire scholastic profession of France, there stood a Grand Master appointed by the Emperor, and with him a Chancellor and a Treasurer, besides a University Council consisting of thirty members, of which ten were appointed by the Emperor for life

* To this rule there were excepted only certain higher technical schools, such as the "École polytechnique," which was organized on a military basis, the scientific schools, and the great ecclesiastical seminaries.

and the remaining twenty by the Grand Master for a year's time. This Council was to draw up the regulations for the schools, to decide upon text-books and methods of instruction, and to exercise disciplinary power over the members of the University, that is, over the whole body of instructors in France. A part of this number—for instance, the professors at the "lycées"—had to pledge themselves to celibacy. All were free from the performance of military service. The teachers of the secondary schools were trained for their calling in the "École Normale." Those particularly distinguishing themselves there were awarded—aside from promotion—titles of honour by the Grand Master and became titular officers of the University. The sphere of instruction throughout the whole country was divided up into districts called "Academies," each presided over by a Rector and an Academic Council resembling the Grand Master and Council of the University.* The whole system of public instruction was then henceforth as strictly centralized and ruled with the same spirit of absolutism as the other departments of government. The institution has since that time received high commendation and has been condemned with equal vigour. One thing is certainly true, that young men attending the "lycées" learned more than the sons of the aristocratic families who were taught at home. The one fault of the system lay in the fact that the uniformity of the requirements left all too little scope for originality on the part of the teacher, and, if one of the principal tasks of education consists in the development and mental stimulation of individual talents so that these may at some future time be of the greatest possible service to the general good, there can be no doubt that herein the system was more than a failure, for the exact contrary was the result attained

* In establishing the University Napoleon had in mind only the instruction of boys. He would not tolerate the idea of public schools for girls. "I do not think that there is any occasion for considering the method of instruction for girls," was his reply when his attention was called to this deficiency; "they cannot be better brought up than by their mothers; public education is not suitable for them, since they are not called upon to take part in public life." It was evident that Madame de Staël was not to be put out of his mind.

and probably intended; for the ultimate purpose of this institution was after all, like the others, only to subserve the Emperor's own system. But even if the national government had relinquished the direction of education to the corporation, and thus relieved itself of the burden, it still retained closely within its grasp the superintendence and control over the same. The decisions of the Grand Master had to be submitted first of all to the judgment of the Council of State, which had power to annul them, and in the departments the schools were visited by the prefects, who reported upon them to the Minister of the Interior. In fact the minister came forward to provide the very first text-book for the University: the catechism which had been brought to completion in 1806 with the concurrence of the Cardinal Legate Caprara, whom Napoleon had repeatedly assisted out of financial straits. In this catechism the political creed of the rising generation in France was thus formulated: "We owe to our Emperor Napoleon I. love, respect, obedience, fidelity, military service, tributes decreed for the defence of the Empire and of his throne; we owe to him also fervent prayers for his safety and for the prosperity of the state, both spiritual and material. We are under obligations to perform all of these duties toward him because God has crowned him with manifold gifts in war as in peace, establishing him as our sovereign, the instrument of His power, and giving him His own likeness upon earth. To honour and serve our Emperor is to honour and serve God Himself, and this is especially our duty because he it is whom God the Most High hath raised up in troublous times to re-establish public worship in the holy religion of our fathers and to be its protector. He it is who by his profound and energetic wisdom has brought back and maintained public order, who has defended the state with his powerful arm, and who has become the anointed of the Lord through consecration at the hands of the Pope, the sovereign pontiff of the Church Universal." To the question what was to be thought of those who should fail to perform their obligations toward the Emperor, the catechism made answer: "According to St. Paul they would sin against the ordinances of God Himself and draw down upon themselves eternal damnation."

That was surely no small measure of success to have been attained by the famishing lieutenant of Valence, to see himself revered by the most cultured nation in the world as "the likeness of God upon earth." And yet this was but a trifle when compared with his inordinate ambition. The bounds of that state had long been to him too restricted, and to walk the earth simply as the image of deity was, after all, not just to his mind. On the day of his coronation as Emperor, in December, 1804, he had said to Decrès, the Minister of the Navy, that he had been born too late into the world, in which there was no longer anything great to be accomplished; and when Decrès replied that he ought to be satisfied, he rejoined: "My record has been brilliant, I acknowledge, and I have had an excellent career. But how different from ancient times! Take Alexander, for instance; after having conquered Asia he announced himself to the people to be the son of Jupiter, and, with the exception of his mother, Olympias, who was in a position to know, and of Aristotle and a few Athenian pedants, he was believed by the entire Orient. Well, then, take my case! If I were to announce myself to-day to be the son of the Everlasting Father, if I were to declare that I was going to return thanks to Him by virtue of that fact, there isn't a fish-wife who would not jeer at me as I passed! The people are far too much enlightened; there is nothing great left to be done." In short, he was not satisfied.

No one realized this more unmistakably than those immediately about him. From the Empress down to the meanest lackey the entire court had to suffer from this perpetual dissatisfaction. Josephine, who well remembered how the young general had at one time regarded the union with herself as a stroke of fortune, had now sunk far beneath his level and trembled at the prospect of divorce, in regard to which Napoleon now first began to make intimations. Not that he desired a separation from the companion in life to whom he had become accustomed; it was only consideration for the inheritance of his crown which brought the idea more than formerly to mind. For Louis's son, the little Napoleon, whom the Emperor had once had thoughts of adopting, and who in gossip was spoken

of as his own child, had died during the last campaign, while his little brother was only an infant two years of age and of very delicate constitution.* Moreover, the alliance with Russia had suggested to him the idea of a union with the house of the Czars which should be "suitable to his rank"; at least it is claimed that such had been under discussion even in Tilsit. Under such circumstances it was not easy for Josephine to assert her position. She was all submissiveness and pliant devotion, addressed the Emperor ever in the most confidential intercourse only as "Your Majesty," having long ceased to use the familiar "thou" in speaking to him, squandered, as she had been told to do, her 600,000 francs, and even more of pin-money, anxiously avoided every occasion in which she might be in the way of her tyrannical lord, and remained at all times equally gracious, equally amiable, equally insignificant. To the whole court she set an example of anxious foreboding, and her apprehension at her husband's return as a victor was characteristic, "for," said she, "the Emperor is so prosperous that he will surely have much fault to find."

And indeed the whole court was characterized by uneasiness and awe. Since the war of 1805 Napoleon was a changed man in one respect, inasmuch as he now carefully avoided all familiarity with any one, surrounded himself with great ceremony, and, if he allowed himself to be misled for a moment into using a tone of confidential and friendly feeling, at once effaced its impression by a few curt words addressed as to an inferior. No one of his brothers was allowed to seat himself in his presence, no one of them might venture to direct a word to him until spoken to, no one of them continued to use "thou" in addressing him. Frequently on reception evenings there would be many more than a hundred persons gathered together, of whom not one dared to utter a word, all awaiting speechless the appearance of His Majesty. And in case the Emperor was then in ill-humour on account of the insolent English papers, which were severe enough in their usage of "General Bonaparte," the entire court was made to feel the consequences. Then he cast

* The third son of Queen Hortense, the future Emperor Napoleon III., was in 1807 yet unborn.

off all semblance of courtesy; he would say, for instance, to a lady after she had stated her name: "O Heavens! I had been told that you were pretty," or to an old man: "You have not much longer to live," and other like urbanities. The melancholy dreaminess which had characterized him at the time of the Consulate had thus given place to almost constant moroseness, and it became more and more difficult to wait upon him. His manner of life was irregular. He would sometimes keep his Council in session about him until far into the night without being himself in the least wearied thereby. And again, as frequently occurred, he would rise in the middle of the night in order to work, when he would dictate to his secretaries with such rapidity that his words could be followed only with a sort of short-hand; or else he would remain for hours in the bath, a habit he had acquired at the recommendation of his physician-in-ordinary, Corvisart, who was of opinion that it would tend to quiet his nerves. But in this he could scarcely be said to have been successful; his nervous irritability was constantly upon the increase, sometimes taking the form of convulsive weeping. The same man who had felt in perfect health in the midst of the fatigues and cares of the campaign and who did not move so much as an eyelash even at the most critical moments of a battle, could fly into a rage at the most trifling discomfort in his own palace. Many a garment did he tear to pieces in his impatience because it incommoded him even in the slightest possible degree, and it was understood among his attendants that it was necessary to supply state apparel which should be exactly fitting. For this reason he commonly presented rather a slovenly appearance, and, now that he had grown corpulent during the last few years, he made in walk and bearing anything but a majestic impression.

But so much the more splendid became the display of the court about him. Upon his return to Paris he had reproached Fouché, his Minister of Police, the "Jacobin grown wealthy," as he called him, with not having exercised sufficient surveillance over the aristocratic salons in the Faubourg St. Germain with their conversations and witticisms all savouring of the opposi-

tion. Fouché at this announced to the high nobility that they could disarm the anger of the potentate only by making advances to him, and, as a result, a large number of men of ancient lineage, who had until now ranged themselves against the government, actually had themselves presented at court, thus enhancing its brilliancy to a very considerable extent. Besides these additions there now came to Paris also several of the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, either to render personal homage to their new lord or to beg of him some new favour. One of the two Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg concluded that the surest way of attaining his object lay in paying conspicuous attentions to the Empress. Dalberg also made his appearance to solemnize the marriage of Jerome to the Princess Katharina of Würtemberg on August 23d, 1807. He is said to have stood out prominently among the other German sovereigns as the only one with whom an animated conversation could be carried on. Those veterans who had aided Napoleon in winning his victories, the marshals, were also for the most part at court; not in uniform, however, but in state dress; not as warriors, but as chamberlains, because Napoleon did not like to be reminded of hours of more familiar intercourse on the field and of many a sacrifice which had been made for him there. He spoke of them also sometimes in a way which was by no means flattering. "Davout," said he, "is a man upon whom I might bestow honours, but he will never know how to wear them gracefully"; Ney had "an ungrateful and factious disposition"; Bessières, Oudinot, and Victor were, according to him, nothing more than "mediocre." Of them all Lannes alone had continued to address him as "thou," to which manner of speech on his part Napoleon came at last to be reconciled, for he was indispensable. Besides this one man hardly Soult himself had the courage to express an opinion differing from his in regard to military matters. Most of the others were under the spell of his powerful personality. The brutal Vandamme admitted upon one occasion that he began to tremble when he came into the presence of "this devil of a man," and that Napoleon could drive him through the eye of a needle.

In the latter part of the summer of 1807 the Court was at Fontainebleau. There were organized theatrical performances by the best actors of the "Comédie Française," concerts by the best Italian singers, balls, hunts on horseback, and other like diversions. But there was not much pleasure taken in them. Napoleon was occupied with affairs of business here as everywhere else, and generally out of temper. "I pity you," said Talleyrand to Monsieur de Rémusat, the Prefect of the Palace, "for you are expected to amuse the unamusable." The entire court suffered under it. The formal receptions or "circles," where no one spoke, and the perpetual tragedies—for comedy was prohibited—were productive of tedium and weariness. This fact did not escape the Emperor, who asked Talleyrand what could be the cause of it, to which his illustrious diplomat replied: "It is because pleasure is not forthcoming at beat of drum, and you always look as if saying to each of us, 'Come, ladies and gentlemen, forward, march!'" Talleyrand might venture to say more than most men. Napoleon affirmed that he was the only person with whom he could talk. There was one thing, however, which must above all be guarded against: he must not for a moment think himself indispensable, as had seemingly been threatened since the Treaty of Tilsit. For that reason he bestowed upon him after the war the Grand Dignitary office of Vice-Grand Elector with a munificent income, but deprived him of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his new dignity being incompatible with the old office, which fell to the lot of Champagny, who had been until now Minister of the Interior. Talleyrand was, however, to continue his permanent adviser, and at Fontainebleau he was indeed to be seen every evening limping into the Emperor's cabinet, whence he would not again appear until after long hours had elapsed.

And, in fact, matter enough did the times provide for their discussions.

Suddenly, in the midst of the festivities at Fontainebleau, arrived tidings which amazed and terrified the world at large, but which to Napoleon and his plans were of very special sig-

nificance: England had sent a fleet with an expeditionary corps to surprise and attack Denmark, which was a neutral power; Copenhagen had been bombarded for three days, from the 2d to the 5th of September, 1807, and the Danish fleet there stationed carried off. Such an abrupt and swiftly-executed act on the part of the ever-dilatory British had been anticipated by no one, not even by Napoleon himself. It developed later, to be sure, that soon after the conclusion of the secret Treaty of Alliance at Tilsit the English government was, through an indiscretion, made acquainted with its contents and had gathered from it that Denmark was soon to be constrained to take part in the Continental Alliance and, with her fleet, to shut out British vessels from the Baltic. The London ministry had now warded off this stroke by the outrage committed upon Copenhagen. For although the energetic Frederick, Prince Regent of Denmark, governing in place of the dotard Christian VII., now concluded an alliance with France,—on October 30th 1807,—his fleet was already gone, leaving no means of guarding the passage through the Sound against the British.

This conduct on England's part furnished the solution to one of the two great questions which had been left open at the time of the Tilsit Alliance: there was no longer any possibility of an amicable arrangement between Great Britain and the Continent while under the ascendancy of Napoleon. Russia was obliged to acknowledge as hopeless her mission to mediate peace and, in accordance with the terms of the Alliance, to declare war against England. And this she proceeded to do on November 7th, 1807. It was not indeed without misgivings that the Czar made up his mind to this step, for, as has been stated, traffic with the island realm was a necessity to his empire. The source of Russia's wealth lay in the export of the products of her rich fields and forests, which were disposed of through the agency of the British, who could handle them better and more economically than any one else; on the other hand, the lack of home industries made articles of British manufacture indispensable to Russian consumers. Those classes of the population most immediately concerned—first of all the

landed nobility, then the merchants and the financiers—saw themselves threatened with enormous losses; the army, which had previously been itself desirous of peace, was now more than ever dissatisfied at the prospect of having shed its blood for nothing, but the ruin of the country; in short, the opposition to the introduction of the Continental blockade was almost universal and manifested itself here and there with suspicious openness. This feeling is supposed to have had much influence later in leading to the rupture with Napoleon. But, for the present at least, Alexander, who was convinced that it would be long before a successful war could be waged against the all-powerful French, maintained his own autocratic will, although he felt little personal confidence in his great ally.* The essential point was to him, after all, that he saw in this alliance the means of obtaining possession of the Turkish principalities upon the Danube—Moldavia and Wallachia—as well as of Finland, still belonging to Sweden.

Hardly more than a few days had passed after his rupture with England before he formally demanded of Savary, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, that these two principalities should be united to Russia and that they should proceed to the partition of Turkey, the plan of which had been proposed at Tilsit. For French mediation between Russia and Turkey, which constituted one of the stipulations of the Treaty of Alliance and which was to have brought about peace between the two powers, had resulted in nothing. On August 29th, 1807, preliminaries had, it is true, been signed at Slobosia, but the Czar had refused to ratify them since they contained no word of ceding to him the two principalities.

This question was very soon to give rise to discord between the allies, not, to be sure, outspoken and public, but secret. Napoleon was kept exactly informed concerning the current of the opposition in Russia by his envoy Savary, who was replaced at St. Petersburg in December by the "Ambassador Extraordi-

* In November, 1807, upon being warned by Schöler, the Prussian ambassador, against reposing too much confidence in Napoleon, he had replied that in dealing with that man there could be no thought of reliance.

nary" Caulaincourt, and by Soult and Davout, who had remained with their corps in Poland and Prussia. He also knew, and that through personal experience, how suddenly the Czar might be persuaded into taking a political course directly contrary to that which he had been pursuing. He was thus obliged to bear constantly in mind the possibility of a change of front on the banks of the Neva. It was, as has been said, his principle of guidance to treat all friends as if they might at any time become his enemies. And how easy it would be for Russia under prevailing conditions to change again into a foe! And he was to assist such an ally to greater power! He was actually to procure the principalities on the Danube for the Czar and thus yield to him the most direct influence upon Oriental affairs, in spite of the fact that he so especially desired to control them himself! Of a surety not. He refused peremptorily to proceed to the dismemberment of Turkey; in the first place, as he said, England would surely take the lion's share in appropriating Egypt, Cyprus, etc., which would make her position in India invulnerable and thus put an end to his own vast schemes.

For this reason, he believed it to be indispensable—and there were other reasons which argued in favour of such a decision—to keep his army on the watch along the Russian border-line, and to delay the evacuation of Prussia by the continual exaction of new and inordinate contributions from that state.* And there was still another consideration.

As has been observed, there now prevailed in Turkey also a feeling of opposition to France; already the Porte had begun to make advances toward England and threatened to establish friendly relations with that power. If that result should be brought about, British commerce, which was to have been

* In a convention signed July 12th, 1807, the Prussian negotiator, General Kalkreuth, had allowed the French to impose upon him the stipulation that Prussia should indeed be evacuated according to designated times and stages, but only upon its having paid the war-indemnity in full or upon having furnished sufficient guarantee of its payment. But, since this indemnity had by order of Napoleon been arbitrarily set at over 150,000,000 francs, there was little prospect that Frederick William III would ever be able to fulfil that condition.

shut out from all Europe, would thus have opened to it a wide access, while to Napoleon, whose thoughts were always bent upon an expedition to India, the sally-port toward the east would be closed. That was not to be tolerated. The Balkan Peninsula must be brought absolutely under his own control. For this it was that he had demanded Corfu, and for this that he now ordered it fortified in all haste and, immediately upon hearing of the Russian declaration of war against England, gave orders to his Minister of the Navy to assemble a fleet with which he might again conquer Malta and Sicily, whilst shutting out the British in the west from any access to the Mediterranean by an attack upon Gibraltar; for this he now requested of the Sultan permission for his troops to pass from Dalmatia through Albania, and for this also he re-enforced the corps in Dalmatia. This was expecting much of Turkey; to ask more would have meant driving her into England's arms. To demand that she should surrender the principalities on the Danube to her hereditary foe would unquestionably have brought about that result. It may be, as Alexander afterwards averred, that Napoleon was the first to speak of the Danubian principalities at Tilsit, but, if so, it was of course only for the sake of winning over the Czar to his system of opposition to England. Since, then, this object had been accomplished by Russia's declaration of war against George III., there was no further occasion for heeding his promise. Instead of this the Corsican now made two moves upon the great political chess-board which absolutely checkmated Russia's Oriental schemes.

In the first place, while making, of course, constant affirmations of his friendship to the Czar, he declared himself ready indeed to procure the countries on the Danube for Russia, but only in case that state would authorize his annexation of Prussian Silesia; otherwise, in case the Czar did not withdraw his troops from Wallachia, his own should continue to occupy Germany. Now Russia could not with any semblance of decency lend her own assistance to the spoliation of Prussia, whom she had taken under her protection, and accordingly declined, leaving her divisions on the Danube, thus enabling Napoleon to

refer in Constantinople to his own good offices and to the malicious Russians who did not want peace,—by means of which representations he was actually successful in inducing the Turks to keep their ports closed against the English.

Then he proceeded to make his second dexterous move against Alexander. Gustavus IV. of Sweden, partly from fear of experiencing the fate of Denmark, and partly out of personal dislike of Napoleon and his system, had adhered to his alliance with England. Napoleon now reminded the Czar of that article of their agreement presupposing this case, urging Alexander to declare war against his brother-in-law, the King of Sweden, and conquer Finland for himself, saying that he would gladly lend his assistance, and that Bernadotte with his army corps in Holstein was already set apart for that purpose. Although the principalities on the Danube lay nearer the heart of the Czar than Finland, he nevertheless acceded to this proposal, and, while his Minister in St. Petersburg was still deluding the Swedish ambassador with false assurances of safety, the Russian troops suddenly crossed the border into Finland during the last week of February, 1808. Evidently he had counted upon the expedition as being very easy of accomplishment, especially in view of the promised aid from France, and had not reduced his forces upon the Danube. The outcome was, however, quite different from what he had looked for. The Swedes, supported by the English, offered effectual resistance, whereat the Czar began to appreciate the difficulties involved in the enterprise and that his expeditionary army must be re-enforced. Poland could not be stripped of soldiery on account of the French in Prussia, and he thus saw himself compelled to draw his reinforcements after all from the Danubian principalities, which meant giving up hope of conquest there for the time being. This measure would, it is true, not have been necessary if Bernadotte had really given the promised support to the Russians. But he did nothing of the kind. For it was precisely the purpose of Napoleon to entangle Alexander so inextricably in the Finnish undertaking that he would abandon Turkish enterprise of his own accord. To Caulaincourt the Czar made com-

plaint, demanding to know why it was that, although France had pledged herself to give efficient support to Russia's efforts against Sweden, Marshal Bernadotte had suddenly ceased to advance. In reply the ambassador could only allege as the reason the difficulties in the way of crossing the Belt to Schonen. But this was, of course, not the true answer. That the Czar might have read in a letter of Napoleon's to Talleyrand, dated April 25th, 1808, in which he said: "You understand well enough that I could not as a matter of fact so lightly turn my soldiers upon Sweden, and that my concerns do not lie in that direction." On the contrary, the French divisions in Poland and Prussia were now concentrated and strong fortifications erected at the strategic point near Modlin where the Bug River flows into the Vistula—a precaution against all contingencies, for dissatisfaction was increasing daily in the land of the ally and there was no knowing what would come of it. Meanwhile, as a decoy to Russia, he instructed Caulaincourt, his ambassador at St. Petersburg, not to refuse frankly to discuss the partition of Turkey, but to reserve the solution of the question for a new interview between the two emperors.

This attitude which Napoleon had assumed toward Russia must be kept in mind in order rightly to comprehend his conduct of the same time toward the other states of Europe. As a matter of course it was impossible under existing circumstances for Prussia and Austria to escape from the sphere of his power, for the incessant occupation of Northern Germany not only had the effect of holding Russia in check, but at the same time threatened and hampered the political affairs of the powers of Middle Europe. Therefore Alexander had hardly more than issued his manifesto against England before the Prussian Court at Memel was compelled to recall its ambassador from London on November 29th. In February, 1808, Napoleon declared without the least circumlocution to the brother of Frederick William in Paris that the question of the evacuation of Prussia had its own place in the great combination of universal policy and was not in the least a matter of money, which was equivalent to saying that even upon the fulfilment of all French

demands the King could not hope to be rid of the French invaders.

Toward Austria Napoleon proceeded in a manner somewhat less summary. During the course of the last two years that state had completed the reorganization of its army and had maintained it, in spite of financial distress, undiminished in number. A certain consideration was therefore called for in dealing with this power. But it was, after all, nothing more than a matter of form when Napoleon suggested to the Austrian court that it should attempt to mediate peace in England, demand the return of the Danish fleet and, in case this were refused, recall its ambassador. It was in reality a command which Austria, hard pressed by a Franco-Russian alliance and threatened by a French army to the north, had no choice but to obey. In consequence, in January, 1808, Count Starhemberg demanded his passports in London and only in strictest confidence informed the government of George III. that, in spite of appearances, Austria remained amicably disposed toward England. In fact Austria was expected to account herself fortunate because in October the French had at last condescended to evacuate Braunau, to atone for which, however, they had proceeded in the regulation of the Italian boundary-line very much to the disadvantage of Austria. In Vienna there was, indeed, talk of overtures which France had made in regard to this matter of a division of Turkey in which Austria should be invited to share. Napoleon had, it is true, admitted the possibility of such a partition and had promised to her, as he had to Russia, her portion in the spoil; but the Emperor had aimed only to excite one of these powers against the other, Turkey constituting for the future an excellent apple of discord, so as to make both serve the ends of his own policy. And when one hears of Stadion, the Minister, cherishing the vain hope of obtaining a fat morsel including Bosnia, Servia, and a slice of Bulgaria besides a strip of country connecting it with Saloniki, and then compares with this Napoleon's promises made at the same time to Russia, one can scarcely restrain a snile at seeing how the machinations of the Corsican, one after another

were unfailingly successful and how he never failed in finding dupes.

But if Napoleon could thus impose his will upon the Great Powers, how much more disregardful and emphatic his dealings with the smaller states which could have no thought of resistance! To begin with Italy. English wares had here found a place of refuge in the Tuscan harbour of Livorno. They arrived there under the American flag, were stored and forwarded from time to time as far as Leipzig. The dowager queen of Etruria, who, imprudently enough, had surrounded herself with persons ill-disposed toward France, declared it to be impossible for her to close her ports to a neutral flag. Thereupon Napoleon, at the end of August, 1807, ordered General Miollis with 6000 men to march into Tuscany and confiscate all English merchandise in the country, following up this act by an announcement to the queen that she must surrender to France her country, for which she would find compensation on the Iberian Peninsula according to arrangements made with Spain. On May 30th Tuscany, likewise Corsica and Elba, were declared constituent parts of France and apportioned into three departments.

There now remained in Italy only a single small state which dared to defy Napoleon's system; this was that of the Pope. This bordered on two seas and could not be omitted in case the Continental system of blockade were to be rigidly enforced. The strained relations existing between Pope and Emperor prior to the last war have already been spoken of. During the war the French ambassador Alquier had devoted all his energies to the effort to induce the Holy Father to acknowledge Joseph as King of Naples and to participate in what was termed the "Italian Federation" under the suzerainty of Napoleon, or, in other words, in an offensive and defensive alliance with Naples and the kingdom of Italy. But he met with no success. The Pope would recognize Joseph only upon condition of a guarantee of his own independence and neutrality, that is, that he should not be called upon to join the league directed against England. Upon this refusal, on July 22d, 1807, Napoleon had

written from Dresden to Eugene Beauharnais a letter which was to be shown to Pius VII. "The present Pope," wrote Napoleon in truly characteristic style, "is too powerful. Priests are not qualified for governing. Why is it that the Pope will not 'render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's'? Is he greater here on earth than Jesus Christ? Peradventure the time is not far distant, if my state affairs continue to be interfered with, when I shall cease to recognize the Pope as anything but Bishop of Rome, having the same rank and privileges as the bishops of other states under my sway. I should not be afraid to unite the Gallican, Italian, German, and Polish churches in a council for carrying on my affairs without a Pope." Of more practical significance was a command issued by Talleyrand on the same day to the ambassador at Rome: he was to exact of the Holy Father the admission of twenty-four Frenchmen into the College of Cardinals and his bestowal of full powers upon Caprara, his legate in Paris, for the execution of a treaty regulating the questions now at issue. To neither of these demands would the Pope accede. Instead, Bayanne, who had been none the less appointed by France as Cardinal, was despatched by the Curia to Napoleon to appease him and accord to him, if need be, what had been refused scarcely a year before—coronation as Emperor of the West—but on no account the increase in the number of the Cardinals, and the entrance into the Federation. But this was to Napoleon, whose plans in the Mediterranean have already been set forth, the essential point. "What is most of all important to the Emperor of the French," wrote Champagny to Caprara, "is that the temporal sovereign of Rome should act with France so that, situated in the midst of the great Empire, surrounded by his armies, he should not be foreign to his interests or to his policy. . . . The interests of humanity, the voices of 60,000,000 of men, are calling to him: 'Compel England to live at peace with us, to give us back our ports, our coasts, our ships, our maritime and commercial relations.' If the Pope alone upon the Continent desired to remain attached to these Britons, would it not be the duty of the head of the Empire to unite at once with the Empire that part of his

domains which isolated itself from it by its political attitude and to annul the gift of Charlemagne, which was being used as a weapon against his successor? . . . And yet the Emperor would be contented with uniting to his Empire only the legations of Urbino, of Macerata, and of Ancona, which are indispensable to him in order to unite Upper Italy with Naples." This was his chief requirement, but to this were attached sundry minor demands: the suppression of religious orders in Italy, the increase in the number of French Cardinals, and the extension of the Italian Concordat to include Venetia.

The threat of annexing the three legations produced in Rome the most painful impression. It had not been forgotten there how Pius had, three years before, made the long and wearisome journey to Paris and there even discredited himself to some extent in the eyes of the Catholic world for the sole object of regaining the previously surrendered territories of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, and now for a second time was he to lose a portion of his territories and precisely that portion yielding the most revenue. The Cardinals—the same who out of regard for their financial advantage had before counselled in favour of the coronation journey—now, on the same account, urged the Pope to yield. He at length did so, and declared himself ready to make common cause with France against England and to receive French garrisons into Ancona and Civita Vecchia. But Napoleon must have foreseen this compliance, for he acted accordingly. Without awaiting the decision of the Curia, he gave orders to General Lemarrois toward the end of December, 1807, to march without delay into the three legations in question, while he meanwhile prevailed upon Cardinal Bayanne in Paris to sign a treaty sanctioning all his demands, amongst others also the one requiring that in the future the College of Cardinals should consist of Frenchmen to the extent of one third. His real purpose in this course was to force the Pope from his conciliatory attitude into one of resistance, so as to take from him the whole instead of a part only of the States of the Church. And this purpose was accomplished. Pius, deeply wounded at the arbitrary occupation of his eastern provinces, not only

refused his ratification to the treaty just agreed upon, but would have no further concern in the federation against England. This was all that Napoleon had been waiting for. He could now with some appearance of truth denounce the Pope to the world as the hindrance in the great work of the establishment of peace, reason enough to justify Charlemagne the second in taking back the gift made by the first of that name. Before the end of January, 1808, General Miollis received instructions to occupy Rome, and on February 2d he entered that city. He was to banish from the country all non-Roman prelates, to incorporate the papal battalions into those of France, to dissolve the Holy Father's guard of nobles, and take upon himself the administration of the affairs of the country. All this was carried into completion by April, 1808, the States of the Church being thus converted into a French province.

Napoleon was at this time in Bayonne. He had been led thither by a political transaction of far-reaching significance in the world's history. Spain was the country concerned. Its king, Charles IV., had up to this time continued an incapable existence and the queen a shameful one, while the people had suffered, destitute and oppressed, under the rule of the Prince of the Peace, who submitted unresistingly to the hegemony of the neighbouring state. At the command of Napoleon the country had become involved in war with England after having sacrificed its ships, its commerce, and to some extent its colonies, in order to preserve its existence, which would otherwise have been imperilled by France, an existence, which had continually to be purchased anew by the payment of high tribute both in men and troops. Not until the time when Napoleon began to make war against Prussia was there any evidence that the court at Madrid might cease to yield its customary submission. At that time the Russian ambassador used all persuasions to induce Spain to take part in the coalition, while the English threatened to foment revolt in the Spanish colonies in South America. The fate of the Bourbon king of Naples, Ferdinand IV., who was a brother of the Spanish king, further added to the fear in which Napoleon was held, and, when it became

known that he was going forth to contend against the renowned Prussian army, preparations for war began to be made in Madrid in the hope that he would meet with defeat; a manifesto issued somewhat prematurely spoke in ambiguous terms of strife which had become unavoidable. But this document bore a fatal date—October 14th—that of the battle of Jena. The news of the brilliant victory overthrew the entire project of resistance; the mobilization, which had been represented to the French ambassador as directed against Portugal, was discontinued and the Prince of the Peace was again overflowing in assurances of his devotion to France.

But Napoleon's ambassador had not been in the least misled as to the true meaning and progress of affairs. He reported upon them, and the Emperor read the despatch and the famous manifesto in Berlin just at the moment when he believed himself to be nearing his goal of universal dominion and was preparing to take his last steps eastward toward attaining it. Eyewitnesses declare that he became pale with excitement. Still he was able to master his feelings. Spain was allowed to have no inkling that he had any knowledge of the change of bearing planned at Madrid, of which he had furthermore received confirmation particularly through intercepted reports of the Prussian ambassador in Madrid. He quietly received the renewed protestations of devotion as if of pure gold, from which he at once proceeded to derive profit. He demanded that a contingent of 15,000 men should be sent from the troops now under arms to the mouth of the Elbe to take part in the defence against England, demanded that the Continental blockade should be strictly enforced, the Spanish fleet united with that of France in Toulon, and imposed upon the court of Madrid the burden of the maintenance of 25,000 Prussian prisoners. Now had there been at the head of Spanish affairs a strong and popular government, it might have availed itself of this moment to open its ports to England and declare itself against France. Ensuing years have proved that in this country of Charles IV. there was no lack of forces available for resistance, and who can say what might have been the effect of such a de-

sertion after the indecisive battle at Eylau? But Spain's government was weak and not in the slightest degree popular; Godoy and the guilty queen were absolutely hated and only the Crown Prince rejoiced in the sympathies of the people, and that for the very reason that the queen and the Minister were devising means of cutting him off from the succession to the throne. It was upon these contentions between government and people and amongst the ruling powers themselves that Napoleon based his purpose of bringing Spain more completely under his own dominion. The only question was how this was to be accomplished. Talleyrand would have been in favour of a marriage between the Spanish Crown Prince and a French Princess, one of the Taschers, for instance, as a means of bringing the state into the federal system of the French hegemony. The Emperor, however, had other views. It may be that upon reading Godoy's manifesto his determination was at once made to deprive the Bourbons here also of the throne and give it to some member of his own family. The path was a devious one by which he ultimately reached this goal. It led in the first place by way of Portugal.

In Tilsit it had been agreed in regard to the court at Lisbon that it should be summoned to make a declaration of war against England and, in event of refusal, be treated as an enemy. In this Spain was now called upon to co-operate. This was making no small demand, for the Crown Prince John of Portugal, regent for his mother, who was of unsound mind, was the son-in-law of Charles IV.; but in spite of this fact the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon associated himself with the representative of France when the latter demanded the closing of the ports of Portugal, the dismissal of the British ambassador, and even the arrest of all Englishmen within the country, with the confiscation of their property. In the answer returned by the Portuguese Minister, who had secretly come to an understanding with England, he agreed to the closing of the ports, though not to the arrest of the foreigners, to whom, moreover, a hint was surreptitiously given to retire from the country at the earliest possible moment. This result was far from satisfactory to

Napoleon, who had been thus overbearing in his demands merely for the sake of provoking opposition, and he at once proceeded to act. On September 30th, 1807, the two ambassadors, French and Spanish, left Lisbon, and on October 18th 20,000 French soldiers under Junot crossed the border, directing their march upon Portugal. On October 27th a secret treaty between France and Spain was signed at Fontainebleau in which the following points were agreed upon: Portugal was to be conquered and divided into three parts, of which the northernmost, lying between the Duero and Minho rivers, should constitute the kingdom of North Lusitania, to be given to the Queen of Etruria as compensation for Tuscany; the southernmost, which was formed of the provinces of Alemtejo and Algarve, was to be Godoy's under the name of the Principality of Algarve, while the middle portion was to remain in the hands of France until the establishment of universal peace. The Portuguese colonies were to be likewise divided, and the King of Spain was to assume the title of Emperor of America. In the drawing up of this treaty Champagny, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was purposely left out and Duroc ordered to put his name to the document; Talleyrand also had no knowledge of it. The only other person in the secret was Murat, who foresaw here a possibility of at last gaining a kingdom for himself. No danger but that the treaty would receive ratification in Madrid in view of the interest in it of the Prince of the Peace, who had even before the last war sought vainly in Paris to get provision made for himself at the expense of Portugal. On the same day the military part of the enterprise was also regulated in a separate convention: France was to proceed through Spain against Lisbon with 30,000 men, while 16,000 of the Spanish troops should occupy Northern and Southern Portugal. A special article conceded to France the right to assemble at Bayonne a further force of 40,000 men, who were, however, to interfere only in case the British should attempt to land troops in Portugal.

In view of these threatening hostilities, Prince John had for a moment hesitated as to whether it were not better after all

to submit absolutely and unconditionally to Napoleon, but his decision was anticipated by the "Moniteur" of November 15th, 1807, which read: "The Prince Regent of Portugal loses his throne. The downfall of the House of Braganza furnishes one more proof that ruin is inevitable to whomsoever attaches himself to the English." There now remained to him no alternative but flight, since his little country could not contend alone against Spain and France. On November 27th the royal family took ship for Brazil to seek a new home beyond the seas. A few days later Junot with a handful of exhausted troops arrived at the city now without a master and without thought of resistance; the Portuguese colours were lowered from the citadel to give place to the tricolour of France.

The Treaty of Fontainebleau is historically important, not so much for its political adjustments as for the military arrangements therein agreed upon. The Spanish troops were directed toward the west, which is tantamount to saying that a French army would be thus enabled to reach Madrid without encountering serious resistance. And that was, as a matter of fact, the purpose which Napoleon had in mind. Circumstances at the court of Madrid were largely responsible for the fact that he was able to carry it out. For just at this time the internal discord there reached its climax. Ferdinand, the Crown Prince, was conspiring against his mother and Godoy to get hold of the reins of government; the plot was discovered and a manifesto issued by the king proclaiming the high treason of his son. Both parties turned "for counsel" to Napoleon. That impartial adviser, thinking the time propitious for action on his own part, admonished Charles IV. against delaying the important expedition against Portugal on account of palace squabbles, and gave at the same time secret instructions to the bearer of the letter to acquaint himself carefully in regard to public feeling in Spain and the strength of her fortresses and army. On the same day, November 13th, 1807, General Dupont, who commanded the second French expeditionary corps of 40,000 men, also received orders to advance across the Spanish frontier as far as Vittoria, although there was as yet not the slightest indication of a disem-

barkation of English troops. Soon after—early in December—the Emperor betook himself to Upper Italy in order to meet his brother Joseph in Venice and offer to him the Spanish crown, an arrangement already agreed upon in most profound secrecy between the two emperors in Tilsit, so that Joseph now despatched a trusted messenger to Alexander I. to convey to that monarch messages of respect which should secure the Czar's favour to himself in the new capacity in which he was about to appear.*

During December and January in the neighbourhood of 30,000 French soldiers marched into Spain and took up positions temporarily near Valladolid and Burgos; Murat was made commander-in-chief. No one knew what was their purpose there. The Spanish people assumed that they had come to set the Crown Prince upon the throne and to overthrow the hated rule of Godoy, and welcomed them therefore with rejoicing. And Ferdinand himself was of the same opinion. Charles IV., on the other hand, in an anxious letter begged for enlightenment. Napoleon's answer was a lie. The troops, said he, were destined to prevent a debarkation of the English and were consequently to march on to Cadiz. Godoy, who saw to the bottom of the scheme, advised flight to the southern provinces, but, when preparations for that course were begun, the people seized the idea that Godoy was trying thus to make impossible the change of system planned by Napoleon, and proceeded to Aranjuez, where the court was staying, and there compelled the king to dismiss his minister and himself to abdicate in favour of his son.

This development was thoroughly out of keeping with the plans of the Emperor. It had been his hope that the royal family would, like that of Portugal, actually take to flight, which

* Upon this point the "Mémoires" of Miot de Melito (II. p. 349 and following), the confidant of Joseph, are a witness scarcely to be disputed. He even mentions the name of the officer who was entrusted with the mission to St. Petersburg. Moreover, Lucien, whom Napoleon chanced upon in Mantua, December, 1807, relates that he also among others was offered the kingdom of Spain by his imperial brother, who exclaimed: "Do you not see it, then, falling into the hollow of your hand thanks to the follies of your beloved Bourbons and to the stupidity of your friend the Prince of the Peace?"

he would then have demonstrated in this case, as he had in the other, to be due to attachment to England. But now on March 23d, 1808, immediately following Murat's entrance into Madrid, the new king, Ferdinand VII., also puts in his appearance amidst the joyful acclamations of the people. To a large proportion of the population it now first began to seem as if the French had really been preparing the way to the throne for the young prince. This was fatal to Napoleon's own plans. He at once set about devising some means of separating the young monarch from his people, whom he had not yet recognized as king. For this purpose Savary was sent to Madrid. He was to represent to Ferdinand that the Emperor was himself on the way to Spain, and that it would be a way of ingratiating himself for the young king to go out to meet him and ask his recognition. Ferdinand thereupon actually set out for Burgos and continued on thence to Vittoria, without, however, seeing anything of the Emperor. Instead there was delivered to him here a letter from Napoleon to the effect that before he could sanction the accession to the throne he must satisfy himself in an interview with Ferdinand as to whether Charles IV. had really abdicated of his own free will or only under compulsion, this interview to take place in Bayonne. Among those about the young prince there were many who raised their voices in warning against undertaking the journey thither; the populace of Vittoria used every effort to prevent his crossing the frontier. But what else was to be done? All about the French were encamped and the invitation was in reality a command. "At Vittoria," said Savary at a later date, "I thought for a moment that my prisoner was going to escape me; but I managed it after all by frightening him." On April 14th, Ferdinand—a prisoner in truth—reached Bayonne, whither Napoleon had likewise invited the king and queen, his parents, and Godoy.

It will surprise no one to learn that the Prince did not find here what he had come to seek. Napoleon not only refused to him his recognition, but demanded of him outright that he should give back the crown to his father, confident that Charles IV. had no further desire to return to a country which

execrated his rule and where unmistakable affronts awaited himself and the Prince of the Peace. Ferdinand attempted at first to refuse, but when news penetrated to Bayonne of an insurrection in Madrid which was attributed to his instigation, and when Napoleon threatened to treat him as a rebel, he yielded and returned the crown to Charles IV., who confidently placed it in the hands of the Emperor. On June 6th, 1808, Napoleon set it upon the head of his brother Joseph.* It was not without the use of guile and of brutal force, to be sure, but Napoleon had nevertheless gained his end. The Pyrenean peninsula had now come indirectly under his sway.

It was yet to be seen whether it would so remain. Were that the case, then the band which he had been forging against England was actually welded, and from the Pillars of Hercules as far as the Vistula the Continent was subject to his more or less peremptory orders; then the colossus in the East would no longer venture to think of separating from him to pursue his own course. He must have experienced a feeling of high satisfaction in contemplating the successes of the year just past, sufficient to drive far from him any misgivings which he might have had as to the morality of his proceedings. He could give new scope to his designs. The English, either because of the attack directed against Sweden by Russia, or because of the events in

* Joseph had not remained uninterruptedly the person upon whom Napoleon desired to confer the Spanish crown. At one time—after the first abdication of Charles IV.—the Emperor had offered it to his brother Louis in a letter of March 27th, 1808. The reason for this was, on the one hand, a personal resentment against Joseph, who had permitted himself a slight deviation from one of the orders issued by his brother, whereat the Emperor had reprimanded him in harshest terms on March 25th (Du Casse, "*Supplément à la correspondance de Napoléon I.*" p. 100), and on the other hand Napoleon had received notification of the extensive smuggling carried on by the English under the American flag in Holland, and for that reason was already cherishing the wish to incorporate that country completely with France. (See Napoleon's letter of March 29th, 1808, to his Minister of Finance, Gaudin, in the 16th volume of his "*Correspondance.*") Louis declined the offer, saying that he was bound by his oath already given to the people of Holland, and shortly afterwards Joseph was again restored to favour.

Portugal, had been brought to withdraw the larger part of their ships from the Mediterranean and the ocean and had directed them toward the north. Napoleon at once resolved to fortify rapidly his already strong position in the great interior basin, to equip three fleets, of which two, making the circuit of Africa and bearing 18,000 soldiers, should set sail for India, while the third should start from Toulon to debark 20,000 men in Egypt. At the same time, as had been agreed upon at Tilsit, an expeditionary corps composed of French, Russian, and Austrian troops should penetrate into Turkey,—for it was with this in mind that Napoleon had brought up the question of its partition in Vienna and at St. Petersburg,—march upon Constantinople and thence plunge into Asia, where they were to cross Persia—as they frankly acknowledged, although that country had been an ally of France since 1807—and continue thence toward the East. The mere tidings that the corps was on the march, as Napoleon said to himself, would provoke an insurrection among the populations of India which had been subjugated by the British; that insurrection would destroy the credit and influence of England, and that country, recognizing its ruin, would be compelled to sign a treaty of peace which would put an end to the tyrannical domination which it exercised upon the seas and would thus cause to disappear the last and greatest obstacle which was preventing the extension of his Empire over the entire globe. According to Talleyrand's statement to Metternich, Napoleon wrote on June 30th to Eugene Beauharnais that by October or November he should be in Italy, to direct from there all this vast undertaking.*

* Vandal's "*Napoléon et Alexandre I^{er}*" has established the fact that early in March, 1808, the project of invading India formed the topic of long discussions between the Czar and Caulaincourt at the same time that the question of the partition of Turkey was being agitated. Public sentiment also was aroused in regard to it. Indeed in Danz's interesting pamphlet, published in Jena in 1808 and bearing the title "*The March of the French upon India*," this expedition is spoken of as a matter already determined upon: 30,000 Russians and 30,000 Frenchmen, supported by Persia and countenanced by the dissatisfied Nabobs, were to put an end to English rule in India. The general peace so much wished for

But what if these successes should not prove lasting? What if there came to disturb his reckoning a factor which he had overlooked, a force which he was unable to appreciate or to weigh because he was himself wanting in the feelings which gave it birth? If he had but accepted the command of the Army of the West in 1795, he would have come to know in La Vendée from personal observation the heroic courage engendered in a people which had been wounded, deceived, and driven to desperation, and he would, perhaps, not have been led into the mistake which he now made of showing his disdain of popular feeling in Spain by practising deception upon it. He would perhaps have followed the counsel of Talleyrand and have attached the popular young king to his family and interests in place of thrusting him from his throne. Ferdinand was of course a worthless character, and Napoleon's purpose to elevate the standing and civilization of Spain an intention deserving of the highest praise, but the point upon which everything turned was, after all, that the will of a people whose power was not to be computed was opposing its resistance to his projects. The Emperor was to learn this to his cost, and that within a very short time.

In July, 1808, Joseph made his entrance into Madrid. He had ceded the throne of Naples to Murat. Charles IV. with his wife and favourite repaired to Italy. The young prince, Ferdinand, remained under surveillance at Valençay in France. The new king brought with him a new constitution which had been deliberated upon in Bayonne by 150 Spanish notables; he brought also capable ministers and the most excellent intentions to raise the decadent kingdom to new power and new splendour. But he found the country in a state of tumult. There were doubtless in Spain intelligent statesmen who recognized the advantage to their country of a newly regulated system of government and who were ready to contribute their services toward its main-

could be attained only through victorious combat with England. It was an idea of gigantic proportions thus to keep occupied in Asia the elements of Europe which were dissatisfied with Napoleon's hegemony, while demonstrating to the nations of Europe that this step was indispensable to their welfare and happiness.

tenance, but their prudent judgment was more than offset by the wounded feeling of millions who regarded it as a national disgrace which must be revenged to have been thus taken unawares and duped by the foreigners. Moreover, religious pride was linked with patriotism among this people which had overcome the unbelieving Moors and the heretical Reformation, and the hatred toward the foreign despot was the more pronounced because he it was who had robbed the Pope of his throne. In short, the nation "refused ratification to the Treaty of Bayonne," as Napoleon himself subsequently expressed it, and sprang to arms.

And success crowned the effort. The revolt had begun in Asturias, and before the end of May had spread with furious rapidity. Messengers were despatched to England to ask assistance, and found ready sympathy. Everywhere bands were forming, for the most part under leadership of the monks, and in many cities there arose Juntas, that is to say, councils governing in the name of Ferdinand VII., who alone was recognized and spoken of as king. At first, it is true, the French troops were able to make their way throughout the country, but before long they found themselves resisted by the "banditti." The population of Saragossa fought heroically against the besieging forces and compelled them to withdraw; in Valencia the same occurred; and although Bessières conquered on July 14th, on the open plain near Medina de Rio Seco, his conquest was counterbalanced by the loss in the mountains of Dupont's entire corps of 17,000 men, which was obliged to surrender near Baylen on July 22d. The tidings of this event drew all remaining Spain into the insurrection, so that even Joseph's Council of Ministers was affected by it. He himself no longer felt secure in the residential city, and before the end of July turned northward, withdrawing the entire French army behind the Ebro. Meanwhile the longed-for support from England had landed in Portugal, where, on August 30th, near Cintra, Junot was brought, although on terms most honourable, to surrender. And as if these disasters were not sufficient, the Spanish soldiers stationed in Fünen, Langeland, and Jutland, upon hearing of

the great revolution, at once deserted their French commanders and took ship upon English vessels which would bear them back to their native country.

Napoleon, when leaving Bayonne in July, had felt no doubt that the revolt in Spain would soon be subdued, and the news of these events astounded and perturbed him greatly; Dupont's capitulation made him beside himself with rage, while the report from Cintra seemed rather to depress and discourage him, for there had taken place that which caused him the most pain: the British had again obtained mastery of Portugal, the cordon was broken. If this damage were to be made good, stronger forces must be brought to bear than had hitherto been employed in Spain, the "Grand Army" must be partially if not wholly drawn thither from Germany. But this was equivalent to giving up his dominating position in the east by means of which he had for a year been holding in check three of the Great Powers: Russia, Prussia, and Austria. And this was the more unfortunate because just at this moment there were beginning to be perceptible smouldering fires of resistance in the two German states which might but too easily flame out in war if the pressure now held upon them were to be once removed.

It was not without solicitude that Vienna had observed events occurring in Italy: the incorporation of Tuscany and the ejection of the Pope from his temporal dominions. Then followed the occurrence at Bayonne, producing a tremendous impression. It was useless then, apparently, to show oneself docile and obedient in the performance of all that seemed good to the all-powerful Emperor—useless to be allied with him, the risk of falling into his toils was not thereby lessened. All ancient dynasties of Europe seemed threatened by a similar fate, and Austria was pre-eminently a dynastic state, since it was in the reigning family that its dissimilar component parts found their chief bond of union. Therefore it was that the danger to dynasties was here especially regarded as a menace to the state, and Austria prepared for war. During May and June, 1808, were organized on a modern plan a reserve and a Landwehr, and the people crowded eagerly into the rapidly

formed battalions.* Napoleon made a categorical demand for explanation, and in July threatened war; it was universally supposed that it must follow. But the renouncement of this purpose was for the time being necessitated through the arrival of the disastrous tidings from Spain. Provision for careful observation of Austria was, however, made by the instructions to Davout to move back into Silesia from Poland, while Mortier's corps was ordered to remain in Franconia. The corps of Ney and Victor were summoned back across the Rhine.

Prussia was meanwhile in no less a ferment than Austria, though feeling was necessarily more suppressed and concealed on account of the presence of the French and their adherents. In the previous year, after the battle of Eylau, a conspiracy was formed under the leadership of former Prussian and Hessian officers to stir up a revolt throughout the territory between the Weser and the Elbe in case the British should land in northern Germany. Ever since the peace of Tilsit the feeling of bitterness among the people had but increased under the oppression of the French soldiery. Under the very eyes, as it were, of the foreigners there were held secret meetings for the promotion of hatred and of thirst for war; in April, 1808, the "Tugendbund" of Königsberg was instituted, which, though in itself innocent, was later to lend its name to all secret organizations hostile to France. Besides these the government, with Stein and Scharnhorst in the lead, worked at the regeneration of the state and its army to strengthen both against the approaching contest. All this could not permanently escape

* On August 10th, 1808, the French ambassador, Andréossy, reported by letter to the home government: "From what takes place before our eyes and from reports arriving from all sides it would appear that Austria has never presented so martial an aspect as now, that the Austrian government has never before been the cause of an impulse such as it has now communicated to the nobility and to all classes of citizens. The 'Moria-mur' of the Hungarians under Maria Theresa surely did not call forth proportionally as many combatants, nor were they more promptly armed and drilled than the number of men that the call to arms of the government commissioners and the enrolment have just furnished to the militia." (Archives of Foreign Affairs.)

Napoleon, and, even if he had not otherwise had knowledge of it, an intercepted letter from the Minister, Stein, to the Prince of Wittgenstein dated August 15th, 1808, must have revealed it to him, for therein was it plainly said that the national bitterness in Germany was to be encouraged, and if Napoleon should refuse the proposals put forward by Prussia the plans of the spring of the previous year should be resumed. It scarcely seemed possible that this was the same Prussia which he supposed himself to have annihilated in those two battles in Thuringia and whose very existence he had granted only as a sort of favour.

And not in Germany only but even in the southeast, where Napoleon had expended his utmost skill in diplomacy, did the results of his efforts appear to be slipping from his grasp. In Turkey a revolt had nearly broken out, Mustapha IV. had been driven from the throne and his brother Mahmud II. made Sultan on July 28th, 1808. Under his rule France no longer found any sort of spirit of tractability. The ambassador was confronted with reproaches in regard to the fickle policy of France, and was impressed with the idea that Turkey was intent upon a separate treaty with Russia rather than upon the friendship of Napoleon.

The entire edifice of Napoleonic supremacy over the Continent, so closely approaching its completion, seemed tottering. The Emperor at once recognized the gravity of the situation, but he was no less swift in perceiving the means of relieving it. The only power capable of preserving quiet in Prussia and Austria until Spain could be reduced to order was Russia. The thing to do, then, was to attempt to secure once more the goodwill of that country. There was, indeed, no denying that he had conducted himself toward the Czar in a most equivocal manner, but that impression was not inefaceable. The evacuation of Prussia was already to be regarded as a concession made to Alexander, and Napoleon hastened to represent it as such. A second concession with respect to the Danubian principalities would, he hoped, secure his end. Hitherto he had been putting off the Czar in regard to these coveted territories until the mat-

ter could be discussed verbally between them. This interview should now take place. Hardly had Joseph's flight from Madrid been made known in Paris before an envoy, bearing the invitation to an interview in Erfurt, was despatched post-haste to St. Petersburg, where he was to call attention to the withdrawal of the troops from Prussia and to make request of the Czar that he would protest in Vienna against further military preparations. Erfurt had previously been suggested by Alexander as the place of meeting, and he was now urged to name the date for that occasion. Everything depended upon Russia's decision, for Austria also had been making approaches to the same power, and England had sent to ascertain the attitude it would assume, while the King of Prussia had intimated in confidential letters that he was not disinclined to make common cause with the Court of Vienna. It was everywhere recognized that Alexander was not really at heart a party to the French alliance, and if he had at this time tendered his aid to the other powers, it is most likely that the result would have been then what came to pass five years later. Nothing is known of what took place in the council of the Czar; one fact alone has transpired: that at a certain moment Alexander was keenly impressed by a letter from Tolstoi, his ambassador in Paris, and particularly by the following passage: "Austria's destruction should be looked upon as the forerunner and means to our own."

But the Czar was not to be prevailed upon by his neighbours. He knew that he was necessary to Napoleon, and that he would therefore be allowed his own way in his Oriental plans—much as they might be opposed to Napoleon's desires. The war against Sweden had meanwhile assumed a more favourable aspect, and Russia was again at liberty to turn her attention toward the South. To desist now once again from hostilities toward his southern neighbours, so as to ally himself with Prussia and Austria in opposing France, would have postponed into the distant future the object so ardently coveted—the possession of the principalities on the Danube, and possibly also Constantinople. Moreover, Alexander was not without vanity, and he was anxious to demonstrate to the opposition in the country

by means of a striking success that he had not erred in his choice of the way to Russia's greatness when deciding at Tilsit to attach himself to the Emperor of the French. Of course apostasy now would be regarded only as an acknowledgment on his part that his judgment had been at fault. And the longer Napoleon was kept occupied in Spain the better Alexander's hopes of attaining his goal in the East. Therefore nothing must be allowed to occur which should interrupt Napoleon in his undertaking upon the Iberian Peninsula; Austria and Prussia must be brought to a state of tranquillity, since a war brought about by them would call the French eastward and necessitate the directing of Russian forces toward the west instead of letting them gather in the south the laurels which had come within such easy reach. The interests of Alexander and Napoleon were thus for the time being identical upon this point, that the swords of the powers of Middle Europe should be kept in their scabbards as long as the war in Spain should continue. Hence it was that the Czar zealously dissuaded his friend Frederick William III. from taking part in any hostile act on Austria's part, and urged him to ratify that most oppressive convention which Prince William had signed in Paris on September 8th, 1808, according to which Prussia had still to pay 140,000,000 francs, to deliver to the French the fortresses on the Oder, to maintain the number of the army at a figure below 42,000, and, in case of war between France and Austria, to furnish an auxiliary corps. In Vienna also he gave warning that quiet must be preserved so that, as he said, the painful necessity might be spared him of arraying his forces against Austria. This done he took his departure for Erfurt.

Here, from September 27th, festivity followed upon festivity. It was not known until afterwards that the life of the Corsican Cæsar was being threatened by Prussian conspirators. Napoleon did the honours to his imperial guest with pomp and splendour as before at Tilsit. His grenadiers were selected as military attendants, while his political train was composed of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine. The actors from the "Comédie Française" played before "a parterre of kings".

the masterpieces of French tragedy and upon a certain occasion when Voltaire's "Œdipus" was being performed. as Talma pronounced the words:

"The friendship of a great man
Is a true gift of the gods,"

the Czar arose and, seizing the hand of Napoleon, clasped it in his own, to the applause of the audience. Yet, as a matter of fact, there existed not the slightest trace of sympathy of feeling between these two men, and everything which would appear as the outward expression of such was simply the result of calculation. Alexander was at heart not in the least degree attached to Napoleon, whose encroachments he regarded as an unmixed evil. "The torrent must be allowed its course," said he one day. But each of them recognized his own advantage in their appearing to Europe as friendly and united, and acted accordingly. We are not so much in the dark as to their interviews as is the case with the meeting at Tilsit. We know that Napoleon asked Alexander to unite with him in demanding of Austria the recognition of Joseph as king of Spain, and, by way of enforcing his demand, he was, according to Talleyrand's Memoirs, to post a Russian army corps in the immediate vicinity of the Austrian frontier. On the other hand, it is known that Alexander did not accept the proposal, reserving to himself simply liberty of action in respect to Turkey, and promising co-operation only in case Austria should declare war. Napoleon's secret object in this had been to involve Russia in war with her German neighbours and thus keep her forces employed so that they could not be directed against Turkey. Alexander, for his part, believed—as was whispered by Talleyrand, who had now already begun to side against Napoleon—that in abstaining from threats of any kind to Austria he should hold France in check with the help of Vienna and vice versa, and thus be enabled to pursue his own designs upon the lower Danube without having aught to fear from either.

Napoleon's first scheme having thus failed, he besought the Czar to defer bringing about a rupture with the Porte, at least

until after England should have accepted or rejected the proposals of peace which they were together about to submit to her. But Alexander had determined upon demanding the two principalities of Turkey as the condition of peace, and again refused acquiescence, and Napoleon was once more obliged to be content. The final result of the meeting at Erfurt was a new treaty of alliance signed on October 12th, 1808, and which was to remain secret "for ten years at least." The first matter therein decided was that the two powers should unite in presenting to England a new proposal of peace, and that upon the basis of present possession ("*Uti possidetis*"), a totally gratuitous proceeding, since it was just this existing supremacy of France upon the Continent which England had been contesting ever since 1803. In Articles 8 to 10 Napoleon then acknowledged the extension of the Russian boundary as far as the Danube, and further engaged not to interfere in affairs between the Czar and Sultan, and to take no part therein in case of the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey unless Austria should molest Russia in her proceedings.

There it stood now, legally drawn up and signed—the act providing for that against which he had for so long secretly contended: Russia was to enter into possession of the principalities on the Danube. For himself there had been but one thing gained, and for that the interview was scarcely requisite: he could now really proceed to the regulation of affairs in Spain without danger of immediate interruption by threatenings in the East. On the whole it was, however, nothing less than a political defeat which he had undergone. The Czar indeed felt that to make an entrance into Constantinople was all very fine, but that there were also very real advantages to be derived from a conquest in which there was no obligation to share with others. Later, in 1810, Napoleon in conversation with Metternich expressed regret at "having been thrown out of his course" at Erfurt. Possibly his consequent ill-humour was the occasion of sundry unfeeling acts at this time of which history has preserved the record. As, for instance, upon one occasion he invited Prince William of Prussia, who was present as the representative of his brother, to a rabbit-

hunt upon the battlefield of Jena; while another day, in the presence of Alexander, he called upon soldiers who were marching through the town to recount their exploits in the war against Russia, and rewarded some of them therefor with the order of the Legion of Honour. Talleyrand characterized such conduct very justly in saying to Montgelas: "We Frenchmen are farther advanced in civilization than our sovereign; he has not passed the stage of civilization in Roman history."

But while Napoleon was not always extremely courteous in his bearing toward princes, he distinguished with special favour the great men of Germany whom he saw during his sojourn at Erfurt. On October 2d the author of "Faust" was admitted to audience. Goethe himself has reported in regard to the occasion that Napoleon greeted him with the words: "You are a man!"* and talked with him about "Werthers Leiden," dramatic art, and fate tragedy, and proposed to him the composition of a work in which the death of Cæsar should be represented in a manner more worthy and imposing than had been possible to Voltaire. "The world should be shown," said the Emperor,—and it is not difficult to perceive his object,—"that Cæsar would have been a benefaction to it, and that everything would have been very different if he had but been allowed time to execute his magnanimous projects." A tragedy such as this would, in his opinion, be instructive both to kings and peoples. For what, indeed, did one want of fate in tragedy? Statecraft, according to him, was the real destiny. And just as he had summoned Goethe to think highly of Cæsar, or, in other words, of himself, did he endeavour to bring Wieland to inculcate a better opinion of the Roman emperors than that commonly entertained. It was the same view about Tacitus which he had already repeatedly discussed with Suard, Johannes von Müller, and others, always with the idea that he might eventually be compared with the successors of Augustus. Christianity was another of the subjects which he brought up in conversation with Wieland, and which he designated as "an unsurpassable system of philosophy, since in recon-

* "Vous êtes un homme." See Düntzer's *Life of Goethe*, p. 578. note 3.—B.

ciling man with himself it at the same time secures public order and tranquillity to the state in the same degree that hope and happiness are assured to the individual." There was evident purpose in Napoleon's conduct in Erfurt and Weimar in manifesting far greater respect to the princes among poets than to the different local rulers: in the first place he desired to show sympathy of some kind with the German nation, which was constantly drawing farther from him, and next he wished the world to see that, in spite of crown and sceptre, he felt himself more closely allied with men of genius than with those whom birth alone had placed above the ordinary level.

CHAPTER XV

THE CAMPAIGNS IN SPAIN AND AUSTRIA. MARIE LOUISE

NAPOLÉON had obtained in Erfurt the respite of which he stood in need for carrying on his contest against Spain. How long this respite would last was indeed uncertain, and he must therefore be on the alert to crush out the rebellious movement by the most expeditious and forcible stroke possible and thus get back the lost throne for his brother. And this was necessary not only for the sake of confirming his power, but also for the sake of his prestige. The world must never be allowed to assume that he had made a mistake in robbing the Spaniards of their native-born king, or indeed that he were capable of a mistake of any kind, for he did not feel sufficiently secure, nor was he high-minded enough, to acknowledge an error without fear of detriment to himself. For this double reason he resolved to cross the Pyrenees himself with forces far outnumbering those of Spain, and prove to all Europe that resistance to himself was an impossibility. The troops which had undergone defeat in Spain had been for the most part only young, untried soldiers; those whom he now took with him were the unconquered veterans of Ulm and Austerlitz, of Jena and Friedland. It cost no small struggle to these troops simply to pass through their native country after having been absent from it for three years, and Napoleon tried to inspire them with enthusiasm by making speeches to them full of fire and flattering promises, and secretly gave orders to the municipal officers of the cities to honour them upon their march with banquets and carousals, with songs and speeches expressing pride in their past achievements and confidence in those to follow, seeking thus to impress the warriors with the idea that the hopes and desires of France were really

centred in the feats of arms which they were about to perform.* And with the troops went also their tried and trusted leaders: Lannes, Soult and Bessières, Ney and Lefebvre, Moncey and Victor, all were detailed to Spain with Berthier as Chief of the General Staff. All together, besides the Guard and the cavalry reserve, there were eight army corps sent to engage in the struggle with the rebellious people; for even Junot, who had been defeated at Cintra, was again to take part in the conflict with his 20,000 men. An army was thus made up of more than 200,000 combatants under leadership of the greatest of military geniuses, fitted out with every equipment and excellently clothed and fed.

All these exertions put forth by Napoleon in order to regain the prestige which he had lost in Spain were in striking contrast

* Two of Napoleon's decrees addressed to the Minister of the Interior in September, 1808, are exceedingly characteristic. "I desire," said he in one of them, "that you should direct the prefects of departments along the line of march to be unsparing in attentions to the troops and to use every means to keep up the good spirits animating them and their love of glory. Harangues, couplets, free theatrical exhibitions, banquets—these are what I expect of citizens in honour of soldiers who are returning as victors." A few weeks later he wrote: "The troops have been feasted at Metz, at Nancy, at Rheims. It is my wish that they should be similarly entertained at Paris, at Melun, at Sens, at Saumur, at Tours, at Bourges, and at Bordeaux, which will mean three times for the same troops. You will kindly send me an account of what the cost of this will be per head, according to what you have authorized. Order songs made ready in Paris for distribution in these various cities. These songs are to recount the glory acquired by the army *and that which is yet to be won*, to extol the freedom of the seas which is to be the result of its victories. These songs are to be sung at the banquets to be given. You will have to order three collections of songs so that the soldier shall not hear the same ones twice over." These orders were carried out to the letter. Fézensac, for instance, mentions in his "Mémoires" that "The march of these different corps through France was a triumphant progress. The municipal authorities in all cities vied with one another in showing zeal in their reception. Everywhere were organized military festivities; everywhere banquets were tendered them. Compliments, harangues, soldier songs followed one upon another celebrating the triumphs of the Grand Army and predicting others to follow." No one realized that all of this had been secretly prearranged by the Emperor and paid for out of his pocket.

to the preparations made by his opponents, which were pitifully meagre. Instead of following up and turning to the best account their victories at Baylen and elsewhere driving the French completely out of the country and making provision for its defence, the Spaniards had given themselves completely over to an intoxication of joy which made them forget all danger threatening in the future and imagine their task of national liberation already accomplished. Every one overestimated the amount of forces at disposal, as also the capacity of the generals and the courage of the troops, for whom nothing could have been more pernicious than this over-hasty giving up to the triumphs already won; the various Juntas in their rivalry worked at cross-purposes to one another, and the different generals likewise; the people, heretofore accustomed to the most absolute rule and now left suddenly without a master, sank into helplessness and anarchy. "The French were welcome to enter the country if they pleased; they would be surrounded right and left and taken prisoners all at once"—this was the opinion, not as expressed by subordinates and the lower classes of people, but as the conclusion of a council of war held in September. In fact some of the newspapers even spoke seriously of "wreaking vengeance upon the other side of the Pyrenees." And meanwhile, blinded by this infatuation, the army—which had been ostentatiously estimated at between 300,000 and 400,000 men, while numbering in reality little more than 100,000—was left without sufficient cavalry, the troops were not drilled for fighting and were without clothing and provisions. Moreover, instead of putting it under command of a general-in-chief, the military guidance was entrusted to a war-committee, which was to direct operations from Aranjuez, where it had established headquarters. Under such management there could result nothing but cruel disappointment, the contest was by far too unequal.

Nothing would have been more satisfactory for Napoleon than for the Spaniards actually to carry out their plan of marching forth and attempting to surround the French army. While still in Erfurt he gave orders to allow the left wing of the adversary,

consisting of over 30,000 men under General Blake, to advance as far as possible toward Biscay and Navarre, so as to fall upon it in the rear with considerable forces which should be thrust in between it and the Spanish centre. But toward the end of October Lefebvre was tempted to offer battle ahead of time, and the enemy was compelled to retreat from Durango to Valmaseda, thus frustrating the plans of the Emperor. Upon arrival of the latter at headquarters in Vittoria, on November 5th, 1808, Lefebvre was sternly reprimanded, but the plan for breaking through the line of the enemy was, after all, not given up. The Spanish centre, consisting of about 25,000 men, was held under command of Castaños between Calahorra and Tudela on the Ebro, and the right wing under Palafox at Saragossa. The advance of the main body of the French army was now directed between Castaños and Blake towards Burgos, while two corps were detailed to follow at the heels of Blake. The conquest of Burgos was brought about after the defeat of an insignificant Spanish reserve army on November 10th, and at the same time Blake was involved in a battle near Espinosa, which he lost on the 11th. Cut off from his line of retreat, it was only by abandoning his entire baggage-train that he was able to save himself from capture by Soult. He directed his flight toward Asturias, where a small Spanish corps under Romana received the fragments remaining of what had been the left wing of the Spanish army.

The next task which Napoleon now set himself was to crush Castaños, who had meanwhile joined forces with Palafox. For this purpose he proceeded to send Ney, with his corps somewhat re-enforced, from Burgos southeastward to Soria, so as to fall thence upon the rear of the enemy, or cut off his line of retreat, while Lannes should attack in the front from Navarre. The attack in front took place as arranged and was successful, Lannes defeating the enemy in the battle of Tudela on November 23d. Palafox was obliged to retreat to Saragossa, while Castaños fled toward the south, where he would unquestionably have been captured by Ney had the latter not been deceived through exaggerated reports as to the strength of the enemy,

which made him hesitate and finally remain in Soria. But at all events the two Spanish armies had been scattered.

There yet remained the British expeditionary corps in Portugal, to which Junot had before been compelled to surrender at Cintra, and which was now approaching under John Moore by way of Salamanca, while 10,000 Englishmen were advancing from Corunna. Of this movement Napoleon was as completely in ignorance as was Moore of the defeats of the Spaniards. The Emperor, who had proceeded from Burgos on to Aranda, assumed rather that the English would march through the valley of the Tagus upon Madrid, and therefore bent all his energies upon putting himself in possession of the capital. After giving orders to Monecy to blockade Saragossa he marched on toward the Sierra de Guadarrama, which encloses and defends the plain to the north of Madrid, while, preceding the main army, Lefebvre advanced upon its right to Segovia by way of Valladolid, and Ney upon its left in the direction of Guadalajara. The pass of Somosierra was defended by 12,000 Spaniards, who, provided with artillery, were in a position to make further progress an arduous matter to the French. The declivities and the solitary road here mounting abruptly were covered by sixteen cannon behind which were concealed strong detachments of infantry. The first thing, before dawn, on November 30th Napoleon ordered his tirailleurs to climb the heights, a feat successfully accomplished under cover of fog; the road, although swept by the Spanish artillery, was cleared by the Polish horse-guards, who rode at a gallop into the face of the terrific fire, hewing down the gunners and driving back the enemy's infantry as well. The defenders of the pass fled in all directions without thought of order. The road to Madrid was free of all obstructions.

At that capital uncontrollable excitement prevailed at the realization of the contrast between the self-complacent and boastful assurances with which the Juntas had until now been deluding the nation, and the fact of the French being at the gates of the city. The horrors of despair which this knowledge brought with it were of advantage only to the conqueror, who was thus enabled to appear as the restorer of order, and who, by the harsh

measures with which he subdued all manifestations of anarchy, was successful in calming no small part of the population and even to some extent in winning them to himself. On December 4th the city surrendered to the Emperor, and before the close of the same day he promulgated four decrees calling for a complete revolution of public affairs in Spain: the Inquisition was suppressed and its domains declared national property; all feudal rights were abolished; the provincial tariffs were done away; the monasteries were reduced to one third of their number and, for such monks as desired of their own free will to enter the secular clergy, pensions were provided. Joseph, who followed his brother's victorious army, protested indeed that these were encroachments upon his rights as a ruler and threatened to resign, but this privilege was denied him by Napoleon, who declared to him, as he did to the inhabitants of Madrid, that he had come as a conqueror, since the act of Bayonne had been nullified by the Spanish rebellion, and his right was that of the victor. In Burgos he had already published a decree of proscription, and those thereby made outlaws had reason to rejoice at suffering no greater hardship than being carried off to France, their property being, of course, confiscated. In this exhibition of severity, as in every act of Napoleon's, there was a distinct purpose, and his aim here was to make the rule of his mild and lenient brother seem desirable. In a proclamation of December 7th he called the attention of the Spaniards to Joseph and his moderate and constitutional government. "It depends only upon yourselves," said he, "to determine whether this constitution shall remain your law. But if all my efforts prove vain and you will not justify the confidence which I repose in you, there will be left to me no alternative but to treat you as conquered provinces and to place my brother upon another throne. I shall then myself assume the crown of Spain, and I shall find means of making it respected by the refractory, for God has endowed me with both power and will to overcome all obstacles." The desired effect was at once produced. In Madrid citizens, officials, and even the clergy hastened to swear allegiance to Joseph as king, and from the provinces also (at least those into which the French had

already made their way) there came in the oaths which Napoleon had demanded. It was through religious fervour that the Spanish people had been kindled into opposing the most energetic possible resistance, and it was Napoleon's design to make use of that same religious zeal for binding the nation into subjection by an oath based upon it.

While affairs were being thus managed in Madrid Moore with his English troops had advanced to Salamanca, where, hearing of the various defeats of the Spanish, he had been for some time awaiting developments, not daring to continue his march farther. It was a considerable time before this came to the knowledge of the Emperor, who had never ceased to suppose that the British would march straight upon the capital. Even as late as December 14th he had ordered Victor and Bessières to Talavera and beyond, while Ney was to leave part of his troops to cope with the remains of Castaños' corps and return with the other part to Madrid. It was not until some days later that he learned the true facts of the case from Soult, who was stationed near Valladolid so as to maintain communication between the main army and France. These tactics on Moore's part seemed at first incomprehensible, but Napoleon at once recognized how they might be turned to the destruction of the British. Soult, who had shortly before been instructed to march into Galicia, now received re-enforcements with orders to entice Moore as far as possible toward the east, whilst Napoleon himself would march from Madrid with 40,000 men in a northwesterly direction, so that, after crossing the mountains, he could fall upon the rear of the enemy in Old Castile.

The plan was excellent, but was destined, after all, to but partial success. Information had reached Moore of Napoleon's earlier command to Soult to proceed into Galicia, and, acting upon this, he had not continued his advance for the present toward Valladolid, but had swerved to the north from his course in order to effect a junction with the forces approaching from Corunna before venturing an attack upon Soult. This movement had the effect of placing a greater distance between himself and the army in pursuit from Madrid. Now Napoleon may very

likely have supposed the march through the Guadarrama Pass and the Old Castilian plains a much simpler and easier matter than it proved to be, for he encountered all sorts of difficulties. In the mountains the troops suffered from snow-storms and sleet. He was obliged to order his horse-guards to dismount and break the way leading their horses, whilst he himself walked in their midst. This occurred on December 22d as they were making their way across the Pass of Espinar. On the following day there came a thaw, turning the rivers into raging torrents, and these had to be forded, since all bridges had been washed away, threatening a new danger. All these obstacles combined to hamper and impede the progress of the troops, so that it was with great difficulty that they finally got as far as Astorga. Moore, having meanwhile discovered the true situation of affairs, had bent his course toward Corunna; owing to the start which he had of his pursuer, he was able to escape the danger of being ground to atoms between the armies of Soult and Napoleon, and the French had to content themselves with following him up closely, a task which the Emperor turned over to Soult alone, returning himself from Astorga to Benavente and thence to Valladolid. Could he have foreseen that the English upon reaching Corunna would not find the transport fleet ready and would be obliged to draw up in line of battle, that through Soult's dilatoriness they would be afforded time for assuming an advantageous position, and finally for embarkation, he would probably have set himself at the head of the pursuing forces. But all this was not to be foreseen, and, regarding his own work as ended, after directing Soult to occupy Portugal, he left the country on January 17th and hastened to Paris.

He had undertaken the campaign in Spain with a twofold purpose; of this but one part had been accomplished: with one or two rapid blows he had conquered the victors of Baylen and restored the halo of his own invincibility. The second was, however a failure: Spain's resistance had not been overcome. Battles had been won and armies had been beaten, dispersed, driven off, but the country remained unconquered, the people unsubdued. The remains of the vanquished armies might still

reassemble in the south and strengthen themselves for new combat; the British might land with their fleet in Portugal or elsewhere. In the judgment of Jomini, the great war-critic, it would have required a systematic campaign of two years' duration, with the expenditure of from 300 to 400 million francs for the sustenance of the army, to carry through the subjugation of Spain. But we know how much Napoleon was pressed for time and upon how unsteady a basis his supremacy in Europe was resting. For it was one of the consequences of his world-embracing policy that it was constantly assigning new problems to him before he had been able to solve that upon which he was already engaged.

Down to very recent times the truth of the assertion has never been questioned that on January 2d, 1809, Napoleon received letters in Astorga whose contents gave him cause for serious uneasiness and eventually led him to determine upon turning back with the Guard; in these letters there were supposed to have been reports of new and energetic preparations for war in Austria and of secret agreements between his formerly antagonistic ministers, Talleyrand and Fouché, which prevented the Emperor from losing himself in the mountains of the west. Lanfrey and other historians have characterized this as mere Napoleonic invention and given it as their opinion that, as when facing the English coast in 1805, the Emperor was only in search of a pretext for escaping from the situation in Spain so as to acquire new glory as a warrior by striking another blow at Austria. This view is, however, not to be accepted as correct, for it has been shown from new historical sources, such, for instance, as the "Souvenirs" of Maret and documents of Metternich's, that there was an intrigue which was by no means insignificant conducted by Talleyrand, Fouché, and others, who declared the Spanish undertaking, and, indeed, all of the world-embracing policy of the Emperor to be prejudicial to France. Metternich, it must be admitted, exaggerated greatly in seeing in this intrigue a conspiracy already developed, and in a band of malcontents a political party bent upon revolution with whom reckoning must be made. In so representing matters at the court which had

sent him out he was taking the course best adapted to lead in Vienna to the very mistake which had caused Mack in 1805 to advance as far as the Iller.* But, however this may have been, there was enough in the matter for the news in regard to it to make an impression upon the Emperor, who was by nature inclined to be mistrustful, and to recall him to France just as a communication of the same order had decided him to return after the battle of Marengo in 1800.†

But of greater weight than this in determining Napoleon to leave Spain was the consideration of Austria's attitude. While he had been fighting in Spain Austria had zealously pushed forward her military preparations and appeared resolved upon war. And for this there was abundant justification. The fact that Napoleon was occupied in Spain was in itself a favouring circumstance. Metternich, who repaired in person to Vienna in order to advise in the light of what he had seen and heard, described the available forces of the French as scarcely superior in number to those of Austria, and was of the opinion that the Spanish war would keep busy so large a part of them "that Austria's forces, inferior to those of France, as they had been before the Spanish insurrection, would be at least equal to them at the outset." In his memorandum of December 4th, 1808, he estimated that Napoleon had at his disposal for operations in eastern Europe only a little more than 200,000 men, and on the same day Francis' minister, Stadion, reported to him his conviction that the hour had come "for making immediate use of the forces of the Austrian state, whose reconstruction had been so successfully persevered in ever since the beginning of the year. The desperate financial situation furnished another argument in favour of decisive action. For the army could be maintained at its full complement only until spring, when measures

* "We have at last reached an epoch," said the Austrian ambassador in a memorandum dated December 4th, 1808, "where allies seem to be offering within the French Empire itself, and these allies are no vile and low-born intriguers; men who might represent the nation call for our support; that support is to our own interest, our one interest, and likewise to that of posterity."

† See page 203.

of some kind would have to be taken. For weeks already England had been besought for subsidies, but these had been promised only upon the actual breaking out of war. But was there, then, no other help besides the Spanish diversion and England's material support upon which Austria might rely? True, there was no further counting in Prussia upon the ministry of Stein, who had advocated a German national revolt, for Stein, at the request of Napoleon, had been deposed from office and had come as an outlaw to reside in Austria. But his downfall had, after all, brought about no real change of system at the Königsberg court. Was it not, indeed, to be regarded as a distinct indication of amity that Count Goltz the Prussian minister, should frankly communicate to the Austrian ambassador early in December the fact of the convention entered into with France on September 8th with the assurance that the king, even if not able to draw out at once from the obligations thus imposed upon him, would nevertheless seize the first propitious occasion to range himself upon the side of Austria? At all events this assurance was allowed great weight in the deliberations in Vienna. They had indeed no means of knowing that the ministers might not always represent exactly the views and purposes of the King. And this was just what happened on the present occasion. Alexander I., on his journey home from Erfurt by way of Königsberg, had invited Frederick William to visit him in St. Petersburg. The Czar's object was to remove him from his surroundings, where all were eager for war, and induce him to abide by the September convention. In this he succeeded. When the King returned to his own country before the middle of February he would thenceforth hear nothing more of taking any part in warlike operations, and exhorted Austria to preserve the peace, or at the utmost to limit her action to parrying an attack by Napoleon; he should himself not separate from Russia. Now the course upon which Stadion had fixed was based upon just the point of allowing no time to the foe of ancient political systems to concentrate his forces and prepare for hurling himself again with superior numbers upon the power on the Danube. His proposal was rather to forestall such a possibility by attacking Napoleon before the Spanish

that at this time neither Alexander nor Frederick William did represent the feeling and desires of their peoples. For, just as in Austria public opinion had clamoured for war ever since the commission of the crime at Bayonne,* so in Germany and Russia enmity toward Napoleon had become a national hatred which was making itself felt more and more plainly. Public sentiment in Prussia was clearly set forth in a letter to the Queen from the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs: "If the King delays any longer to fix upon a course compatible with the wishes of the people, who are loud in their demands for war against France, a revolution will be the inevitable result." Even personal enemies of Stein's, such as the Minister Beyme, importuned Frederick William to separate from Russia and accept the homage of the provinces which had formerly been his on the farther side of the Elbe. Others called his attention to the danger which he was incurring—that Austria, in case she should be victorious in this war of liberation, might get a footing also in northern Germany, since Silesia was already signifying her desire to return under Austrian rule. Ernst Moritz Arndt, indeed, cried aloud to the world: "Liberty and Austria! shall be our battle-cry; long reign the House of Habsburg!" A storm of enthusiasm swept over all Germany and made itself felt in Vienna in spite of the dissuasions and warnings of the King of Prussia, who now again had thoughts of abdicating just as he did previous to the battle of Jena. Was it then so serious an error of Stadion's when, acting upon this impression, he took into account the German people rather than its rulers, and finally succeeded in constraining even the cold-hearted Emperor Francis to "hold the knife, so to speak, to the throat of Napoleon"? (End of February, 1809.)

Just what Austria hoped to gain by the war is to be seen from the instructions of January 29th given to Count Wallmoden, who was empowered to act as plenipotentiary in the negotiations with England: "to get back to the point of inward strength and

* On March 18th, 1809, the French Chargé d'Affaires wrote to the home Ministry from Vienna: "In 1805 the government alone advocated war, neither the army nor the people desired it; in 1809 it is demanded by government, army, and people."

consistency at which the country stood after the last treaties previous to the Treaty of Pressburg, . . . but with the understanding that the right is reserved to make certain minor arrangements concerning the improvement of our frontier and our position toward Germany when a favourable opportunity shall present itself, particularly as two younger branches of the hereditary dynasty have been deprived of their rightful inheritances in the course of the revolutionary wars and must find, either in Germany or Italy, rehabilitation in their inherited territories or compensation therefor." Somewhat farther on it is declared: "It is Austria's desire, if she should be successful in overthrowing the tributary system of Napoleon, to see every lawful proprietor again in possession of the lands belonging to him before the time of Napoleon's usurpations. This principle is to apply first of all to Spain; then in Italy to the King of Naples, the Pope, and the King of Sardinia; in Germany to the King of Prussia, to the Elector of Hesse, to the Duke of Brunswick, and to the King of England as regards Hanover, and, lastly, to the present duchy of Warsaw in favour of Prussia. The court of Vienna extends this principle even to those princes of Germany whom in the approaching war it would be compelled to treat as foes, but whose return into their inherited lands at the close of the war it is ready to guarantee beforehand, although with certain conditions more or less severe according to the conduct observed by them during the course of the war." *

To what extent Napoleon was informed as to these intentions on the part of Austria when he so abruptly ceased operations in Spain it would be impossible to say with any degree of accuracy. It has, however, been shown that many a bit of information reached him, generally by way of Munich, concerning the country's preparations, of Austrian agitations to rebellion in

* Austria was even prepared "to grant to the King of Sardinia an addition to his former territories sufficient to prevent his being compelled in every war to take shelter under the French flag and to serve as advance-guard to the French army." It was therefore at least gross exaggeration when, upon the basis of this very document, Austria's aim in 1809 was recently described as "the mastery of both Italy and Germany." (Oncken, *Das Zeitalter der Revolution*, II.)

Tyrol, of secret agreements between the Tyrolese nobility and the government at Vienna, with various other acts indicative of a renewal of hostilities. During his Spanish campaign he had not for a moment lost sight of Austria, and although he had left only 60,000 men in northern Germany under Davout and 30,000 in the south under Oudinot, he was constantly intent upon the strengthening of these forces, which would have been by no means competent to resist a sudden attack of the Austrians. He demanded of the Senate the conscription of 1810, and succeeded in having the number of annual recruits raised from 80,000 to 100,000 men. This last measure being retroactive enabled him to draw 20,000 men additional from those liable to military service in each of the years from 1806 to 1809. A young army of 160,000 men was thus collected out of which he organized a fifth battalion to every regiment. He further withdrew from Spain two divisions and the Guard, and ordered two other divisions which were already on the march thither to face about and return to Germany, so that by the middle of April—the time at which he assumed that war would break out—he had at his disposal there 200,000 men exclusive of the army in Italy. It was announced in Paris that the Spanish affair was at an end, the country subdued. He was firmly resolved upon the new contest and was unsparing of pains in preparation for it. Here again he was concerned in demonstrating the inviolability of his supremacy: henceforward no one need cherish the hope of agitating with impunity against him whilst he was elsewhere occupied. In his eyes any state manifesting the slightest independence of movement was regarded as rebellious and deserving of punishment. Moreover, to this was added still another consideration.

While in former wars the army had been self-sustaining and had yielded in addition very substantial financial profits, the Spanish campaign had not only brought into the treasury no war indemnity, but, on the contrary, had occasioned very great expenditure. The financial situation had thereby suffered greatly and absolutely demanded improvement. "He is in need of money," said the Russian envoy Romanzoff to Metternich in

regard to Napoleon; "he made no attempt to conceal the fact from me; he wants war with Austria as a means of getting it." In Vienna, on the other hand, Zichy, formerly Minister of Finance and now a member of the ministry, but not in charge of a department, was likewise crying: "War, for the business situation demands it!" So the great aims of world-mastery on the one side contending with world-liberation on the other were inextricably bound up with the material necessities of state economy. Strife was inevitable since both parties desired it. But to Napoleon, to whom it had so often meant much, it was now doubly important to make out Austria as the aggressor, not only in order to be able to demand of Russia the help promised under those circumstances, but also in order to appear again to the French as the one who was against his will constantly being drawn into war by foreign powers. To this intent he had, for instance, circulated the last week in February a report that he had sent to Vienna to make proposals of a most acceptable nature in the hope of maintaining peace—a statement true only in appearance. Moreover, he needed time to complete his preparations, for the recruits had been assembled only by the middle of February and needed first to be drilled. It was not until the beginning of March that he gave orders to concentrate forces in southern Germany, and not until the last days of the month did he arrange the strategic arrangement of his forces, which was to be completed by April 15th under supervision of the staff. Hostilities would not, he hoped break out before that time or preferably until even later, somewhere about the end of April or beginning of May, as he wrote on March 27th to Eugene Beauharnais. By that time the 200,000 men of the army in Germany ought to be assembled around Ratisbon, which was to serve as headquarters, and only in case of the Austrians engaging earlier than had been counted upon were they to occupy the line of the Lech with Donauwörth as point of support. Should they be successful in assuming the position at Ratisbon—with Davout at Nuremberg, Masséna, in command of the forces last sent out, at Augsburg, and Oudinot with the Bavarian troops near Ratisbon—they were prepared against all contingencies. The enemy, whose

main army Napoleon knew to be in Bohemia, might either make an incursion into Bavaria at Cham and attempt to march direct upon Ratisbon, in which case the French divisions rapidly assembled would stop him in the valley of the Regen, or he might direct his course toward Nuremberg or Bamberg, running the risk of being cut off from Bohemia, or, again, he might debouch to the north toward Dresden, when the French would sally into Bohemia and follow him into Germany; but if the Austrians should arrange to outflank the French position on both sides, the French would proceed to attack their centre, keeping open a line of retreat along the Lech. Everything depended upon the question *when* the Austrians would open hostilities—for the first step must be left to them to take on account of Russia—and in *what direction* that step would be taken.

In the offices of the Austrian quartermaster-general the new campaign against France had long been under consideration. A plan had been elaborated as early as October, 1808, according to which Davout was to be attacked in Saxony and the North German princes and peoples incited to rise in opposition to Napoleon. But then had followed a long series of vacillations due to the fact that immediately about the Emperor there existed all the time two currents of opinion, one, represented by Stadion, advocating the most expeditious possible offensive operations, and the other, represented by Archduke Charles, advocating extensive equipments for defence against the possibility of Austria's being finally attacked. This indecision continued to the end of the year, and the question was still open when the entire month of January had passed. The only certainty reached was that the preparations for war could not be completed before the end of March. It was not until the beginning of February that the Emperor decided upon taking the offensive. And now a new plan of operations was formed according to which one corps, under Archduke Ferdinand, should march toward Warsaw, another division of the army, under Archduke John, should penetrate into Italy and rouse the Tyrol to insurrection, while a corps under Hiller should

take up its position on the Inn, but the body of the army, under Archduke Charles, should be concentrated in Bohemia so as to operate thence according to the position which the main force of the enemy should adopt. (February 8th.) But by the time that the separate corps finally began to assemble in Bohemia, news came of the advance of the French in Suabia and of Davout's march upon Würzburg, that is to say, of the concentration of the hostile army in the valley of the Danube, and fears began to be felt that it might press forward to the right bank of the river, overpower with its vastly superior numbers the solitary corps under Hiller and march direct upon the capital, while the main body of the Austrian army in marching from Bohemia to the Danube might encounter difficulties in crossing the river and arrive too late to prevent catastrophe.* Hence it was decided about the middle of March that, instead of proceeding directly against the French with seven of the corps which had been assembled in Bohemia, a *détour* should be made through Linz enabling them to unite first with Hiller's detachment and so assume the offensive in crossing the Inn rather than by way of the Bohemian forest. Two army corps only which were left behind in Bohemia were ordered to take the direct route and march upon Ratisbon with the expectation that they would have rejoined the main forces before the decisive battle should take place. The result of this decision was that three weeks were lost in executing marches with extreme deliberation, giving time to the Bavarians to make all their military preparations, including the evacuation of Munich. It was April 9th before the Austrians stood at the Inn ready for crossing, on which day the Archduke Charles sent to Munich his declaration of war.

A few days before the Prince had addressed his army in a

* The Austrian Colonel Stutterheim claims to have learned from "those who were well informed" that these were the reasons which influenced the decision, but the whole matter is at present still wrapped in darkness. The usually accepted idea is that differences in regard to the plan of operations arose between General Mayer on the one hand and Archduke Charles and his second, General Grünne, on the other. But this view lacks confirmation.

military order charging them with the mission of liberating the Continent. "The liberty of Europe has taken refuge under your banners," said he; "your victories will loose its fetters, and your German brothers, now still arrayed in the ranks of the enemy, await deliverance at your hands." Then, apostrophizing Germany, he continued: "Austria's sword is not drawn for the sake of her own independence alone, but also in behalf of the liberty and national honour of Germany." By a manifesto issuing from the pen of Gentz announcement was made to the world that it was not against France that war was being waged, but solely against the system of constant expansion which had been the cause of the prevailing confusion of political relations. The war which had its beginning in April, 1809, was then no war of state against state, no contest to decide the greater or less extent of a political sphere of influence, but a struggle for the independence of the nations of Europe against a power which had long ceased to recognize the confines of state boundaries, but which, on the contrary, strove to obliterate them as far as possible and impose upon the different peoples the revolutionary system of centralized equality.

Even before the hostile armies encountered one another in Bavaria war had already sprung into blaze elsewhere. First of all in the Tyrol. A deep-seated hatred against Bavarian rule existed in this country, particularly among the nobility and peasant population, and that government could count its few adherents only in the larger cities among the citizens belonging to liberal circles. This feeling of resentment was due to various measures taken by Bavaria toward the tributary country. It had divided it into three districts, had abolished its name, done away with the provincial diet, introduced military conscription, and, more than all, had imposed ecclesiastical reform. Promises made by Austrian emissaries and the government at Vienna served to encourage this animosity, and when no question remained of open war the Tyrolese peasantry arose and, after giving successful battle to the Bavarian troops, compelled them to capitulate and took possession of the capital.

where they were soon joined by the Austrians, whose arrival was hailed with shouts and rejoicing. At the same time the army commanded by Archduke John advancing from Carinthia had defeated the French under Beauharnais at Pordenone, and on April 16th, 1809, had overcome them a second time in the battle of Sacile or Fontana Fredda, driving them back as far as the Piave and Adige. Success had likewise attended the corps of Archduke Ferdinand in his advance into Poland, so that on April 20th he was able to enter Warsaw. The value of these successes was enhanced by the fact that, in spite of the delay to the Austrian advance caused by the changes in their plan of operation, Napoleon was none the less taken by surprise, since he had not expected attack until some weeks later. Much now depended upon whether the main army of Austria would understand taking advantage of the favourable circumstances to effect rapid and decisive operations.

Berthier was entrusted with the supreme command of the "German Army" until the Emperor should himself reach the theatre of war. He was, however, by no means competent for the performance of this task. Napoleon had given explicit directions to recall Davout to the Lech and there concentrate the army, that is, whatever the circumstances, to unite the forces before going into action; but, instead of following instructions, Berthier left Davout stationed at Ratisbon and relied upon bringing Oudinot and Masséna up into line with him to the south of the Danube. The only result of this proceeding was that the French army, instead of being concentrated, remained for several days split up into two parts liable to be overpowered one after the other by the Austrian army, which was moving forward as a single solid body. But this favourable opportunity was neglected by the Austrians. Six days were spent, from April 10th to 16th, in getting from the Inn to the Isar, a distance covered by the French a short time afterward in two days' march, and when, on the morning of the 17th, the Archduke set out from Landshut northwards toward Ratisbon so as to take the offensive against Davout, that general had already fallen back in spite of Napoleon's orders. The Emperor,

however, arrived upon the Danube just in time to rescue his army from its perilous situation.

By means of the signal telegraph Napoleon had learned in Paris on the evening of the 12th of the crossing of the Inn by the Austrians and of their declaration of war. He at once started for the scene of action; travelling for four days and nights with but short delays for rest and refreshment, he reached Donauwörth on the morning of the 17th. Here he at once perceived the mistake which the Austrians had made in advancing too slowly, and, enraged as he was at the confusion which Berthier's blundering had caused, the position held by the enemy served to reassure and calm him again. "Where is the enemy?" he asked as he left the vehicle in which he had been travelling. "The Archduke crossed the Inn and the Isar," replied Montyon, who often described the scene afterwards, "then swerved to the right and is now on the march to Ratisbon." This report seemed at first incredible to the Emperor, and he had to be again and again assured of its correctness before he would put faith in it. "At these words," said Montyon, "the Emperor seemed to increase in stature, his eyes flashed, and extending his arms toward Ratisbon he exclaimed, with a joy which was betrayed in look, voice, and gesture: "Then they are mine! That is a lost army! In one month we shall be in Vienna!"

The Emperor was mistaken. Three weeks were to suffice for removing all obstacles to his entry into the Austrian capital.

The generalship now displayed by Napoleon has been by common consent and at all times classed among the greatest of his achievements. It is needless to describe the campaign in detail. Only its results need to be indicated.

The two French armies might even yet have been defeated one at a time by the Austrians, since the distance in a straight line from Landshut to Ratisbon was only seven miles and that from Augsburg to Ratisbon sixteen, and it has been observed with good reason that Napoleon had years before even less time and space at his disposal when in his first Italian

campaign he defeated separately before Mantua the two Austrian armies sent to the relief of that city. But the Austrians continued their advance always at the same deliberate pace, and furthermore, since uncertainty existed as to whether Davout were still in Ratisbon or had moved backward toward the west, their forces were divided so that only one half was directed toward that city, while the other pushed on toward Abensberg in order to attack the Marshal while making a flank movement and prevent his junction with the Bavarians.* Meanwhile Napoleon had begun to issue his orders from the hour of his arrival on the 17th: Davout was to fall back from Ratisbon to Ingolstadt, following the right bank of the Danube, and the Bavarians under Lefebvre were to keep in touch with him, while Masséna was to advance from the Lech toward the Inn. The latter in particular was directed to use all possible expedition, since Napoleon in the end fixed upon a plan which enabled him not only to unite his own army, by drawing back the left wing and pushing forward the right, but to execute his favourite manœuvre as well, of threatening the enemy in his line of retreat, which was in this case towards Landshut. All these movements were duly carried out amidst a series of successful engagements with both wings of the Austrian columns. It was not long before the concentration of the army had been effected, and by April 20th Napoleon was prepared to take the offensive with his whole line, Davout being on the left in the neighbourhood of the Laber, Masséna on the right near Mossburg, the Emperor at the centre with the Bavarians, and several French divisions across the Abens. Napoleon's sagacity in making this disposition of forces was clearly proved by the outcome, for before the close of the 20th he had already pushed his way between the two halves of the hostile army, throwing back upon Landshut one of them which had pushed forward to the northwest under command of Hiller, while the other, commanded by Charles, succeeded on the same day in taking

* Radetzky, who himself took part in this campaign, regards this division of forces for the sake of taking Ratisbon as the second great mistake of the Austrians, the first being the march by way of Linz.

Ratisbon. Leaving to some of the lesser forces the task of pursuing Hiller to Neumarkt and beyond, Napoleon himself at once turned against the Archduke. That general had drawn to himself in Ratisbon one of the two corps from Bohemia, which had likewise taken unnecessary time for the march, and, thus re-enforced, he advanced on the 22d toward the south. But at Eckmühl Vandamme attacked and overcame the corps under Rosenberg constituting the Austrian centre, while Davout forced back its right wing and Lannes threatened to out-flank its left. In spite of extraordinary bravery displayed by the Austrians, such an onset proved irresistible; they were forced to withdraw again into Ratisbon, where on the following day (the 23d) occurred another engagement, the loss of which compelled the Archduke to cross the Danube so as to make his way back to the capital by way of Bohemia.

Without making any attempt at pursuit of the Prince, Napoleon now gave orders to advance upon Vienna.

In later years, when in exile at St. Helena, he repeatedly averred that the greatest and most adroit of military manœuvres had been that which he had carried out in the battles of Abensberg and Landshut and finally completed in that of Eckmühl, the action at the last-named point particularly being in his estimation the military feat most worthy of admiration. And indeed when it is taken into consideration that less than a week before he had found a severed army in which the greatest confusion prevailed while confronted by an enemy with concentrated forces, and had within those few days found means to unite his own army and divide that of his adversary and then severally to defeat those sundered parts, there are few who would deny him the honour to which he thus laid claim. And next to this strategic genius, that which was most truly marvellous in this extraordinary man was his untiring energy of mind which allowed him no sleep, and scarcely even food, until his aim had been accomplished. "Work is my element," said the prisoner at St. Helena. "I was born and bred for work. I have known the limitations of my legs, I have known those of my eyes, but I have never been able to discover my limitations for work."

These victories in Bavaria were, moreover, important not only as brilliant military achievements. They constituted the decisive feature of the whole war, which in consequence of them totally lost its original character. Austria had expected to carry on an offensive warfare, and had made its beginnings with this intention; she was now thrown back upon the defensive and was henceforth never able to assume the offensive beyond her own confines. Hardly five days before she had appeared as the foremost combatant of all Europe, and her army was now nothing more than the defender of its own state! For, as a further consequence of the disasters suffered by Charles, the Archdukes John and Ferdinand had been compelled to give up again the ground which they had gained in Italy and Poland. At the Austrian headquarters there prevailed the deepest dejection. From Cham, whither Archduke Charles had withdrawn, he wrote to Emperor Francis: "Another such an encounter and I shall have no army left. I await the negotiations for peace." But in spite of the enormous losses sustained during this campaign of five days' duration—and these were estimated at over 50,000 men—the Austrian Emperor was not yet of opinion that the time had come for yielding. He was at this time still under the influence of Stadion, who was in no wise ready to give up hope of a happy issue. "Everything is not yet lost," the minister writes to his wife, "if only we can manage to infuse courage into the Archduke and his army, which, by the way in which it has been sacrificed, has every reason to feel disheartened." The brother of the Premier, Count Frederick Stadion, was to this intent despatched to headquarters, and as a result the voice of the general-in-chief actually began to take on a more confident tone. He did indeed write to Napoleon—to which no reply was ever vouchsafed—offering to enter into negotiations, but he nevertheless cherished the hope of being able to effect a junction between Budweis and Linz with the two corps under Hiller, which, falling back before Napoleon, had reached the Inn and were now marching down the Danube, and with their help to compel the enemy to retreat by threatening him in flank and rear. (Letter

from Archduke Charles to Francis II. from Neumarkt, April 28th, 1809.) But these hopes proved illusive. At Linz Hiller was unable to hold his own against the pursuing French, who far outnumbered him, and after a heroic combat at Ebelsberg (May 4th, 1809) he was obliged likewise to yield the line of the Traun. It was not until Crems was reached that he was able to gain the left bank of the Danube, and here he awaited the Archduke, who was advancing by way of Zwettel and Meissau; about the middle of May the two portions of the army were united upon the eastern slope of the Bisamberg, opposite Vienna.

In conversation with General Bubna of the Austrian army at a later date Napoleon himself designated it as a military error not to have followed up the Archduke into Bohemia; he had, said he, long hesitated at Ratisbon, and had decided in favour of the advance upon Vienna only on account of the general situation in Europe; that is to say, in order to prevent the refractory elements of northern Germany from allying themselves with Austria. On May 13th he made himself master of the city, which did not oppose any very effective resistance, and proceeded again, as in 1805, to set up his court in Schönbrunn. Much had indeed been thus accomplished, but it was yet far from being a complete conquest. For the possession of the enemy's capital did not have full significance until the hostile army posted opposite the city should be likewise vanquished, and if Napoleon wished to continue to act upon the offensive he must risk an engagement, although his forces were diminished by detachments, Lefebvre having been sent with the Bavarians against the Tyrol and Bernadotte left in Linz, while Davout was but now on the march toward Vienna.

He selected as his means of approach to the enemy a crossing to the southeast of the city near Kaiser-Ebersdorf. By this way, during the night of May 20th, he ordered his light cavalry, the corps of Masséna and Lannes, and behind them the Guard to pass first to the large island of Lobau and thence, during the next night, to the northern bank of the river, all of which was accomplished without interference from the enemy. It had been the Archduke's original plan to await the onset of the

French in a position supported by the Bisamberg, for they seemed to be planning to cross at Nussdorf, but upon learning to his surprise of their having crossed the river below Vienna and that they had already taken possession of Aspern and Essling on the morning of the 21st, he determined upon issuing forth and attacking them with his superior forces. Furthermore, in order to make sure of remaining in this numerical superiority, he gave orders to destroy the bridge across the main stream at Ebersdorf by means of boats loaded with stone set floating down the river, thus to prevent the possibility of re-enforcements reaching the enemy. But this undertaking was not immediately successful. The French continued to hold the points which they had occupied, and during the course of the night Napoleon was still able to draw over the river enough troops to allow of his proceeding farther on the morning of the 22d. For the two armies were as yet not far from equal in point of numbers, and if the brigades under Davout should come up so that he could count upon them, Napoleon felt that victory for the French was assured; Davout could then relieve Lannes at Essling, and the latter could be entrusted with the task of dashing forward and breaking through the Austrian centre. And in fact hardly had Davout announced his arrival at Ebersdorf on the other side of the river before Lannes on this side received orders to advance. This command had already been carried out with prodigious energy, and the Austrian line had already been forced to bend and give ground in the middle, so that the Archduke was able to avert catastrophe only with greatest difficulty, exposing himself personally and bringing into action all reserve forces, when suddenly the great bridge in the rear of the French gave way, the troops under Davout were kept back on the south side of the river, and Lannes, unsupported by troops from Essling, was forced to retreat. But now the Austrians on their side with unflinching courage again advanced to the attack; Napoleon was once more forced to assume the defensive, and the battle took on the same character which it had borne on the previous day. A number of critical moments were yet to be passed through in which the Archduke is said to have considered the advisability of retreat, but finally the

French were compelled to give up Aspern and Essling and retire to the island of Lobau, a movement protected with great valour by Masséna's troops, and in particular by the heroic General Mouton.*

For Napoleon the day was lost. His generals had covered themselves with glory, but the commander-in-chief had suffered defeat. He was conveyed by boat to Ebersdorf, and there he is reported to have sat before his improvised supper alone, immovable, speaking no word and staring straight before him until his eyes filled with tears. Was he weeping, as his flatterers claim, for Lannes, who was lying mortally wounded? Or was it another loss which extorted from him these tears? For there was no concealing from himself the fact that the fame of his irresistibility was a thing of the past. In vain did he proclaim to the world in his bulletin: "The enemy retired from the positions which it had taken, and we remained masters on the field of battle." No one would give credence to such a statement.

Shortly before he had conferred with his marshals on the island of Lobau. To them he had appeared as undaunted and confident as ever. He had not been willing to agree to their proposition of evacuating the island; he insisted upon holding and fortifying it. And in this events proved him to have been in the right, for when, during the night of May 23d, the Austrians with two brigades attempted to wrest it from them, the enterprise failed.† Whether it might not after all have

* There is, as yet, no entirely trustworthy account of the battle at Aspern. The decision in favour of Austria was finally brought about by the cavalry general, Prince John Liechtenstein, as the Archduke himself declared on the following day to Francis before the whole army. Thus Stadion, who accompanied the Emperor, wrote in a letter to his wife dated May 23d.

† This was the announcement made by the Archduke himself to his brother the Emperor. In a memorial of the 29th submitted by Wimpffen, his Chief-of-Staff, occurs this statement: "Advantage could not be taken of the victory, since the firm position of the enemy rendered all pursuit impossible; moreover, the Danube could not well be crossed as long as the enemy continued to maintain a considerable part of his army on this side of the main stream on the island of Lobau."

been successful if greater forces had been brought to bear is indeed open to question. Marmont relates that the utmost confusion prevailed in the French army, which was compelled to bivouac on the island for three days until the great bridge could be restored, affording the enemy the opportunity for making a sudden attack with all the chances in his favour. But the Archduke contented himself with seeking out the best possible position on the Marchfeld and assuming an attitude of waiting. In his opinion the fruits of the victory should be sought in a diplomatic rather than a military way, that is, it should be made the means of obtaining the most advantageous possible terms of peace. He was far from confident of winning a second victory in the open field. "The battle of Aspern has softened Napoleon's heart," he wrote within the next few weeks to his uncle, Duke Albert of Saxe-Teschen. "We ought to profit by such good fortune, which we are hardly likely to experience a second time."

The alternating fortunes of the struggle had engendered throughout all Europe sensations equally fluctuating. Those hostile in feeling to Napoleon, and particularly those in northern Germany, had been carried away with enthusiasm at the first successes of the Austrian troops in Italy, but especially at the prosperous issue of the Tyrolese insurrection. All the counsellors of Frederick William III. were now pressing in their advice to form an alliance with Austria. That country counted upon the alliance as a certainty and, in order to clinch the bargain, offered to Prussia the duchy of Warsaw just conquered by Archduke Ferdinand. But in vain. The King opposed his counsellors; regarding the national warlike uprising in his country from his narrow point of view, in which Prussia alone was considered, he condemned it as "criminal disorder," particularly when Schill, amidst the acclamations of the populace and acting upon his own responsibility, led forth his battalion from Berlin to help sustain the insurrection under leadership of Dörnberg in Westphalia; and it was not until word came from St. Petersburg that the Czar did not intend to carry on serious hostilities against Austria that he reluctantly gave his

consent to secret preparations for war and stopped the payment of the tribute due to France. This was taking a step which must of necessity be followed by another to be anything else than preposterous. But this second step remained untaken. The defeats inflicted upon the Austrians in Bavaria produced their effect, and the King persistently maintained his opinion that the Emperor of the French would be able to conquer also an army composed of the united forces of Prussia and Austria, and that it was, after all, better to be King behind the Oder than not to be King of Prussia at all. Even the battle of Aspern made no change in his views, for the fact that no advantage was taken of it only went to furnish the basis for a new argument which Frederick William urged against his ministers. To add to all this, the Austrian government now perpetrated the mistake of failing to accept without discussion the proposals made by Prussia as a condition to an alliance, and replied instead with only vague and general promises, referring her to England in answer to her demand for arms and money. When, therefore, towards the middle of June, the Austrian Colonel Steigentesch appeared in Königsberg somewhat too ostentatiously in order to conclude a military convention there, he found that he had missed his aim and was obliged to take his departure again without having accomplished what he came for. The King had now determined to await the issue of the next battle. In spite of the experience of 1806 he was the same man that he had been in 1805. It was his people only who had changed.

Since the departure of the Austrians the Tyrol had been occupied by the Bavarians and French, and the news was now received with enthusiasm in Prussia that the Tyrolese peasants had again risen and been victorious in the battle on Mount Isel on May 29th; at the same time it was learned that a detachment of Austrian troops united with a volunteer corps recruited by Duke Frederick William of Brunswick had penetrated into Saxony and Franconia, and, finally, that the English were threatening to land troops at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. Did it not seem as if the hour had come for striking?

That was the view taken of it at least by the Prussian Generals Blücher and Bülow, who were in command in Pomerania and who forthwith decided upon a military uprising against Napoleon, whether with or without the sanction of the King. But just then arrived other news which marvellously abated this enthusiasm.

After the battle of Aspern the two armies had remained inactive near Vienna, confronting one another. The Austrian army refrained from assuming the offensive for the sake of allowing the victory of the 22d to produce its effect at a distance and, as is asserted by one of the initiated, so as "not to risk the destruction of this effect by the chances of an unsuccessful battle." The Archduke called up in his defence the example of Fabius, "the Delayer," who conquered Hannibal. "Napoleon and I," he wrote one day in June to the Duke of Saxe-Teschen, "are watching one another to see which will be the first to commit an error of which the other can take advantage, and are meanwhile repairing our losses. I shall take no risks, for the forces which I now command are the last which the state can afford, but I shall use the utmost energy in grasping every opportunity for dealing a decisive blow." But Napoleon was guilty of no further mistakes during this campaign. He showed himself, on the contrary, most efficient in taking measures for entirely wiping out the consequences of his former error. He now drew to himself for the decisive conflict all troops whatsoever at his disposal: Eugene, who had followed in pursuit of Archduke John, approached by way of Carinthia with over 50,000 men, and was by the end of May already across the Semmering Pass; Marmont, with 10,000 men, was summoned from Dalmatia; Lefebvre was ordered from the Tyrol to Linz, where he was to relieve the forces there under command of Bernadotte and Vandamme, and they and their divisions thus set free moved up into the vicinity of Vienna. In order to protect these forces to the best advantage, the island of Lobau, where Masséna's corps had remained stationed, was now fortified, the great bridge across the Danube protected by stockades and guarded by a flotilla of rowboats. No de-

tail toward assuring victory in the approaching encounter was too trifling to receive the attention of the Emperor.*

Upon the other side of the river the Archduke had meanwhile also strengthened himself, summoning to his aid a distant corps under Kollowrat, while his brother John was approaching by way of Hungary, where he was joined by the "Insurrection," or provincial militia, levied by vote of the diet of the preceding year as contribution toward the war. All this did not take place without mishap. To prevent a junction between the Archduke John and the main army Napoleon sent out the Viceroy against him, and on June 14th Eugene revenged himself at Raab for his defeat at Fontana Fredda. John was at first compelled to retreat toward the east, and it was only after crossing the Danube and with greatly reduced forces that he at length reached Pressburg, whence he was again able to enter into communication with his brother.

By the first days of July Napoleon was ready with his preparations; to the 130,000 men at the disposal of the enemy he could oppose 180,000 besides an excellent artillery equipment, particularly if he should succeed in striking the blow before John should be able to reach the scene of action from Pressburg. On the night of July 4th his army crossed from Lobau to the northern bank of the river without interference from the Austrians, who were misled by a demonstration made for that purpose at Aspern. During the following day Napoleon was able, without encountering any very vigorous resistance, to draw up his troops in battle array facing Archduke Charles, who, in view of the superior number of the enemy, had withdrawn his forces into a position of defence on the Bisamberg and behind the Russbach, which runs obliquely across the Marchfeld. A considerable detachment was sent forward by Napoleon in the direction of the March for purposes of reconnoissance in order to

* On May 21st he had, for instance, followed the course of the battle from the island of Lobau while clinging to a rope ladder; he now ordered conveyed thither one of the great sliding-ladders such as are used in gardening at Schönbrunn in order to assure himself of a more comfortable and convenient observatory. (Archives of the War Office.)

find out whether John were yet approaching. Upon receiving information of a reassuring nature from that quarter he determined, late in the evening as it was, to make an attack upon the Austrians, directing the shock of his onset with superior numbers against the left wing of his antagonist, so as to prevent the possibility of a junction between the two princes, while his own left wing under command of Masséna was entrusted with the task of engaging and holding the main body of the hostile army. The attempt failed. The Austrians repelled the assault and drove the French back to the position whence they had advanced to the attack.

Next morning the Archduke detected the weak point presented by the enemy, and gave orders to his right wing to march forward along the Danube, while the centre should likewise advance at the same time. These combined forces Masséna alone was not able to cope with, and to prevent being flanked he was obliged to face almost toward the river; re-enforcements sent to his assistance proved unable to prevent a retreat which was constantly assuming more serious proportions, when Napoleon appeared, leading a considerable portion of his army, and, after making a fruitless attempt to stop the advance of the enemy by means of his cavalry, he brought into play more than a hundred cannon, and with these succeeded where the cavalry had failed. But, in spite of this danger assailing him in the rear, he had not lost sight of his aim to conquer with the right wing. About noon he ordered forward to Wagram and Markgraf-Neusiedl troops sufficient to outnumber the Austrians, assured that, once in possession of Wagram, he would be able to compel the retreat of the Austrian right wing from its advanced position. So certain was he of the outcome that in the midst of the battle he ordered his faithful Roussan to spread out a bearskin for him on the ground and allowed himself twenty minutes of sound sleep.* Soon after this the enemy was indeed compelled to

* There were several occasions upon which Napoleon fell asleep while a battle was raging about him; for instance, three years later, at the battle of Bautzen. Speaking of this afterwards he said that it was a habit of no small advantage to the commander-in-chief. He could thus quietly

abandon the territory which it had gained, and with the successful storming of the heights near Markgraf Neusiedl by Davout the fortunes of the day were decided; far back of the Russbach as far as the slopes of the Bisamberg and the road to Brünn were the Austrians obliged to retire, although in the most perfect order and without having been absolutely vanquished. Napoleon's losses had been so great as to prevent his risking another battle. Moreover, his immediate object had been attained. He had defeated the main army of his antagonist and rendered impossible its junction with that under Archduke John. For when the latter reached the Marchfeld in the afternoon Charles had already ordered the retreat, and the newly-arrived corps found nothing further to be done. It has recently been attempted to prove that John, who was already in possession of his brother's order early on the morning of July 5th, could not have been more expeditious in setting out from Pressburg or in marching to the front, and that, even if he had arrived in time, there were French forces yet intact which would have hindered his taking part in the action. This latter point would demand thorough proof before it could be accepted as fact, but, in regard to the former, one is involuntarily impelled to ask whether a French general under precisely similar circumstances would have required quite as long for carrying out a command of Napoleon's, and to any one who knows the history of these wars none but a reply in the negative would be possible.

But with the battle of Wagram the campaign had not even yet been decided. Austria had by no means been overcome. The Archduke had still under his command an army ready for battle, which he now concentrated near Znaim, whither Napoleon could not follow him with all his forces, since he would have to leave Eugene with the Army of Italy, which had decided the fortunes of the day on July 6th, to watch Vienna and Archduke John. It now happened, on July 11th, just as Masséna and Marmont were engaging the enemy and as preparations were being made

await the reports from the various divisions instead of allowing himself to be influenced and carried away by what was taking place before his eyes. (Las Cases, Memorial of St. Helena.)

for another battle, that there arrived at Napoleon's headquarters an officer, with a flag of truce to propose an armistice. Was this to be accepted or rejected? His generals counselled the latter, he decided upon the former. In this he was actuated by various motives. In the first place he saw that by the new method of warfare—where the use of artillery had gradually replaced the use of the bayonet and which had played so important a part at Wagram—battles were being made more sanguinary without becoming more decisive, so that he began to lose faith in battle as the infallible means of success. It was but a short time after this, on August 21st, 1809, that he wrote to Clarke: "Battle should be offered only when there remain no hopes of other turns of fortune, since, from its very nature, the fate of a battle is always dubious."* Moreover, he had recently had troublesome experiences with his troops which further served to establish him in this opinion. On the 6th Bernadotte's corps had retreated without offering the least resistance and had to be dissolved, and on the following night tidings of John's approach had caused a panic, driving thousands to flight toward the Danube. The Emperor bewailed the fact that his soldiers were no longer those of Austerlitz. Finally, in the last engagement many an excellent general had fallen because he had been compelled to expose himself in leading forward troops which responded but feebly to his commands; Masséna had been in danger of his life. The Austrians, on the other hand, had shown themselves worthy foemen who knew how to win when the forces opposed were equal in number and whom he had succeeded in defeating only with the greatest danger and difficulty in cases where he disposed of forces numerically superior. No, the thought of war was losing its charms for him. Accordingly, on July 12th, he accepted the proposal of a cessation of hostilities, giving consent thereto, however, only at the price of about 80,000 square miles of territory, a condition

* In conversation with the Austrian General Bubna some time later, he explained the immoderate use of cannon to which he had been driven, saying: "You see well enough that my infantry is far from perfection; the best of it, the old infantry, is in Spain."

which Francis ratified only after prolonged refusal, and then with the secret resolve to continue the war. Since in this determination the Archduke was unable to concur, the Emperor himself assumed the supreme command of the army and Charles retired completely from the leadership.

It is easy to see that the Truce of Znaim was a long way yet from signifying peace. Austria built hopes upon Prussia, whose King seemed this time really to have made up his mind to interfere, and actually sent a special messenger to the Austrian camp, where the Emperor held his court. But, as events proved, it was after all in appearance only that this resolve had been taken. Austria also built hopes upon England, which had landed a new army in Spain under Wellesley and was preparing a second expedition against Holland or northern Germany. She further entertained hopes of support from Russia, which had not shown herself an overzealous partisan of the Corsican, and was likewise hopeful of aid from Turkey, but most of all she counted upon her own military forces, the number of which was to be raised to 200,000 men and put under command of Prince Liechtenstein. It was in order to conceal these hopes and preparations as far as possible that Francis sent to solicit peace of Napoleon.

Now that adversary was genuinely desirous of peace for the very reasons which encouraged Austria to resistance, but he was no less careful to conceal this wish than was Francis to veil his warlike inclinations, in order to derive the greatest possible profit from the negotiations. He at first refused abruptly to consider the proposal, spoke of a partition of Austria and of demanding the abdication of the Emperor, and vouchsafed compliance only upon a repetition of the request to enter into negotiations. The plenipotentiaries of the two powers, Champagny and Metternich, then repaired to Altenburg, but their negotiations resembled a great intrigue rather than a serious transaction. Here again Napoleon made exaggerated demands, requiring the cession of all territory then occupied by his forces, which amounted to about a third of the entire realm; to this the Austrians responded with counter-demands

by way of prolonging the conference, and matters continued on in this wise until at last decisive changes in the general situation impelled them to proceed seriously to business.

The English had indeed obtained some hard-won victories in Spain, but their effect had not been lasting, Wellesley had forced Marshal Soult to withdraw from Portugal and, penetrating into Spain, had defeated Victor at Talavera on July 27th and 28th, 1809, but, being threatened in his left flank by a movement of Soult's, he was obliged to return to Badajoz on the frontier of Portugal. At the same time one of the Spanish armies, which had been merely dispersed by Napoleon, was defeated by General Sebastiani (August 11th). Soon after calamity befell likewise the British enterprise on the coast of the North Sea. Instead of landing at the Elbe and summoning to their aid the general uprising among the German nation, they had, with a view only to their own interest, directed their course to Holland in order to take Antwerp. In this they utterly failed and, toward the end of August, were compelled to return home baffled and disgraced. In spite of the advances already made Frederick William III. could not decide to mobilize against Napoleon even upon receiving word that Austria was ready to continue the war, while from the Czar word came to Emperor Francis that he need not count upon Russia and had better make peace with France. How completely changed was the aspect of affairs from what it had been but shortly before, and all to the disadvantage of Austria! But the most important consideration of all was the fact that Austria could no longer depend upon her own forces, since a fearful malady had begun to rage throughout the army which, according to Varnhagen, who was then in the Austrian service, eventually disabled from 70,000 to 90,000 men.

All these reasons combined to efface from the mind of Francis and his court at Totis all inclination for the continuance of hostilities, and Napoleon now threw aside pretence and acknowledged his own desire for peace. "I sincerely wish for peace," said he in confidence to Count Bubna, whom Francis had sent as his ambassador and through whom he was negoti-

ating directly with Napoleon. "Until now I have had the support of Russia, and the Czar maintains his alliance with me in spite of the opposition of the nation—a course for which I give him due praise, for a sovereign should not concern himself as to the opinion of his subjects." (No one was more concerned in respect to that than was Napoleon.) "But what assurance have I that everything will remain thus? As for Prussia, I know that she has long wavered between you and me." He spoke in praise of the Austrian army, saying that if commanded by himself it would be quite as good as the French and superior to all others. He abated the demands made at Altenburg, representing them as due to the private malice of Champagny, but he still exacted the surrender of three and a half million of inhabitants in the west, the south, and Galicia. This he established as his ultimatum from which he was not again to be moved, and when Francis finally resolved to accept the conditions and sent Liechtenstein direct to Schönbrunn with full powers,—the negotiations at Altenburg having been broken off,—Napoleon added to this the exaction of a war-indemnity of 100,000,000 francs, which he later reduced to 75,000,000, but which Champagny, by way of gratifying his master, caused to be again raised to 85,000,000.

Finally, so desperate was the outlook for Austria, left solitary and disabled, that on the night of October 13th,—impossible as it was for his impoverished nation to pay such a sum, —Liechtenstein was brought to append his signature to even this condition, though subject to the consent of the Emperor. Napoleon did not, however, wait for this to be granted, but on the following morning announced by cannon to the Viennese that peace had been concluded.

✓ The treaty just signed despoiled the Austrian Emperor of more than 40,000 square miles of territory: Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, and the Inn quarter fell to the Confederation of the Rhine, West or New Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw, as likewise the district about the city of Cracow and the circle of Zamosc in East Galicia, while a small strip of East Galician territory was made over to Russia. Into the possession of Na-

Napoleon himself came Görz, Montefalcone, and the long-coveted city of Trieste, besides Carniola, the district of Villach in Carinthia, and all Croatian lands to the right of the Save. These territories together were given the name of Illyria, which was to have a government of its own. The integrity of what remained of Austria was guaranteed by the Emperor of the French, while Francis I. gave his sanction to all changes made, or to be made, by Napoleon in Spain, Portugal, and Italy. As a matter of course Austria was now compelled to break once more with England and to participate in the continental blockade. By a secret article Francis I. further pledged himself to reduce his army to 150,000 men and to pay a war-indemnity set by Napoleon at 75,000,000 francs, but which through the good offices of Champagny was eventually raised to 85,000,000.

Before the morning of October 16th Napoleon had already left Schönbrunn. An incident which had taken place there admonished haste on his part. Three days previous, while reviewing the troops in the court of the castle at Schönbrunn, a young man had attempted to force his way to him. When arrested he was found to be armed with a long knife and frankly acknowledged that it had been his intention to assassinate the Emperor. The youth, Frederick Staps by name, had scarcely outgrown boyhood and was the son of a Protestant minister at Naumburg. Though calm and quiet by nature, the misery and distress of his native land had filled him with such unspeakable hatred toward the oppressor that he had resolved upon taking his life. Napoleon would fain have believed at first that this was nothing more than a case of insanity, until convinced against his will, in conversation with Staps himself, of the deep-rooted feeling of bitterness in Germany and of the extent to which it had already armed the nation against him. To Napoleon's question whether he would be grateful if granted pardon, Staps replied calmly: "I should still seek means of killing you." He was ordered shot in absolute secrecy. The matter was to remain entirely hushed up, but in case anything should transpire in regard to it, the Minister of Police was

charged to disseminate the report that the would-be assassin was considered insane. And such was the success of this ruse that the idea was entertained for many a year that Staps was in custody at Vincennes.

Once more did Napoleon return in triumph to Paris. It was indeed not generally known how narrowly he had escaped defeat in this last campaign, and even if the report had gained publicity, was not the treaty of peace witness to the contrary, with the humiliating conditions to which Austria had been obliged to yield consent? But the French people saw after all nothing further than another victorious campaign, bought with French blood, but redounding in nowise to the advantage of France. There have already been noted the first seeds of inward discontent with the Emperor to whom France was insufficient. What did all this amount to, all that he accomplished toward gratifying the vanity of the French people—of what account was all the fame and glory which he brought back to them as compared with the undeniable fact that his ambition was not satisfied with the French throne? A striving such as this, in opposition to national feeling, toward aims continually farther and farther removed, could not fail in the end to deprive him of popular favour. For there is but one thing that a people cannot pardon in its ruler, and that is lack of patriotism. There were, moreover, reasons enough besides this for awakening opposition. There still remained unfulfilled the promise given the year before that the war with England should shortly be terminated; it continued in undiminished vigour, precluding all business ventures of considerable extent. Ports which formerly existed in most flourishing condition were now sinking into poverty and decay. Nor was the prospect of a cessation of hostilities any more encouraging with regard to the offensive war against Spain, and southern France was undergoing enormous losses through the breaking off of the lucrative trade formerly carried on between the two countries. A further grievance lay in the fact that the Emperor displayed a contempt for the middle classes which was deeply felt. The sons of certain privileged circles alone were admitted to the positions of "auditeurs" in the Councils of State, and, since this

was the only road to the higher offices and dignities, all other aspirants were obliged to content themselves with service in the humbler departments. And yet it was precisely those whom the Emperor counted as most securely bound to himself through the bestowal of these privileges who were in fact among the most disaffected. An observant contemporary remarks: "The generals, as a result of their rich dotations, had an interest altogether apart from that of their sovereign—to take care of what they had acquired—and were for that reason the less willing in rendering the incessant and fatiguing service required of them. The partiality shown by the Emperor for attaching to himself priests and 'émigrés' had won for him only lukewarm and doubtful adherents, while giving cause for belief that he ignored the fundamental principle of his power—the Revolution—of which he had been the issue. The members of the ancient nobility with whom he was so fond of surrounding himself accepted, it is true, the dignities offered them, but betrayed his secrets on every occasion when they succeeded in acquainting themselves with them, flattered him grossly to his face and complained behind his back of their unhappy fate in having to serve an upstart. The clergy, in sooth, carried its servility to the point of absurdity in its religious instruction, preaching absolute obedience such as is favoured by every hierarchy, but bewailed at other times the fate of the Pope." And now it was just at this time that, as a result of an indirect order of the Emperor, Pius VII. was compelled to leave Rome—an act which aroused against Napoleon millions of pious souls.

Under such circumstances it behooved the Emperor to seek some means of ingratiating himself with the French people in the hope of turning the tide of popular favour once more toward himself. There had existed for years a desire on the part of the general public, which was shared also by those who surrounded the Emperor, that he should acquire a direct heir by means of a new marriage. People thought that the joys of a family of his own would also enhance his appreciation of the state and recall his mind from dwelling upon the boundless extension of his power. And this wish was cherished the more from the fact

that good morals did not exactly reign supreme at the Imperial Court, where Josephine, who had long since ceased to possess the affections of her husband, now rather encouraged than interfered with other fancies of his, solely for the sake of retaining her position.* There were scandalous tales in circulation, particularly in regard to the brothers of the Emperor, and the feeling was that all this would come to an end upon the introduction of a well-regulated family life at the court. Moreover, the hope was entertained that a new marriage with a daughter of one of the monarchs of Europe would be a pledge of peace and at the same time act as a restraint to his lust after world-dominion.

To this general wish Napoleon was now ready to accede. He appointed her son, the Viceroy Eugene, to prepare Josephine for the divorce which public policy inexorably demanded, and on December 15th summoned a family council at the Tuileries, where he announced his determination to enter upon another alliance. "The political system of my monarchy," said he, "the interests and needs of my people, which have at all times regulated my actions, demand that I leave behind to my offspring—heirs of my love to my people—this throne upon which Providence has placed me." Since the union with his well-beloved wife Josephine allowed him no hope in regard to this matter, he should be obliged to sacrifice the tenderest impulses of his heart to the good of the state and loose the bands which united him with her. Being but forty years of age, he hoped to rear in his spirit and in his ideas the successors which should be granted him. The Empress, whom he had himself crowned, should retain her title. Josephine, in the midst of sobs, declared herself ready to make the sacrifice demanded of her by the state, and on the following day a *Senatus consultum* declared the Imperial marriage dissolved. One difficulty was still to be overcome—some way must be devised for making the matter accept-

* In his "Souvenirs" de Broglie relates that he saw the Empress before the war of 1809, "and in her train the splendid assemblage of maids of honour, ladies in waiting, and ladies of the palace, including the procession of readers which constituted the harem of our Sultan and which helped him to endure for a while longer the painted antiquity of the former Sultana."

able to those of the Catholic faith. For, as has been seen, an ecclesiastical marriage had been entered into on the day preceding the coronation. But Napoleon declared coolly that he had given his consent at that time under moral coercion, and this was then utilized as an argument for the nullity of the religious marriage, which argument was accepted by the Chancery of the Archbishop in Paris before the end of January, 1810.

Immediately after the divorce Josephine retired to Malmaison. But where was the new consort to be found? Unquestionably political motives had loosed the old bonds and political motives must dictate the new. No other consideration was here of consequence unless, perchance, it was that of ambition in the upstart to connect himself closely with one of the ancient royal families of Europe. Of these the most illustrious were those of Austria and Russia. The policy which he was then pursuing indicated the latter to the Emperor as the source from whence to draw. And indeed it is asserted that there had been talk of a marriage between Napoleon and the Grand Duchess Katharina even at the time of the interview between the sovereigns at Tilsit, while at Erfurt Alexander had spoken, though not without a certain reserve, of his younger sister, Anna. The former had, to be sure, been married meanwhile to Duke George of Oldenburg, but Anna was still unclaimed. The question then arose as to how this marriage would conform with the political situation.

Since the events at Erfurt much had taken place which threatened rupture between the two countries. There had been the outbreak of war with Austria which the Czar would so gladly have prevented so as to be able to use all his forces against the Swedes and Turks, and there had followed French victories which had occasioned deep anxiety in St. Petersburg. On September 19th, 1809, by the Treaty of Friederichshamm, Alexander had, to be sure, succeeded in forcing Sweden to relinquish Finland, but Turkey had opposed more successful resistance and had been by no means subjugated, so that in the fall of the year the Russian troops were again obliged to return across the Danube. But that which caused the Czar the most chagrin was

Napoleon's conduct toward the Poles during the course of the war. For, when Napoleon had seen with what intentional dilatoriness Russia was carrying on the war against Archduke Ferdinand, he turned to the national forces of the duchy of Warsaw under Poniatowski, summoned the West Galicians to assert their independence and thus accomplished by means of the Poles what the Russians had denied him. Two million Galicians added to the duchy of Warsaw was the form in which the gratitude of the Emperor showed itself. The allies of Tilsit and Erfurt were now mutually distrustful. But for Napoleon it would have been exceedingly inconvenient if Russia had for this reason taken up arms against him just at this time with Prussia standing ready prepared for war. Accordingly, on October 20th, 1809, only a few days after the conclusion of peace at Schönbrunn, a despatch was sent off to St. Petersburg representing to the Czar how impossible it had been for the Emperor to allow the West Galicians, who had risen with one accord to his assistance, to return under Austrian dominion; that it was, however, far removed from his thoughts to awaken any hopes of the re-establishment of Poland, and that he was, on the contrary, ready to unite with Russia in obliterating the name of Poland from history. (He did not suspect that Alexander would discover that he was at the same time sending to assure the Poles that these representations were not intended seriously by him.) But, in order to completely reassure the Czar, even before the divorce he returned to the marriage project in his instructions to Caulaincourt and asked directly for the hand of the Grand Duchess Anna (November 22d, 1809). There would be little difficulty in making it clear that this offer of marriage had at this time no other object than to appease Russia. Princess Anna was but fifteen years of age and, according to Caulaincourt's statements, not yet fully developed. It was to be foreseen that Alexander would reply, if not with a refusal, at least with a request for delay which might be interpreted as a rejection of Napoleon's offer. And it is all the more impossible to believe in the sincerity of his solicitation because at the same time, and again before the divorce, there was coming to form and maturity a second project, kept in profound

secret, for a marriage with the Archduchess Marie Louise of Austria.

Ever since the lack of warmth betrayed by Russia in her behaviour during the summer just past, it had been evident to Napoleon that the alliance with that power must shortly come to an end, and that an implacable war must ensue over the question of the mastery of the world—"to see which of the two should finally be sole master." And when that should be the German powers of middle Europe, or Austria at least, must on no account be under Russian influence. This consideration probably suggested to the Emperor of the French the idea of a marriage with an Archduchess; there was besides another consideration which was of some importance, that this Princess belonged to a family of which no woman had been barren. It depended only upon gaining the compliance of the House of Austria. In order to accomplish this end all possible publicity was given to the Russian marriage project, so that the fear in Vienna of seeing an intimate alliance between Russia and France should smooth the way for the other courtship, or perhaps even call forth advances from the Austrian side. It is not yet clear from which party came the first decisive word, whether the suggestion was made to Metternich or by him to Count Laborde, a confidant of Napoleon's who had been active in the matter of the negotiations for peace and had then remained in Vienna for some time.* In any

* In a despatch to Schwarzenberg (Vienna, December 25th, 1809) Metternich reports an interview between himself and Alexander de Laborde, who had formerly been in the Austrian service and had formed many attachments in Vienna, particularly with Schwarzenberg among others. Previous to his departure Laborde had sounded him upon the possibility of an alliance between the two families, suggesting the marriage of the Austrian Crown Prince Ferdinand with a daughter of Lucien's, or that of Napoleon with the Archduchess Louise. The first proposition he had at once rejected, but not so the second. On the other hand Laborde—and not Narbonne as Lanfrey, Lefebvre, and others have miscalled him—states in a memorandum which he most probably prepared for the Emperor in early December, shortly after his return to Paris, that Metternich had tried to persuade him to postpone his departure from Vienna, and in a discussion about means of establishing better relations between France and Austria had directly named a marriage of Napoleon to an Austrian

case Emperor Francis and his present Minister of Foreign Affairs regarded a family alliance with Napoleon as a certain security for the state, a guarantee for its continued existence, and for the sake of these considerations feelings of antipathy to the suitor were not allowed to stand in the way.

After the first secret parleys between the diplomats the matter was brought before the Countess Metternich, who was then in Paris, by Josephine and Hortense themselves, while Eugene was commissioned with a similar errand to the Austrian ambassador, Prince Schwarzenberg; for Napoleon insisted that those most concerned should be the very ones to collaborate in furthering his new marriage.* His next step—which was in reality nothing more than a matter of form—was to hold a council of his ministers on January 27th in order to be able later to adduce the advice of his ministers when dealing with Alexander. On this occasion Maret, who had been taken into confidence by Napoleon, pleaded in favour of the Austrian and against the Russian marriage, and on February 7th, 1810, the decision of the Emperor was imparted to his family council. Before the close of the same evening Schwarzenberg had signed the provisional marriage contract. The Russian project was accordingly definitely abandoned. The first proposal of Coulaingcourt

Archduchess as such a means, in case the French Emperor should really carry out his plan of divorce. This idea, Metternich had hastened to add, was of his own devising, he being ignorant of the intentions of his sovereign, though he was convinced that they would be favourable to the project. Later, in a letter of September, 1811, to Jakobi-Klöst, Metternich designated himself as the one who had proposed the marriage (M. Duncker, "Aus der Zeit Friedrich des Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelm-III.," p. 325). Finally, in his "Mémoires" he again denies the statement and puts the initiative on Napoleon, though men well situated for knowing the truth of the matter, such as the Bavarian Minister Montgelas, name him as having been the instigator of the marriage. However it may have been, this much is to be inferred from all the sources: that both sides were more than willing to bring the matter about.

* "The Sovereign," said Montgelas, who was certainly informed with great exactitude by the Viceroy, "did not wish to have Eugene appear as a victim in need of sympathy, and, on the contrary, treated it as a matter of importance that just those persons who were most nearly touched by his new marriage should outwardly assist in bringing it to pass."

had remained long unanswered and was followed by an insistent reminder. When there came from St. Petersburg only the anticipated explanation from Alexander, that the Grand Duchess was still too young and the matter would have to be postponed, Napoleon at once grasped at the opportunity thus presented. "Postponement," said he, "is only another word for refusal; moreover, I will have in my palace no foreign priests to come between me and my wife." An answer couched in the politest terms was returned to the Neva saying that the thought of the marriage was given up. The Czar might perhaps feel wounded at this,—and we know that he did feel resentment,—but, once sure of Austria, that was to Napoleon no matter for apprehension. He had gained the object of his double dealing.

Berthier, as Grand Ambassador, arrived meanwhile at Vienna in order to make the formal proposals for Napoleon, which were followed on March 11th by the ceremonious nuptial benediction in the church of St. Augustine in the Austrian capital. Archduke Charles stood as proxy for his illustrious adversary. Thence the bridal party hastened towards France and was met by the Emperor on the 27th at Compiègne. On April 1st the civil marriage was celebrated at St. Cloud, which was followed next day by a repetition of the church marriage in the chapel of the Louvre. It was observed that the ceremony was identical with that at the marriage of Louis XVI. to Marie Antoinette, and that the marriage articles were drawn up word for word like those in 1770.

Marie Louise did not particularly please the Parisians. A fine-looking girl of eighteen years, she presented indeed a fresh, wholesome appearance with a straightforward look in her beautiful blue eyes, but in spite of her clear complexion and full red cheeks she was thought ugly and, above all, ill dressed. The courtiers were especially impressed with her excessive embarrassment. But she soon acquired dignity and a certain firmness of bearing, especially upon meeting with encouragement and great respect from Napoleon, to whom she saw all else bow in humblest submission. Up to a short time before she had hated him as Austria's bitterest foe, that is,

she had hated him as much as a child of the least passionate of monarchs was capable of violent feeling, and her recently published letters to a friend at that time show how great was the sacrifice which she made for the good of her country. On January 23d, for instance, she writes from Ofen (or Buda): "Since Napoleon's divorce from his wife I always open the Frankfort Gazette with the idea of finding the name of the new consort, and I acknowledge that the delay causes me involuntary uneasiness. I place my fate in the hands of Divine Providence, which indeed alone knows what is best for us. But, should misfortune will it so, I am ready to sacrifice my personal well-being for the good of the state, satisfied that true happiness is to be found only in the fulfilment of duty, even if to the prejudice of one's inclinations." To this she added, however: "Pray that it may not come to pass." But it was to be, notwithstanding.

But however much there might be found to criticise as to the outward appearance of the new Empress in Paris, the event in general was nevertheless hailed with great satisfaction. To be sure the irreconcilable element of the Faubourg St. Germain was indignant at this alliance between Legitimacy and the Revolution, and the radical Republicans likewise at the support thus given in Austria to the rule of their oppressor. But the great mass of the people rejoiced notwithstanding. The soldiers of the Guard themselves thought this marriage with a foreign princess to be a guarantee of peace. Rentes rose when it was learned on February 9th that the contract had been signed. Napoleon took immediate advantage of this state of feeling to repeat his old, familiar assurances. He gave orders to Champagny to address a circular letter to all foreign ambassadors asserting his love of peace: "You will say in it that one of the principal means of which the English availed themselves for kindling the continental war consisted in making it believed that it was part of my purpose to destroy all dynasties. Since circumstances have now placed me in the position to choose a consort, it has been my desire to deprive them of the accursed pretext under which they stirred

up the nations and created discord which flooded Europe with blood." But it was scarcely to be expected that the world would place confidence in these affirmations. At the Court of Vienna, as Metternich reports, they began asking themselves what had been the scheme upon which Napoleon had been reckoning in making this marriage: whether it were his intention to sheathe the sword and really ground the future of France and of his family upon the principles of order and peace, or whether he were only counting upon drawing Austria's forces into the service of his system of conquest. And that was indeed the decisive question. It was not long to remain unanswered. When, on March 20th, 1811, the cannon of the Invalides announced to the anxiously waiting people of Paris the birth of a Prince, to the initiated the political horizon was seen to be already thick with clouds again, nor had they any question as to the origin of the storm. And what deep meaning might there not lie concealed in the title which the Emperor bestowed upon his new-born son, "The King of Rome"! None but the name of the ancient mistress of the world seemed to him yet worthy to adorn the heir to his power.

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CHAPTER XVI

AT THE ZENITH

It was a decisive factor in Napoleon's life as a ruler that at the very time when he supposed he had prostrated the governments of Europe and made them harmless to his plans, he encountered a still unsubdued foe in the subjects of those governments. When he declared war against the several states he had evidently not foreseen this persistent opposition of the people, and had thus committed the very same error of which his predecessors in the revolutionary régime had been guilty. Neither the Convention nor the Directory had cared whether the nations of Europe really desired to be freed from their princes and to be assembled under the leadership of the Republic. And Napoleon cared just as little whether they really wanted to come under the hegemony of the French and to receive his laws as a gift. He thought his ambitious schemes were sufficiently secured if he brought the several countries under constitutions and governments that were useful to himself because they were dependent on him. He had scarcely any appreciation of the instinct of nationality; so little, indeed, that he ignored it even among the French, whom he was hoping to unite with Dutch, Germans, and Italians in one empire for all time. This was quite natural. What he had once possessed in his youth, and soon lost, was a mere clan feeling, such as armed Italians against Italians, Corsicans against Genoese, dialect against dialect. Of the mighty patriotism which throws its bonds about all the members of a powerful race owning one custom and tongue, of this he had no knowledge. Besides, he was too ardent a disciple of the cosmopolitan rationalism of the eighteenth century, the doctrine that frowned upon the difference between races as well as between social classes, and cherished the ideal of a citizenship of

the world without distinction of race. To this philosophy he had yielded homage until his mind was filled with the one dream of seeing all mankind reduced to a common level and subject to his will. Hence all that he saw was populations, not nations, and he thought he had subdued them when he had defeated their armies and humbled their governments. But when he attacked a people like the Spaniards, in whom the instinct of nationality was highly developed, they rose, burning with rage, seized the arms their leaders had dropped and continued the conflict with desperate resolution. The same spirit of national resistance to boundless ambition was soon astir everywhere; and it is characteristic of the most far-sighted enemies of the French Emperor that they justly valued this movement and saw in the arming of the people the surest means of defence. Thus Pitt in England had long before raised his army of volunteers, Stadion in Austria had insisted on creating a militia, and Scharnhorst in Prussia never tired of calling for a law requiring universal military service. A deep significance lay hidden in the words of the Austrian minister to the Russian plenipotentiary: "We have constituted ourselves a nation."

And what energy came into the conflict with this national element! In Spain, which Napoleon thought he had won by a simple military parade of Murat to Madrid, the flame once kindled would not be quenched; and Austria, although on the brink of ruin, managed, in 1809, to lead into the field forces that gave the great general more trouble than he had ever had with the armies of the cabinet of Vienna. Moreover, there were uprisings in the Tyrol and northern Germany, while in Russia a current of public sentiment sheathed the sword of the Czar against the troops of Austria. And was it not a fatal omen for Napoleon that, at the very time when national hate was arming the peoples of Europe, in France itself there was a patriotic feeling against the ambition of their ruler which heeded no ties of country, and the ideal of a national state aroused a secret but conscious opposition to the international empire. Just as the Spanish revolt broke out in the spring of 1808, the police in Paris came upon the traces of a republican conspiracy in which even some senators—

among others Sieyès—are supposed to have been somewhat involved.

This popular resistance of the nations to Napoleon's political schemes found in 1809 an ally in His Holiness the Pope. It was not the weapons of his secular power that he wielded, for Napoleon had broken them; his lands were occupied, the administration was in the hands of foreign officials, and it needed only the formal act to make the patrimony of St. Peter what it had virtually been since April, 1808, a province of the Empire. No; he armed himself against the Emperor with the thunderbolts of his spiritual authority, which rested on a broad popular foundation. No sooner had the Spaniards revolted than he protested, from the very midst of the French troops occupying his territory, against the outrage on himself, and forbade the bishops in the Legations wrested from the Papal States to take the oath of fealty to the new lord. And when, after the victories in Bavaria in April, 1809, Napoleon retorted from Vienna with two decrees which divested the Pope of all temporal sovereignty and declared the Papal States to be a province of the French Empire, Pius VII., under the impression produced by the day of Aspern, published against his oppressors a bull of excommunication that had been ready for months. This opened anew the whole great question, many centuries old, of the conflict between the imperial power and the papacy, and Napoleon was forced to seek a solution. He chose the one that conformed best with his aggressive nature and with the universal system of the Revolution which he represented.

As soon as he heard in Schönbrunn that the Pope had caused the bull to be posted on the doors of the churches in Rome, he sent to the King of Naples, who was in his confidence and had full charge of the Roman enterprise, secret instructions that the Pope must be arrested if he preached insurrection; such a course, he said, was not unheard of, as Philip the Fair and Charles V. had done so. Murat took the hint for what it was meant to be, a command, and on the 6th of July, just as the fortunes of war were deciding in favour of the Emperor at Wagram, Pius was arrested in the Quirinal and removed from Rome. He was taken

at first to Grenoble, and thence on a special order of the Emperor to Savona on the Riviera, most strictly guarded throughout.* Somewhat later, before the Treaty of Vienna, Napoleon ordered the cardinals and generals of religious orders, the papal court and archives, to be transferred to Paris, whither he also purposed to summon the Pope in order to have him near at hand as an instrument of his absolute will. But what if Pius refused such services! Even this emergency was to be provided for. After his return from the campaign, and after he had fully arranged his marriage with the Austrian princess and thereby deprived the Pope of his last prop in an orthodox Catholic power, a *Senatus consultum* of February, 1810, (enacted at his instigation,) openly incorporated the Papal States into the French Empire, divided them into two departments, and raised Rome to the rank of second city of the Empire. The same act provided an annual income of two million francs for the Pope, and bound future Popes, at their accession to the chair, to the Gallican articles of 1682, which had established the independence of the French crown of any foreign ecclesiastical power, the fallibility of the Church in matters of faith, and the superiority of the councils over the papacy, points that had been affirmed by the Council of Constance. The Emperor's object in pursuing this course was quite apparent: it was to override the resistance of the Curia by means of a subservient council. For as early as July, 1807, he had written to Eugene that he would not shrink from assembling in one council the churches of Gaul, Germany, Italy, and Poland, and get along without the Pope.†

And the Pope really did resist. He not only refused to confirm the divorce of Napoleon and Josephine pronounced by the Archbishop of Paris, in consequence of which thirteen cardinals declined to participate in the subsequent marriage festivities; he also refused to the bishops nominated by the Emperor the rite of investiture, a privilege reserved to him by the Concordat. The

* Afterwards the Emperor publicly declared that the arrest, which he had himself secretly ordered, was a piece of folly, and at St. Helena he emphatically denied all complicity in the act.

† See page 423.

mild-tempered man, who had not the most exact knowledge of canon law, was deprived of his advisers with the hope of winning him over more easily; Austria exerted itself to settle the dispute; and toward the end of the year Napoleon imposed more severe restrictions on his prisoner, depriving him of his papers and all opportunity of correspondence, and even of his writing materials; but all was in vain. Pius remained firm, and although he seemed inclined now and then to make concessions, yet the very next moment he would retract everything for fear of impairing the dignity of his position. He preferred even schism to the subordination of the Vicar of Christ to a secular sovereign.

Under such circumstances, with the ecclesiastical confusion prevailing in France, Napoleon felt obliged to take some decisive step if he wanted to carry his point. He now actually convoked the national council. But at the very outset a preparatory commission composed of prelates urged the objection that even the French catechism recognized the Pope as the "visible head of the Church," of whom she could not divest herself without jeopardy; and that Bossuet, too, whom Napoleon was fond of quoting as an opponent of ultramontanism, had asserted that the Holy Father required for the exercise of his ecclesiastical functions complete independence of any secular power whatsoever. To which, indeed, the Emperor then glibly replied that that might have applied in Bossuet's time, in the seventeenth century, when there was a considerable number of acknowledged secular sovereigns, no one of whom would concede to another political superiority above the Pope; but now that Europe acknowledged him as sole ruler such a consideration had no force. Incidentally he insinuated that the successors of Peter "were constantly bringing discord into all Christendom in the interests of their petty Roman state that was no bigger than a duchy." And when in June, 1811, the prelates of France, i.e., of the Napoleonic Empire, assembled, with some Italians and Belgians among them, their first resolution concerned the oath of loyalty to Pius VII. It was only by menaces and not until several opponents had been arrested that the council was brought to the point of promulgating as its

own a decree dictated by Napoleon, to the effect that if the Pope delayed investing a bishop more than six months after he was nominated by the Emperor the metropolitan might invest him. (August 5th, 1811.) Pius in Savona was finally prevailed upon to give his assent to this, but only with regard to the bishops in France; he made an exception of the Italian bishops and demanded his advisers again. This by no means ended the conflict.

It was not yet decided whether Pius would be obliged to submit. But any one who viewed the general situation might venture such a conjecture. The ill treatment suffered by the supreme head of Catholicism, and his appeal to the faithful, did not produce upon them the profound, stirring impression which had been produced in former centuries. The world had become secularized to an astonishing degree. Furthermore, a large part of the Emperor's foes, English, Russians, and Prussians, were not in the range of the papal authority, while other nations, as the Catholic Poles, based their very hopes on the strongest union with Napoleon. Nay, even the Pope's own subjects showed little resistance to their new sovereign, and finally accepted with great readiness the military plans of administration, the reform of the judiciary, the improvement of education, the regulation of streets and rivers, the draining of swamps, and other valuable innovations of the godless régime.

Only on one people, the Spaniards, if we may disregard the peasants of the Tyrol, did the fate of Pius VII. have an influence that helped to determine its political attitude. Their priests were unwearied in steeling their courage against the man who threatened, as they said, the altars as well as the thrones.* In the last days of the year 1808 the revolutionary Central Junta, which conducted the government for the exiled King Ferdinand, had summoned the nation to a guerilla warfare: bands were to be formed under the command of a monk or a

* In one of the catechisms composed by the Spanish priests for purposes of war, a devilish nature is ascribed to Napoleon alongside of his human nature, the slaying of a Frenchman is called a meritorious act, and to give up fighting is declared an infamy worthy of death.

trained officer for the purpose of attacking small French detachments, intercepting couriers, capturing transports of weapons and ammunition, and the like. The appeal met with an immediate response. The guerilla bands were everywhere and nowhere; they might be driven away and pursued, but could not be destroyed, and as a means of distressing the enemy they were unequalled. Soon after the call of the Junta a manifesto proclaimed to the nations of Europe that in Spain the liberty of *all* nations was at stake, and appealed to them for support. The English, who heretofore had appeared on the peninsula merely as enemies of Napoleon, now entered openly into a friendly alliance with the Spanish insurgents and pledged their utmost efforts. And though they never fully met this pledge,—there were never more than 30,000 British on the side of the Spanish,—yet at their head was a man of genius, Sir Arthur Wellesley, or Lord Wellington as he was called after the battle of Talavera. "If the war on the Spanish peninsula holds out, Europe is saved," he was wont to say, and he acted accordingly. With prudent calculation, staying on the defensive rather than risking his small forces in daring enterprises, he held the enemy's superior force in check and accomplished his object: the wound in the body of the Empire was kept open. Despite the 250,000 men that Napoleon had left, his marshals proved unable to pacify the country. At variance among themselves, wearied with an exhausting war that promised no profit, they only gained unimportant successes, and when the Emperor returned from Schönbrunn to Paris the reports from the south were anything but favourable.

It was now generally expected that he himself would go to Spain, bring the discordant generals to act together and win a final decisive victory by the force of his superior genius. But he did not go. Of those who knew him best some said he did not wish to risk his life in a country where fanaticism was raging, others that he was detained by his divorce and remarriage. It is possible, too, that the same motive which at the beginning of the year hastened his return to Paris now kept him there, i.e., distrust of Talleyrand and Fouché, whom he

had observed during the Austrian campaign in secret agreement with Murat. In any case, he treated the Spanish affair with great contempt (doubtless to avoid contradicting his own positive statement months before that he had set it aside once for all), and contented himself with directing the operations of his generals from Paris.

At first it really seemed as if that would suffice. On November 19th, 1809, the French defeated at Ocaño the last regular Spanish troops, drove their remnants back to Cadiz, and brought Andalusia into the hands of King Joseph. There remained now only the guerillas and the English allies. The former the Emperor heeded little. Of their terrible importance he had no conception, and hardly believed it when he heard that the war with them was far more horrible than that in the Vendée. He thought better of the English. "The English are the only dangerous element in Spain," he wrote to Berthier at the end of January, 1810. But ought they not to manage to overcome the few thousand British even without his presence, especially if he considerably increased (as he now did) the forces on the peninsula, and secured by flatteries and promises the ablest of his marshals, Masséna, for the great undertaking of driving Wellington from Portugal? Ney and Junot were to command under Masséna, while Soult, who was at the head of the army in Andalusia, was to proceed from there to Portugal to aid him. So confident was Napoleon of the result that on February 8th, 1810, he issued a decree which withdrew the four provinces north of the Ebro, Vizcaya, Navarra, Arragon, and Catalonia, from the Spanish administration, changed them into four French military districts, and clothed four generals, Suchet, Augereau, Reille, and Thouvenot, with the highest civil and military authority in them. They were to provide for the troops under them out of the revenues of these provinces, as the government of Joseph was not in a position to exploit the resources of the country so energetically as to cover the expenses of the army; they were to receive orders from Paris only. In these districts the tricolour replaced the Spanish colours. An accompanying letter of the same day addressed to Berthier gave still more general expression

to the purpose of the Emperor to put into the hands of the generals the administration of all Spanish territory conquered by them. And suppose now the conquest proceeded; suppose Suchet kept pushing farther south from Catalonia and Masséna really wrested Portugal from the English: would all Spain then finally come under French rule? Certainly it would; nothing else was the plan of Napoleon. By the separation of the four provinces Joseph had lost what little credit he had won by his moderation with the liberals of the country, and when he sent his minister Azanza to Paris to secure the revocation of the edict of February, the latter, after long delay, was finally informed that the Emperor had irrevocably determined to incorporate the whole of Spain into France, "of which it is the natural continuation"; its king was to abdicate and was to wait for that act only until the English were driven from the peninsula.*

All now depended on Masséna and the success of his expedition. He was not destined to succeed. The fortresses that blocked the road to Portugal capitulated only after long and obstinate resistance; this gave Wellington a respite, which he used in destroying, while on his methodical retreat, all the resources of the country, and in constructing to the north of Lisbon a triple belt of forts from the sea to the Tagus. At this strong position near Torres Vedras, despite an important success at Busaco in September, 1810, the French army met a signal reverse, having

* The necessary documents even were handed to the dismayed diplomat drawn up in full, Joseph's letter of abdication and a manifesto of Napoleon's to the Spanish. The latter contained the following: "My brother has voluntarily given back to me the crown which I resigned to him, and has entreated me not to permit the ruin of his subjects. He is acquainted with your affairs, he asked my protection and insisted on my receiving you into my empire." A rather bold perversion of the facts! The contrary was the truth. Azanza in Paris had ascribed the general tumult to the quarrels and thefts of the French generals as its chief cause, and declared that Joseph's moderation was the only means of pacifying the country; and he had begged the Emperor to sustain the latter actively for only a year longer without violating the integrity of Spain. The above-mentioned papers, however, never reached Madrid. They fell into the hands of a guerilla and were soon afterwards printed in the newspapers of the Spanish insurgents and in the "*Courier de Londres*,"

suffered sorely from privations on the march and having failed of receiving the needed support either from France or Soult; so that in the spring of 1811 Masséna was forced to return to Spain. After a new defeat which he suffered in the beginning of May at Fuentes de Onoro he lost the supreme command, which the enraged Emperor transferred to Marmont.

Portugal, then, was not conquered, England was not driven from the Continent; rather, the Briton had greatly increased his prestige by his victory over the ablest marshal of the Empire. The various French divisions and their unwilling allies, on the other hand, suffered beyond description. Unnumbered human lives were swallowed up by disease, hunger, and the secret wiles of the foe. "This is a gruesome war," writes an officer of the Rhenish allies about the incessant warfare with the guerillas; "here there is no alternative but victory or death, and at the end—death after all." For instance, the regiment of the Saxon principalities which in the spring of 1810 arrived in Spain 2300 strong, lost 1000 men by September, and over 1200 more were lying in hospitals. In October only 27 were still fit for service. Of the detachments sent across the border by the Emperor, but a fragment, and a small one at that, ever reached its destination. The discouragement of the warriors kept growing, and only this one hope made them hold on until 1812, that the great Emperor, the battle-winner, would surely yet come to make a glorious end of the desperate fighting.

But he did not come even then, although the situation grew worse and worse, and for very definite reasons. He did not come because he regarded the war in the peninsula as only a side issue in the mighty feud which he was waging against Great Britain in all corners of the continent, a factor of secondary moment, which must at once lose all its importance as soon as the great duel was elsewhere victoriously concluded. As this claimed all his activities, he plainly felt that he could not afford to enter personally into the subordinate detail of the peninsular struggle, which would take him too far away from the centre of his policy and its immediate aims. In short, the war of commerce was the main issue in his eyes;

that was the essential feature of his policy. In 1810, at the time when he sent Masséna to Lisbon, he reverted to it with heightened zeal, and affirmed his conviction that England was already so weakened financially by the blockade that only a few years' perseverance would suffice to exhaust her power completely. And indeed indications were not wanting that supported this belief. The English treasury had suffered severely from the endless subsidies to Continental powers and expensive expeditions to Spain and Holland; the notes of the Bank of England had fallen below par 20 per cent; on the Continent the pound sterling, usually exchangeable for 25 francs, was now valued at only 17 francs. A commercial crisis was the necessary consequence, and there were numerous bank failures. A respectable opposition in Parliament was earnestly working against the prosecution of the war. The Continental blockade had not as yet been enforced with full rigour. Once this were done, then Napoleon felt assured that England would yield, sue for peace, and renounce her supremacy of the seas. That would naturally end the Spanish war also. Under such circumstances, so he argued, would it not be absurd to go over the Pyrenees himself, instead of arranging from Paris for the strictest enforcement of the blockade system? This would be impossible from Spain because communication was so difficult. No, Wellington was not to be defeated on the Iberian peninsula alone; for the physical force of this or that British expedition was not the real foe, but the material force of British wealth which equipped these expeditions, organized coalitions, and incited revolts. That must be destroyed, and that first of all. So all turned perforce on the one question whether the Continental blockade could really be enforced so strictly as to destroy the national wealth of Britain, as Napoleon thought it could. The answer involved the fate of the world.

It has been repeatedly pointed out in this biography that the idea of continuing the war of a hundred years with England by closing the continental market to British manufactures and colonial products did not originate with Napoleon, but was of an earlier date. As a matter of fact it had its birth

in the revolutionary government of France at a time when the young General Bonaparte was just beginning to gather his laurels in Italy.* The men in authority in the Republic were thoroughly convinced of the soundness of this idea, and the Emperor remained true to it as well. In his intercourse with individual states he constantly worked for its realization, until, having made himself conqueror of Austria and Prussia, he issued from Berlin in November, 1806, that decree of blockade which barred from the coasts of the Continent all ships that came from England and her colonies.† To this the English had replied in 1807 by the order that all non-French vessels (the French were confiscated out of hand) which wanted to trade with blockaded ports must first touch at London or Malta and secure permission at a high price. This tyrannical measure Napoleon met the same year with the equally rigorous decree that all ships which should submit to these English conditions or touch any British territory whatever in their voyage were to be regarded as denationalized and treated as good prize in the ports of France. By these measures the maritime trade of neutral powers was made so extremely difficult that the government of the United States actually forbade its citizens all commerce with Europe. This embargo was restricted in 1809, by the Non-Intercourse Act, to England and France and was then generally evaded, for American shippers took English colonial products and manufactures on board and traded with Holland, the Hanseatic towns, and the ports of Russia and Prussia, making false declarations as to the place of

* In a letter dated July 22d, 1796, Mallet du Pan writes to Thugut: "Hatred of England has gained new force; the preparations for a landing there are being continued, and a plan has been formed and partly carried out of closing the ports of the Continent against England." A week later he writes: "As far as possible the markets of the Continent will be closed to England, by which her revenues, her factories, in short her most important resources will be attacked; by this means the opposition of the British nation will be roused and thus its government be forced to sue for peace." An article in the official "Redacteur" of October 29th of the same year contains this sentence: "Our policy must limit itself to ruining the commerce and thereby the power of England by shutting her out of the Continent."

† See page 366.

shipment. In the Mediterranean the neutral Turkish flag on Greek vessels protected the British cargoes that were smuggled into Trieste, Venice, Genoa, etc. This extensive indirect trade sorely interfered with Napoleon's great scheme, and he cast about for means of crippling it as completely as the direct commerce with England. In March, 1810, he issued an edict aimed directly against the neutrals; Greek vessels in the south were to be most carefully searched for indications of the source of their cargo, while the American ships—and here the embargo of the government at Washington stood him in good stead—in all French ports and ports accessible to French arms were threatened with confiscation.*

But it was not the trade of neutrals alone that disturbed Napoleon's policy against England. Side by side with it an immense smuggling trade had been developed along the coasts of the North Sea and the Baltic which continually furnished the Continent with the prohibited English colonial products and textiles—at very high prices, to be sure—while in the London warehouses the home products rapidly fell in value. In 1810 the difference, i.e., the premium on smuggled articles, amounted to nearly fifty per cent on an average. In order to put a stop to this contraband trade, the Emperor issued August 5th of that year at Trianon an edict which required all merchants to pay a tax of fifty per cent and more *ad valorem* on their colonial products, "which were, of course, all of English origin," and also threatened with confiscation all storehouses of such products found within four days of the borders of the Empire. By this decree he practically drove the business out of the hands of the smugglers and secured a considerable fund for his own treasury, "the extraordinary domain" which a *Senatus consultum* of January, 1810, had granted to him separate from the national treasury and independent of national control and into which this tax flowed. A

* This measure against the neutrals also was earlier designed by the Directory. In the beginning of January, 1798, that body recommended to the legislature to seize all neutral ships which carried English wares, no matter who the owners were, and to close the French ports to every neutral ship that had entered English harbours. The object, it was stated, was to protect the liberty of the seas.

later decree issued at Fontainebleau October 18th ordered all articles of English manufacture found either in France or allied countries to be burned wherever they were seized. And in fact during the next weeks French soldiers were seen everywhere crossing the border, and in concert with the customs officers breaking into storehouses, heaping up the fruits of British industry and converting them to ashes. Sugar and coffee, on the other hand, were carried on ammunition-wagons to Antwerp, Mainz, Frankfort, or Milan, where they were sold at public auction. A premium was set on official zeal in this task; smugglers and receivers of their goods were handed over to the Draconian penalties of a court established in November, 1810, for this special purpose. To such a pitch of severity had the Continental system grown. In France only was it modified by the special provision that certain skippers there could obtain for a round sum (which likewise went into the privy purse of the Emperor) permission to import certain classes of English products; in particular indispensable provisions and dyestuffs. In this way the French were kept in good humour, although in other countries the nuisance of the "license" system caused intense bitterness of feeling.*

All these regulations, however, would fail of their object unless they were enforced with equal stringency *everywhere* on the Continent; i.e., unless all the powers of Continental Europe adopted the laws against the neutrals and the tariff of Trianon. Napoleon made no delay in summoning all of them to do so;

* It is by no means to be supposed that Napoleon allowed those European states from which he debarred English imports to trade freely among themselves. Even in 1806 he made it impossible to import textile fabrics into France, also soda, soap, and the like. Again in 1810 the Italian market was closed against Swiss stuffs, and Italian raw silks, being kept out of Switzerland and the Rhenish Confederation by high tariffs, were drawn exclusively to Lyons for the purpose of enriching its manufacturers, while the silk-growers of Lombardy fell into poverty. So decidedly was Napoleon opposed to free trade that, among other things, he permitted no new editions of J. B Say's treatise on Political Economy, which had appeared in 1803. It may be added that not even the "license" system was originated by his government; licenses had been issued by the Directory.

some with diplomacy, others with menaces. And everything seemed to depend on whether they all really complied or resisted.

One of the states had already fallen a victim to the system—Holland. The Dutch had attained importance and wealth only through their shipping, their colonies and commerce; these were their sole dependence. So, when Napoleon's laws making all maritime commerce impossible were enforced, their ruin was inevitable. Of this the Emperor was well aware. "Holland cannot escape her ruin," he wrote as early as March, 1808, to his brother Louis when he offered him the Spanish crown with the object of annexing Holland to France.* For it had not escaped his knowledge that the Dutch welcomed American ships with their British cargoes, and sent the goods farther into the interior of the Continent in order to save at least a fraction of their once magnificent carrying trade. Louis declined at that time, and Napoleon also temporarily laid the plan of annexation aside. But immediately after the Austrian war he took it up again. His pretext now was that the Dutch had not been able to raise sufficient forces against the English invasion of 1809. And in fact it was the marsh fever rather than the troops of King Louis that kept the British from Antwerp and compelled them to beat a hasty retreat to the island of Walcheren, where one detachment did indeed maintain its position for a few months. And when Louis hastened to Paris to defend himself and his country from the charge of "treason against France," Napoleon openly conveyed to him his intention of incorporating Holland into the empire and of endowing him with a German principality. This one concession was granted to the King, that a Dutch confidential agent might first go to England to demand secretly the revocation of the Order in Council of 1807; in case of acceptance, he offered to open Holland and the Hanseatic towns, while in case of refusal he threatened to annex them to France. This mission, the sole aim of which was evidently to throw upon England the blame for the annexation of Holland, proved a failure, as the English government wished to negotiate *openly* on a peace basis, which Napoleon declined to do; and the neighbour-

* See page 432.

ing state would surely have lost its independence at once if the moment when the whole world was hoping for peace and quiet to result from his marriage with the "daughter of the Cæsars" had not seemed to the Emperor inappropriate for such an arbitrary act. He contented himself with forcing on Louis a treaty ceding to France all Dutch territory on the left bank of the Rhine, including Zealand, Brabant, and the part of Guelders on the left of the Waal; placing all the Dutch coasts under the surveillance of a French corps of occupation 6000 strong and of French customs officers; and, furthermore, binding the King to equip fifteen large war-ships. In return for all this the Emperor promised to remove the restrictions so long imposed on the trade of Holland with France (March 16th, 1810).

But this promise was not seriously meant; Napoleon aimed merely to strike a first blow, not wishing to fell the tree at a single stroke. He was far from observing the stipulations of the treaty. The customs barriers between Holland and France remained in force, the French corps of troops was increased to four times the stipulated number, and in concert with the foreign customs officers performed intolerable acts of violence, and complaints made to Paris met only insults. Thereupon Louis no longer deemed it compatible with his dignity to keep the crown; on July 1, 1810, he abdicated in favour of his younger son, the older having in March, 1809, become Duke of Berg, and secretly withdrew to Austria. Napoleon was surprised by this step of his brother, and expressed himself bitterly on his ingratitude.* It was of course an embarrassing thing for him to appear before the world at variance with his nearest relatives. But that made no change in the course of events. For even before the news of Louis's retirement arrived at Paris, a decree already lay there in full form, the first provision of which read: "Holland is annexed to the Empire." Now it was published, and

* See the conversation with Caulaincourt, page 27. It is interesting to compare this with another conversation in which the Emperor shortly after informed the Swedish ambassador that he had driven (!) from the throne his brother, whom he loved and had educated, because he had been powerless to deal with the Dutch smugglers. (Lefebvre, V. 73.)

Lebrun, Napoleon's former colleague in the consulate, went to the new province as his viceroy.

Observe the method of these usurpations. In Holland, as well as in Spain, his brothers disappoint the hopes of the Emperor, since neither Joseph nor Louis is able to escape the strong national repulsion toward the Empire. Instead of appreciating and heeding these impulses, Napoleon merely deems his brothers too weak, too ambitious, or too obstinate to serve him. His deep distrust henceforth extends even to them, and he abandons the family system in order to take Europe, so to speak, under his personal rule.* In Spain and in Holland he proceeds in the same way. There in February, 1810, he annexes the country as far as the Ebro; here in March, as far as the Waal; and at the same time the documents were already complete that were to declare the incorporation of both these countries *in toto* into the Empire. In Spain, to be sure, the necessary condition was not yet fulfilled, i.e., the expulsion of the English; but they had been obliged to evacuate their position in Walcheren as early as December, 1809. But these annexations were not destined to stand.

"The British Orders in Council have torn to shreds the public law of Europe. A new order of things reigns in the world." With these words it was that Napoleon recommended to the Senate to make the union of Holland with France constitutional. But that was not all the rescript contained; he demanded not only the mouths of the Scheldt, the Mosel, and the Rhine as "new guarantees" against England, but also those of the Weser and the Elbe; and the obedient senators, in a consultum of December 1810, actually declared both Holland and the entire German coast of the North Sea to be parts of the Empire, including the districts of Oldenburg, Lauenburg, the three Hanseatic cities, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, the principalities of Arenberg and Salm, parts of Hanover (which in January, 1810, had just,

* In September, 1810, he said to Metternich among others: "There are relatives and cousins and aunts. But they all amount to nothing. I should not have left the throne even to my brothers. But then, time alone makes one wise. I ought to have appointed only regents and viceroys."

fallen to the share of Jerome), of Westphalia and Berg; in brief, more than 12,000 square miles. The new territories were to form three departments, with Osnabrück, Bremen, and Lübeck as capital cities. And for this step there was not a shred of lawful title, no legal ground, not even a pretext; it was purely arbitrary from beginning to end. In the same arbitrary way Napoleon at this time incorporated the Swiss republic of the Valais. "The annexations are demanded by circumstances," said the minister of the Emperor in his report to the Senate. But what could it be that would not be demanded by circumstances? On the same ground the Emperor might justify the union of entire Europe under his sceptre, if he had the power to unite it. In this direction in fact his thoughts were tending.

Yet not even these annexations from Germany were original with Napoleon, for along with the blockade system against England the Directory already had their eyes fixed on the acquisition of the North German coast, and twelve years before Sieyès had termed these districts the "most important part of the globe to France"; once possess those, and the English can be excluded from all Continental ports from Gibraltar to Holstein, aye, to the North Cape.* This programme now seemed on the point of being carried out. For even Denmark, whose rule at that time still extended over Norway, at once complied with the demand of Napoleon to proscribe the cargoes of neutral ships. The hatred of the Danes against the English, which had gone beyond all bounds since the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, caused Frederick VI. to overlook the serious consequences of such a course for his country; and besides the Danish king was influenced by the hope of some day attaining with the help of France the throne of Sweden, which must soon fall vacant. This expectation, however, was not to be fulfilled. For a change had ensued in the political status of Sweden. Even during the war against the Russian-French alliance, a war which resulted in delivering Finland to the Russians and Swedish Pomerania, with Stralsund and Rügen to the French, the unwise enmity of Gustavus IV. against Napoleon and his obstinate clinging to the

* See page 191.

broken reed of England had brought the country into a sad plight. In March, 1809, he was deposed and his uncle Charles XIII. put in his stead. Then the Swedes had concluded peace with Russia and in January, 1810, with France, which gave Pomerania back to them, but bound them to the strictest observance of the Continental blockade. Nay, more: in November, 1810, Charles XIII. even went so far as to declare war against England, shortly after he had chosen as his successor (for he was childless) Bernadotte, whose affability had won many friends in Swedish Pomerania, little suspecting that he was calling to his side one who was anything but a friend of the Emperor of the French.*

As Napoleon contended with his principal enemy for mastery of the far north of the Continent, so also he strove to be master in the extreme south. In Sicily the British were firmly established, keeping the Bourbon dynasty under the pressure of constant interference and guardianship. From this point they had undertaken in 1809 an expedition against Naples, with the same deplorable results, however, as in that against Antwerp in the north. Napoleon replied by commanding his brother-in-law, King Joachim of Naples, to wrest Sicily from the English, or at least to keep their troops shut up so that they should send no re-enforcements to Spain and Portugal. This attempt to land in Sicily failed utterly in 1810. In the following summer it was to be repeated with the support of the Toulon fleet; but as the ships were unable to put out, the undertaking was postponed. In reality, like the conquest of Spain and Portugal, this, too, was a side issue; and Messina might be won, like Lisbon, in other ways.†

* In December, 1810, a Russian ambassador in Stockholm reported that the Crown Prince Charles John (the name Bernadotte now bore) used very bitter language against Napoleon, asserting that he had been always given a post in the field of battle where he might easily fall (*Revue Historique*, XXXVII. 74). It should be remembered that Bernadotte was a Gascon.

† Of some interest is the rumour current at the time and reported to the home government by the English plenipotentiary, Lord Bentinck, that Queen Caroline, ever since her granddaughter Marie Louise had married Napoleon, had been seeking to arrive at an understanding with

One thing, however, becomes perfectly clear when we consider Napoleon's unbounded activity during this time, and that is, a sore disappointment was in store for those who expected from his connection with an old dynasty his reconciliation with the system of the old states. And equally astray were those who beheld in the birth of his son a year later a pledge of peace. For at that very time, the spring of 1811, his plans took their loftiest flight. Sooner or later Spain and Portugal would fall to the share of France, either through conquest—for Masséna was still before Lisbon—or in the train of the greater events. From the southern extremity of the Italian peninsula to the far-distant north where the Continent ends in the Arctic Ocean, all governments were under his influence, apparently without any will of their own; and only the Slavic colossus of the east yet remained to reckon with. For what purpose had Napoleon bound half the Continent to march under his banner, if it were not to become master, at last, of the whole?

The latest news from England served only to confirm the Emperor in the course he had entered upon. In that country the economic conditions had, in consequence of the annexation of the seaboard states to France, grown more and more serious. England, to be sure, had taken possession of most of the European colonies across the ocean (including the French colonies, Isle de Bourbon, Isle de France, and Cayenne); but the hope of a profitable export trade with them in manufactured articles was disappointed, as they were obliged to accept in exchange colonial products, to which Napoleon closed the European markets

the Napoleonic dynasty against England, whose pressure she endured with the greatest reluctance. The plan was said to have been that her troops should in 1811 attack the British on the island while Murat stormed Messina. Then for a suitable equivalent Sicily was to be ceded to the latter or to Napoleon, while the Bourbon prince Leopold was to marry the niece of the Corsican. Satisfactory proof of these statements has not been adduced. The despatches of Bentinck that mention them have but recently been made known. But besides there was much talk of annexing Naples to the empire and of Murat's disgrace. The recently published diaries of Queen Catharine of Westphalia also make mention of these things. But they never came to pass; greater events thrust such projects into the background.

more and more rigidly. In addition the use of machinery had resulted in overproduction and loss of profits. The British Parliament had to open a public loan for the distressed manufacturers. Of course French industries suffered as well, but the remedy there was merely a matter of time, as the Emperor supposed, and a short time at that. When, a few days after the birth of his child, he accepted the congratulations of a deputation from the chambers of commerce and industry, he spoke with the greatest confidence of his ultimate victory. He now openly rejected all thoughts of peace. "You see," said he, "how far England has come down in the world. Louis XIV. and Louis XV. were obliged in their day to make peace, and I, too, would long ago have been obliged to seek it, if like them I ruled old France; but I am not the successor of the French kings, but of Charlemagne, and my empire is a continuation of the empire of the Franks. In four years I shall have a navy. Once my squadrons have been at sea three or four years, then we can try conclusions with the English. I know I may lose three or four naval battles;* very well, I shall lose them; but we are courageous, always booted and spurred, and we shall succeed. Ere ten years pass by I shall have subjugated England. No European state will trade with her any more. It is my customs barriers that do the greatest harm to the English. Her blockade but injured herself most by teaching us how we could dispense with her products, her sugar, her indigo. Yet a few years and we shall be inured to that. Soon I shall have beet-sugar enough to supply all Europe. For your manufactures you have a wide market open in France, Italy, Naples, and Germany." Then the Emperor proceeded to speak of the French national treasury, and said among other things: "I take in nine hundred millions annually from my own country and have three hundred millions lying in the Tuileries; the Bank of France is filled with silver, while the Bank of England has not a shilling. Since 1806 I have brought in more than a billion francs in war contributions. I alone

* "Three or four fleets," according to another reading.

have money. Austria is already bankrupt, Russia will be, and England no less."*

These last statements of the Emperor about the French finances call for a word of explanation. It is true that Metternich, too, who stayed in Paris for some time in 1810, formed the opinion that "France is without question the richest nation of the Continent and can in financial matters bid defiance to any other." But he adds the qualification that "the coffers of the state are empty, those of the ruler are full." And that was pretty near the truth; for over against the nine hundred millions of revenue mentioned by Napoleon there stood in the budget of 1811 nine hundred and fifty-four millions of expenses. And although the annexation of Rome, Illyria, Holland, and the Hanseatic department, and the new tariff, contributed to raise the revenues, yet the expenses of the military system had grown rapidly. The estimates of the Minister of War for that year called for 480 millions (400 in 1810), of the Minister of Marine for 170 millions (110 in 1810). To meet this situation Napoleon represented in a memorial of December, 1810, that a loan was "immoral because it burdened future generations," and proposed only an increase of indirect taxes (*droits réunis*), and in addition a new impost, the tobacco monopoly. (He expected this would yield 80 million francs.) His forecast proved to be mistaken. The year 1811 was favourable for wine, but not for grain. The drought, which ripened grapes to a memorable sweetness, withered the grain, the price of flour was almost doubled, its consumption decreased correspondingly, and with it fell the revenue from taxes. The year closed with a deficit of 46 millions. And while Napoleon's claim of 300 millions in his treasury was in the main correct, it is certain that only half that amount was in cash, the rest consisting of claims against states and private individuals. Evidently the brilliant picture which the Emperor

* The speech is here given (as a fragment) in its original form as it was published in the *Revue Critique* of 1880 from two independent sources. The version in Thiers (XIII. 22-27) evidently represents a later revision in which the words of the Emperor were communicated to the diplomats and German newspapers. In the *Memoirs of Miot* (III. 189) there appears a third version.

had drawn of the finances of France was far from true. We may judge by that how severely he felt the blow when—as we shall hear later—Russia closed her territory to French exports, and how strenuous were his efforts to multiply sources of income for the French, and so increase their power to pay taxes, by conquering new markets for their products in the East. Hence, just as in 1809, so three years later, the financial situation doubtless helped to make war seem a necessity.*

Any one who will compare the above address of the Emperor to the representatives of industry with his commands to the Minister of the Navy in the same month of March, 1811, will find in them the whole vast plan of universal empire set forth in the boldest outlines. The empire of Charlemagne no longer satisfies him; not even the Continent of Europe; no, he requires the entire globe to come under his iron sceptre. He proposes to have two immense fleets fitted out within the next three years, one for the ocean and one for the Mediterranean; the latter destined for Sicily and Egypt, the former at first for Ireland. And in case matters went well in Portugal and Spain, expeditions were to be despatched before the end of 1812 to the Cape of Good Hope, to Surinam, Martinique, etc., and sixty to eighty thousand men, "avoiding the hostile cruisers," were to be distributed over both hemispheres. At the same time the last decisive Continental war against Russia is in preparation with the purpose of coercing the Czar if he refuses to enter the federative system under Napoleon's suzerainty, and of opening the way to the British Indies. With a single covetous look the Emperor encompassed the whole world, and so completely was he dominated by the thought of his coming universal rule that he no longer sought to conceal it. "They wish to know whither we are bound," said he. "We shall make an end of Europe, and then throw ourselves like robbers on robbers less bold than ourselves, and possess ourselves of India, of which they have made themselves masters."

* It is stated that the minister Mollien advised the Emperor against war with Russia on the ground that the finances of the state needed peace; whereupon the latter replied: "On the contrary, they are falling into confusion and for that reason are in need of war." Cf. page 460.

When the Bavarian General Wrede, who was sojourning in Paris in the early summer of 1811, on one occasion spoke a word in favour of peace, the Emperor answered him with severity in tone and glance: "Yet three years and I am master of the world."

The more surely Napoleon counted on the ultimate success of his Continental policy against England, the more important it became for him to deprive British goods of their last resort, the ports of Russia. Hence he had to arrive at an understanding with Russia in order to induce her to adopt his measures against the neutral flag; i.e., his tariff to bar out colonial produce, and his decree ordering the destruction of warehouses of English manufactures. This could be secured by amicable means if the Czar yielded, or by forcible means if he resisted. Under existing conditions the latter was more probable.

We have already seen the beginnings of serious differences between these two allied powers. They date from the war of 1809, when Russia showed a lack of zeal in supporting France against Austria, and Napoleon retaliated by adding Galician territory to the duchy of Warsaw. The Emperor's marriage with an archduchess might also be regarded as a move in the game against the power of the Czar, and it is a significant fact that on the very day on which Napoleon summoned Prince Schwarzenberg to Paris to sign the marriage contract, February 6th, 1810, word was sent to the French ambassador at St. Petersburg that a treaty signed by him on January 5th could not be confirmed. That treaty concerned Poland. Alexander I. felt keen anxiety lest the duchy of Warsaw should, under the protectorate of the French Emperor, extend some day over the entire domain of the old Polish kingdom, and had asked for guarantees from France on that point. Caulaincourt, still keeping in mind his instructions to keep Russia quiet, had gone into the matter and had formally promised that the kingdom of Poland should never be restored; nay, more, that the name Poland should be carefully avoided in all public documents. To sign this meant for Napoleon to lay down one of the most effective weapons against Russia, which he had been busily forging in the years 1806 and 1809, and to

guarantee besides that no one else should venture to restore Poland. If there had been any necessity of making such a concession to the Czar, it would have been different. But since the Austrian marriage had brought the Emperor Francis over to the side of France there was no such necessity. In brief, Napoleon did not ratify the treaty, and for the sole purpose of avoiding offence to his ally he had a counter-proposition offered in St. Petersburg, wherein he offered to bind himself merely to support no attempt to restore the old kingdom of the Jagellons. This was to be incorporated in a secret treaty. But that did not satisfy Alexander. He desired a public treaty which would bind the French Emperor in the eyes of the whole world; he insisted on his original demand, and appealed to the promises which he had received soon after the peace of Schönbrunn was concluded.* "The Emperor," he said to the French ambassador, "gave me the most positive assurances, and at that time wanted to give them; why not now?" The answer, to be in keeping with the truth, must have run thus: Because the Emperor, who now deems himself "sole lord of Europe," has already had clearly in mind this breach with Russia and only wants a pretext for bringing it about as soon as it is advantageous to him. Of course that was not the answer of the ambassador. But the Russian monarch knew what to expect; for at that very time (April, 1811) he assured Prince Adam Czartoryski that Napoleon was far less concerned for the welfare of Poland than he was to "make use of that country as a tool at the moment when he should want to make war upon Russia." This moment had not yet arrived; but it was not very far distant. As early as October, 1810, Metternich had returned from France to his master with this conviction: "In the year 1811 the peace of Continental Europe will not be disturbed by any new attack by France. In the course of that year Napoleon will increase his own forces and assemble his allies for a decisive blow against Russia. Napoleon will open the campaign in the spring of 1812."

The Polish question was, moreover, but one link in a long chain of disputes that arose between the allies of Tilsit in the

* See page 487.

course of the years 1810 and 1811. An element of equal discord lay in Turkey, where Napoleon had in secret always opposed Russia most strenuously. The Russians had victoriously crossed the lower Danube and gained such decisive successes that there was a fair prospect of peace with the Porte. Napoleon was very sorely displeased at that prospect because it must be his desire to keep the Russian forces continually occupied in the south when he made his attack in the north. To accomplish this, not wishing to appear openly against his allies, he sought to hide behind Austria. He advised Metternich to occupy Servia, which Russia claimed, and promised to be an inactive spectator if the Court of Vienna contested the Danubian principalities with the Czar. The Emperor Francis would have none of this. Napoleon, however, had gained this much, that Turkey, being informed of the interest that France and Austria took in her fate, persisted in refusing the Russian demands, and the war went on.

These, however, were matters of secondary importance compared with the main fact, i.e., Russia's attitude in the Continental blockade. In the middle of October, 1810, Napoleon had called upon the Czar to confiscate neutral vessels found in his ports, as had been done since May in the ports of France and of countries under French influence. "If Russia confiscates them," runs the despatch on this subject, "she gives England the 'coup de grace' and ends the war at once." And to Alexander himself the Emperor wrote: "It depends only on Your Majesty whether we shall have war or peace." The Czar refused; he could not do otherwise. For even the rupture of direct commercial relations with England had inflicted severe losses on Russia. Her natural products thus lost their most important market. The result was inevitable; three years later the deficit equalled the revenues and paper money fell to one fourth its nominal value. In truth, when Napoleon so confidently predicted the bankruptcy of the northern empire, he knew perfectly well the source of his ally's financial distress. Was the wish to increase it and hasten the catastrophe lurking in the demand now made on St. Petersburg to turn away the neutrals as well? No; the Czar could not

accede to that. Where in all the world was he to look for active support against a future attack of Napoleon if now he himself helped to ruin England? He replied to the proposal of France by declaring that he was willing to maintain now as before the anti-British system of the Tilsit Treaty and confiscate every ship that failed to give unimpeachable evidence of its nationality, but that he could not bring himself to go beyond that, as Russia could not dispense with the colonial produce and depended on the trade of neutrals; that it was by no means certain that the latter carried British goods only.

This was a blow struck at Napoleon's policy in its most sensitive spot. For as soon as Russia tolerated neutral flags in her ports the Continent was opened to British exports, and England could derive new hope and capacity for resistance from the Czar's refusal. If anything had been wanting to convince the Emperor that he must first fight Russia if he wanted to ruin England and become master of the world, nothing was lacking now. Henceforth, although keeping up all the formal courtesy and seeming candour of diplomatic intercourse, he proceeds to take decisive steps against his ally. Then took place the annexation of the North German seaboard lands, including the duchy of Oldenburg, whose prince was closely related to the Russian dynasty.* Napoleon had at the outset left the Duke the choice between ceding his territory for some equivalent, or receiving French troops and customs officers. But when the distressed regent, after some delay, accepted the latter alternative, he was informed (the same old game) that it was now too late and that his land was already taken into the Empire. As a compensation he was offered the petty territory of Erfurt, which had belonged to the electorate of Mainz, then to Prussia, but since 1806 had been at the disposal of the French government. The Czar spoke the truth when he declared to the French envoys that that act was a slap in his face before all Europe, and at the same time a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Tilsit in which Napoleon had

* Duke Peter I., who governed for his cousin William, belonged, like the Czar, to the house of Holstein-Gottorp; he was the uncle of Alexander I., and his younger son George was the latter's brother-in-law.

solemnly guaranteed the integrity of Oldenburg. He sent a circular letter to the European powers in which he protested against such a violation of the rights of the house of Holstein-Gottorp to the duchy. "What," said this letter, "are alliances worth if the parties to them are not held by the treaties on which they rest?" Was this the expected rupture? No, not yet; the conclusion of the protest was conciliatory in tone and emphasized the continuance of the alliance. But that was mere words. The acts of Russia hardly left an opening for an understanding. For on December 31st, 1810, a ukase was issued which not only relaxed the control over neutral ships in Russian ports, so that colonial produce under any pretext could be unloaded and forwarded south into the interior through Brody, but also made the importation of certain luxuries, especially silks and wines, almost impossible by a high duty. But silks and wines were among the chief products of France and the principal articles of her export trade. This was another blow at Napoleon. He demanded the repeal of the decree, but received the simple answer that the measure was dictated by the bad financial situation of Russia.

After this new refusal of his ally Napoleon began most strenuously to arm himself in secret.* In March, 1811, Davout, who was on the Elbe with his army, received the command to fly to Danzig "in case there were to be operations against Russia," and there to strengthen his force of 90,000 with 50,000 Poles and Saxons. It was now that Napoleon spoke of his world-wide plans and held up to view his prospective world-monarchy. In March, 1811, he revealed to his adjutant-general, Narbonne, the purpose, long cherished and constantly reflected upon, of marching through Moscow to the Ganges in order to overthrow British rule in India. But Russia also was facing the struggle, and at this very time Alexander I. unfolded to the Prussian ambassador, as a plan of campaign, the invasion of the duchy of Warsaw and an advance to the Oder. Both empires were

* In December, 1811, he admitted openly to the Prussian ambassador Krusemark: that ever since the appearance of the Russian ukase he had been quietly preparing for war.

determined on war, both were arming, Napoleon hiding behind the pretext that his measures were called forth by those of the Czar. Upon only one occasion thereafter does he seem to have considered a peaceable understanding, and then only to gain time. This was when the news of Masséna's ill fortune came to Paris. Yet he would not grant Alexander's desire to exchange Oldenburg for Warsaw. He had no wish to strengthen Russia in the west at a time when she had just acquired Finland in the north and was in a fair way of winning the Danubian principalities in the south. Not a village of the Polish duchy should be yielded to the Czar's empire, he declared to his representative in a public audience on August 15th, 1811. But Alexander made no other proposition, and left unanswered one made by Napoleon, who, as a matter of course, demanded the enforcement of the blockade and promised licenses. The Czar found decided encouragement in the events in Spain and in the dissatisfaction in North Germany. He did not feel that war was to be avoided at any cost. Before the end of 1811 the French Emperor said to Krusemarck that Russia thought he was too busy in Spain to draw up a very formidable army elsewhere, but that was a mistake; that he could very well tolerate the English on the peninsula, as they could not drive out his troops; that he must first bring the war in the north to an end, and not until then could he turn again to the south. His only concern now was to gain enough time to put as many troops on a war footing as he deemed necessary for his decisive struggle with the only Continental power not yet prostrated, and to choose the moment for beginning hostilities. The silence of Russia toward his last overtures was used to represent the Czar as the real author of the war, and this became the settled conviction in the world at large.*

* Recent attempts to make this view a part of history must seem a failure to any one who has an accurate knowledge of the aims and character of Napoleon. It is only necessary to read what Metternich wrote to Bubna a year later, May 13th, 1813. "Napoleon should consider the efforts we had to make to prevent our support of France from becoming utterly odious. We attempted the impossible to prove that *Russia* was break-

It was indeed a gigantic army that the Emperor proposed to bring into the field, not less than four hundred thousand strong he assured the Prussian ambassador, while to the Russian he made it half a million; even this figure was finally to fall short of the truth. The Republic, too, had sent forth such masses against their foes; but with this difference, that then the enthusiasm of new-born freedom armed the might of the French people, whereas now only the iron will of the ruler called the reluctant hosts to arms. More and more heavily had his government weighed on the French since his last campaign. In the cities the least sign of discontent showing its head was the occasion of suspicion, persecution, and punishment. After 1811 the number of state prisoners rose to twenty-five hundred. They were arrested at the mere command of the Emperor or his minister of police, and imprisoned without a trial, one "because he hates Napoleon," another "because he has ever since 1811 been expressing opinions hostile to the government in letters to his brother," a third for "religious views," etc. In February, 1810, a special censorship was established in Paris with a director-general, several auditors, and fifteen to twenty censors, so that the censorship should not be in the hands of the police. With most officious zeal everything was forbidden or altered that might waken even the appearance of displeasure in the all-powerful ruler. In one case, for example, a passage praising the English Constitution had to be cut out of a book; in another a title must be changed from "History of Bonaparte," which was not obsequious enough, to "Memoirs of the Campaigns of Napoleon the Great." This diligence of the assiduous censors extended to the farthest boundaries of the Empire. After the French occupation the theatres of the Hanseatic cities were no longer to represent Schiller's "Robbers," "Maria Stuart," "Wilhelm Tell," or Goethe's "Faust." As for the newspapers, two of the four independent Paris papers, the "Publiciste" and the "Mercure de France," were wholly suppressed, while the other two lost their capital and be-

ing the peace. This pretext is lacking to us in the year 1813." Oncken, "Oestereich u. Preussen im Befreiungskriege," II. 378.

came wholly dependent on the government. A special bureau (*Bureau de l'Esprit public*) furnished them with reports of victories from Spain or with articles on Italian and French music, in order to divert the attention of the bored Parisians, while hundreds of thousands were arming themselves for the bloody struggle. To be sure Napoleon tried to draw the veil of forgetfulness over his harsh measures against the press by conferring honours on scholars and artists. He decorated them with the cross of the Legion of Honour, raised the Gros, the Gérards, Guérins, Lagranges, Monges, and Laplaces to the baronage, and regretted that Corneille was no longer alive to be raised to the rank of prince.

In the country, not less than in the cities, the government soon was obliged to support its authority by strict measures. The French peasant had hitherto proved himself the most reliable supporter of the Emperor. This was partly due, doubtless, to the fact that, being less easily moved than the townsfolk, he clung longer to the side once chosen, and the General who restored order had once been his man; but still another reason was the inclination of the French peasantry for military service, for in any case it gave a number of men their support, and if brave men could give themselves the proper training it raised them to respectable situations. Napoleon could boldly say, as in fact he did: "What do I care for the opinion of the salon and the chatterers! I do not listen to it. I know but one opinion, that of the peasants. The rest is of no importance." But even that inclination to military service had its limits when the villagers themselves heard more and more often of the innumerable victims which the frightful war beyond the Pyrenees was swallowing up, and were now told that a second war was to begin in a distant land, of whose terrors the veterans of 1807 had told many a story. No wonder that the conscription of the ages due in 1811, which was to furnish the Emperor with 120,000 men, met with no enthusiasm whatever. Men of means paid as high as 8000 francs for substitutes, and thousands of the poor took flight. For these deserters the families, the communes, nay, even a whole district, were held respon-

sible, and this new "law of hostages" was most strictly enforced by flying columns (*colonnes mobiles*).

Even more heavily than on France did the hand of the "Protector" press on the states of the Rhenish Confederation, whose princes received orders in April, 1811, to hold their contingents ready. Westphalia, which had been brought to the very brink of financial ruin by the extravagance of its king, Jerome, so that increase of taxes and forced loans could no longer delay bankruptcy, was nevertheless compelled to raise its army to 30,000, and also furnish supplies for 20,000 French troops with their horses. When Jerome remonstrated he was told that he was perfectly at liberty to step down from the throne. It was much the same in Bavaria; she had been rewarded after the war of 1809 with the territory of the diocese of Dalberg, but on the other hand had been forced to cede South Tyrol to Italy and Illyria, Ulm, and other lesser territories to Würtemberg, besides assuming a large debt for the treasury of the Emperor and raising 30,000 men for the war. Würtemberg had given up 40,000 souls to Baden and received 140,000 from Bavaria. Baden had to add to the territory of Hesse-Darmstadt in return for her own accessions. The Corsican had scattered the German governments and subjects about like chaff. To make up for the loss of Ratisbon, the territory of the Prince Primate was enlarged by the addition of Fulda and Hanau and created the "archduchy of Frankfort"; with the arbitrary reservation that after the death of Dalberg the sovereignty should fall upon Viceroy Eugene, who had lost, as a consequence of Napoleon's remarriage, all prospects of succeeding to the Italian throne. Dalberg may have feared that the impatient despot beyond the Rhine might some day overlook this proviso, and recommended himself by the most accommodating servility, while his people groaned under most oppressive taxes and his troops were called upon to serve in Spain far more than the treaty required. But Saxony, above all, armed in feverish hate, especially in the duchy of Warsaw, where Napoleon heaped up immense stores of war materials. All who were liable to military service were called in, and a national guard was established.

Thus the governments of the Rhenish Confederation, with their troops, were absolutely at the disposal of the Emperor. Woe to them if they disobeyed! "If the princes of the Confederation," wrote Napoleon in April, 1811, to Frederick of Württemberg, "raise in my mind even the slightest doubt as to their disposition to arm for the common defence, they are lost, I declare it openly; for I prefer enemies to uncertain friends." *

There remained, then, only the two German powers of central Europe, Prussia and Austria, the vanquished at the battles of Jena and Wagram, to be summoned to their duty. As far as Prussia was concerned, Napoleon had not forgotten that he had once conquered the country and only out of consideration left it free from Russia, against which he was now preparing to fight; nor had he forgotten that he had once encamped as victor by the Niemen. Might he not gain that position again, perhaps, by bringing Prussia, like Holland, under his immediate control? Such a plan he really seems to have contemplated for a moment. A forged report of Champagny, dated in November, 1810, in which the minister suggests to the Emperor the partition of Prussia in favour of Saxony and Westphalia, is supposed to be based on reliable information on the part of the forger. At the beginning of 1811 Queen Katharine of Westphalia also made an entry in her journal in reference to the impending partition of the realm of the Hohenzollerns. Again, about the same time, the rumour was current in Spain that the rest of Prussia was to be given to Berthier.† But the plan was soon abandoned. It was quite possible that the absorption of Prussia would meet as much resistance on the part of the people as did that of Spain, however great the difference between the hot-blooded southerners and the "sensible, cold, tolerant, self-controlled Germans," as Napoleon characterized them. The wildest reports, in fact, came to

* That this was no empty threat is shown by a passage in the diary of the Queen of Westphalia, who writes in her journal on January 11th, 1811: "The Emperor is much displeased with the Grand Duke of Baden; he seems to be among the princes who will disappear" (*Revue historique*, XXXVIII. 95).

† Cf. my essay, "Stein und Gruner in Oesterreich" in the "*Deutsche Rundschau*" for 1888, p. 137.

Paris as to the secret doings of the "Tugendbund," as the sum total of German enemies of France were styled. No; no coup d'état! Would not Prussia and Spain both after the defeat of Russia fall like ripe fruit into the arms of the ruler of Europe? It were far wiser to make the considerable auxiliary forces of Frederick William serve his purposes by peaceful means and so assure his position on the Niemen. Such was the plan Napoleon finally adopted; and he was successful, owing in part to the unhappy situation of Prussia, whose territories were threatened constantly by the Rhenish Confederation on the one hand, by Warsaw on the other, and finally by the French garrisons in Stettin, Küstrin, Glogau, and Danzig; and in part to the unwilling support furnished to the plans of the conqueror, as in 1805 and 1809 by Frederick William, who mistrusted his people and was firmly convinced of the invincibility of the Corsican.

It is true that in the spring of 1811, when Napoleon failed to answer Prussia's proposals for an alliance, there were moments in which not only the leaders of the patriotic party, especially the Minister of War, Scharnhorst, but also the prime minister, Hardenberg, who had returned to his post in 1810, admonished the king to arm and to come to an understanding with Russia; and in fact during the summer, with all possible secrecy, the military forces were increased to 100,000 men. In the autumn a military convention was concluded with the Czar, in which the latter promised to meet any attack on Prussia as an invasion of his own land and to push forward with all possible haste to the Vistula. But by that time King Frederick William was already of another mind. This prince, in other respects so clear-sighted, who estimated the forces of Napoleon more correctly than the war party, was very deficient in that courage which is ready to take chances. When orders came from Paris to discontinue the armament, he complied at once; and when Napoleon returned to Prussia's proposals of alliance, the King was persuaded by a court party, which saw in attachment to France the only salvation of the state, to open negotiations. These led, on February 24th, 1812, to an offensive and defensive alliance with the conqueror. But on what terms! At the time when Hardenberg offered the

Emperor alliance and aid from Prussia, he did so with a reservation which was to guarantee the integrity of the country, raise the military power of Prussia, restore the fortress of Glogau, and insure some acquisitions of territory. No mention of all that now. Napoleon had purposely postponed resuming negotiations until his re-enforcements in the fortresses on the Oder, in Westphalia and Poland had reached the point when he could at once give the greatest emphasis to his demand that Prussia should either enter the Rhenish Confederation or make an offensive and defensive alliance. So the treaty of February 24th was for Prussia an unparalleled humiliation. It provided that Prussia should furnish a contingent for service anywhere in Europe, excepting Spain, Italy, and Turkey. She was to raise 20,000 men and 60 guns against Russia under the command of Napoleon, about one half of her entire armament as stipulated; the other half was to garrison the Silesian forts, Potsdam, and particularly Colberg and Graudenz, the commandants receiving their orders from the French general staff. The French were to march unopposed through the entire Prussian territory, excepting a part of Silesia; their generals were to make requisitions, procure provisions for the army, and preserve order and safety. The vast amount of provisions Prussia must furnish was to be taken as part payment of the war-contribution still due. Thus the patriotic revival of 1811 had ended in submission, in return for which the king gained nothing but vague promises of increase of territory in case of victory, promises from Napoleon, who had kept saying regretfully ever since 1807, "How could I have left so much land in that man's possession!"

The resolution of the Prussian king to cling to France in the impending war was not a little influenced by the attitude of Austria. He felt convinced that it would not do to risk that "game of chance," the struggle against Napoleon's superior genius and forces, unless both Russia and Austria were ready for a united exertion of all their strength. As early as December, 1811, Scharnhorst had actually been in Vienna in order to ascertain the temper of the Austrian cabinet, but had at last learned merely that Emperor Francis was not just then in a position to

grant any aid. The truth was that Austria was on the side of France. Metternich's reports to his sovereign during that period disclose the fact that Vienna politics were decidedly hostile to the Czar. The action of Russia against Turkey in the Danubian principalities was enough to separate these two powers. Then, again, Alexander had in the first months of 1811 resumed the plan which he had deliberated on with his confidant, Adam Czartoryski, before the war of 1805, i.e., to restore Poland and rule it constitutionally as a united kingdom under Russian suzerainty. This plan also gave offence in Vienna, for it involved the cession of Galicia by Austria; and while Russia offered in exchange Servia and the Danubian principalities, yet those would have to be conquered first, and that was out of the question during a war with Napoleon. Of course Galicia might be lost to Austria even if the latter adhered to the French Emperor; for he was doubtless himself playing off united Poland against Russia, and Napoleon and Metternich had already had some talk of it in the summer of 1810. But in the first place Napoleon offered Austria, which was so impoverished since the last war, the important province of Illyria with its seacoast as an equivalent for the Polish territory, and again as an additional reward for Austria's co-operation in the war he promised further acquisitions proposed by her in Bavaria and Prussian Silesia, extending her border to the river Inn. For the dismemberment of Prussia, no matter which side she espoused, was for Metternich as much an assured fact as the victory of the French in the war with Russia.* The policy of Vienna must then in any case wholly depend upon that of Napoleon, but even in this dependent position Metternich wanted to take advantage of junctures to strengthen, if possible, Austria

* "Prussia is no longer to be reckoned among the powers," he assured Emperor Francis at the beginning of 1811; and in a speech in November of the same year he said: "Prussia is in the hopeless state of fearing dismemberment whichever side she may espouse." And again the same document contains this statement: "The antecedent probabilities, based on former experience, especially that of recent years, are undeniably in favour of French victory." Metternich at that time estimated the French army at from 200,000 to 300,000 men. How clearly he must have felt confirmed in his policy when he heard reports of double that number!

while in subjection, as long as she could not be free. And Napoleon did not oppose the wishes of his father-in-law. In December, 1811, he declared to the Austrian ambassador: "The first mistake which Prussia makes will settle the Silesian question." Nay, more, even if Prussia did not depart from the line marked out for her, he might dispose of Silesia in favour of Austria in case of a successful war; for in that event there would be plenty of means of compensation, and Frederick William would have to put up with some other province, whereas Silesia was the only one that could round out the domain of Austria.*

Thus it was that the Austrian government was induced to enter an active alliance with France that offered definite advantages. This decision had already been made and announced at Paris when Scharnhorst came to Vienna. It is obvious that his mission was foredoomed to failure; nor is it less obvious why Metternich, inexcusable as it may seem, advised the envoy of a state which he regarded as done for to join Russia; in other words, to make that "first mistake" which would settle the Silesian question in favour of Austria.† It would seem as if the mere name of Silesia had called to mind the times of the great empress who ventured three wars for the lost province; the Franco-Austrian treaty of alliance of 1756 was resurrected to serve as a model both in its stipulations and to some extent even in its language for the new offensive and defensive alliance. The document was signed by Schwarzenberg at Paris

* Metternich's "Memoirs," II. 517. Maret, who had succeeded Champagny as Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed that Prussia might be compensated for Silesia by the Baltic provinces of Russia.

† Schwarzenberg had the decisive audience in Paris on December 17th. Metternich could not have received the report of it before the 25th. Until then Scharnhorst received no definite answer. On the 26th he was received with the statement that Austria was unable to help, and with the hint that Prussia would fare better in alliance with Russia than with any other power. See Metternich's "Memoirs," II. 517, and Lehmann's "Scharnhorst," II. 434. Duncker, in "Aus der Zeit Friedrich des Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelm III.," attributes to Metternich the further statement to the ambassador that Austria would not side with France but remain neutral, but there is no trace of this in the reports of Scharnhorst, so Professor Lehmann kindly informs me.

on March 14th 1812. Austria was to support France against Russia with 30,000 men; these, however, unlike the Prussian auxiliaries, were all under Austrian officers, were to take no commands from any French general, and were only to obey the directions of Napoleon. Upon the restoration of Poland Austria was to retain Galicia; if, however, she were willing to cede a portion of it, she was to receive Illyria in compensation. The integrity of Turkey was guaranteed, i.e., Russia was to acquire none of it for herself. The conclusion of the treaty reads: "The Emperor of the French binds himself, in case the war has a successful issue, to procure for the Emperor of Austria war-indemnities and accessions of territory which will not only counterbalance the sacrifices made, but will be a monument to the close and lasting ties between the two sovereigns." As Illyria had already been spoken of, these words can refer only to Silesia; for was not that "the only province that could round out Austria"?

Napoleon in such ways had made sure of the central German powers, and now from the southern extremity of Calabria to the Memel, from Cape Finisterre to Bukovina, the Continent was obedient to his nod. He would have been glad indeed to receive, or rather firmly hold, Sweden and Turkey also, the old enemies of Russia, in his system, in order that they might attack the foe from the north and the south, while he dealt the finishing stroke in the centre. But here his fortune failed him. When the ambassadors of France and Russia were out-bidding each other in Stockholm, Bernadotte deemed the moment favourable for endearing himself to the country he was to rule by gaining a large accession of territory. The Czar, on the one hand, offered as a reward for Sweden's support his consent to the annexation of Norway; to this Napoleon would not listen, as Norway belonged to Denmark, which remained loyal to him. He himself, on the other hand, offered to restore Finland to Sweden after the defeat of Russia if Sweden would march against Alexander with 40,000 men and at the same time prosecute the war against England with energy. But to be involved in hostilities with Russia and the British empire

at the same time seemed an impossibility to the Swedish government. "We did not hide from ourselves," we read in a subsequent report of the Swedish ministry to Charles XIII. dated January 7th, 1813, "the fact that a war with Russia, which must of necessity bring in its train hostilities with England, was too great a task for Sweden; that an English fleet in the Baltic Sea during the summer could prevent all undertakings against Russia; that the coasts of Sweden would meantime be at the mercy of the English; that commerce and coastwise navigation would cease altogether for a time and cause great distress; that Sweden's great need of grain demanded continued peaceful relations with these very powers, Russia and England," etc. For such reasons, supplemented by the occupation, especially imprudent at this juncture, of Pomerania by the French to break up smuggling, and the long-continued variance between Bernadotte and Napoleon, the French offer was declined, and on the 5th of April, 1812, the alliance with Russia was concluded.

In Turkey, Sultan Mahmud would gladly have taken the hand that Napoleon finally held out to him in the first months of 1812; but such was the state of affairs that even this despot could not follow his inclination. In the preceding autumn the Russians had rallied their forces for a decisive blow; they had gained successes, and then offered peace under comparatively easy terms, for the express purpose of closing the war on the Danube before the great conflict with France began; they no longer demanded the two principalities. This happened at a moment when the Turkish treasury was empty, when the army was in a deplorable condition, and when the desire of the people for peace and rest had become universal. The reckless Janizaries alone still called for war. Of what use, then, was Napoleon's promise to give back the Crimea, Tartary, and all the territory Turkey had lost in the last forty years, if she could not furnish the 100,000 men which he demanded as auxiliaries? Moreover, England threatened, if the Sultan accepted the French system, to force the Dardanelles and burn Constantinople. The Divan upon being consulted by Mahmud declared

for peace with the Czar, and the treaty was concluded at the end of May, 1812, with the provision that the Pruth should thenceforth be the boundary.

Naturally Napoleon felt very keenly these diplomatic reverses at Stockholm and on the Bosphorus. Yet, after all, he had under his command an overwhelming force when he took the last step that should make him master of the Continent. Firmly resolved as he was on this step (and the objections raised by his ministers did not make him waver), Alexander I. was equally firm, for the popular opposition compelled him to resist the Napoleonic dictatorship which interfered so impudently with the material interests of Russia. The rupture was inevitable; all further delay was due to purely military considerations. On the 30th of April, 1812, the Russian envoy in Paris at last delivered the ultimatum of the Czar, to the effect that he would negotiate with France only on condition that the French should previously evacuate Prussia and Swedish Pomerania, and even then he would not renounce trade with neutrals. In order to gain time Napoleon did not answer at once, but sent his adjutant-general, Narbonne, to Alexander with instructions which, although sent on May 3d, were antedated the 25th of April, as if the Russian ultimatum were yet unknown.* While the envoy was on his way to Wilna, Napoleon journeyed in May to Dresden to make a threatening demonstration, as it were, by displaying his forces. We may well believe that he flattered himself it would again overawe the foe.

At Dresden there assembled, to do homage, the princes of the Rhenish Confederation, over whom the Corsican now exercised more absolute authority than any Roman Emperor of the German nation had for a long time. The last of these Emperors, Francis of Austria, was present also. With the King of Prussia and the lesser "sovereigns" he stepped dutifully into the shadow of the mighty upstart who had obliterated the boundaries between the Roman and the Teutonic elements in Europe and had united the forces of both for the decisive struggle over the fate of a continent. To be sure, it was the motive of personal ambition and

* Ernouf, "Maret, Duc de Bassano," p. 374.

of boundless lust of power that had set in motion these masses; and it was an almost intolerable compulsion that held them together. And yet if one, accepting the guidance of genius, could have mounted the heights where details are lost in the broad survey of the whole, he might well fancy he beheld a league of the civilized powers of Europe, marshalled under the leadership of the greatest general of the age, to spread by conquest the civilization of the West over the East, and to make an end of international strife by bringing all nations under one sway; and he might be tempted to say of Napoleon with Goethe:

"What centuries dark have long been groping after,
By his mind's eye is seen with clearest vision;
The small and insignificant has vanished,
The Sea and Land alone remain contending.
When from the Sea her shores are conquered,
And proud waves dash themselves in vain upon them,
Then, under guidance wise, through mighty conflict,
Will fall the fetters from the prisoned mainland."*

Or are these words, addressed to Marie Louise, merely conventional homage, the tribute offered by the great humanist of the century to the Emperor now that he has climbed to the highest pinnacle of power? No, to Goethe Napoleon's greatness was beyond question. The poet perceived exactly what constituted his historical significance: it was his unconscious devotion to the ideal. "Napoleon," he once said, "who lived wholly in the ideal, could not consciously grasp it. He renounces all ideal considerations and denies that the ideal has any reality, while at the same time he is striving to make it real." The poet serenely looks above and beyond the Emperor's base conduct and his sordid, selfish aims. Others might speak of the horrors of war and the oppressive yoke of the tyrant; his eyes were fixed on the final goal, the union of the nations in a higher civilization. And from this standpoint Goethe was right in ranking Napoleon with the great men of history. One and all, their only claim to such title is that they worked at the behest of great ideas, whatever

* From Goethe's poem in honour of the Empress Marie Louise, July, 1812. The last five lines refer to the contest with England, the mistress of the sea, and the Continental blockade.—B.

their own immediate aims were. Alexander of Macedon, to be sure, burst the narrow bounds of his petty state for the mastery of the world and carved his name by unrivalled deeds in the memory of the ages; but the real motive power behind him was the expansive force of Greek culture, and in its service he undertook his eastern expedition. Charlemagne, again, established a mighty empire with his sword; but only as the submissive instrument of the moral ideas of Christianity, which thus conquered the new nations of the north. Similarly, when we see Napoleon treading the same path, when we see him, too, all eagerness to raise his own person to the very summit of power and subdue the whole world to his will, this very will is in large part not his own, but only the instrument of that civilization of humanity whose development requires the intellectual efforts of centuries before it becomes the common possession of the entire race. This onward march is through streams of blood in any case, but, after all, it is in blood that the laws of humanity are written, be it One who sheds it on the cross, or millions that testify with their death. Wherever the Emperor of the French had conquered, there we see the impulse to a new social order; on the banks of the Manzanares, as well as on the Tiber, on the Rhine and on the Elbe, in Naples and in Poland, in Prussia and in Austria; now directly under the pressure of conquest, and again indirectly because resistance to the man of might seemed possible only if he were met with his own weapons. To cite but one instance, it was the day of defeat at Jena alone that changed the entire internal system of the Prussian state.* Thus it was a most important case in the interests of civilization that was to be tried in 1812 at the outposts of civilized Europe. It is a mere incidental detail that the prosecuting attorney who conducted the case with his sword demanded for his fee the sovereignty of the world.

* "It is in any case remarkable that of all those who later played a prominent part in the reform legislation and who had previously been numbered among the leading men of the old régime, not one, before that powerful impulse, had in any way propounded plans of reform." (E. Meier, "Die Reform der Verwaltungsorganisation unter Stein und Hardenberg," p. 133.)

But the nations of Europe occupied no such lofty point of view. They did not inquire after the ideal mission which Napoleon was unwittingly fulfilling, and hence could find no comfort in it when, spurred on obviously by personal ambitions, he threatened their independence, forced their sons into the battlefield, restricted their commerce and industry, and waged war upon their religious dignitaries. They hated him bitterly. This hostile feeling was manifested most strongly in the two nations which were farthest removed from the spirit of the revolutionary humanism and in which the primary instincts of religious and national feeling had been preserved in their purest form: Spain and Russia. The former was not yet subdued; how would it fare with the latter?

CHAPTER XVII

MOSCOW

WHILE Napoleon was displaying his magnificence at Dresden, his columns were marching to the Vistula. Such an army the world had never seen before. Far more than 400,000 men stood ready to march into Russia, and the reserves afterwards drawn into active service in the east raised the army of the northern campaign to a total of at least 600,000. For a long time and with great energy the Emperor had been making his preparations; he had put off the enemy till the last minute with negotiations; and he had made unprecedented demands of the nations, until at last he hoped by reason of undoubted superiority to overmaster the enemy.

Yet he was not without his misgivings. Ségur relates in his Memoirs that during the time of the preparations in Paris he would sometimes start from his thoughts in the greatest excitement and exclaim that he was not yet sufficiently prepared for so distant a war and needed three years more. Then, again, he remained impervious to warnings and objections ventured by others around him and sought eagerly to refute them. Foremost among those to give warning was Caulaincourt. He knew Russia and the national pride of the Russian people; they would never think of peace, so he believed, as long as a single foe stood on the soil of the fatherland. He pointed to the doubtful loyalty of compulsory allies, to the hatred of the German population growing out of the French system of plundering, to the inhospitable theater of war whose horrors the campaign of 1807 had sufficiently made known. Similarly Poniatowski described the pathless wastes of Lithuania, portrayed its nobility as already half Russian and its people as cold and unresponsive, and confidently declared that no great results were to be expected

from setting them free. Ségur, an older man, would then recall the thoughts of the Emperor to France, which must cease after the campaign to be France as soon as it was expanded into Europe. The end would then be that in the place of the monarchs of the Continent he would put the generals of the Empire as viceroys; and these, more ambitious than the officers of Alexander the Great, would not wait, perhaps, for the death of their sovereign in order to rule on their own account. To the same effect spoke Duroc also. But all had spoken in vain. Of the allies, Napoleon replied, he had no fears; Prussia had her hands tied, and the south German courts and Austria were bound to him by ties of family. Moreover, the Germans were of a slow-going, methodical nature, and he could always find time to attend to them. He was well aware of the ambition of his generals; but war was just the thing to divert their thoughts. Peace has its dangers no less than war. For if he should draw back his armies into the interior of the country, the rest and idleness would give rise to far too many ambitious interests and reckless passions for him to control. Do we not seem to be listening to the speakers of the Convention and the radicals of the Directory? * Is it not the dreamer of former days who again brings forward destiny as the final argument? "I feel myself driven," said he, "to a goal that I know not. When I have reached it, an atom will suffice to overthrow me. Until then all the efforts of men avail naught against me."

Having thus silenced his advisers, he turned with new energy to the various and countless cares of providing for the immense army, which must be in want of nothing. And truly the equipment was complete down to the smallest details. Besides the ammunition-trains for the several corps there were reserve depots containing millions of cartridges at Modlin, Thorn, Pillau, Danzig, and Magdeburg. To transport some 1350 guns to Russia 18,000 horses were in readiness, and in addition siege-trains were ordered sent from Danzig and Magdeburg toward Dunaburg and Riga. As the region abounded in rivers, two great pontoon bridges were taken along, besides which each army

* Cf. pp. 75 and 159.

corps had its own pontoons and tools. Prussia had to provide supplies of horses on the Vistula and the Oder. The greatest task was to furnish food for such vast masses. This called for the closest attention; for, as Napoleon repeatedly assured the generals under him, such a great host of men so close together could not live on the land. Thousands of wagons laden with flour and rice followed the French army corps, some drawn by oxen which were afterwards to be slaughtered. In the middle of January the Emperor made arrangements for storing provisions for 400,000 men for fifty days at Danzig and in the cities along the Vistula and the Oder. Prussia had to provide for twenty days in addition. Two great transports were to carry flour and biscuit by water from Elbing to Wilna. Danzig, Elbing, Warsaw, Thorn, Marienburg, Bromberg, and Modlin also held immense stores; Danzig alone having 300,000 hundredweight of flour and 2,000,000 rations of biscuit. In order to avoid carrying, in addition to all this, fodder for 150,000 horses, it would be necessary to wait for a season that would cover the fields and meadows with green grass. Thus the administration of the army exercised some influence on politics: it delayed the campaign until summer.* The Russians did not take advantage of this delay and assume the offensive and push beyond the frontier, as Napoleon might well have feared. The "last act," as he reassuringly termed his Russian expedition, could now begin.

Early in the morning of May 28th, the Emperor left Dresden and went at first to Posen, arriving on the 31st; thence he proceeded to Königsberg. Narbonne had reported as the Czar's answer what was already known: the demand to evacuate Prussia. Napoleon now took up the gauntlet without more ado. He had divided his "Grand Army" into three parts, commanded respectively by himself, Eugene, and Jerome. The main army was composed of select troops, embracing the

* Ségur (IV. 94) relates that Napoleon was detained in France two months longer by a scarcity of provisions due to failure of crops in the preceding year. Per contra, Maret, in a speech of August 16th, 1811, dealing with the entire Russian policy, set June of the next year for the beginning of the war. (Ernouf, "Maret," p. 304.)

Guard, a strong corps under Davout, another under Oudinot, a third under Ney, who also commanded two Württemberg divisions, a fourth under Macdonald, to whom were assigned the Prussians under Grawert, and last by the cavalry reserve under Murat (two corps), in all 250,000 men.* To the second part belonged, under the Viceroy of Italy, the Italian and Bavarian corps, and also a French corps of cavalry, in all 80,000. The third army, under Jerome, included the Poles under Poniatowski, the Saxons under Reynier, the Westphalians under Vandamme, who was to be the king's adviser, and a corps of cavalry made up partly of French and partly of Poles; this also numbered 80,000. The army was for the most part in good spirits, proud of their leader, who knew how to reward generously deeds of valour and in whose genius they believed more confidently than ever. Although some generals felt that the troops were too young to stand the hardships of war, or, like Rapp, openly acknowledged that they would rather have remained in Paris, yet there were plenty of others that had not yet received any fiefs nor had a ducal coronet, and who could tell how soon another opportunity would come to win either? That there had been draft riots in Holland and Illyria, that thousands of French fugitives from military service had to be brought back in fetters, and that in the first few days a bloody encounter broke out between Prussians and French over a provision train, were after all mere incidental details.

By the end of May the army stretched from Königsberg and Elbing up the Vistula to Novo Alexandria, while the Austrians under Schwarzenberg gathered at Lemberg. This wide

* Statements of the strength of the several army corps are not wholly consistent. The table in Fézensac's *Souvenirs* estimates the Guard at 35,800, while according to authentic sources it numbered 47,000. It was subdivided into the division of the Old Guard, two divisions of the Young Guard, one of the Polish Guard, and one of the cavalry Guard. On the strength of Davout's corps even official sources disagree. The lists of the Minister of War report 72,000; Thiers, who claims to have used the tables of the Emperor himself gives 97,000-99,000. Approximately the last number is named also by Napoleon in conversation with Katharine of Westphalia. (See her diary for 1812 in the "*Revue Historique*" of 1888.)

extension of the allied lines left the Russians in doubt whether Napoleon would advance in the north, at Kovno and Grodno, or in the south, from Warsaw. They had to be prepared at both points to avoid being surprised, and to this end divided the forces at their disposal into two armies, one of which took its position to the north about Vilna under the commander-in-chief, Barclay de Tolly, the other south of Pripet, under Bagration. Both of these generals had distinguished themselves in the campaign of 1807. A third division, under Tormassoff, destined against the Austrians, was still in process of formation in Volhynia. The army of Barclay numbered 127,000, that of Bagration 66,000; but when the latter moved north to join the main army, he had to leave nearly 30,000 men to Tormassoff. Thus the 400,000 men of Napoleon had in front of them at first not quite 170,000 Russians, and divided at that. To be sure there was yet another Russian army in Wallachia, and a third, a weaker one, in Finland against the Swedes; but diplomacy had not yet left these free to act, they were tied down for the time being. Napoleon had no suspicion that he had such a superior force. He estimated the enemy's numbers at a much higher figure.* Perhaps it was this error that proved more fateful than any other to him and to his army. For it led him to draw up a plan which perhaps he would not have formed had he known exactly the enemy's strength, and the energetic prosecution of which exposed his troops to all manner of annoyances that a more methodical campaign might have spared them. This plan was to march upon Vilna by way of Kovno with the first army, whose left wing, under Macdonald, was to move across the Niemen at Tilsit, and thus break through between the divisions of Barclay and Bagration. The second and third armies, disposed in echelon to the right of the first, were to follow by way of Grodno, to enter in like a mighty

* In the memoranda of two officers at headquarters are found the evidences of such an overestimate. Ségur gives 300,000 as the total number of the Russians, Fézensac 330,000. The latter estimated the two armies of Barclay and Bagration alone at 230,000. The division of Bagration was always kept at its original figure of 66,000.

wedge, as it were, and widen the distance between them; so that then they could be separately surrounded and defeated. But by a strange fate the very vastness of the forces at his disposal was to redound to his disadvantage. The same general who in 1796 with 40,000 men had gained unheard-of victories over a far superior foe was destined, now that he had ten times that force, to fail of mastering a far weaker enemy. Paradoxical as it may sound, this was the natural result. For Barclay did not dare with his inferior numbers to give battle to the French single-handed. He sought by retreating to restore his lost communication with Bagration. But as the distance between them was still further increased by the advancing columns of the French, they could not be united (in case Bagration escaped the threatened investment at all) except after a extended *détour*. Thus it came to pass that, seeking constantly to effect a junction, they fell back before the French, refused the battle which Napoleon longed for with feverish impatience, kept the enemy in hot pursuit after them through waste lands and by desolate roads, until his provisions could no longer reach him, his troops broke down from exhaustion, and the proud army melted away to such an extent that no decisive advantage could be taken of the victory which it at length painfully secured. Such in the main was the course of subsequent events that preceded a catastrophe which is one of the most appalling in history.

It should not be overlooked in this connection that while Napoleon had Moscow clearly in mind as the ultimate goal of his expedition, he could hardly have expected to reach that goal in this belated campaign. In Paris he had told his confidants that his plan aimed at driving Alexander and the Russian power, weakened by the loss of Poland, back beyond the Dnieper. In Dresden he had said to Metternich that the campaign was to come to an end at Minsk and Smolensk; that he would make a halt there, fortify both places, take up winter quarters at Vilna, organize conquered Lithuania, and feed his army at the expense of Russia. If this should not result in peace, he would next year press on to the interior and, just as

patiently as in the first campaign, wait for the submission of the Czar. This plan, in accordance with which the entire system of supplies was arranged, was still in force when Napoleon led his army over the Russian frontier. In the manifesto issued at this point to his soldiers he called the war he was entering upon the "second Polish war," and at Vilna he assured General Sebastiani that he would not cross the Duna, for to go beyond that river this year would be certain destruction. The Poland that he planned to wrest from Russia meant the widest extent which that kingdom had had in the seventeenth century when Smolensk also belonged to it; and it was in this city that he planned to stay, as he said to Jomini, who was to oversee the transport of provisions.* It is clear that originally he had by no means planned a rapid advance into the heart of Russia, as some military writers maintain, and it was certainly contrary to his long and well-considered purpose to arrive at Moscow so soon. It was the enemy that forced upon him this disastrous speed. But let us now proceed to the events themselves.

Early on the morning of June 23d the Emperor, accompanied by only one general, had ascertained the most favourable point for crossing the Niemen southeast of Kovno. The passage began about midnight over three bridges and lasted several days. No enemy was in sight; no one opposed the French on the opposite bank. But Napoleon had counted on resistance, and now he hoped to meet it before Vilna, the chief city of Lithuania. Thither he directed his movements; there Alexander was waiting. The Czar had repeatedly extended his sympathy to the Poles; now he intends at least to try to block the game of the French

* Jomini, "Précis politique et militaire des campagnes de 1812 à 1814," I. 75. He also relates a table conversation in Vilna in which the Emperor states his plans exactly as he had to Metternich in Dresden. "If M. Barclay supposes I would run after him to the Volga, he is mightily mistaken. We shall follow him as far as Smolensk and the Dwina, where a good battle will provide us with cantonments. I shall return with headquarters to Vilna to spend the winter, and will send for a troupe of the Paris Opera and the Théâtre français. The next May the business will be finished, unless we make peace during the winter."

Emperor. In this he seems to be successful. For the approaching French army hears but little of the expected enthusiasm of the Lithuanians for the "liberator" of Poland. The Czar at last had to evacuate Vilna, and on June 29th Napoleon entered the city with his own men. There was no resistance; it was child's play to drive back the weak Russian posts. Nor was there in the city the expected enthusiasm, nor the spirit of sacrifice shown in Warsaw; no, nor the many thousands of fighting men he had counted on, nor money, nor any other aid. The Emperor was sorely displeased. The failure of the Warsaw citizens to pay more than half the expense of the 70,000 men they furnished, thus entailing additional burdens on the French, sufficed to make him take a wholly different view of the restoration of the old Polish republic from that taken by the national patriots. "I cannot understand," he had written to Davout the preceding December, "how this country can look forward to becoming a nation." He had also repeatedly spoken with contempt to the Czar of this desire of the Poles; and when Alexander's ambassador, Balascheff (who was minister of police and was after information rather than diplomatic negotiations), called upon him to assure him that the Czar would not think of treating while one enemy stood in his empire, he said, among other things, "Do you think I care anything for these Polish Jacobins?" It was his real thought that he uttered to Narbonne: "I tolerate the Poles only as a disciplined force on the field of battle. We shall have a little bit of a diet in the duchy of Warsaw, nothing more." But when this bit of a Warsaw diet sent a deputation to Vilna with the request that he would but speak the word now, declaring that the kingdom of Poland was in existence, he gave an evasive answer, with the reminder that he had guaranteed the integrity of Austria. Such, in fact, was his agreement with Francis I. in Dresden.* Under these circumstances it was no wonder that the Lithuanians were wanting in a spirit of sacrifice.

* The truth of this is shown by a letter of Francis I. to his governor of Galicia, Count Goess, dated June 7th, 1812, in which is this passage: "The restoration of the kingdom of Poland will probably be one of the first results of the war between France and Russia. The French emperor

But there was another special reason for this. The "liberators" fell upon the land like the most inveterate enemies. Thousands of hungry marauders poured through the villages, plundered the castles, and ran riot. Nay, even in the suburbs of Vilna, under the very eye of the Emperor, pillage was going on. This relaxation of discipline among both the French and their allies arose from two causes. In the first place, the troops, after crossing the Niemen, had advanced by forced marches to overtake the enemy over roads perfectly sodden by continuous rains; progress became painfully difficult, and many, especially the tender recruits, not being equal to the task were left behind. Then, again, the supplies could not be forwarded. Wagons stuck fast in the mud; the oxen, being neglected, fell victims to disease and perished. Similarly over ten thousand horses sickened and died in the first few days from eating the wet grass. The transports with their great cargoes of flour got as far as the Vilna to be sure, but in that shallow river they ran aground, and when wagons at last brought their freight to Vilna, the army was no longer there. Great distress ensued. Even in the Young Guard, as its leader, Mortier, reported to the Emperor, soldiers actually perished from hunger; others in despair blew out their brains. Napoleon had to resort to the Jews, and also to counterfeit paper rubles which he had caused to be struck off in Paris by the million. Thus on the march from Kovno to Vilna a state of disorder had already grown up, for which there was later no remedy. It was the shadow of the coming event.

But there was plenty of confusion among the enemy as well. In general it must not be supposed that there was any definite purpose in view at the Russian headquarters. It was only

will take only an indirect part in this event, and will leave it to the assembled Polish diet and the fully authorized Warsaw ministry to organize the provinces formerly constituting the kingdom of Poland but now under Russian control. To the deputation of the diet which may venture to request of the Emperor the restoration of the kingdom he will reply that that is the business of the Poles themselves, but he must explicitly inform them Poland can never be understood to include the province of Galicia, now in the possession of Austria, since he had in the treaty of March, 1812, given Austria explicit guarantees for ever." (MS.)

during the next few weeks that they stumbled, as it were, upon the right way of destroying the foe. For the moment Barclay concentrated the six corps of his army a few days' march beyond Vilna, which the French could not prevent; then, burning all stores and magazines behind him à la Wellington, marched hurriedly to Drissa, where a fortified camp was established like Torres Vedras. Here he wanted to wait for Bagration, who was to come up with the Cossack hordes of Platoff by way of Novogradok and Vilika; but Bagration did not come. He found the road already occupied by Davout, whom Napoleon had pushed rapidly ahead with some divisions as far as Minsk to meet the second Russian army, which Jerome was driving in from the west. The Russian general did not dare to fight his way through, as he supposed the main army of the enemy was before him, and turned to the south to join Barclay by way of Bobrinsk and Mohilev. Jerome had not hastened his advance enough to intercept him. Davout, on the other hand, still supposing the enemy was 70,000 strong as before, waited for the King of Westphalia to attack before he pushed forward; so Bagration escaped. Napoleon, fairly beside himself at the dilatoriness of his brother, gave the chief command of the third army to Davout, and Jerome in chagrin returned to his kingdom.

At the same time, about the middle of July, the Emperor sent Murat, Oudinot, and Ney to follow the main Russian army to Drissa. This step was taken too late, but the necessity of securing supplies had detained them in Vilna. At Drissa they were to engage Barclay in front, while Napoleon with the Guards, three divisions of the army of Davout, and the troops of Viceroy Eugene would turn his flank and so cut off his communications with St. Petersburg and Moscow. But this plan likewise failed. The Russians received word that Bagration could not come up, abandoned their ill-chosen position after unimportant skirmishes with the French vanguard and marched to the east. The right wing only, under Wittgenstein, waited to cover the road to St. Petersburg, and was watched by Oudinot and Saint-Cyr. For the second time Napoleon's hope of forcing the enemy to stand had vanished. On the contrary, the Russians persistently

retreated. What a terrible loss these unsuccessful manœuvres had already involved! The more they hurried forward the greater were the sacrifices, especially on the roads previously traversed by the enemy. Marauding assumed enormous proportions, especially as during the advance to the Dwina the July sun was intensely hot and clouds of dust made it difficult to breathe. General Saint-Cyr, who commanded the Bavarians, relates that his corps lost on an average a battalion (800 to 900 men) a day from the ranks; and it was the same everywhere. Those who remained in the ranks had a terrible struggle with want and misery. For weeks there had been no regular supplies. With meat as their sole food, for no bread and vegetables were to be had, the troops became so sickly that they broke down on the march. Finally dysentery broke out and carried off thousands. The cavalry were in the worst plight. Their horses, which now had nothing to eat but old straw from the thatched roofs of huts, died under their riders, and the carcasses lay by the wayside, infecting the air. Napoleon himself suffered terrible hardships. He was no longer the same man that had enjoyed such health in the hard winter of the Polish war. A painful disease (dysuria) had developed in the last few years; it was especially annoying now, as riding was distressing. Besides, the daily reports about the dwindling of his army and the unceasing hunt for a decisive battle that kept eluding him were a tremendous strain on his nerves. He seemed to lose the calm control of himself and of others that he was wont to display in the field. How he longed for a battle to put an end to the agonizing situation! "After we had crossed the Niemen," wrote the artist Albrecht Adam, who served through the campaign in Prince Eugene's headquarters, and who seems to know whereof he speaks, "the Emperor and his entire army were occupied with a single thought, a single hope, a single wish—the thought of a great battle! Men spoke of a great battle as of a great festival, enjoyed it in anticipation, and hung their heads whenever they were disappointed in their expectation."

Then hope smiled again. Barclay was marching on the right bank of the Dwina towards Vitebsk. He had sent orders

to Bagration to proceed to the same place by way of Mohilev and Orcha. Two possibilities now lay open to Napoleon: either he might, by marching up the left bank, succeed in getting such a start of the enemy as to cross the river at Bechenkowiczi and attack the Russian flank; or Barclay might make a stand at Vitebsk, where he was expecting Bagration. The first move was frustrated by the rapid advance of the enemy; nothing remained but to follow him. But the second seemed destined to be realized. On the 25th of July Murat's cavalry for the first time met with serious resistance. The next day the French drove the Russian rear back to Vitebsk, and there on the 27th stood Barclay's whole army in battle array. Eye-witnesses describe the joy of the French and the satisfaction of their leader at this sight. The Russian general had really made up his mind to fight; for, knowing that Bagration was marching up from the south, he could not let him fall into Napoleon's hands without support. But again something intervened. Davout had moved eastward from Minsk to Mohilev and anticipated Bagration at the latter place. Bagration then tried, on July 23d, to force his way through, was repulsed, and once more turned to the south in order to reach Smolensk by a long *détour* and wait to be joined there by the first army. News of this movement reached Barclay on the night of July 26th while he was still facing the French in battle array. Now, he reflected, there was no sense in fighting; the force of the French was far superior to his own, and it was among the possibilities that while the battle was going on at Vitebsk Davout would march upon Smolensk and get there before him. Of course if Napoleon attacked him he must resist. But the Emperor contented himself with insignificant skirmishes on the 26th and 27th; in order to gather as many troops as possible and treat the enemy to an "Austerlitz" (as he said) for one reason, and also to avoid sending his soldiers worn with marching into battle in the noontide glare of a very hot day; perhaps also, as some have conjectured, because his physical and mental powers had been under too heavy a strain to permit of his making a sudden resolution. In any case his hesitation was disastrous. On the morning of July 28th not a

Russian was in sight. They had all departed during the night, and a thick fog that did not clear away until late in the day so completely veiled their retreat that there was no indication of the direction they had taken.

It was a tremendous disillusion for the French. Almost a third of the Grand Army had melted away, more than 130,000 names had to be struck off the army lists, and nothing accomplished yet! The cavalry was so near exhaustion that General Belliard openly assured the Emperor, yet six days' march and he would be without cavalry. Besides, they were too far from the wings of the army: Macdonald had sent the Prussians to Riga and was marching with his French troops on Jakobstadt; Reynier had to be left behind to watch the Russian reserve under Tormassoff on the Pripet; and Schwarzenberg, lastly, who had been marching toward Minsk to join the main army, had turned aside at a summons from Reynier. For on the same day that Napoleon was getting ready for a battle at Vitebsk, July 27th, a Saxon division of thirty-five hundred had been captured by Tormassoff, who deserved closer attention than the Emperor had as yet given him. He now put Reynier under Schwarzenberg's command, and deputed the latter to defeat the Russian and "make an end of him." A like command was given Oudinot with regard to Wittgenstein, whom he was to drive away from Drissa and hurl northwards into the hands of Macdonald. But Wittgenstein would not be hurled, not even when Saint-Cyr brought up reinforcements; at the middle of August he was still before Drissa.

Such was the situation when Napoleon resolved at last to give his troops the rest they so urgently needed, to bring up ammunition, and to restore some order to the chaos which prevailed in the commissariat. Fortunately the country began to be more productive and populous about Vitebsk, and the people themselves were more cleanly and well-to-do than the brutish peasantry of Lithuania. This was encouraging, although it was during this very period of rest that the dysentery claimed most victims. Davout was summoned with his army. It is related that the Emperor, returning from his search for the

vanished Russians, excitedly dashed his sword on the table and exclaimed that he would stay there, collect his forces, and organize Poland; that the campaign of 1812 was closed; the next one would look after what still remained to be done. To the same effect he expressed himself to Murat, who was for advancing; the year 1813, said he, would see him in Moscow, 1814 in St. Petersburg; the Russian war would require three years. And this was practically the order of events in his original programme. Only one thing was yet lacking, the most important, to be sure—victory, or, as he had said to Jomini, “a good battle.” The French army did indeed lie between the Dnieper and the Dwina, in a natural gateway that formed the entrance to the Muscovite empire, the goal he had fixed for his first great movement. But the Russian territory he occupied had been bought with his own losses, not his enemy’s, making an uncertain and joyless possession. There was the rub. He fairly suffered torments at the thought of his shaken prestige. Suddenly he broke out: he would leave Vitebsk, too, after a short rest, and proceed on the road to Moscow. The enemy was before Smolensk, and he would not be willing to sacrifice this first truly Russian city without a fight as he did barren Poland, especially since his two armies were united; there a battle must be fought. A victory at Smolensk would give the key to either Moscow or St. Petersburg. Moreover, with the Dnieper as a protection, a stronger position for winter quarters could be found there. But before all things the battle. “No blood has flowed as yet,” said he to the generals opposing his plan, Berthier, Duroc, Mouton, and Caulaincourt. “and Russia is too important to yield without a struggle. Alexander can negotiate only after a great battle. I shall seek this battle and win it before the holy city if necessary.”

As a matter of fact the Czar had no thought of negotiating; least of all now that the Sultan had ratified the treaty of peace and the Moldavian army could come north. Napoleon learned of this, and it was a severe blow. But its effect on him was to strengthen his resolution in seeking a quick, final decision. After a stay of two weeks he broke up the camp at Vitebsk.

His plan now was to concentrate to the south of that city the entire army lying near it, about 190,000 men, cross the Dnieper, and then march forward under cover of the river along its right bank to the east. He learned that the enemy had assumed the offensive after uniting the two armies, and were advancing by the direct road from Smolensk to Vitebsk; it was quite possible, therefore, to reach Smolensk without discovery, turn the left flank of the Russian and cut him off from the road to Moscow. This manœuvre—resembling that against Mack in 1805—was begun on the 10th of August with admirable precision; the troops passed over the Dnieper, and on the 14th crossed the old Russian frontier at Krasnoi. The information as to the movements of the Russians proved to be correct. The Czar had been forced to yield to the strong sentiment prevailing in the army and among the people, which demanded that the soil of ancient Muscovy be defended; and Barclay had to make up his mind to fight. To avoid altogether losing his communication with Wittgenstein and being outflanked on the right where he supposed the French were stronger, he chose the northwest as the direction for his advance. Only as a precaution he detached one division across the river to the left. This division it was that Napoleon's vanguard met on August 16th and drove back to Smolensk with severe loss. But meantime Bagration had been informed by messenger, and, perceiving the danger, sent back a corps with all speed to the city to ward off the first attack. He himself followed as fast as he could on the 16th, having first sent word to Barclay.

On the morning of that day the van of the French army arrived at Smolensk and at once began an assault on the walls. This was repulsed, and thereby Napoleon's plan was thwarted at the start, for the two Russian armies in the mean time had hastened up and were again in possession of this important point and of the road to Moscow. No less an authority than Clausewitz has blamed the Emperor for taking the right bank of the Dnieper instead of attacking the enemy in front, beating him and so gaining Smolensk. But that would have been what Napoleon was wont to call an "ordinary battle." The de-

feated enemy would have fallen back through Smolensk upon his base, and that was just what he wanted to prevent. Now, to be sure, there was nothing else to do, provided the Russian was accommodating enough to fight at all. He did fight, but only in covering his retreat. Barclay could not be induced to leave the city, but he sent Bagration, who was eager to fight, along the road to Moscow, while he kept but a single corps to defend Smolensk. When Napoleon was convinced that the enemy had no intention of fighting a decisive battle, he tried to force his position in order to hold him fast and compel him to fight. Time after time he stormed the city, but all in vain. The veteran officers recalled the siege of the Syrian fortress Acre. Nor was bombardment any more successful. Again the French fought a whole day with all their superior force the rear-guard of the retreating foe, until the latter voluntarily evacuated. They did not neglect to burn the magazines and the northern quarter of the city, which consisted mostly of wooden houses as in all Russian cities. Smoking ruins the conqueror found, but again victory had eluded him. If he had only gone right on toward Moscow! Barclay, in order to evade the French batteries beyond the Dnieper, had described a long arc, the chord of which was commanded by Napoleon. He might have been overtaken easily and brought to bay. But the Emperor did not know the situation and merely sent forward Ney and Murat, who in turn had serious fighting only with the rear-guard of the enemy, at Valutina Gora, on the 19th. Barclay was at liberty to march on unimpeded with the main army.

What was to be done now? In Dresden Napoleon had said to Metternich that his undertaking was one of the kind that depended for success on patience. He who exercised that virtue best would have victory for his portion. He himself sinned grievously against that conviction. Murat himself, before the beginning of the assault upon Smolensk, had advised him to pause, since it had become manifest that the enemy would not give battle, but was anxious to get away. The advice was in vain. Later, after he had become master of the ruined city, his

generals again remonstrated. Rapp, who had come from the Niemen, painted the distress of the long journey, the unnumbered victims of typhus and dysentery; the thousands of marauders who dragged themselves, half-dead from exhaustion, to a bush to die unseen; the thousands of deserters, who organized in bands and ravaged villages and castles until the desperate people killed them. And what was Napoleon's answer? That he knew all that and admitted the horrors of the situation; but for that very reason it was no time now to delay. After the first victory everything would be all right again. So his first aim was still the victory over the main force of the enemy, and that was to be gained on the way east, on the road to Moscow. There was no further talk of remaining in Smolensk, half-burned as it was.

It may excite remark that Napoleon was still so sure of his troops; though, of course, it was only of those whose robust physique and discipline had kept them in the ranks. They murmured indeed as they had in 1807, but they marched on, despite the frightful heat by day, despite the loss of sleep since the nights had to be given up to foraging in the surrounding villages, despite the gloomy prospect of not being able, perhaps, to endure the burden of the next day. They were chosen troops, vigorous and hardened veterans, those 157,000 men with whom he left Smolensk—especially those of Davout.* They wanted to be on hand in a forward movement, for behind them lay the horrors of the Polish wastes, while before them was battle and victory and honour and reward, and they must at last reach far-famed Moscow.

To be sure, if Napoleon had looked into the matter more closely he might, perhaps, have remained at the Dnieper after all, or gone back to Lithuania. But his eye was as dim in Russia as it had been in Spain. Here, too, he saw nothing but an army before him that was yet to be beaten, and a cabinet to which he wanted to dictate terms: this and nothing more. He

* In Vitebsk, Orcha, Mohilev, and Smolensk garrisons of about 14,000 men were left. About an equal number had been lost in the recent fighting and on the march from Vitebsk.

failed to see the new enemy that faced him the very moment he left Polish territory at Krasnoi and crossed the old Russian frontier: the strong national instinct of the Russians, which joined their religious fervour and their barbarism to make their resistance unparalleled. This feeling prevailed everywhere: in the army, whose strength and courage it steeled with fanaticism; at the court of the Czar, who could not escape its influence; among the masses of the people, who armed themselves by thousands and shouted to their ruler before the Kremlin, "Let us conquer or die!" Of all this Napoleon saw nothing. And yet there was no lack of unmistakable signs. Was it not significant that a single Russian corps resisted a large army for two whole days, without letting them take a single prisoner? Was it not remarkable that the enemy let the sacred city on the Dnieper with its holy shrine be consumed in flames before it was suffered to fall into the invaders' hands?

Russian chauvinism was already demanding a victim in its own camp; it was Barclay himself, the commander-in-chief. Being a Livonian, he seemed a foreigner to the army; at the court he had his most inveterate enemies in the Old-Russian party; he had fallen out with Bagration, and the operations of the army suffered from the discord between its leaders. Only the Czar had kept him thus far, and now even he could do so no longer. The fact that he had not defended with greater energy the city of the Holy Virgin, that he had risked no battle before its walls, was reckoned an inexpressible offence, and Alexander was led to believe that such a battle must have resulted in his favour.* Barclay was removed from command and was succeeded by Kutusoff, an "Old Russian," a favourite of the army, but appointed by the Czar only under stress. We have already met him in 1805. His prestige permitted him to fall back still farther and to delay offering battle until he arrived at the broken

* That is what the Czar wrote subsequently to Admiral Tchitchagoff, who was leading the Moldavian army north. The letter is printed in his Memoirs. Barclay's justification of himself was that he was preserving the army for a decisive action at a suitable time; he also pointed out that Napoleon had but to cross the Dnieper lower down to force him out of the city, that his position there had never been tenable.

country near Borodino, where the Kalotza flows into the Moskwa. The "Sacred Heath" it was called, and the legend ran that never had an enemy penetrated beyond it. Here a battle had to be fought out, for Moscow must not fall without a blow into the hands of the enemy. Alexander had but recently given its inhabitants most definite promises of military protection.

On September 1st Napoleon had arrived at Gjatsk, where he was informed that his vanguard had met with serious resistance. Soon doubt was no longer possible; the enemy really was about to fight. The Emperor collected his army to the number of 130,000; the Russians could muster only 120,000, and of those 10,000 were raw militia. Kutusoff, however, occupied a chosen position. He occupied both sides of the Moscow road behind the Kalotza, and had thrown up earthworks. The most westerly of his redoubts was captured by the French on September 5th after a fierce struggle: this pushed the left wing of the Russians back from the Kalotza against the other lines, so that they were arranged in the shape of an elbow with the angle at Borodino. Napoleon at once formed his plan. He would not follow Davout's good advice, i.e., to turn the enemy's left flank; such a threatening movement might deprive him of the chance to fight. He would attack with a strong force both the left wing and the centre successively, bend it around still more, turn the front of the Russians thus from the west to the south, then hurl them across the road and drive them to the Moskwa. If Kutusoff would only stand firm! Napoleon was so excited by this question that he hardly slept that night. To add to his agitation that evening the news arrived that Wellington had defeated Marmont at Salamanca on July 22d. That loss, also, must be made good. His troops too could get little sleep; were they not obliged to fetch food for themselves and their horses? But they all came back and donned their best uniforms, for the long-desired festival was at hand. Nor can one read without deep emotion how the sick Germans, as well as French, crowded into the ranks of the fighting men.

The battle began on the right wing, followed closely by

Davout's assault on the redoubts of the left wing and again, before noon, by the attack of Ney and Murat on the fortified centre, while Eugene was gaining the village of Borodino on the left, the pivot of the whole movement. The fighting was fierce in the extreme, and the historian is uncertain whether it is the attack or the defence that deserves the meed of heroism. The Russian redoubts were carried, soon lost again, only to be won anew and yet again lost. The exploits of Napoleon's infantry and horse, in particular of the German cavalry regiments, were most extraordinary; and so at last he became master of the enemies' position. But nothing more than that. The Russians retired indeed, but it was only to rally again in a new position a mile or so away and offer new resistance. But the shattered divisions of Murat and Ney were in no condition to renew the attack. This was the moment, before the enemy had recovered themselves, for a strong reserve to step in and complete the victory. Such a reserve was in readiness, the 20,000 of the Guard. Murat urgently pleaded for the order to advance, but Napoleon refused it. "Suppose another battle takes place to-morrow," he replied, "what shall I fight with?" He almost neglected to give the order to cannonade the retreating centre of the enemy. The generals hardly knew him for the old Napoleon; they laid everything to the inflammation of a severe cold and the constant pain he was suffering, but in particular to his overstrained nerves, that were unequal to the new task after such wearing excitement.* It was only a battlefield that Napoleon had won on that September day, not a battle. In spite of their enormous losses—44,000 in dead and wounded—the Russians remained overnight in their last positions, and it was not until the next day that they proceeded on the road to Moscow. Their general managed to make even the Czar believe that *they* were the victors.

* Napoleon has been condemned by almost all military writers for holding back his Guard. Jomini alone finds a word of excuse for him and sees his mistake rather in his failure to press the Russians from the very outset with utmost energy on the left wing, while it was still weak. [To Jomini add Clausewitz. See Rose, II. 236.—B.]

During the fighting Napoleon had not moved from his distant position. It was the first time he did not intervene in person, quite contrary to his oft-expressed conviction. No doubt he was in distress. But what was his discomfort compared to the many thousand times multiplied agony at his feet! Eylau was far outdone in scenes of horror. In one day there had fallen more than 70,000 men, dead or wounded; and a wound here meant but too often certain death. Napoleon declared the battle was the bloodiest he had ever seen, and the most hotly contested. He had gained this one point, that Moscow was now open to him. "Moscow! Moscow!" he is said to have ejaculated repeatedly the next day in great agitation. But beyond Moscow he will find an army of whose resisting power he had learned by experience. It will receive reinforcements. From the south another army will approach which has succeeded in defeating the Turks. His wings and his line of retreat will be menaced by superior hostile forces. It had not been a victory that would bring the enemy to the point of yielding. There must be more fighting; will his army be equal to it? Only about 100,000 men were left to him after the slaughter. Three days before the battle reinforcements of 30,000 men under Marshal Victor had crossed the Niemen; the Emperor ordered them to join the reserves at Smolensk and march forward to strengthen the main army at Moscow. But for the moment that is all he can command. And yet his eye kindles when on September 14th he looks down from a height at the mighty city of the Muscovites. He had reached his goal.

On the morning of September 14th Kutusoff entered Moscow, but in the afternoon left it again by the opposite gate. The dismay of the inhabitants remaining after the rich and prominent had taken their departure was unbounded. They, too, had heard of a victory at Borodino, and now the triumphing general was retiring and abandoning the city to the enemy! It was the signal for a general flight, so that the army could hardly make any progress; but in the hurry very little was saved. Immediately following the Russians the French marched in, Napoleon waiting until the next day; he was waiting, it is

said, for a deputation from the authorities. But none appeared. That was the first disappointment, and others were to follow. The city was deserted, not a soul on the streets; all who remained hid behind window-shutters in fear. "It seemed to us," Adam says, in describing the entry of the troops, "as if good actors were to play to an empty house." The Emperor rode into the Kremlin and took up his residence there, keeping the Guards in the city; the other corps had to find shelter in the vicinity. It was a comfort that to all appearance food was plenty; there were abundant provisions and forage, and the soldiers began to make themselves at home in the deserted dwellings, enjoying some rest at last from the unutterable sufferings of the campaign.

But there was no rest to be found in Moscow. Even before the entry thick columns of smoke had been seen rising here and there in the distance, but such a common spectacle attracted no further attention. In every city stores had been burned at the approach of the enemy. But soon they paid closer attention, as it was repeatedly announced at the Kremlin that there were fires at various points, and it soon became evident that they were occupying a doomed city. Lashed by the northeast trade wind, the element burst its bonds and spread farther and farther. At noon on the 16th of September the entire city was in flames, sparks flying even into the Kremlin. At last that, too, was reported to have caught fire, and Napoleon, who had scarcely had time to take one astonished look in the home of the Czars, was forced to leave the palace in haste; with difficulty struggling through the confused masses on the streets, he reached the country-seat of Petrovskoje. There he beholds the city, to possess which had been the very summit of his ambition, swallowed up in a sea of flames. And if anything could deepen the impression of this dread spectacle on the Emperor's feelings, it was the certainty which was soon felt that the conflagration was not the result of chance or thoughtlessness, but that the enemy himself had sacrificed the metropolis to prevent its stores and wealth from falling into the hands of foreigners, and to make it impos-

sible for them to stay there.* Napoleon had a commission inquire into the cause of the fire, and a number of incendiaries caught in the act were shot. But the fury of the flames was no longer to be checked. Not to rob the soldiers of all their hopes, he gave permission to plunder. The havoc wrought was enormous, but little was secured. Provisions were for the most part burned. The flames had spared the cellars, however, and wine and brandy was found in abundance. But the only result was to carry disorder to a climax, so that the few peasants who ventured into the city with provisions were robbed, while on the other hand the soldiers fraternized with some thousands of Russian marauders and let them come and go as if the war were over.

Most earnestly did all wish it were ended; Napoleon by no means the least. By September 20th the fire at length subsided, but three fourths of the city lay in ashes. The inhabitants, still numbering 10,000, wandered without shelter or food through the streets. A battalion of the Guard had saved the Kremlin, to which Napoleon now returned. He could not believe that Alexander would leave one stone unturned to regain possession of his country. Daily he expected overtures for peace negotiations, but in vain. Then he tried to hasten them by writing to the Czar on the 20th. Moscow was burned, he said; the calamity might have been avoided if Alexander had sent him a letter either before or after Borodino; he hoped his letter would be kindly received. And now again he waited. Soon September is past and the winter is threateningly near. The army can be fed only by foraging parties that have to go farther each day; these involve great danger and often get nothing. A single Russian corps gives out that it captured 3000 Frenchmen within three weeks. An additional source of danger was the peasant militia, who hid their property and defended their

* Even Russian historians now regard it as proved that the governor of the city, Count Rostopchin, ordered it to be fired before he left. Unquestionably the recklessness of the soldiery and mob license may have had a large share. The sentiment of the people must also be taken into consideration. Many preferred to burn their houses rather than see them in the hands of the French.

villages. "You are the nation of the Russian faith," their leaders cried to them; "die for your faith and for the Czar. What are you Christians for if you will not suffer for the faith? What are you orthodox for if you will not serve the Czar?" Rostopchin denounced Napoleon as unbaptized, and that sufficed to make his appeal to the inhabitants of the Moscow government futile. At Vereia partisans surprised and captured the French garrison. The highroad to Smolensk had already become unsafe, convoys of provisions were intercepted, and regular courier service was interrupted. The generals advised a retreat to Poland; but Napoleon could not yet bring himself to acknowledge his defeat before the world of which he expected to be master at Moscow.

"Imagine Moscow taken," he had said to Narbonne before the beginning of the campaign, "the Czar reconciled or supplanted by a dependent government; then tell me whether an army of French and allies cannot push on from Tiflis to the Ganges, and there by mere contact destroy the whole fabric of mercantile greatness in India? With one stroke France would have conquered the independence of the west and the freedom of the seas. Alexander the Great had as long a journey to the Ganges as I shall have from Moscow." So it was Moscow, always Moscow, that filled his thoughts. As the picture of Jerusalem once swayed the imagination of the crusaders, so now the holy city of the Russians swayed his. The story sounds altogether credible that was told later in the circles of his nearest relatives and intimates, that he took the insignia of imperial dignity, robe, sceptre, and crown, with him on the journey to Russia, in order that after he had dictated peace he might be proclaimed in the Kremlin on the Moskwa "the Emperor of the West, Supreme Head of the European Confederation, Defender of the Christian Religion."* Now all that was gone forever, peace was not assured, the Grand Army which was to have

* "Spectateur militaire," 1887, vol. 38, pp. 378 ff. Robe, crown, and sceptre have never been seen again; perhaps they were lost on the retreat in the hurry of leaving Vilna. Cf. the description in the "Mémorial" of the paymaster Peyrusse, p. 136, and in Coignet, p. 342.

paved his way to supreme power had dwindled away, and its very existence was in jeopardy.

For while Kutusoff had at first gone farther to the south east, he had afterwards turned west, had occupied an excellent position near Tarentino, south of Moscow, that threatened the French line of retreat, and was constantly strengthening himself. Moreover, the state of affairs in both wings was wholly favourable to the Russians. On the Dwina Wittgenstein's force was increased to 40,000 as against the 17,000 of Saint-Cyr. In the south the Russian army from Moldavia, under Tchitchagoff, had effected a junction on the 20th of September with the force of Tormassoff, making a total of 64,000, which exceeded Schwarzenberg's corps by 30,000. And still no answer from St. Petersburg! Napoleon was beside himself. For one moment he thinks even of fetching the answer in person, but in the next the impossible project is abandoned. Finally he must reconcile himself to making the overtures himself, and on the 5th of October he sends General Lauriston to Kutusoff. He replies that he has no authority and can only report to the Czar. Another period of suspense that pretty soon ends in the conviction that this step was equally fruitless.

Alexander remained firm, even though Romanzoff at the head of a court party friendly to France, Grand Duke Constantine, and even Alexander's mother, who most bitterly hated Napoleon, all spoke in favour of peace, the Czar still stood firm. Not because his unstable character had suddenly in the stress of invasion fortified itself; no, there were other reasons for his steadfastness. For one thing, the war sentiment among the people, especially after the loss of the rich metropolis, had increased to such a pitch that he could hardly do otherwise than yield to it. Then again, during the last days of August, at Abö, in Finland, he had met Bernadotte, who had exhorted him to be steadfast and had given him back the corps that was by treaty to help conquer Norway. This added 20,000 men who were hastening to join Wittgenstein. Lastly, there was doubtless no lack of energetic men about Alexander (one thinks involuntarily of Baron vom Stein, whom he had summoned in May) who

advised him to persevere and who may have lent a firm support to the wavering resolution of the Czar. So the decision was for war.

Meantime Napoleon had wasted five weeks of most precious time dallying with the hope of peace, until at length the inexorable truth stood clearly before him that he must leave Moscow. Who would venture to paint what was passing in the mind of this man when he saw the proud structure erected by him to his own renown breaking down piecemeal; saw it with his far-sighted vision that descried not only the terrible danger immediately before him, the death-dealing winter, when the summer had already melted his army to half its original size; but also all the remote consequences: the uprising of his compulsory allies, and an endless series of new struggles, and, at best, the task of conquering all over again what but a few weeks ago had been in his possession! In vain he sought to banish the thought of his lost prestige, to escape being alone with it. We are told that he prolonged meals beyond the usual time, something he had never before done; that he had a company of French actors who were in Moscow perform pieces before him; that he threw himself eagerly into plans for a new organization of the Théâtre français at Paris, and the like. But at last something decisive had to be done. Above all, the Emperor had to become a general once more. The source of the whole disaster was that hitherto he had been too much the Emperor, too little the general.* In the latter character he now had to order the retreat. In the midst of preparations for it, at one of the daily reviews, there fell upon him the tidings that the Russians had assumed the offensive on October 16th, had surprised Murat, who had been sent south to watch Kutusoff, and driven him back toward Moscow with very heavy losses. With that vanished the last hope of peace, and it was settled beyond recall that fighting must be renewed.

Since the beginning of October Napoleon had been considering the question by what route he should leave the untenable capital.

* "Moscow is not a military position, but a political one," he had said to Daru. "People always see in me here only the military leader, whereas I am here in fact as Emperor."

He had three routes before his mind: one the road by which he had come, another leading to Smolensk via Kaluga, the third to the northwest through Bjeloi to Weliki-Luki, which would permit him to threaten St. Petersburg. At the outset he felt rather inclined to choose the last, because it had less the appearance of a retreat; but he soon gave it up. Nor did the southern route meet with his full approval. In the notes which he dictated we read: "Any movement on Kaluga is advisable only if it have for its object to retreat to Smolensk. But if we are retreating to Smolensk in any case, is it wise to seek the enemy and expose ourselves to the loss of some thousands of men in a march that after all would seem to be a retreat before an army which knows well its country and has many secret agents and a numerous light cavalry?" In an affair with the enemy, he went on to explain, one might have left on one's hands three or four thousand wounded with which it would be necessary to retreat for hundreds of miles; this would look like a defeat, and in public opinion the enemy would have the advantage even if he had been beaten. Therefore he would prefer to take the road by which they had come "We should not have the enemy about our necks, we know the road thoroughly, and it is five days' march shorter, too." The army would carry flour for two weeks, and could stop at Viasma and find provisions and fodder." These notes are from the early part of October. Soon afterwards, however, he had decided for the road by Kaluga, particularly as the advance of the Russians made it necessary to support Murat. But we shall have occasion to see the force of the above considerations.

On the 19th of October the "Grand Army" left Moscow in a southwesterly direction; the soldiers were burdened with booty whose weight soon wearied them in the march; wagons in endless lines were loaded with the plundered splendour of the holy city, with articles useful and useless, with sick and wounded; foreign families fleeing from the hatred of the Russians swelled the numbers of the camp-followers; the whole array was not unlike a migrating tribe. In Moscow, where Mortier remained with 8000 men, the Emperor spread the report that he would return

after defeating Kutusoff, and really made the latter believe he was coming to attack him. But he really had no such intention. He planned rather, in order to avoid an "affair" and the thousands of wounded, to turn the enemy's left flank and reach Kaluga before him by the (new) western road, or at least to get to Juchnov before him and then reach Smolensk by way of Jelnia. But Kutusoff was not deceived very long. Soon after Napoleon, covered by two corps, had turned off to the west towards Borovsk with the bulk of his army, the news of it came to the Russian headquarters, and at once the Russian general started for Malojaroslavetz, where the two roads to Kaluga meet at the river Luscha. Perhaps the Emperor might have carried out his plan after all if his army had moved forward more rapidly. But what with the heavy burdens of the infantry, the poor horses for the cavalry, the lack of teams for the 600 cannon, the immense length of the train, and besides all the heavy rains and the muddy roads, any faster advance was impossible. The result was that the vanguard under Eugene entered Malojaroslavetz only a little before the Russians, on October 24th. Here ensued a bitter struggle over an elevation occupied by the enemy on the other side of the river. The Russians lost the position and regained it repeatedly, until at length, after a frightful loss of life, it was finally carried and held by the Italians under the Viceroy. But that was all. For Kutusoff, who had come up meanwhile with the whole army, held the road to the south, and the question now was whether Napoleon would fight his way through here or not.

So the "affair" had come off after all. The fighting of the 24th had cost the French 5000 men in dead and wounded. Were it to be renewed on the next day on a larger scale, then, with the resistance the Russians were making, the losses would certainly be serious. In the council of war held by Napoleon scarcely more than one vote (that of Murat) was in favour of fighting; the great majority were decidedly against it. Even the bold Mouton, who in May, 1809, had saved the situation on the Lobau, advised the quickest possible retreat to the Niemen, and that, too, on the highroad by which they had come and which

they knew well. This, as we have seen, coincided with the Emperor's opinion. Perhaps, too, the danger he had been in on the 25th of being captured by a bold band of Cossacks while on a reconnoissance may have made an impression on him. His only misgiving arose from the fear of "having the enemy about their necks" if they retreated to the north. But Kutusoff himself solved the question the next day by breaking camp and going farther south, perhaps with the object of luring the Emperor still farther from his base. But the latter took advantage of the opportunity thus granted to turn at once to the north and gain the highroad at Moshaisk. Mortier had already been ordered to leave Moscow on the 21st. He was to blow up the Kremlin first, an act of impotent rage that was only partially successful. On the 27th he had joined the army, which now proceeded westward by forced marches. It had lost a week of valuable time and could not venture now to stop at Viasma if Kutusoff understood his business.*

What now follows is a retreat compared to which the march through the desert after the futile assault on Acre seems like child's play. Would not those who a few weeks ago had not given out in the haste of pressing forward to Moscow now lose their strength in the hurried flight of the retreat? Would not the cold now carry off those whom the heat then spared? Would not those who then withstood hardship and hunger succumb to them all the more surely, now that they were the pursued

* Reports of Napoleon's attitude during these days are meagre. The fact that he did not follow the receding Russians (who might later come to a stand and give battle again) is nothing surprising, take it all in all. But it is certainly strange that he did not take the shorter road from Malojarslavetz through Medyni to Viasma. He gave his reasons in a letter to Junot dated October 26th: the cold, and the necessity of disposing of the wounded (in fact some three or four thousand), led him, so he said, to go to Moshaisk. But the cold had not yet set in. Not until the 27th did any frost appear at night, while otherwise the weather was fine. The winter of 1812 came later than usual in Russia. So the second point alone must have been decisive, the wounded, to which Napoleon had assigned great importance in his notes at the beginning of October. But the blame may rest partly on the bad maps at his disposal and his ignorance of the roads.

instead of the pursuers? There was indeed a definite goal before them; they must march bravely, it was said, only as far as Smolensk. There was stationed Victor's corps; there were to be found abundant stores—at least they had been ordered: there, between the Dwina and the Dnieper, they might defy the winter. And so the sadly demoralized army retraced the same *via dolorosa* which it had traversed two months before; past the horrible battlefield of Borodino, where the dead still lay unburied; past the hospitals, caverns of horror, from which they longed to take away all who were still living; past the burned cities and villages and all the places given over to gloomy desolation. After the beginning of November the night frosts began to be felt more and more keenly. Most of the soldiers were too lightly clad and suffered not a little. Hunger began to pinch them, too, for the provisions brought from Moscow had soon been consumed, and it was impossible to supply themselves by foraging as formerly they had done, as the bands of armed peasants prevented it and the enemy was appearing again.

Kutusoff, thanks to the excellent service of his light horse, had received timely notice of Napoleon's departure; he turned about and followed him with the main army through Silenki toward Viasma, while the Cossack corps of Platoff harassed the rear-guard commanded by Davout. Napoleon gave orders to march as they had done in Egypt, with the baggage in the centre, so that in case of attack they could make front and fire in every direction. So they proceeded at a rapid pace. "The enemy is fleeing," Platoff reported, "as never army fled before." There were good reasons for such haste. By taking the shorter route which Napoleon had rejected, Kutusoff had reached the highroad near Viasma by November 3d with his vanguard and cut off the French rear. The only thing that saved Davout was that Eugene sent back two divisions from Viasma for his support. Napoleon was already far beyond that city with the Guard. If Kutusoff had attacked the French with his whole army on that day, he would have struck them a fatal blow; but he held back. Though he displayed desperate energy in resistance, he was hesitating in attack, and was rather disposed to promote his

enemy's flight, supposing that the latter must perish in the Russian winter even without his assistance.

The fight at Viasma had cost the French 4000 in dead and wounded, 3000 had been taken prisoners, and the corps of Davout was completely disintegrated, so that Ney had to assume command of the rear. On the 6th of November the cold increased by from eight to twelve degrees, and an icy north wind brought dense snow.* The road grew slippery, causing the horses to fall in heaps, and thus depriving the hungry soldiery of their only animal food; many cannon were abandoned; long lines of ammunition-wagons were blown up; the cavalry as they lost their horses had to march afoot. Discipline was utterly relaxed. Every one thought only of himself. The wounded of the last fight were left to their fate and died by the wayside; likewise thousands who because of cold and fatigue had thrown away their weapons and left the ranks. Their comrades drove them from the camp-fires at night; so they went aside and were frozen to death in great numbers. In this way it is said that at a single camping-place three hundred perished in one night. Many a one waited for the Russians, to beg from them and lengthen his life a few days; but with the disappearing foe would vanish his last hope, if indeed a Cossack lance had not already taken pity on the doomed man. The greatest misery was endured by the rear-guard. One of Ney's officers reports of these days: "The little food we had was consumed, the horses were falling from hunger and exhaustion and were soon devoured by the soldiers. Whoever departed from the road to look for food fell into the enemies' hands. So our men would rush upon any solitary fugitive and take his provisions from him by force; lucky for him if they left him his clothing. Thus, after wasting the land, we were brought to the point of destroying one another."

At last hope seemed to beckon to the exhausted warriors from the rising towers of Smolensk. Of the hundred thousand,

* In some accounts (Bausset, Guretzky-Cornitz, Berthezène) the 4th of November is the date when severe cold and snowfall began; most of the others (Fézensac, Gourgaud, Peyrusse. Coignet, Napoleon in bulletin 29) give the 6th. [The temperatures are probably equivalent to 14° and 5° Fahr.—B.]

however, who had started out from Moscow scarcely fifty thousand still answered the roll-call, including five thousand calvary in a wretched state. For this last Murat was not a little to blame; because quite unnecessarily he would set the poor men on the Cossacks, by which means they lost their horses and then were famished on foot. Hence they named him the "Butcher of Cavalry"; of the other leaders, however, the Viceroy in particular and the "undaunted" Ney were held in highest respect. And one who follows attentively the history of this campaign must here give his unqualified assent to the general opinion; Ney, especially, performed on this retreat wonders of courage, sagacity, and coolness in most desperate situations. Napoleon, on the other hand, roused much hard feeling among the other troops by his favouritism for the Guard, which had been displayed repeatedly even during the previous summer. And now in Smolensk, where he entered on the 9th of November, and where the arrangements of the commissariat were far below his expectations, he first of all provided the Guard with rations for two weeks, in consequence of which the other troops, who had rations for only one week, fell into all manner of excesses.* In the fire-swept city but few houses afforded shelter from the fierce cold. Most of the troops had to pass the night in the open air, and piles of corpses lined the streets. Was this a place to go into winter quarters?

No, the line between the Dwina and the Dnieper had already become untenable. While yet on the march Napoleon had received news from Victor that sorely troubled him. That general, at a call from Saint-Cyr, had hastened to his aid against

* On the arrival of the army in Smolensk the paymaster, Peyrusse, writes in his diary on November 10th: "At once the stores were broken into, no regular distribution was possible, everything was plundered. All power and authority of officers ceased in face of an army that was rendered desperate by hunger and all manner of misery. The soldiers retained possession of the stores. Wine, brandy, rice, biscuit, vegetables, everything was in confusion and was trampled under foot. The enormous stock of provisions squandered in this way hardly sufficed for two divisions." Napoleon later charged his overseers with malfeasance of office and corruption, but it was only to avoid the admission that he, the lord of the world, was sometimes not master of his own army.

Wittgenstein with about 18,000 men; but toward the end of October the two had been defeated at Tchatchniki by superior numbers and were obliged to retreat. This exposed the army returning from the north to serious danger, and Napoleon was in the utmost anxiety. He ordered Victor, doing it with an urgency that was affecting, to make a new advance and throw the enemy across the Dwina. But suppose he failed to execute that command? No, there was no tarrying at Smolensk. And in fact he remained only long enough for Eugene, who was coming up by a painful *détour* through Duchovchina, to arrive, before collecting his army after a fashion; he did not wait for the rear-guard. On the 13th he again left the city after issuing orders that the several corps should march a day's journey apart from each other. In view of the fact that Kutusoff, during the four days' halt at Smolensk, had again overtaken the French and might attack the army at any moment on the line of march, the grounds for this arrangement are not apparent. The conjecture may be hazarded that he did not suppose the enemy was as yet so near, and that his aim was to regulate the distribution of provisions better by means of this separation of the divisions. Be that as it may, the army marched out of the city between the 12th and the 17th of November. Of the 30,000 stragglers who had followed the army into Smolensk only a quarter now joined the rear-guard under Ney. Of the remainder, some had perished from cold and hunger, others stayed behind to plunder. They were cut down by the returning inhabitants, thrown into the flames, or drowned. The sick and wounded had been left behind in the hospitals. Many of them had lost their lives when at Napoleon's command the towers of the city wall were blown up. It was a chapter of horrors unparalleled.

During the very first days after the exit from Smolensk the bitter cold began to claim its victims, and the army again began to disintegrate. And the enemy was close at hand, too. When Napoleon had reached Krasnoi with the Guard, the Russian vanguard seized the road behind him, and there was danger that the isolated corps would be successively beaten by this division,

which was 17,000 strong. To prevent this, Napoleon halted and waited for Eugene, who was next on the road. He had only 15,000 with him (so far had the Guard dwindled away), while Kutusoff, who was only one day's march distant from Krasnoi, had at his disposal fully three times as many, although in his hasty march through the deep snow of the country roads he had been obliged to leave behind at least a half of his infantry sick and incapacitated.* Now again, as at Viasma, the Russian general avoided separating Napoleon from the rest of his army by advancing his main force and then overpowering him, as he might have done. He adhered to his system, from dread, we are told, of the Emperor's genius, which seemed to him invincible even in these straits. Emboldened by this, and also in order to protect Davout from the Russian vanguard, Napoleon on the next morning actually assumed the offensive, supposing that Kutusoff would withdraw his vanguard from the road at the prospect of a general engagement and so leave the way open. The venture was successful—it was the early morning of the 17th and the cold was terrible—and Davout, too, could now come to Krasnoi. But now a new danger threatens Napoleon, that of being outflanked, and he marches on to Orsha, leaving Ney to his fate. The latter, after fighting several times to no purpose, stole over the Dnieper by night with 3000 men, but on the farther side fell in with Platoff's Cossacks and, after untold hardships, at last regained the highroad near Orsha with scarcely 900 men.

The cold now began to moderate, but thawing weather with long-continued rains turned the roads into deep mud, so that the soldiers found it still more painful to march, having for the most part nothing but rags on their feet. Of the scarcely

* The regular Russian troops did not display in this war the power of endurance that was to be expected. Of 100,000 men with whom Kutusoff began the parallel pursuit of Napoleon, 48,000 lay in the hospitals by the beginning of December, although they were clad in fur, well fed, and had not moved forward so rapidly as the enemy. In the middle of December only 40,000 of the 200,000 men in the Russian army were still under arms. Poles and Germans seem to have endured the cold best. (Bernhardi, *Toll's Denkwürdigkeiten*, II. 352, 469.)

25,000 men still remaining the majority threw away their weapons, and even the Guard began to waver. Then Napoleon, who in the cold days had often marched on in front of his troops, clad in a cloak of Polish fur and leaning on a birch staff, stepped among his old grenadiers and addressed them as follows: "You see the disorganization of my army. A wretched infatuation has led most of the soldiers to throw away their weapons. If you follow this dangerous example, there is no hope left. On you depends the salvation of the army." At a critical moment provisions were secured in Orsha by the aid of the Jews, and, besides, weapons and some batteries were found, the latter being drawn by horses belonging to pontoon-trains. The boats were abandoned, as it was supposed they would not be needed. There was the bridge at Borissov held by the French; and once let that river be behind their backs, then they thought, there was no further obstacle on the road through Minsk to Vilna.

But the cup of tribulation was not yet full. On the 22d of November Napoleon received word that Admiral Tchitchagoff, who had drawn up a part of his army facing Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, had proceeded with the rest through Minsk to Borissov, had driven the French from that point, and now commanded the bridge. To make matters still worse came the tidings that Victor and Oudinot had been wholly unsuccessful in their operations against Wittgenstein and were marching south straight for the highroad. Now indeed the doom of the army seemed sealed. In its rear was Kutusoff, to the south and in front was Tchitchagoff, on the right was Wittgenstein. If the two latter effected a junction and opposed the French at the Beresina, there was no hope of escape.* The thaw and rains had melted the ice, the river was high, its banks were like swamps, and the pontoons were behind them at Orsha.

* The Russians had acted on an excellent plan of co-operation, which had been communicated to the leaders of the two wings as early as September. Wittgenstein was to drive back Oudinot and Macdonald, Tchitchagoff was to do the same to Schwarzenberg, and then the two were to unite at Borissov to cut off the retreat of the enemy, whom Kutusoff was expected to drive toward them.

It was a situation to bewilder the strongest mind. Napoleon, whom we have seen weak and nervous on the march to Moscow in view of the uncertainty of the outcome, was now strong and prudent in face of certain failure. Since he had become the general once more, he threw himself into the character. Even his bodily ills seem to have disappeared. His health was as good as in the winter campaign of 1807. This point should not be overlooked here. His mind and energy in these days of extreme distress and embarrassment were as powerful as of old. "He was pale," says one in his escort, "but his countenance was calm; nothing in his face betrayed his mental sufferings." His eye takes in the entire danger at a glance and discerns the only means of safety, if safety is still possible. First of all he must have those troops that have thus far faced Wittgenstein, as they had suffered nothing like the main army. Oudinot with his 8000 men is to repel the division which Tchitchagoff had sent across to Borissov, and if possible regain possession of the bridge, while Victor with 11,000 men marches southwest from Tchereja, where his troops are stationed, to the Beresina and holds Wittgenstein in check as long as possible. Meantime Napoleon got rid of a large part of the camp-followers that still clung to the army, and sacrificed half of his wagons at Bobr in order to have horses for the little artillery still remaining. Here he learns that Oudinot has secured Borissov indeed, but that the Russians had burned the bridge. On the very day before he had written to him: "If the enemy should get control of the head of the bridge and burn it, so that we could not cross, it would be a great misfortune." And now this was a reality, and a reality which involved crossing a river a hundred yards wide with marshy banks while facing two superior hostile forces and while pursued by a third.

Had the Emperor been dealing with foes that were but half-way his equals, neither he nor his army would have escaped. He could never have reached the frontier as he did, though with but a small remnant of officers and subalterns; nor could he have filled up these rescued cadres to form a new army and so overrun Europe with new wars, as he actually did. But Kutu-

soff's only thought was "not to appear at the frontier with emaciated troops," and his pursuit was astonishingly slow; Wittgenstein was poorly informed of the desperate situation of the enemy, and advanced with caution instead of hastening to the upper Beresina; and neither of these nor the quite incompetent Tchitchagoff was of a calibre to annihilate the greatest general of their age. The third, whose task it should have been not to let the Emperor slip through, fell headlong into a trap set for him by Oudinot, who had been ordered to seek a suitable spot for laying a bridge and after this had been found—a little north of Borissov, at Studjanka—to give the enemy the false impression by a feint that they were going to cross south of the city. The deception was so successfully carried out and was furthermore so effectively re-enforced by Wittgenstein's conjecture that this was the intention of the French, of which the Admiral heard, that Tchitchagoff sent only a weak detachment north and took his main army a day's march south of Borissov to meet the French army in case it sought, as he supposed it would, a junction with Schwarzenberg. This was on the 25th of November, the same day on which Oudinot led his command north of Borissov to Studjanka and there began the construction of two bridges, which, however, were not finished until the following afternoon. How they lamented now the lack of the pontoons! Frost had suddenly set in again, and the marshy banks became hard, but the floating ice was a great hindrance to the work of the bridge-builders, who had to stand breast-high in the water. And all this when every moment was precious. At last the crossing could begin. A number of guns that had been placed on the heights of Studjanka commanded the farther bank and kept at a distance the Russian detachment stationed there. Cavalry swam over and drove them away. So the path was open and remained open the next day. Napoleon directed the march over the bridge until at noon of the 27th he himself passed over with the Guard. At Studjanka there was now only the bulk of Victor's corps, whose rear-guard had arrived at Borissov to detain the advancing force of Wittgenstein. The entire army numbered hardly from 30,000 to 35,000 men

under arms.* The horde of stragglers probably amounted to as many more. A large part of these poor wretches were kept in the village across the river by hunger and cold. Many, too, of the Moscow fugitives that had followed the camp stayed there, unwilling despite all warnings to leave their wagons, which contained their few goods and last remnant of food. It was a scene of woe unutterable!

But Napoleon was not to escape in this way, without any hindrance from the enemy. On the very evening of the 27th Wittgenstein with Platoff came upon the rear-guard of Victor, about 4000 men, which he surrounded and compelled to surrender. Then he proceeded unopposed to Studjanka, and held the marshal with the larger part of his forces firmly in check. At the same time Tchitchagoff, who had been informed of the true state of things, had come north along the right bank. This compelled the army, with the exception of the shattered corps of Eugene, Davout, and Junot, which had passed on via Sembin, to fight its way along. The two Russian leaders had agreed at Borissov to co-operate, and so on the 28th of November, amid icy weather, fighting began on both sides of the river. On the east side Victor with about 7000 men had to defend himself against several times as many, while on the west side there were only 17,000 to repel the onset of 26,000. Yet even this task was performed by these sorely-tried troops, most of whom now were non-French. On the right bank, to be sure, the advance columns at first gave way before the onslaught of the Russian chasseurs; and even the Young Guard retired toward the river.

* Accounts differ greatly, varying from 22,000 (Ségur) to 50,000 (Fézensac). The latter figure is certainly incorrect. Moreover, Napoleon himself had no lists before him now. Clausewitz, writing from Borissov to Stein November 30th, speaks of "about 40,000." The most correct estimate is probably that of Chambray, who put it at 26,700 infantry and 4000 cavalry on the 26th of November. The enumeration in Bogdanovitch (III. 271) is erroneous. The corps of Oudinot and Victor made up the main portion. The Guard had shrunk from 47,000 to 6000, in spite of special care. The great corps of Davout, once numbering certainly more than 70,000, now was reduced to 1200; while of the 30,000 men that stood under Ney at the Niemen, only 300 were left.

But Ney, who took the place of the wounded Oudinot, fired his men on to a new advance so that they repulsed the enemy and took a couple of thousand prisoners. Far into the night the struggle lasted, the Russians gaining no advantage worth mentioning, and the Old Guard not entering the fight.*

Meanwhile Victor, supported by the artillery across the river, had withstood Wittgenstein's feeble attacks until evening, when he was able to use the darkness to cross the river with the remnants of his army, after having helped forward a large number of non-combatants over the bridge.† But he was no longer able to cover the passage of all the stragglers and fugitives. On the very morning of the day of battle, when the Russian artillery began to play, thousands of these rushed terror-struck for the bridge, where now arose a wild, inextricable confusion of wagons and carts that blocked the way, of frightened horses that trampled the sick and wounded under foot, of men that fought desperately for a brief span of life—all these raked by the enemies' fire. In the hand-to-hand struggle that ensued many were hurled over into the water. Many more of their own accord in an agony of fear entrusted themselves to the icy waves or the floating cakes of ice, while others were forced into the stream by the pressure of the throng behind them; the great majority perished. If anything could surpass these scenes in horror, it was those of the next morning, when the last armed detachment fought its way over the wooden structure at the

* Whether Tchitchagoff can be charged, as he has been recently, with intentional neglect is as yet unsettled. The Russian commanders were no heroes, it may as well be said, and the French army with all its stragglers still gave the impression from a distance of a host of 60,000 or 70,000. Tchitchagoff hardly commanded half that number. So it is quite intelligible, although not very much to his credit, that after at last getting his bearings he did not hasten to the place of crossing, but first halted (as Jomini relates) at Borissov to bring over re-enforcements on a rapidly constructed pontoon bridge. Wittgenstein, too, for the same prudential reasons advanced to the Beresina far more slowly than would have been requisite for a complete success.

† One of Wittgenstein's generals explains the timidity of that leader by the presence of Napoleon: "They feared him like the lion that no animal dares to approach." (*Historische Zeitschrift*, 62, 192.)

point of the bayonet and then set it on fire. With a frenzied roar the crowds that were left behind, men, women, and children, flung themselves after the columns right into the flames, until the timbers broke and cast their despairing burden into the torrent. Some five thousand of them still were left behind, taken prisoners by the Russians. When Tchitchagoff, after the departure of Napoleon, arrived at the point of crossing, he found, as he himself relates, the ground covered with the bodies of the slain or frozen in all sorts of positions, the peasant huts of Studjanka packed with corpses. In the river were awful heaps of drowned soldiers, women, and children, emerging above the surface of the waters, and here and there riders rigid in death like statues on their ice-bound horses. The governor of Minsk had about 24,000 bodies burned here; this included only those picked up on the battlefield and by the banks of the river. Even ten years later, islets and mounds are said to have been visible in the Beresina, formed of the victims of those days, and overgrown with forget-me-nots, to call to mind, as it were, the most ghastly spectacle of the century.

The glorious passage at arms on the 28th of November, by which the enemy's plans were brought to naught, was like the last flickering of life in an organism given over to death; after it Napoleon's military force crumbled to pieces. He no longer had an army, but only a following of men who under the pressure of terrible cold discarded their weapons; half-crazed or even wholly crazed with hunger and smitten with typhus, they struggled along on the road to Vilna, past Sembin and Molo-detchno. On the 3d of December, the thermometer standing at about -3° ,* only about 9000 men still had their weapons; but before long even they were unarmed, when the temperature fell to 22° below zero on the 6th, and to 35° below on the 8th. Each successive night claimed hundreds of victims. Napoleon had clearly seen, the day after the battle by the Beresina, that nothing more was to be done with these troops. "In this state of affairs," he wrote to Maret at Vilna, "it is possible that I may consider my presence in Paris necessary for France, for

* These temperatures are expressed in Fahrenheit degrees.—B.

the empire, and even for the army." That settled the matter with him; and there were excellent reasons. For long before reaching Smolensk he had received news from the French capital that gave him no little anxiety. A general of republican opinions, named Malet, who had already become involved in 1808 in a conspiracy against the Emperor's government and had since then been detained under careful guard in a Paris *maison de santé*, had formed a plan with a couple of royalist confidants to announce the death of Napoleon and to forge a *Senatus consultum* which clothed himself with the command of the city and set up a provisional government of moderate republicans and constitutionalists with Moreau and Carnot at their head. With this as a basis they proposed to win over the municipal guard and the national guard that were in garrison at Paris, seize the persons of the municipal authorities and so overthrow the Empire. For two weeks no news had come of the Emperor. The people had at first approved the expedition to Russia as the last decisive step in establishing a permanent peace; but the persistent advance into the enemy's country had disturbed their minds, and the burning of Moscow finally dispelled all illusions and opened up a prospect of endless war. Malet counted on all this when he went to work early in the morning of October 23d. A regiment of national guards, the veteran municipal guard, and two generals whom he brought out of prison, all took his representations for the truth and obeyed him. They helped him to apprehend Savary, the Minister of Police, and the prefect of the Seine was so thoroughly convinced that he had a hall made ready in the *Hôtel de ville* for the sessions of the provisional government. It was only at the commandant's office that, thanks to the presence of mind of two officers, Malet was seized with two companions and it was proclaimed to the troops standing below that the Emperor was alive. "Vive l'empereur!" they shouted back, and the farce was at an end. Malet and his deluded adherents were soon afterwards tried by court-martial and shot.

Such was the news that Napoleon received on the march. What struck him about it, and what remains significant even for

history, was the circumstance that of all those who so easily believed in the death of the Emperor, not one remembered the dynasty, but each one took for granted as self-evident that a change of government would ensue. "What!" he exclaimed in his disappointment, "my wife, my son, the institutions of the Empire—no one has a thought for all that!" But even this was not all. If such a plot could succeed in some measure as long as the army was known to be in the distance, what might not be attempted if it became known that the army no longer existed? Nor could its fate be kept secret. Was it not strange that he had met no couriers since leaving Smolensk? No, he could not wait; he must go on and reach Paris simultaneously with the news of the complete failure of the expedition and of the loss of hundreds of thousands of men that went with him, in order to counteract the impression with the overpowering force of his personality. At the Beresina he had still done his duty as general; now that the army was crumbling away there remained nothing for the military leader to do except to get help for it, and that was possible only from a distance. The attitude of the Germans was an added source of anxiety. Therefore, as soon as the column had once reached the Vilna road at Molodetchno, he would leave it and hasten home.

On the 5th of December they had arrived at Smorgoni, constantly fighting the enemy in the rear, who captured thousands of unarmed prisoners; here he gathered his marshals about him and told them his decision. Murat was to lead the army beyond the Niemen. Before Vilna they would find Bavarian troops under Wrede and a fresh division. For the remnant of his army as well as for France his presence in Paris was indispensable. From no other point could he hold Austrians and Prussians in check. They would deliberate well before declaring war against him as soon as they saw him as the head of the French nation—he was at this moment a Frenchman through and through—and beheld a new army. First he had let Eugene read aloud to them the last bulletin, dated at Molodetchno on the 3d of December; it was No. 29 and contained hints, though by no means the undisguised truth, as to the ruin of the Grand Army. The whole

truth is not to be found in it, and to one that knows all the woeful story it must seem like detestable trifling with misfortune to say: "Men whom nature did not harden enough to make them superior to all vicissitudes of fate and fortune lost their cheerfulness and good humour and dreamed of nothing but mishaps and defeats; those, however, whom she created superior to everything preserved their good spirits and behaviour and beheld new glory in the hardships which they had to overcome." Nor did the bulletin state *how* the hundreds of thousands perished; everything was laid to the Russian cold winter. Before the 6th of December the army, it was implied, was still proud, splendid, and victorious, until the terrible climate of the north weakened and consumed it. That he himself was the sole cause of this havoc the imperial author did not betray with a single word. Not a word was said of his mad rush forward beyond Vitebsk and Smolensk in the intense heat of the Russian summer, which had caused the army greater losses than the winter. Nor did he tell them, if the cold was responsible for the disaster, that *he* had invoked it by his obstinate waiting in the burnt-out capital. The world was to know one thing first of all: he was alive and well. "The health of his Majesty has never been better": with these words the bulletin closed. Then he took leave of his generals and rode away with three companions: Caulaincourt, whose secretary he pretended to be, Daru and Mouton.* On the

* Some have called this desertion; but this is just as incorrect as it was when Napoleon left the army of the Egyptian expedition, and even more so. He was sovereign and could command the army in person or not as he saw fit, and hence could resign the command when he would. And he would be in a much better position to procure succour for the straitened army if he hastened on in advance of it than if he stayed. The peculiar closing passage of the bulletin has also often been censured as being cynical. But it was called forth by some remarks in the letters of his confidential correspondent, state councillor Fiévère; on the occasion of the Malet fiasco he had complained that the bulletins never told whether the Emperor was alive, "which is after all the first thing we want to know." In a previous letter of October 23d he had said: "The Emperor's presence in Paris, provided he could get away without detriment to the army, would do much good." Napoleon was wont to repose rare confidence in this adviser.

6th he met Maret at Vilna; on the 10th, the French plenipotentiary De Pradt at Warsaw; and on the 14th, the King of Saxony at Dresden, where but seven months before he had graciously accepted, in the full splendour of his power, the homage of half the world. With incognito preserved he reached the French frontier, and on the 18th of December, before midnight, he entered Paris, where his bulletin had preceded him by a day.

Twice on the journey home he is said to have been threatened with an assault on his life. The first time was on Russian soil, at Osmiana, where he met the combined division of Loison, and a French major belonging to it suggested to some German officers to let him share Wallenstein's fate; the second time was in Glogau. The statements on this point are very explicit and leave no doubt that the idea was entertained and discussed. But in neither case did it ripen into a serious purpose, and Napoleon escaped unharmed. Not yet was his star to disappear, but it was beginning to sink toward the horizon. Ruddy as the orb of day at its setting, it was to flood Europe once more with the colours of fire and blood ere it sank forever into the western ocean.

CHAPTER XVIII

LEIPZIG

WHAT a painful awakening for Napoleon from his dream on the way to Moscow of an unlimited dominion over states and nations! His prestige, won by such a long series of astounding military achievements, was shattered. For, although he had not been defeated in the last campaign, yet he had fled—whether from want, or cold, or sure destruction, it mattered not, he had fled; and the impression could not be obliterated which this unheard-of event had produced on Europe. Of the "Grand Army," whose best elements had been victorious at Austerlitz and Friedland, there now survived only insignificant remnants. And we know what the army was to him. "His people," was the apt characterization of it by Jaucourt, the friend of Talleyrand. An army, to be sure, was still under arms ready to serve his will; but in size it was not to be compared to the one he had lost, and, moreover, it was in the field against the English and Spanish. He still had allies, of course, but they were only allies of his good fortune and his might; it was a serious question whether they would continue allies of his weakness.

Reviewing the Emperor's aims in his expedition to the East, we find that it was not only the extension of his continental power over Russia that he sought, but also to shut England entirely out of Europe. Thus smitten in her most vital interests, she would sue for peace, withdraw her army from Spain, and open the seas to the world-wide policy of the conqueror. Perhaps this object would have been accomplished if Napoleon had halted at Smolensk according to his original plan, and then liberated Lithuania. He would in that case have collected his army and swelled it with re-enforcements; he would have established a well-regulated commissariat; then with an imposing show of strength

he could have taken up a position threatening both Russian capitals, and one not without influence on political affairs in the world at large. For at the very time that he crossed the Niemen he found a helper in his struggle with England—the United States, which had declared war against England in June, 1812. For two years Napoleon had worked for this result, by promising the United States exemption from the decrees of Berlin and Milan if they would stop trading with England and her colonies and secure the repeal in London of the Orders in Council of 1807. He well knew that the English would not consent to this, at least not in the essential points. And in fact they not only refused when repeal was proposed, but took an altogether hostile attitude. They caused all American vessels to be searched for British seamen in order to press them into the English navy, and stirred up enemies in America against the government at Washington. This led them in 1812 to open war, which at the outset cost the British some losses at sea. This new complication, combined with the constant decline in the financial condition of the island kingdom and a threatening position of Napoleon in Russia, would perhaps have operated in London in favour of a general peace, especially as the year had closed without any great results for England in the Iberian Peninsula. For, in spite of Wellington's victory at Salamanca, which procured for him the supreme command over all the forces arrayed against the French and raised the siege of Cadiz, he was finally forced by the blunders and selfishness of the Spaniards to retire to the Portuguese frontier. But when one despatch after another brought to London news of the dwindling away of the Grand Army, of the fruitless slaughter at Borodino, of the burning of Moscow, of the retreat and its horrors: then, as a matter of course, there was no longer any thought of peace and compromise with Napoleon. Nay, rather, the war sentiment now gained undisputed sway.

Before the end of summer Great Britain had secured a peaceful settlement with Russia and at the same time had been influential in bringing about a treaty between Alexander I. and the Spanish Regency (dated respectively July 18th and 20th, 1812); so that while the fate of the campaign was still in the

balance there already existed a coalition, directed not so much against France as a nation, as against that predominance achieved by Napoleon and represented in his ambitious personality. Now arose the question whose answer would decide the future course of events: would the nations within the magic circle of Napoleon's power, in view of the great losses they had suffered, also join the general movement, either with or without the consent of their governments?

Napoleon does not seem to have discerned at once the full significance of the events in Russia. After his departure from the army he had still hoped that it would be easy to provision it and restore it to order at Vilna, that the division approaching to support it would bring new strength and courage, and that Murat, backed by Macdonald with the Prussians on the one side and by Schwarzenberg on the other, could maintain his position beyond the Niemen. When he passed through Warsaw he assured the government there that he still had 120,000 men. He had no thoughts of giving up his position of supremacy in Europe; not even when finally he heard that the remnants of the "Grand Army" had been unable to keep their position at Vilna, but that after infecting the newly-arrived fresh troops with their disorder they had to be led back over the Niemen to Königsberg, with untold sufferings and hourly losses on the road, and that the Old Guard numbered only 400 and the cavalry of the Guard 800 horse, the remainder consisting of a chaotic mass of several thousand officers and subalterns. That was a great misfortune, of course, but not so great as to destroy all courage. Napoleon resolved to bring a new army into the field and march against the Russians in the spring. Immediately upon his arrival in Paris preparations for armament were initiated on a large scale, the plans for which he had very likely thought out carefully during the protracted retreat.

The principal thing was, of course, that his government still had a strong enough position in France itself and the French people did not refuse to follow in his service. The authorities and institutions, as was to be expected, taking the hint,

showed no lack of devoted homage and assurances of unwavering loyalty. In his answers to them Napoleon made some reference to the plot of Malet and to the attitude of the government organs. "Timid and cowardly soldiers," said he to the deputation of the Senate, "may cost a nation its independence, but timid officials destroy the majesty of the laws, the rights of the throne, and the order of society. The noblest death would be that of the soldier on the field of honour, if that of the official who falls while defending his monarch, the throne, and the laws were not still more glorious." In his reply to the address of the Council of State he inveighed against those who upheld the doctrine of natural rights, and held them accountable for the insecurity of public institutions. "Indeed," he said, "who are they that have declared the principle that revolt is a duty? that have flattered the people by ascribing to them a sovereignty which they are incapable of exercising? Who have undermined the dignity and sanctity of the laws by making them dependent not on the hallowed principles of justice, on the nature of things and of civil rights, but simply on the will of a collection of men who are wholly lacking in any understanding of civil and penal law, of administration, or of military and political statutes? He who is called to regenerate a state must proceed on principles diametrically opposed to these. History portrays the heart of man; in its pages must we seek for the merits and defects of different kinds of legislation." What was his object in such outbursts? Nothing but to point out clearly once more how he himself had once saved the state from the anarchy into which that spirit of revolt had plunged it. This spirit had now manifested itself again, and the state would certainly be ruined by it if the Emperor were to be forsaken now instead of being sustained with might and main; and this applied equally to his son, the heir of his throne and of his principles.

It now remained to be seen whether the people of France could be made to share that conviction. For that was necessary if Napoleon was to succeed in recovering with a new army his former position.

On his return home all the recruiting material he could command consisted of the conscription of 1813, say 140,000 men, most of whom reported at the military stations before the end of December and were listed in the cadres. Within a few months they would be sufficiently drilled for active service. Of trained soldiers there were only four regiments of marine artillery, 3000 gendarmes, and two battalions of the Paris municipal guard. These forces would not by any means be sufficient for the Emperor in his present situation and with his outlook for new wars and new victories. He must have other and far larger forces. There were the cohorts of the national guards, 80,000 strong; but then they were not available outside of France, and most of their leaders were officers who had been either invalided, pensioned, or discharged.

Some remedy was required in this situation. In the first place the Senate was called upon to pass a decree that the cohorts, like the regular line, would have to serve in foreign wars; next, the "Grand Army"—whenever the chaos of stragglers was disentangled—must send on all available generals, staff-officers, colonels, and subalterns. Both these things were accomplished. Nay, more: from the national guard itself there came in individual petitions (by order, of course) for the privilege of being led against the enemy, whereupon the Senate passed the necessary decree, January 11th, 1813. This also opened up the prospect of 250,000 men in addition; i.e., 100,000 from the last four age classes, which had hitherto been exempt from the levy, and 150,000 of the conscription of 1814, which, however, the Emperor would not call to arms until spring. Thus the material for the new army was provided, and if some squadrons and a few larger bodies of troops were taken in from the army in Spain, a very respectable army could be put into the field. But Napoleon was not satisfied with that; in April he demanded from the Senate 180,000 men more, national guards and recruits, so that, taking into account desertion, incompetence, and sickness, he might have at his disposal an army of 600,000 men for the campaign of 1813. The scarcity of horses he sought to remedy by purchases in France and Hanover.

Moreover, the suggestion was made to corporations and private parties that they could secure special consideration by voluntarily offering to the Emperor horsemen already equipped.

Napoleon exhibited in January of 1813 the same untiring activity as of old, the same knowledge of his resources down to the smallest detail, all held ready for use by a prodigious memory. It is with increasing astonishment that we see this one man, no longer aided by the usual carefully prepared lists of troops, under circumstances that would have dimmed the vision and disturbed the calm of any other human being, and surrounded by servants that were of assistance only in subordinate matters, working with indefatigable energy to rebuild the fabric of his power. What a pity that this great genius for administration, which had once brought order and strength to the state, was now exhausting itself in efforts that would sap the national forces!

But for these new sacrifices which he demanded it was not enough to have gained the consent of the Senate. It was necessary also to gain the good-will of the people, or at least overcome its reluctance; and that was no easy task. But here French patriotism helped him out. Not only the Emperor but France, too, had forfeited by the misfortune of the last year her commanding position in foreign affairs, her decisive pre-eminence among the nations. However deeply the people might deplore the unceasing state of war and its consequences, they nevertheless had no desire to see their country in a state of weakness. And the consequences of her loss of power were already making themselves felt.

This was true to begin with in Prussia, which had been compelled to join sides with the oppressor only by a menacing show of power. The people there regarded the destruction of the Grand Army, from which their own soldiers had escaped, as a sort of judgment of God, and as a sign to them to throw off at last the yoke of this humiliating alliance:

"With rider and horse and all,
So God hath caused their fall,"

as a poet expressed it. The oppressive acts of the troops as

they marched through the country had kindled the rage of the people against the foreigners and roused an undying hatred in their bosoms that sought for expression in action. One incident may serve as a measure of the sentiment that prevailed in the Prussian corps which had been compelled to serve the enemy of the people. Before Riga it had certainly behaved well. But later when Paulucci, the Russian commandant of the fortress, by authority of the Czar, sought to win over General von Yorck (who was in command in place of Grawert, then sick) to the Russian side, and exhibited a letter in which Alexander bound himself solemnly not to put up his sword until Prussia should occupy again her position of 1806; and when in December, on the retreat back to the south, Yorck's division found before it a Russian division under Diebitsch, who confirmed the promise; when, finally, the news was positively confirmed of the breaking up of the Grand Army: then the Prussian general concluded at Tauroggen on the 30th of December, 1812, a convention declaring his corps to be a neutral body and binding it not to fight against Russia for two months, even though the King should repudiate the agreement and command them to join the French again. That was a momentous act; for it showed that even a man of strictest loyalty and most conservative convictions, who had a profound aversion to reformers like Scharnhorst and Stein, was forced to give way before the weight of public opinion. In 1809 such men as Blücher and Bülow wanted to act, "with the king or without," in favour of Austria; now even a man like Yorck refused to fight against the Russians, whether the King approved or not. So the national sentiment won the day even over the monarchical. The cabinet of Frederick William III. began to be uncertain as to its course; it must needs turn about, to regain full control over them. But the encouragement from that convention at Tauroggen to the rest of Germany was indescribable. "Those whose memory reaches back to that period," writes Ranke, "will recall that the news of it seemed even to those at a great distance like a flash of lightning that illumined and transfigured the entire horizon. Whilst it under the French yoke, one could feel everywhere the universal pulsations of the national consciousness."

The impression of that same news on Napoleon was deep and lasting. The lessons he had received in Russia and was still hourly receiving in Spain in regard to the power of a national rising had at last opened his eyes, so that he did not delude himself as to the moral significance of the event. But in addition to that it had also a strategical significance, and it was this aspect that proved fatal to him. For after the desertion of the corps of allies any longer stay of his broken army at Königsberg, even with such re-enforcements as were sent, was out of the question. Murat had to retreat before the pursuit of the Russians to Posen and give up the line of the Vistula. This is the point to which Napoleon directed the attention of the French. "Immediately after I had heard of the treason of Yorck," he writes on the 6th of January to Berthier, who had remained with the army, "I resolved to make a communication to the nation, to be issued to-morrow, and order extraordinary levies of men." The response was the *Senatus consultum* of the 11th mentioned above, which was nowhere stubbornly opposed, so that Maret felt quite justified in explaining to the ambassadors at foreign courts that it was the intention of the French people not only to arm itself on a scale corresponding to its losses, "but also to establish its prestige, its glory, and its tranquillity secure against all contingencies." The Emperor assured the Prussian envoy at Paris, Krusemarck, that the French would follow him unquestioningly, and that if need be he would even arm the women.

But if the people were to offer this new sacrifice of blood without resistance, then the prestige and renown of their commander must also be undimmed. Hence wherever opportunity offered positive assurances were given out that the Emperor had invariably defeated the Russians, that it was only the fiendish cold that had destroyed the army, which really had perished only after Murat took command. There has been recently published a conversation between the Emperor and one of his higher officials, Count Molé, in February, 1813, which shows clearly how Napoleon wished to be judged. On this occasion he said: "The King of Naples is incapable of taking

supreme command. He has lost me an army, for at the time I left I still had one; now I have one no longer. After my departure the King lost his head; he did not know how to awe men into obedience, discipline grew extremely lax, in Vilna the troops plundered twelve millions' worth of property, and the soldiers became good for nothing."

Another means of overcoming popular dislike of these new armaments was found in the settlement of his contest with the Pope. In that way he would win over the millions of devout Catholics who had been offended by his violent measures against Pius VII. Would not they, too, see in the destruction of the army a visitation of God, who withheld his favour from a leader who was under the ban? Uncle Fesch, the cardinal, had the courage to say as much right out; that was something that demanded consideration. In 1811, as we have seen, the Pope at Savona had accepted the decree of the national council concerning the investiture of newly appointed bishops only with certain reservations; he had not recognized the council, and had granted the privilege of confirmation to the metropolitans in case of refusal on the part of the Pope only on condition that they performed the rite in the name of the head of the Church, whereas the Emperor desired the new bishops to be invested in the name of the Emperor. Pius, who was already regretting his action, refused his consent to this, whereupon Napoleon gave orders to bring him from Savona to Fontainebleau; here, with the assistance of some submissive prelates, new negotiations were begun, which the Emperor himself then brought to a conclusion. He employed against his prisoner all the resources of his diplomatic art and craft. Now he would make demands without serious intent and only with a view to dropping them for something more important; again, he would threaten, become vehement, taunt His Holiness with his ignorance in ecclesiastical affairs; and then, again, he would spread out before him a glowing prophetic picture of the extension and power which the Church would attain by his aid—first and foremost, the recovery of Germany to the Catholic fold—if Pius would only yield to his wishes, renounce temporal sovereignty, accept the decree of the

council without ado, and establish his residence in Paris. But on this last point the Pope was not to be moved; he chose Avignon, which was not expressly mentioned, to be sure, in the concordat; that read as follows: "His Holiness will exercise the ✓ papal authority in France and in the kingdom of Italy in the same form and manner as his predecessors." Having yielded this point, Napoleon did not insist that the renunciation of the patrimony of St. Peter should be explicitly set down in the articles; that was involved in the provisions of the agreement. The new concordat was signed on the 25th of January, 1813; the decree of the council in regard to the investing of bishops was included word for word. In return for his lost lands the Pope was to be maintained with an annual revenue of two million francs; the Emperor pardoned the refractory prelates. Napoleon had not yet secured all that he desired; he wanted to be the head of the Church, somewhat like the Czar in his own country, only far higher and with more universal sway as the name of the Church indicated, and with a world-wide mission to fulfil. Still the immediate advantage he was after he had gained. He had made his peace with the Pope, and the world could hear of it none too soon. Newspaper articles and church bells proclaimed it far and wide, and everywhere they sang "*Te deum laudamus.*" And although Pius, tormented by misgivings and remorse and enlightened by his old advisers, who again had access to him, as to the political situation of Napoleon, recalled his consent two months later, yet meantime the news of the reconciliation at Fontainebleau had its effect, and the war preparations were then for the most part completed.

But, besides the faithful, the Emperor had to win over those, too, who were more concerned for this world's goods than for those of the next world. That was, of course, very difficult; for, since he had undertaken the Russian expedition with the expectation that it would bring in material profit and restore order to the finances of the state, like the wars of 1805 and 1807, the disappointment was tremendous. And now the new armaments called for new and extraordinary expenses. A deficit of nearly 150,000,000 francs was expected for the year

1813, and the shortage of the two preceding years, over 82,000,000 francs, had not been made up. Mollien, Minister of the Treasury, a most honourable man, who had followed the policy of the Emperor with undisguised anxiety, advised him to increase the direct taxes. But Napoleon set aside that suggestion more positively than ever. He fought shy of touching the personal property of individuals. He hit upon another device: he would turn the communal property to some account. Several thousand communes possessed real estate that was not used for public purposes, but was leased. These lands were estimated to be worth 370,000,000 francs. The rentals were small, amounting to only about nine millions. But nine millions of interest would represent an investment of 135,000,000 in the five per cents, which were then selling at 75. Now if the communes had their nine millions of yearly income assured by entering for them 180,000,000 in the Great Book of the public debt, then by selling the lands on account of the state the 230,000,000 required would be obtained and the deficit covered. The sale was to be done by the "caisse d'amortissement,"* which in the interim issued redeemable bonds bearing five per cent interest, with which the minister paid creditors of the state, contractors, etc., this being easily managed because of the sure interest. Napoleon himself purchased 71,000,000 francs' worth from the treasury of the Tuileries, to raise the value of this paper. Mollien protested long against this arbitrary measure, which not only robbed the communes of their property, but also limited them for all the future to the above small revenue, whereas by natural processes their expenses would go on increasing and could be met only by increased assessments which would fall on individuals directly. Hence it was in appearance only that for the moment the individual with his property was not called on to contribute. But for Napoleon the moment was all-important. The great founder of national order and well-being we once knew is hardly to be recognized in this opportunist. Regardless of everything, now as during the past summer, he pushes on for that decisive victory which is to

* See page 229.

lay all Europe at his feet. Then will he restore order and prosperity, but certainly not until then.

When the new financial law had been discussed in council, it passed, in accordance with the constitution, to the Corps Législatif. Before the Russian campaign this concession was no longer made; the financial law for 1812 had been enacted without consulting the deputies of the legislature. In fact Napoleon seems to have cherished the firm intention to dissolve the Corps Législatif entirely after his victories over Russia; he said of it to Metternich at Dresden that he had muzzled it and brought discredit upon it, and now only needed to put the key of the legislative chamber into his pocket. Then he had a new programme in mind. "France," said he, "is less fitted for the form of popular representation than many countries. In the Tribune there was nothing going on but revolution; I established order by abolishing that body. However, I do not want absolute power; I want more than mere forms. I want something that will conduce wholly and solely to order and public prosperity. I shall reorganize the Senate and the Council of State. The former will replace the upper house; the latter, the Chamber of Deputies. I shall continue to appoint all the senators; one third of the Council I shall permit to be elected, the rest I shall choose myself. These will then prepare the budget and discuss all bills. Thus I shall have a real representation of the people, for it will consist only of experienced men of affairs; no more visionary ranting, no glittering tinsel of theory. Then France will be well governed even under an inactive ruler—for such are sure to come—and the usual method of educating princes will entirely suffice." This speech had the definite aim of showing Metternich and the world clearly that his work, the Empire, did not rest, was not dependent upon a single life. He would see to it that it should remain unshaken even under those emperors of his dynasty who were not endowed with his genius and energy. So far so good. But the fact that he expected national salvation only at the hands of bureaucrats shows that his own mind was not without its limitations; for he failed to grasp the great truth that only by the working together of theory and practice, only when

thinking shapes public policy and, conversely, when political experience guides thinking, does a state develop a healthy life; whereas he, by his one-sided reliance on the practical factors of government, fell into as barren an extreme as the radical doctrinaires that had preceded him in governing France. Had not the very things which he recognized as the foundations of the modern state and which he was spreading throughout the world with his armies, his officials, and his codes of laws once been the dream of just such visionaries as he detested so bitterly? His judgment of them might be never so contemptuous, and yet but for them and the fruit of their thinking his name might never have gone down to posterity.

But these plans formed by the Emperor in the days of his highest glory had through subsequent events become impracticable. He now had no intention of altering the constitution. He did not lock up the hall of the Corps Législatif, but rather opened its sessions on the 14th of February, 1813, with a speech which he wished to be regarded and publicly announced as a communication to the nation. This last remnant of popular representation was now a most welcome means of arriving at an understanding. He referred them to the Minister of the Interior for the evidence that at no time had commerce and trade been so flourishing in France as at that hour. He then painted the course of the Russian war in the well-known colours, only that here for the first time mention was made of the "*premature* appearance of the winter's cold," which has since managed to maintain itself for decades in history as an integral part of the Napoleonic legend. Besides that, he spoke of his peace with the Pope, of the English, who had again been obliged to evacuate Spain, where the "French dynasty" was now dominant and would continue dominant. He said he was satisfied with the attitude of the allies; he would abandon none of them and he would maintain the integrity of their governments. That meant that he proposed to hold fast to Poland, the Rhenish Confederation, and Italy, in brief, the entire sphere of power that was his the previous year; to hold and keep it undiminished just as if no miserable war had weakened his forces by the loss

of a tried army of 400,000 men. But the world had accustomed him to making extraordinary plans, and for him it was in itself a sufficient sacrifice that he had to defer his intentions to master the world, for the Continental blockade could no longer be maintained, England continued unhindered her commerce in the North Sea and the Baltic, with Cadiz and the Levant, and the Indian project was vanishing into the remote future. He must first conquer, win victories unparalleled, if he was to take up that thread where he had dropped it.

But supposing that Napoleon should be able to obtain from the French another armament for a new military expedition, the next question was: could he also have at his disposal the military strength of all his allies, as in the last campaign? On the 18th of January, 1813, he had written to the princes of the Rhenish Confederation and called upon them for new contingents. To encourage them, he declared that the Russians had fought poorly and only the Cossacks had proved themselves effective fighters after their fashion. The Grand Army of Germany, with the corps of Schwarzenberg, still amounted, he declared, to 200,000 men (!), and these he would swell before March by the national guards and new levies in Italy to such a point that he might have dispensed with further help from "his nations," but for Yorck's defection with 20,000 Prussians. That had obliged the army (an army of 200,000, it is to be remembered) to retreat before the Russians (who fought so poorly) beyond the Vistula, and so the war had approached the vicinity of Germany. He would be ready, indeed, with all his forces to defend the Rhenish states, but they must also feel the necessity of taking their share in that task.

The answer to this appeal was entirely satisfactory, although the several contingents diminished in size in proportion to the distance from France. The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was the only Rhenish prince who openly deserted Napoleon; all the rest were loyal. The most compliant, far more so than the Emperor's own brother Jerome, was the Grand Duke of Frankfort, who at once began most eagerly to equip two battalions in order to give Napoleon "opportunity for new glory."

An oppressive excise law furnished the requisite funds. The King of Württemberg, whose army corps of 14,000 had shrunk to 173 officers and 143 soldiers, hastened to assure him that immediately after he had become acquainted with the 29th bulletin he had busied himself in the effort to replace his contingent. Jerome of Westphalia again complained to his brother of the financial distress in his state—he himself had invested nineteen millions in France—but his brother's peremptory rebuke induced him to agree to furnish 20,000 men and send provision for 15,000 more to Magdeburg. As no money was on hand, he simply made requisitions. Bavaria, which had lost no less than 28,000 men, had to furnish an entire army, which was possible only with several conscriptions in 1813. Such sacrifices seemed too great to the Court of Munich, and the authorities reflected for a moment whether they should not take a neutral position; but finally, intimidated by the mighty armaments of Napoleon, they consented willingly to send one division. The rest of the contingent was gathered in a camp near Munich under Wrede. The Saxon court wavered even more than the Bavarian, as it saw Poland in the hands of the Russians and its own land threatened by a Russian invasion. Its policy was wholly dependent on that of its two German neighbours, Austria and Prussia.

And that brings up the principal question: would the two chief German powers maintain the alliance with France or not? On the answer to this everything at first depended.

Even before he wrote to the Rhenish states, Napoleon had made the proposal to the Courts of Berlin and Vienna that they reinforce their contingents. Then followed the defection of Yorck. Could that be the answer of Frederick William III.? Napoleon, with his usual distrust, might well suspect this, but he nevertheless accepted the assurances of the Prussian envoy that the King had nothing to do with that step, which was in fact the case. He not only had not commanded it; he actually felt, rather, that his policy had been disturbed by the high-handed act of his general. For, if the reports were true which trustworthy messengers had brought to Berlin ever since

November, 1812, as to the fate of the Grand Army, the consequence would surely be that the Russians would hasten to take every advantage of such an unexpected opportunity. But the aversion to what was called the "preponderance of Russia" was just as pronounced in Berlin as the desire to rid themselves of the French yoke. They did not venture even remotely to think of recovering Prussian territory beyond the Elbe, and the part of Poland lost in 1807 would doubtless now be appropriated by Russia. But Poland had been the very goal of Hardenberg's thoughts of late; he had even fancied Napoleon would bestow that kingdom on Frederick William, which would make a bulwark against Russia. So at the close of the year 1812 the Court of Berlin was rather disposed to reach an understanding with Austria, when also there was a strongly hostile feeling against Russia, and a confidential agent of the King repaired to Vienna. Just at that time came the proposal of the Czar that Prussia should separate from France and join his party, that he would restore Prussia to the position she held in 1806; should the King, however, adhere to his alliance with Napoleon, this would be regarded as a declaration of war, in which case Russia claimed the right to partition Prussia.

That was no empty threat. At the time of Alexander's compact with Bernadotte at Åbo the annexation of Prussia as far as the Vistula was talked of, the Crown Prince of Sweden agreeing to accept it in lieu of Norway, which had been promised him. And even now a strong party in the Czar's court were insisting on making the Vistula frontier a condition of peace with Napoleon. This party, which included Kutusoff and Romanzoff, did not, however, prevail. Alexander adopted another view which a young diplomat, Nesselrode, successfully advocated. Russia, said the latter, is in need of a long and secure peace; this is not to be obtained unless the preponderance of France is destroyed by decisive defeats and the old balance of the powers is restored. Russia alone is not equal to this task and needs the support of the central powers. This shaped the overtures made to Prussia. The Czar gave up all claims to East Prussian territory; that, of course, did not include the duchy of Warsaw,

which he was just entering. We learn that he was again, as in 1811, ardently considering the project of a united Poland under his rule, i.e., in a personal union with Russia. As he wrote to Czartoryski on the 13th of January, 1813, only regard for public opinion at home, which was unfavourable to the Poles, and for Austria and Prussia, hindered him from bringing forward that project now. Such a plan necessarily stood in the way of an understanding with Frederick William III., and it was now a question of the utmost importance whether the latter's envoy, Knesebeck, would find in Vienna what he was looking for, namely, willingness to join Prussia in an armed intervention with the twofold object of profiting by the weakness of France on the one hand, and of guarding against the threatened preponderance of Russia on the other.

Nowhere was there greater astonishment over the issue of the Russian campaign than at the court of Francis I. As late as October, Metternich, who had seen fit to approach Hardenberg after the Franco-Prussian alliance had been concluded, wrote to him confidentially that, judging from the way the Russians conducted their war operations, he regarded their existence as a European state virtually forfeited; and as the necessity of peace was being felt also in England, he purposed to agitate a general pacification. Such was in fact his intention. But in order to be able to play the rôle of mediator with dignity, the minister felt that what little army the impoverished state on the Danube had must be spared as far as possible, and this had been his constant effort throughout the campaign. As early as April, 1812, he had told Stackelberg, the Russian envoy at Vienna, the ostensible provisions of the treaty of alliance with France and assured him that Austria would certainly not raise more than 30,000 auxiliary troops; beyond that she would arm only in her own defence. Russia, to whom security along the Austrian frontier was as welcome as the same condition on the Russian frontier was to Austria, answered readily that in case of victory she would not act contrary to the interests of the Court of Vienna. So a sort of unwritten agreement was arrived at between these two declared enemies, and their diplomatic relations were

only outwardly broken off. This, however, was very far from being an understanding directed against Napoleon.* Austria gained the point that she could strengthen herself without any interference on the part of Russia. Hence she was not making a mere show of fighting in the war against Russia, but was acting simply as a power that spares what little force it has because it is absolutely necessary. When, however, Napoleon, after the campaign, demanded that his father-in-law should double his contingent (which had gone back to Warsaw with the Saxons under Reynier and with a French division), so that the Russians might be kept busy while he was raising new armies, this demand was so directly contrary to the plans of Austria that consent was impossible. Yet the refusal could not be expressed abruptly and outright, lest suspicion be roused. What was to be done?

Metternich found an expedient in resuming in real earnest his plan of pacification; he assured Napoleon through a special envoy (General Bubna) that only a universal peace on a broad basis could heal the wounds of the last campaign and establish the new French dynasty. At the same time he urged the British government to conclude peace. Napoleon did not reject this Austrian effort at intervention; but his utterances to Bubna left little or no prospect of peace. Spain, he said, would remain in the possession of his family, only his troops should leave the country; but that only on condition that the British evacuated Sicily. Murat would keep Naples. He himself would not give up one of the countries annexed to France by *Senatus consultum* (Piedmont, Rome, Tuscany, Holland, Vallais, the Hanseatic territory, Oldenburg, etc.). On the other hand, if Francis doubled his contingent, he would furnish subsidies. His very life was in the thought of renewing war. As soon as this certainty was reached, Metternich turned all his efforts toward keeping the clash of arms far from Austria. He refused Napoleon's demand for a doubled contingent, yet by no means joined sides with his enemies. He shielded himself behind his rôle as a preacher of

* At that very time the Austrian envoy at Stockholm, Neipperg, tried to break the alliance between Sweden and Russia, and this was known in St. Petersburg. (Martens, "Recueil," III. 86.)

peace, yet carefully avoided proposing definite conditions of peace which he might have to defend; for Austria was in no fit condition for war either financially or in military resources. He encouraged Hardenberg to join the party of Russia publicly, because that would keep the war in the north; but he would not exert himself to secure from Russia the cession of Warsaw to Prussia, which made Knessebeck's mission a failure. To avoid all chance of collision he sent the auxiliary corps, not from Warsaw to Kalisch, as Viceroy Eugene, who had relieved Murat as commander of the broken army, had demanded, but to Cracow after the close of a truce with the Russians, "in order to save it for the coming campaign," as he assured the Emperor at Paris. This was not as yet defection from Napoleon, but it was "the first step in that direction": so the French Emperor himself termed it. He saw at once all the disadvantages of this measure, which would force Eugene, by depriving him of his support, to recede from the Vistula to the Oder. The Russians would get an open road for their advance.

But that advance in turn brought pressure to bear on the negotiations with Prussia and would hasten their settlement. Frederick William III. felt keenly hurt at the exclusively Austrian policy of Metternich. That King was still of the same mind as in the crisis of 1805, 1809, and 1811; he was still strongly convinced (and not without good reason) that Napoleon was to be overcome only by a coalition of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and it was only with reluctance that he was induced to negotiate separately with Russia. He had disavowed the defection of Yorck, and yet the same messenger who announced his discharge to that general was commissioned to hold out secretly to the Czar a prospect of alliance, provided the latter would protect him from Napoleon by a rapid advance and also restrict his Polish schemes. When Alexander gave a reassuring answer—he wrote that letter to Czartoryski on the same day—the King consented to go away from Potsdam to Breslau in order to get away from the French, who still occupied Berlin (this was on the 22d of January, 1813). In spite of that, he left Napoleon an opportunity of again securing Prussia for his own interests by paying

her debt of 90,000,000 francs incurred by the immense army supplies, or by guaranteeing to Prussia new territory. Napoleon did neither one thing nor the other; he contented himself with speaking to the Prussian envoy quite carelessly about parts of the duchy of Warsaw and the kingdom of Westphalia, without binding himself in the least, and so facilitated the quest of Alexander. On the day when the envoy's report arrived at Breslau, Hardenberg, who was already favourable to Russia, persuaded the King to create a military commission, of which Scharnhorst was made a member (January 28th). Yet Frederick William had no thought as yet of fighting side by side with the Czar. When he mobilized the troops of the line in Silesia and Pomerania (February 12th), he aimed only at guarding against a possible attack by the French, perhaps from Berlin, where a division under Grenier had arrived; and when he sent Knessebeck to Alexander to negotiate for a treaty of alliance, his immediate object was only to propose to Napoleon, with Russia to support him, a truce that should keep the French troops on the left side of the Elbe and the Russian on the right of the Vistula, and so serve as an introduction to a peace, on the same basis as the peace of Lunéville, perhaps, or of Amiens. For the time he had not the remotest intention of waging a war of extinction against Napoleon.

But that was the intention of his people. Although this sentiment was not strong enough in the year 1809 to carry the King with it, now it was to succeed. In memorials, in petitions and addresses, in letters from devoted generals, it was impressed on the King that every Prussian regarded war against France, whose oppression had been so deeply and painfully felt, as a holy war. And it was seen how much in earnest the people were when the military commission on the 3d of February called upon the well-to-do and the intelligent to enter the army as volunteer chasseurs, and a few days later set aside all exemptions from service between the ages of 17 and 24, thus declaring liability to service universal. They came in throngs, fired with enthusiasm and the martial spirit, and eagerly seized the weapons that were offered, while others, who could not fight with

them, sacrificed almost their last possessions for the sole purpose of resisting the French—certainly for no other purpose, whatever the King's decision might be. There was a revolutionary impulse in the Prussian people, just as there had been four years before, when Frederick William hesitated, only it was still stronger.* Moreover, they felt themselves to be not merely Prussians, but Germans first of all, and "constituted themselves a nation" as the Austrians had done in 1809, while the King and his confidential advisers still adhered to provincial particularism. This national German movement among the people favoured the Czar to this extent, that it laid infinitely less stress on the possession of Polish territory than did the policy of the Berlin cabinet, and Alexander had but to give it active support to pave the way for his secret designs with regard to Warsaw. Accordingly he sent Stein with full powers to Königsberg, to assemble the provincial estates and secure from them appropriations and military preparations; the same Stein who was looked up to as the head of the national party that looked far beyond the boundaries of the petty German states to a united Germany. "I have but *one* fatherland," he had written in December, 1812, "that is, Germany; in this moment of great development I am utterly indifferent to dynasties." He accomplished his object in Königsberg completely. The diet gladly acceded to Yorck's demand that his corps be filled up, passed a militia law drafted by Clausewitz, calling for about 40,000 men all told, and opened the East Prussian ports. All this was quite independent of the court, and just as if their King had already definitely taken sides with Russia.

But that was far from the case. The negotiations between Knessebeck and Alexander at Kalisch came to a halt, because the former went beyond his instructions and demanded more persistently than they called for that all former possessions of Prussia in Poland be returned to her; to this the Czar would not listen. Not until the Czar at the suggestion of Stein, utterly ignoring the troublesome envoy, had a treaty presented directly

* See page 457.

at Breslau did matters finally reach a settlement (February 27th), and then it was under the pressure of the growing excitement among the people and the army. On the next day the convention was also signed at Kalisch. It was an offensive and defensive alliance, with the object of liberating Europe and primarily of restoring Prussia to the position she occupied in 1806. Russia guaranteed to her ally the possession of old Prussia, Frederick William gave up his quondam Polish province and contented himself with a strip of land which joins East Prussia and Silesia. Both powers were to make efforts to win Austria to their cause, and Russia agreed to support Prussia's efforts to secure subsidies from England. In order to restore the former power of the House of Hohenzollern, conquests in North Germany were fixed upon,—Hanover, only, being excepted on account of England. In Article III. the King pledged himself to add to his war forces by calling out the Landwehr, and on the 17th of March, 1813, appeared the necessary decree, accompanied by a ringing appeal "To my people," summoning them to a war of liberation from the long-endured oppression of foreign tyranny. On the same day Hardenberg handed to the French ambassador, Saint-Martin, the declaration of war.

Thus at Breslau the German national party had won the day over the local Prussian party, and soon the national trend of the Russo-Prussian alliance found expression in a new treaty of March 19th, 1813. In a proclamation to all Germans of the Rhenish Confederation the liberation of Germany from the dominating influence of France was held up as an object for which all should work together. Any prince who failed to respond to the appeal within a given time was threatened with the loss of his territory. A few days later a proclamation of Kutusoff "To the Germans" was published in which the threat was still more plainly uttered against those princes who "would be, and remain, false to the cause of Germany"; they were declared to be "ripe for annihilation by the power of public opinion and the might of arms in a just cause." A central commission of administration of four members with full powers,

appointed by Russia and Prussia,—Stein at their head,—was to administer affairs, make requisitions, raise a militia, etc., in the territories occupied. This was aimed in the first instance against Saxony, whither the viceroy Eugene had gone from the Oder by way of Berlin; only to leave it again, however, in March at the express special command of Napoleon, and to take up a strong position at Magdeburg. Alexander had said to Knesebeck and other confidential agents that Saxony was much better situated than Poland for an addition to Prussian territory, and that may have had some weight at Breslau. King Frederick Augustus had gone with two regiments of cavalry to Ratisbon, and his minister Senfft thought the best way out of the difficulty was to withhold the Saxon troops in Torgau both from the French and the allies, and to conclude a secret alliance with Austria which guaranteed the integrity of her (Saxony's) German possessions and granted an indemnity for Warsaw, in return for which Saxony would support the pacification scheme of Emperor Francis with 30,000 men (April 20th, 1813). The Saxon people failed to rise and join Prussia, as the allies may have hoped, although the populace in Dresden, embittered by the blowing up of the stone bridges at the orders of Davout as he was retiring, welcomed the two monarchs with great demonstrations of joy on their entry into the city on the 23d of April.

While the appeal to national feeling proved a failure here, in other places there were uprisings which had no lasting effect owing to the presence of the French, e.g. in Hamburg, where a Cossack patrol appeared about the middle of March and was enthusiastically welcomed; in Oldenburg and other coast cities, where rash acts of violence against the French tax-collectors and gendarmes led later to cruel reprisals, when the Russians had to retire again and a French flying column appeared in their stead. If the King of Prussia had only changed his system and joined the national party two months earlier, when everybody was still fresh from the impression of the catastrophe that befell the Grand Army, he would have succeeded in winning a great following in the west German states and the appeal

to the nation might have found an echo everywhere.* Now, indeed, when Napoleon had conjured a new army out of the earth and had attached his vassals beyond the Rhine anew to his interests, this result could no longer be secured. The allies, if they wanted to conquer, had only themselves and the help of outside powers to rely on.

V The Treaty of Breslau of February 27th was to be communicated to Sweden and England as well as Austria. Those two nations were now brought into closer relations through the good offices of Russia, which had been allied with them for a year. England guaranteed to Crown Prince Carl John the future acquisition of Norway, and promised him the island of Guadeloupe and corresponding subsidies if he would enter the Continental war against France with 30,000 men. Napoleon, who may have foreseen something of the kind, had made yet one more effort, sending a secret messenger at the end of February, 1813, to effect a reconciliation with Bernadotte; but as he again did not offer Norway, but only Pomerania and indefinite lands between the Elbe and the Oder—the well-known partition of Prussia—the negotiations came to nothing. On the 3d of March the Swedish-British treaty was concluded, and on the 23d the Crown Prince sent a public letter to his former sovereign renouncing his allegiance. Prussia also, which had hitherto been at war with England, now naturally entered into a treaty with that power, which promised Frederick William the necessary subsidies. And in order to hold that monarch to the project of war and so keep Russia on the offensive, the government in London gave up the scheme of founding a Guelph kingdom under a British prince between the Elbe and the Scheldt. Pitt's plan came to life again, namely, in this struggle against the preponderance of France to restore the balance of the powers and so reopen the old markets for British exports. The old map of Europe which he had ordered to be rolled up was brought out again; for now it was to be restored. This was not at all the sentiment which Metternich

* On the 29th of January Prince Hatzfeldt said to Napoleon in Paris that if the fire were now kindled in Prussia, it would inflame all Germany, and the Emperor agreed with him.

looked for on the Thames when he offered the English government his good offices toward securing a universal peace, in which England was to induce Napoleon, by concessions beyond the seas, to restrict himself on the Continent and keep the peace. The London Cabinet rejected that altogether now. The passage in Napoleon's speech from the throne dealing with the future of Spain was enough, they said, to show that such a step had no prospect of success.

This naturally reacted on the policy of the Austrian government. If Austria was to hold fast to the rôle of peace-maker,—which was desirable both for her own independence and in order to cut loose from the French alliance,—she must lay before the French Emperor the proposed restrictions without being able at first to offer anything in compensation; and, as he would hardly enter willingly into the plan, she must be armed, in order that the emphasis of powerful resources might be lent to the proposals. In other words, Austria had to exchange the rôle of unarmed mediation for that of armed intervention. To have the requisite strength, Metternich made the compact with Saxony, and tried to win Murat, Bavaria, and even Jerome (it is stated) to his party of neutral mediation. This change in policy was adopted in March, 1813, at the very time that Napoleon had sent a new ambassador, Count Narbonne, to Vienna, to hold forth there the prospect of a partition of Prussia and the acquisition of Silesia, if his father-in-law would fight again on his side with 100,000 men, Metternich declined, and when the envoy requested that at least the auxiliary forces should terminate the truce concluded in January, he replied that the Russians had already served notice to that effect; but he shrewdly concealed the fact that they had done so at the request of Austria and after the convention of March 29th, in order that the corps might retire before superior forces to Galicia and from there to Bohemia, where a new force was being armed for the purposes of the policy of mediation. Would that army ever see active service? That depended on whether Napoleon were "reasonable," as Francis I. called it, i.e., whether he would forego his oppressive preponderance in Europe. The situation was well described by Talleyrand in Paris in the

following words addressed to Prince Schwarzenberg on his return: "The moment has come when the Emperor Napoleon must be King of France." That penetrating mind knew well enough that this utterance gave expression to an antagonism of interests that could never be reconciled.

It had originally been Napoleon's plan not to open hostilities until May. As late as the middle of March he speaks of it in letters to Eugene, saying that he proposed to cross the Elbe north of Magdeburg, having with him not only the army commanded by the Viceroy, but also a second to be collected in Mainz and Erfurt; then by forced marches he would advance by way of Stettin to Danzig, where Rapp was waiting with 30,000 men to be relieved. He thought he could command by that time 300,000 men for that movement, enough to bring the lower Vistula under his control. Then the Russians would have to recede, and Prussia would fall into his hands; and we have already seen how he divided up the state of the Hohenzollerns in his proffers to other governments. It was a grand conception, but very far from being a plan of war. Soon, even in a few weeks, it was dropped. The alliance of the northern powers, together with their insurrectionary tendencies, the threatened loss of Saxony, but especially the increasingly manifest uncertainty of Austria, led to a change of plan. Napoleon arrived at the conviction that the sooner he cut the web of diplomacy with his sharp sword the better, in order to bring the wavering to his side by the mandate of the conqueror and to gain control of the property of the vanquished. Hence he resolved on beginning the war earlier than he had intended. On the 15th of April, 1813, he left St. Cloud, and two days later he was in Mainz.

The preparations he saw there and soon afterwards in Erfurt, and the troops he passed in review, could not exactly inspire him with confidence. His new army was to embrace twelve corps besides the Guard, but at first he had only seven of these at his disposal. Of the seven, the first was stationed in Hanover under Davout to command the lower Elbe, and so could not be counted on for the offensive. Eugene commanded two others (numbering 47,000), and the rest, numbering about 135,000 under the

Emperor himself, took up the march for Saxony by the end of April.* Hence there were in all only a little over 180,000 instead of the 300,000 men on which he had counted a month before; and as the campaign began earlier than he had foreseen, their equipment left much to be desired. Above all, there was a great lack of cavalry. The entire army, excluding the corps of Davout, had only 10,000 horse, and the recruits of that body had hardly had time to become accustomed to their mounts. The infantry were late in getting their weapons, and had not been able to drill until they were on the march. The best artillery had been lost in Russia or was beyond the Pyrenees. They had to bring out old unwieldy cannon that had been discarded. But in other respects there was deficiency everywhere. Especially was the need of officers felt; and though many were recalled from Spain, yet there were not enough. The corps of staff officers was particularly weak. The corps of Oudinot and Marmont had none at all. The sanitary corps was short of men, and the army administration was wretched. All in all, it was a poorly equipped mass of recruits that was now to renew the gigantic struggle for the mastery of the world. What a contrast from the year before! Napoleon felt doubtless that he must throw the whole weight of his personal genius into the fight if he would conquer. "I shall conduct this war," said he, "as General Bonaparte, not as Emperor."

However, one advantage he still had: he was far superior to his enemies in point of numbers. Such an early opening of hostilities caught the allies in the midst of their preparation. Scharnhorst, writing on the 2d of April, said that the Prussian army would not be able to do anything until the end of May;

* The most thorough investigations on the French army in 1813 have recently been published in the "*Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine*," 1888; the figures there given have been accepted here. They gain in authority by their approximate agreement with the estimates of Jomini ("*Précis des campagnes*," etc., I. 237). He assigns 140,000 men to the Emperor and 40,000 to the Viceroy, excluding the divisions of Davout and Victor. The figures of Thiers are too high, those of Camille Rousset too low. The estimates in the contemporary German works of Clausewitz, Odeleben, and Müffling are altogether mistaken.

before that much depended on fortune. The Russians, after the losses of the last campaign and after investing the fortresses still occupied by the French along the Vistula and the Oder, had scarcely more than 50,000 men ready for open war; these, together with the somewhat stronger Prussian army, were advancing under Wittgenstein, Blücher, and Tormassoff (the latter replacing Kutusoff, who was sick, and who died the last of April). It was only in cavalry that the allies were stronger, having twice as many as the French—an advantage that was destined to have some influence on the progress of the war. When Napoleon now moved from Erfurt upon Leipzig, these armies joined their forces between the Elster and the Pleisse; and Wittgenstein, on whom the supreme command devolved, determined to attack the flank of the enemy while on the march, near Pegau in the direction of Lützen (May 2d).

The French Emperor had no expectation of such a sudden offensive movement, although he had heard of the concentration of the hostile forces and their position near Pegau. His plan was rather to come into touch with Eugene and then from Leipzig to fall upon the right wing and the rear of the enemy. On the first of May he had come upon the Russian vanguard at Lützen and had driven it back eastward. Then Ney's corps had taken a position east of that town, while Eugene was advancing from Markranstädt to Leipzig, and the remaining corps of Marmont, Bertrand, etc., were approaching singly between Naumberg and Lützen. Napoleon had just arrived at Leipzig the following morning, where a division of the enemy offered some resistance and led him to believe that he had a strong body in front of him, when suddenly a fierce cannonade in his rear undeceived him. He realized that Ney's troops had been attacked by superior forces. He immediately decided to halt the army thus surprised while on the march, to have Eugene advance south from Markranstädt and Marmont eastwards to the right of Ney, and to support Ney in the direction of Lützen with the Guard as a reserve. Meantime Bertrand on the right of Marmont could threaten the left wing of the enemy, while a corps of Eugene's army under Lauriston

took possession of Leipzig. This was all thought out and ordered in a flash. The only question was whether Ney's recruits would stand the attack of the enemy until the other divisions could enter the line of battle. But, though he had scarcely dared to hope for it, they were firm. The young, undrilled, ill-fed men, who had followed the Emperor's call reluctantly and sullenly, now fought with the greatest stubbornness against the valour of the Prussians, and it was not until afternoon, after long and bloody struggles, that they were driven out of the villages they had occupied—Gross-Görschen, Klein-Görschen, Rahna, and Kaja—and thrown into confusion. In the meanwhile, however, Marmont had been able to engage in the battle, and Bertrand to make a threatening demonstration; and when finally Napoleon, in the centre, pushed forward the Guard in order to recover Kaja and the other positions, and a corps of the Viceroy under Macdonald attacked the right flank of the enemy, the latter had to yield before superior forces, and the battle of Lützen, or Gross-Görschen, was won by the French. Napoleon had exposed himself more than ever that day, in order to fire his new troops. As a reward he heard from the lips of the youngest recruits, nay, even from the wounded and mangled, the enthusiastic "Vive l'Empereur!" of his old troopers.

To be sure, the victory was not so complete as he had thought to make it by surrounding the enemy at Leipzig; and it was not absolutely necessary for the allies to go back at once that night across the Elster and thence on to the Elbe. Napoleon, who may have had about 120,000 men in the battle, had suffered heavier losses than the enemy; more than 20,000 men were dead or wounded, and among them many officers, whom he could ill spare. No prisoners had been taken, no cannon captured. The lack of cavalry and the poor staying qualities of the raw recruits made it impossible to follow up the victory effectively, and the skirmishes of the next few days amounted to nothing. Nevertheless the victory was not wholly without influence on the political situation, for it brought Saxony back to Napoleon's side. On the 5th of May the Emperor

entered Old * Dresden, and from there sent word to the King, who was staying at Prague, to declare himself either as friend or foe. At this, Frederick Augustus, despite his convention with Austria, chose the former and offered Napoleon his cavalry guard and the entire garrison of Torgau. Ney started for that fortress with three corps, both to take up the Saxon forces, and then by crossing the Elbe to force the allies near Dresden back from that river. On the 11th of May they did actually leave the New City, and the Prusso-Russian army did not come to a stand again until it was beyond the Spree.

But the most important question had not been settled by this incomplete victory of Lützen, as Napoleon hoped it would be; Austria kept right along on the course she had entered. Hardly had the news reached Vienna when Metternich sent Count Philip Stadion, the Minister of War in 1809, to the headquarters of the allies to announce Austria as an armed mediator, and to state the conditions which the Court of Vienna would endeavour to enforce with all its powers. The minimum requirements were as follows: the duchy of Warsaw was to be dismembered, Napoleon was to give up the departments beyond the Rhein (Holland, Oldenburg, the Hanseatic cities) and his protectorate over the Rhenish Confederation, Prussia was to be restored and Illyria and Dalmatia ceded to Austria, which was also to have a new frontier toward Bavaria. New successes of the enemy might of course moderate these conditions, but they could not change the political attitude of Austria. They were the same conditions which Metternich had hoped to make acceptable to Napoleon, in case he had succeeded in persuading England to yield some colonies. As we have seen, England's refusal thwarted this plan.

How far the battle was from bringing the Emperor Francis back to the dependent alliance of the previous year became clear to Napoleon when Count Bubna made his appearance at headquarters in Dresden to unfold the programme of Austria in the following terms: a general peace was possible only through

* The Old City is on the south or left bank of the Elbe, and the New City on the north bank.—B.

cessions on the part of the Empire, for which England should give compensation; but as that country refused at present, the Emperor must make a beginning; then the island kingdom, being isolated by the peace of the Continent, would in turn submit. Must not this last remark have sounded hollow in the ears of Napoleon, the man who for years had in vain exhausted all his resources to bring about such an isolation? He came to the conviction that Austria was already in closer touch with the allies than with him, and at once decided upon his measures. He wrote to Francis that no one was more anxious for peace than himself, that he was ready to have a congress in which even the representatives of the Spanish insurgents might find seats, that he also favoured the idea proposed by Bubna of a truce pending negotiations; yet he would not make himself ridiculous in the eyes of England; rather than that he would die at the head of all high-spirited Frenchmen. At the same moment he directed the Viceroy, who had gone to Italy, to gather a new army by the end of June at the latest, which could keep the 60,000 or 80,000 Austrians in check in the south; the news of this was to be industriously spread in Vienna, so as to intimidate the government.

But as he always had several strings to his bow, he at the same time made an effort to reach an understanding with the Czar directly, without the intrusive mediation of Austria, which demanded sacrifices of him. Caulaincourt was to go to the hostile camp with the proposals for a congress and a truce, get permission for an interview with Alexander I., who was with the army, and open up to him the opportunity "to take a splendid revenge for Austria's foolish diversion in Russia" (as his instructions read). And what did the Duke of Vicenza have to offer? Poland to begin with. The grand duchy of Warsaw and the republic of Danzig were to be ceded, not indeed to Russia, but to Prussia, excepting a narrow strip that would indemnify the Duke of Oldenburg. In return Frederick William would have to cede his territory west of the Oder, i.e., Brandenburg with Berlin, and that part of Silesia marked off by a line drawn from Glogau to the Bohemian frontier. In

this way Prussia, whose capital would be in Warsaw, Königsberg, or Danzig, would come absolutely under the influence of Russia. Brandenburg was destined for the King of Westphalia, and the Krossen district evidently for Saxony. Napoleon had no desire, it was said, to return to the Tilsit agreement against England, as his aim now was to pave the way for a general peace; and the Czar must hereafter find some other method of enforcing respect for his flag.* By these concessions Napoleon hoped to break up the coalition. If Poland were abandoned and the Continental blockade dropped, would not Russia be content? Were not those the principal points at issue in the dispute of 1812? Six years ago he had gained what he now aimed at by the splendid victory of Friedland. Now, again, a second Friedland should secure a hearing for him. His envoy was still waiting in vain for the requested interview when the die was cast again for war.

On the 18th of May—the same day that Caulaincourt was dismissed—Napoleon sent orders to Ney, whom he knew to be at Luckau with the corps, to move in haste in the direction of Drehsa east of Bautzen; on the next day he himself hastened from Dresden to the vicinity of Hartha, where Wittgenstein had decided to risk another battle. The Russian general had been reinforced by new troops brought by Barclay and the Prussian General Kleist, and, entrenched in an excellent position that had become famous in the Seven Years' War, he was ready to receive Napoleon if he came from the west. But when it was learned at the headquarters of the allies that hostile forces were also approaching from the north,—as was indeed the case, since Ney, acting on the advice of his chief of staff, Jomini, had set out in a southerly direction even before he received the orders of Napoleon,—Alexander, instead of attacking Napoleon with a superior force, sent Barclay and Yorck against Ney.

* Only a part of these instructions have found a place in the correspondence of Napoleon. The real peace overtures have been given by Lefebvre ("Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe," V. 331), while the giving up of the Continental blockade is mentioned only by Jomini ("Précis politique et militaire des campagnes de 1812 à 1814," I. 261), who quotes the proposal verbatim.

Some skirmishing ensued on May 19th near Weissig and Königs-wartha, which caused the French about as much loss as it did the allies. But it had as a consequence that the French Emperor himself opened the attack on the 20th of May, in order to draw off the allies from Ney and leave him free to advance. With four corps and the Guard he made the attack from the west about noon, crossing the Spree at several points and driving back the vanguard of the enemy to Bautzen. By evening he succeeded in getting a strong position on the other side, and meantime Ney had also arrived via Klix, leaving only Reynier still to come. The next day was to decide matters, and the prospects were certainly not in favour of the allies, whose numbers were now inferior.

The Emperor's plan was to push Ney against Barclay, who formed the right wing of the enemy and was next to Blücher, who formed the centre, and so gain control of the enemies' line of retreat, while he himself attacked the Russians in front and deceived them as to his real object by his personal presence there and by deploying a stronger force. He kept at work until early morning, and at once gave orders for the action to begin on the right as a sign for Ney to advance; not until then did he lay himself to rest a few hours on the field of battle. Had Alexander seen his great antagonist sleeping so quietly, he would hardly have disregarded Wittgenstein's remonstrances and sought the decisive action at this place, as he really did by leaving Barclay's weak division without any reinforcements. The latter was in fact driven back after a few hours far beyond Gleina, and Blücher's flank exposed to serious danger. But instead of boldly pushing right into Blücher's rear,—as Jomini says he advised,—Ney for the first time became cautious. He could not of course conjecture that the enemy would leave his right wing so unpardonably weak, and so he waited for Reynier's arrival. When Reynier appeared at Klix he advanced again but no longer directly upon Hochkirch—for the favourable moment was gone—but on the right against Blücher, who was already turning his artillery upon him. That movement left the road to Görlitz open, and the mass of the allies, now

✓ vigorously pressed by Napoleon, were able in the nick of time to extricate themselves. They lost the battle, as they deserved to, but they saved their army, which was on the brink of destruction had not the boldest marshal of the Empire belied his reputation on that day. In vain did Napoleon press after the enemy. He lacked here as at Lützen the necessary cavalry, and his youthful columns were exhausted with fighting. On the next day, the 22d of May, when he rode in person to the vanguard to fire their ardour against the obstinate resistance of the Russian rear, he lost three able generals of his staff, among them his trusted Duroc, whom he sincerely mourned.

Was that such a battle as Napoleon expected by which to force his proposals on the Czar? Far from it. The political effects, in turn, were on a par with the military. Caulaincourt was not granted an interview with Alexander, but merely notified that the mediation of Austria had been accepted and further proposals would be received only through that power. The allies did, however, entertain the idea of a truce, and accordingly Stadion wrote to Berthier that they were ready to come to negotiations on that head between the lines of the armies. The question now was whether Napoleon was in earnest about the truce.

In the mean time, however, he had followed close upon the enemy, constantly fighting. He had left only Oudinot behind at Bautzen, whence he was directed to proceed to Berlin by way of Hoyerswerda. The allies had finally turned off to the right from Liegnitz and Jauer toward Schweidnitz, having abandoned Breslau. They were not agreed as to the continuation of the war. Barclay, who replaced Wittgenstein as commander-in-chief, was in favour of retiring to Poland with his disorganized Russians and Poles, to reorganize them there and provide them with ammunition, which was already running short. If he were to remain in Silesia, he needed six weeks' rest. This consideration, in view of Austria's preparations, settled the point for the allies, since Frederick William III. regarded with the greatest anxiety a possible separation of the two armies. If Napoleon had been aware of this critical situation of his enemies, he

would hardly have done what he himself later—and others as well—termed the greatest mistake of his life. He knew nothing of it, and so consented to the armistice. Of course he had his own reasons for wishing it. In a letter to the Minister of War, Clarke, dated June 2d, he gives two of them: his lack of cavalry, which prevented him from striking a decisive blow, and the hostile attitude of Austria. But those were not all. In his own army there was but too much confusion. The heavy loss of officers in both battles made itself keenly felt. The young infantry broke down from the exertion of constant marching; most of the corps had a third of their men, and that of Ney more than half, in the hospitals. Owing to the distress arising from defective administration thousands deserted, while others scattered in unrestrained marauding in order to find food. Consequently, in spite of re-enforcements, the army had soon shrunk to 120,000 men.* Besides hostile bands of guerillas did much damage in the rear, cutting off convoys, capturing two trains of artillery, and the like. It seemed to Napoleon foolhardy to build hopes of a third victory on such conditions for a foundation; for it could not be followed up any more than the preceding, and the losses it would involve would only give Austria a new advantage. One thing more. Reports poured in from Paris told of the most ardent longings for peace. Even men whose tried complaisance seldom troubled the Emperor with unwelcome truth, the Marets and the Savarys, urgently requested a cessation of hostilities, and he was obliged to take some account for the moment of public opinion in France. So on the 4th of June, when the army had pushed on to Breslau and Oudinot stood facing Bülow by the Elster, while Davout had occupied Hamburg, the armistice was signed at Poischwitz. According to its terms the French were to retire beyond the Katzbach, and the allies beyond a line that leads from the Bohemian frontier by Landeshut, Striegau, and Canth east of Breslau to the Oder. The Oder from the mouth of the Katzbach north, the Saxon frontier, and then

* Lefebvre (V. 348), who managed to secure information from the war archives at Paris, gives this figure for the time before the armistice.

the Elbe to the North Sea, bounded the territory to be occupied by the French army. Hostilities were to cease until the 20th of June.

If it had been Napoleon's purpose to break up by a sudden attack the game of diplomacy, and in particular to tear in pieces the web spun by Metternich, then his spring campaign was a failure. Nor had he succeeded any better in separating Russia and Prussia, nor in bringing Austria, like Saxony, over to his side. Rather, by his separate negotiation with the Czar, had he put in the hands of the latter a lever which he was not slow to bring to bear on the Court of Vienna. Great was the consternation of the Austrian government at the news of the second defeat, the repeated appearance of Caulaincourt at the camp of the allies, and the negotiations for a truce. It was feared that Napoleon might now turn upon Austria and compel her to join him; or that Russia might give up the fight, as in 1805 and 1807. It seemed necessary, therefore, to approach the allies by some overt act and bind them to the cause. Hence Francis I. repaired early in June with his minister to Castle Gitschin in Bohemia, to be nearer to them. Thither came Count Nesselrode, sent by Alexander to induce Austria to join the alliance formally. He found the Emperor greatly disinclined to enter the war with his poorly equipped troops as long as the possibility still remained of securing peace through negotiations. But he did obtain from Metternich a statement of six conditions which he declared to be essential for peace, and the first four of which Austria was willing to enforce by a resort to arms in case Napoleon rejected them: (1) the dismemberment of the duchy of Warsaw; (2) the consequent enlargement of Prussia, to which Danzig was to be restored; (3) restitution of Illyria to Austria; (4) independence of the Hanseatic towns; (5) dissolution of the Rhenish Confederation; (6) restoration of Prussia to her position in 1806 as far as possible. These first four conditions by no means contained what Austria had previously proposed as the "minimum," and in so far the victory at Bautzen had after all influenced the power on the Danube. But, on the other hand, the allies now felt sure

that Austria would under certain circumstances fight against Napoleon, but never against the allies. The latter had indeed, as early as the 16th of May, agreed at Wurschen on a much wider-reaching programme, including in addition to the above points the separation of Holland from France, the restoration of the Bourbons in Spain, the restoration of Austria to her position in 1805, the withdrawal of the French beyond the Rhine, and the liberation of Italy. But the certainty of Austria's co-operation, which Metternich claims to have guaranteed in person to Alexander I. at the Bohemian castle Opočno, made them ready to negotiate with the French in regard to a peace even on those conditions. For it seemed as good as settled that Napoleon, if victorious, would not consent to such terms. This peace was, to be sure to serve only as a preliminary arrangement, and was to be followed by negotiations looking to a definitive pacification that could not be brought about without the participation and assent of England. To this Russia and Prussia had to pledge themselves in June when they arranged with the London government, by treaty for subsidies, to supply them the funds for carrying on the war. On the 27th of June, 1813, then, at Reichenbach, the headquarters of the allies, the three powers signed a secret treaty the provisions of which had already been formulated at Opočno and included the four indispensable articles of Austria together with her solemn promise to declare war on France at once if Napoleon should not have accepted these provisions by the 20th of July.* In that event, indeed, the three powers were to wage the war no longer for that modest reward, but for the entire comprehensive programme of May 16th; that is to say, France was to be driven back and confined within her natural boundaries. Moreover, the powers bound themselves to allow no separate negotiations on the part of Napoleon with any one of them.

Napoleon had been made uneasy by Metternich's journey to Alexander and was not satisfied with Bubna's report; so he

* The evacuation of the fortresses along the Vistula and Oder by the French was also included among the essential demands binding Austria to open war.

invited the Austrian minister to meet him at Dresden. Metternich came, after explaining the situation to Nesselrode, and on the 26th stood in the palace Marcolini in the presence of the Emperor. In an interview lasting nine hours, during which Napoleon lost his temper more than once,—going so far, in fact, as to call his second marriage a piece of stupidity and to charge Metternich with venality,—he tried to confine Austria to the attitude of armed neutrality; but Metternich stubbornly held to armed intervention. This interview has become celebrated in history because it was supposed to mark the decisive turn in the policy of Austria and in the fate of Napoleon. But such a view of it is incorrect. The Vienna Court had, rather, been yielding to pressure from Russia for some time, and any pause in its movement was hardly conceivable at this point; so Napoleon was not so far wrong when he said of Metternich, "He thinks he moves everybody, and everybody moves him." Everybody but Napoleon; for the last word he uttered to the minister at the close of the interview was not to be fulfilled: "You certainly will not declare war on me."

The interview in Dresden resulted in the Emperor's meeting Austria half way; he not only declared the alliance of 1812 dissolved, but even accepted the armed intervention of Austria. There might be cause for wonder in this determination of Napoleon, did we not find an explanation of it in a convention signed on the 30th of June by Maret and the Austrian minister providing that, in the interests of the peace negotiations to be carried on at a congress to meet at Prague, the truce should last until the 10th of August, and that Austria was to prevail on the allies to accept the proposal. Metternich had already made this proposal, as a reward for the acceptance of Austria's mediation, in the great interview of June 26th; which proves that at that time he was still really in earnest about securing peace.*

* The question whether Napoleon or Metternich was the first to propose a longer truce was long a matter of dispute. Since the publication of the authentic report which the minister prepared for Francis I. in 1820 the question seems decided in favour of Metternich. In this document we have the answer Metternich claims to have made to Napoleon's request

Nor did Napoleon desire war at any price. He, too, would perhaps have been ready to conclude peace, though he would have preferred it to be a general one, that would put an end to all hostilities and secure repose to the French people. A mere Continental peace that left the war with England open and the French colonies in English hands he cared much less for and would accept only under two conditions: either after a series of crushing victories that assured the preponderance of the Empire for some time to come, or in consequence of a separate convention with Russia, similar to that of Tilsit. Now in order to strike crushing blows he needed time for extensive preparations, a period which he had reckoned at three months in his instructions to Caulaincourt on the 26th of May. The armistice of June 4th fell far short of that. Now the desired increase of time was within reach, and at once the Emperor seized it. But at the same time he hoped to find an opportunity at the congress to reach a separate understanding with the Czar. Hence he planned to send to Prague not only Narbonne, who was accredited to Austria, but also Caulaincourt. Of course not at once. He kept back the marshal until the 26th of July, when the extension of the armistice was confirmed by the signatures of the various negotiating parties at Neumarkt. Why was that? Did he hope to find some way of approaching

that Austria remain neutral: "Emperor Francis has offered the powers his mediation, not neutrality. Russia and Prussia have accepted it; it remains now for you to decide. Either you accept, *in which case we shall fix a period for the duration of the negotiations*, or else you decline, in which case my sovereign will deem himself wholly free in his plans and acts." That is to say, if Napoleon accepts the mediation, Austria proposes to allow for the necessary negotiations a time mentioned in the conditions of the truce. The extension of the armistice was advantageous for Austria's war preparations, but it was far more so to the French. If, then, Metternich made such a high bid to secure Napoleon's acceptance of mediation, he must have been very much in earnest in seeking a peace that would save his country from invasion. He himself told Hardenberg early in July that Emperor Francis was convinced that the whole burden of the war would fall on Austria, that it would bring the greatest calamities to the monarchy, and that to prevent this he would renounce all acquisition of territory. (Oncken, "Preussen im Befreiungskriege," II. 399.)

Russia even at Neumarkt? Or was he unwilling to appear at Prague under the fresh impression of the news from Spain that Wellington on the 21st of June had totally defeated the French army at Vittoria, far north of the Ebro, and put them to flight, that only a few positions were left them beyond the Pyrenees, and that after those fell immediate danger would threaten France herself? No doubt he was anxious to extricate himself with honour in the east; and so Caulaincourt received instructions "to conclude a peace that would be glorious." *

In the capital of Bohemia Caulaincourt was soon convinced that there was no prospect of fulfilling his sovereign's wishes. Anstett, the representative of Russia, was a confirmed hater of Napoleon, and moreover he had agreed with Metternich to conduct the negotiations in the same manner as in the congress of Teschen in 1779; i.e., not to express their views in open conference, but only in writing through the mediating power. Metternich had chosen this method in order to preclude all chance of secret understandings behind his back, and the allies had adopted it in order that Austria might more surely compromise herself with France. Under these circumstances Caulaincourt found nothing to do, and Napoleon had to give up his idea of a separate agreement with the Czar. The news that Alexander and Frederick William had conferred with Bernadotte at the Silesian castle of Trachenberg on a plan of campaign completely shut off any further thought of peace. At the end of July Napoleon left Dresden to meet the Empress Regent and the minister in Mainz, to receive their reports, give them directions for the time of his absence on the next campaign, and to inspect the divisions of two new army corps.

* Ernouf, "Maret," p. 574. The statement that Napoleon was not at that time averse to a general peace is confirmed by Metternich in a letter of June 28th from Dresden to Francis I. " . . . convinced that the question of a general peace would be much more easily fought to an issue than that of a Continental peace." (Oncken, II. 395.) Maret even handed him an outline of the scheme. (Ernouf, p. 565.) The positive statement of Napoleon at St. Helena that at Dresden he wished for a general peace has been made known in Montholon's "History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena."

Then on the 5th of August he returned to Saxony. Only five days remained before the close of the congress, and it had not got beyond formalities. This was perfectly natural, for nobody was now anxious for peace. The allies had never expected it as a result of Austria's mediation, but had accepted her offices only in order to build for her "a bridge across the chasm"; and Metternich himself had assumed quite a warlike mood at the news of events in Spain. His only wish now was to convince his wavering master that reconciliation with Napoleon was impossible, and he finally succeeded.* Fouché, who during those days passed through Prague as the newly-appointed governor of Illyria, had told the allies a good deal about the precarious situation of the Emperor and the despondent feelings of his people. Even in Austria the people were in a ferment and the minister had to reckon with them. Broglie, Narbonne's secretary, says in his memoirs, "We could no longer cross the street without being insulted."

But the most important thing was that Napoleon became convinced at last that he had been mistaken about Austria's future attitude when he expressed himself so confidentially to Metternich. The reports of Caulaincourt, and especially the Austrian army lists which the French had managed to get hold of at Prague, led him to consider more seriously than before the possible effects of a declaration of war from that quarter. He suddenly saw himself face to face with a more powerful coalition than had ever confronted him, and that, too, of powers which he had hitherto supposed to be irreconcilable in their interests. He made one last effort to break it up. Hardly had he returned to Dresden when he instructed Caulaincourt to sound Metternich secretly as to "how Austria understood the peace, and whether, in case Napoleon accepted her conditions, she would make common cause with him, or else remain neutral." But he was too late. As his answer Metternich brought forward not only the four indispensable articles for which Austria had

* Wellington could therefore assert with some show of reason, after all, that his victory at Vittoria drove Napoleon out of Germany. (*Historical Review*, 1887, p. 598.)

bound herself to fight, but the two additional ones for which she desired to negotiate, i.e., he demanded also the dissolution of the Rhenish Confederation and the restoration of the old Prussian state. All this was to make sure that Napoleon would refuse. His definite answer to these conditions, yes or no, was to arrive at Prague not later than midnight of August 10th. They were doubtless anxious hours that Metternich spent after sending off his ultimatum. What if Napoleon declared outright and in season that he accepted? What an embarrassment for Austria! Yet Metternich's calculation was sound. The victor at Lützen and Bautzen could not accept a programme that disputed his control of the German troops and bade him vacate the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder. "Do they want me to dishonour myself?" he said to the minister in Dresden. "Never! Your sovereigns born to the throne can suffer defeat twenty times and yet each time return to their capital. But I am a child of fortune; I shall have ceased to reign on the day when I have ceased to command respect." He was now indignant at the demands of Austria, which he exaggerated in his letters to Jerome and Cambacérès as including even the restitution of Venice, and just to propose something on his part he offered the following terms: dismemberment of the duchy of Warsaw, the independence of Danzig, and the restoration of Illyria with the exception of Trieste. These were communicated to Bubna at Dresden on the evening of the 9th, and he reported them in good time at Prague. But Napoleon's official answer did not arrive there until the 11th, when the representatives of France already had in hand their passports and also Austria's declaration of war. The congress was closed; a new terrible struggle was about to begin.*

* Napoleon did not so quickly throw up the game of diplomacy. Hostilities could not commence until after a week's notice. This interval he used to announce his acceptance of Austria's ultimatum, for no other purpose, surely, than to throw the odium of the aggressor on other shoulders. But he accomplished nothing by it. On the 16th of August, Alexander and Frederick William having come to Prague, his envoy received a negative answer and his dismissal. In the year 1814 the Emperor, then dethroned, said to the Austrian General Koller: "As to the congress of Prague, I con-

We cannot be expected here to describe at length the battles in which the nations and governments of Europe, forgetting their individual quarrels, made a united resistance to the oppressive preponderance of imperial France. We can mention only the most important steps in the progress of events, and those only briefly.

During the armistice Napoleon had made the best possible use of his time. The army with which he now confronted the enemy is estimated at 440,000 men. Of cavalry, the lack of which he had lamented so bitterly a few weeks before, he now had a superabundance; nor was there any longer a deficiency of artillery. And although his forces were made up of the youngest of the youth of France and the states of the Rhenish Confederation available for service, yet we have seen these striplings at Lützen and Bautzen fight like veterans. They would do their duty again, and do it even gladly and eagerly were not the treasury at so low an ebb, and did but the commissary officials have a little more sense of honour. But money for the men's pay was scarce, and the corruption was incredible; so that the young warriors suffered excessively from hunger, which sent many thousands to the hospitals.* Moreover, there was still a great scarcity of officers and subalterns; the latter doubtless because the Emperor took the best material for his Guard, which had now grown to 58,000 (normal strength 80,000) and was cared for with the same solicitude as before. It almost looked as if the Emperor, who was free from national ties, meant to make a personal army of this host within a host. Besides this body there were fourteen army corps. One corps of the division under Davout, on the lower Elbe, had been de-

fess to have been deceived in you; I took you still to be what I had learned to know you on former occasions, and you had in the mean time changed to your own advantage."

* The lists show no less than 90,000 men sick, exclusive of the 440,000 at which the army was reckoned in Germany. Corruption extended to the immediate circle of the Emperor. An eye-witness relates how the paymaster Peyrusse put into his pocket 1000 francs out of 4000 that the Emperor had set aside for a monument to Duroc, remarking that such was the custom. (Odeleben, "Napoleon's Feldzug in Sachsen," p. 255.)

tached and sent to Dresden under Vandamme. A second was brought from Franconia and put under Saint-Cyr. Poniatowski had brought 12,000 unarmed Poles through Austria, and in addition there were five reserve corps of cavalry under Murat, the Emperor manifestly intending in this way to bring this general out of his political vacillation and bind him to himself. The entire force was stationed for the most part between Dresden and Liegnitz; only three corps under Oudinot were north of Kottbus and Kalau, facing Bülow, who was to cover Berlin.

The allies, too, had been making mighty preparations during the last few months. Alexander I. had organized the recruiting system, so that troops could arrive from all parts of the Russia empire, to say nothing of the great reserves in Poland. Prussia, thanks to the warlike enthusiasm of her people, had done wonders. "We now have an army," wrote Gneisenau as early as on July 11th to Stein, "such as Prussia never had before, even in her most glorious days." Austria, likewise, had made all conceivable exertions.

As to the plans for the proper utilizing of these forces (reckoned at 480,000) against the dreaded Cæsar, a provisional agreement had been reached even in June at Gitschin, when Francis I. first suggested the possibility of his co-operation with the other powers. The plans were further discussed and settled at Trachenberg, in concert with the Prince Royal of Sweden. There were to be three armies in the field. The main army was to occupy Bohemia, out of regard for Austria, which had been so courted and now feared a new invasion from the north and the occupation of Vienna by the enemy; re-enforcements from Silesia raised it to the desired size, and at the end of the armistice it numbered 230,000 men. Then a northern army under Bernadotte (156,000, over 40,000 of which, however, were detached); and finally a Silesian army under Blücher (of 95,000). The fundamental plan of strategy adopted for the campaign was, that if the enemy threw himself with his main body on any one of these armies, it should fall back while the other two advanced to the attack.

Napoleon had received no information of such a plan. He

became aware of it quite late from the march of Russian troops toward Bohemia. He himself had never formed the purpose of marching on Vienna which was ascribed to him in the enemies' camp. His plan was quite different; he wanted Davout from Hamburg and Oudinot from the south to co-operate in an offensive movement on Berlin, which he thought would be successful, for he far underestimated the northern army and judged that to be the weakest point in the enemies' lines. To form a connecting link between those two generals a division under Girard was to proceed east from Magdeburg. After the Prussian capital had been occupied, Küstrin and Stettin were to be relieved at once and so the left wing of the entire French line would be pushed towards the east. In the mean time the Emperor meant to cover this movement by a vigorous defence against the other two armies, leaving the enemy to take the offensive. From what point the attack would be made he was not certain. To prepare for any emergency he took a temporary position at Görlitz with the Guard, supposing that the united forces of the Russians and Prussians might advance from Bohemia by way of Zittau. He tried to secure Dresden from being surprised by means of earthworks and palisades, and entrusted the defence to Saint-Cyr, though he himself could take part in it within a few days.

But the expected offensive movement of the enemy at Zittau did not take place. On the contrary, Blücher had already commenced hostilities on the 16th of August and had driven four French corps under Ney, which were immediately in front of him at Liegnitz, over the Bober. Napoleon wanted to retrieve the loss and strike Blücher a fatal blow. But the latter at once became aware of his presence by the very behaviour of the French troops, if not by the resounding cry of "Vive l'Empereur!" and discerning the purpose of a decisive movement, he did what had been agreed upon, and retired fighting beyond the Katzbach. The Emperor failed to see that this retreat was intentional, and so pushed on eagerly after him, until a call for help from Saint-Cyr unexpectedly overtook him: Dresden was most seriously threatened by the advance of a hostile army

from the Erzgebirge. So the issue was to be determined in quite a different quarter from what Napoleon had supposed. He left Macdonald with three corps in front of Blücher and set out with the remainder to the west on the 23d of August. After extraordinary forced marches for three days the troops arrived in the vicinity of Dresden. The Emperor now conceived the daring plan of crossing the Elbe below the enemy, who was already near the city, so as to bring the hostile army between himself and Saint-Cyr, and thus cut off its line of retreat. But he was obliged to drop the brilliant conception at once; Saint-Cyr was too weak to make any lasting resistance, and the defensive works were still incomplete, so he had to choose the safer way and advance upon the enemy from Dresden. All he did was to send Vandamme with 40,000 men to Pirna and Königstein, while he himself entered the city on the forenoon of the 26th of August with the Guard, which had marched from Löwenberg in three days, over eighty-five miles. The corps of Marmont and Victor were still on the way. It was fortunate for him that at the enemy's headquarters, where Schwarzenberg was commander-in-chief, though with constant interference on the part of the three monarchs and their advisers, the favourable moment for attack the next morning was allowed on trifling grounds to slip by, and the assault on the city was postponed until the afternoon. Not until about four o'clock did the allies advance in a semicircle broken by the declivities near Plauen. But being without means for storming, and without re-enforcements on account of the scattered state of their forces, they were unable in spite of desperate valour to gain any lasting success, but just threw away their lives in the futile attempt to get possession of the suburbs. In the evening Napoleon himself issued from the gates to the attack and drove the Russians back on the left far beyond Striesen, the Austrians on the right to Löbtau and Cotta, and the Austrians and Prussians in the centre to the heights of Räcknitz. The battle was won without the corps of Marmont and Victor, which arrived during the night and greatly strengthened the French army.

On the next day the Emperor at once assumed the offensive.

He engaged the enemy's right wing and centre, while Murat with his corps of cavalry pushed through between the centre and the left wing, which he cut off, surrounded, and routed, taking an Austrian division prisoners. The enemy's mistake in leaving his cavalry inactive in the centre greatly aided the victory of the French. Meantime Vandamme also had crossed the Elbe and engaged a weak corps of the enemy at Königstein. Threatened in their rear, and with their left wing severely crippled, the allies retired. In those two days they had lost nearly a third of their forces in dead, wounded, and prisoners, while the enemy, being well protected by their position, had much smaller losses to report and could boast of another proud victory. If Napoleon had followed it up with the same skill with which he won it, the main army of the allies would have been overtaken by catastrophe that no successes of the other two armies could have retrieved. He did not do so. Primarily because, although he was certain of victory, he did not feel sure that the enemy, whose main forces in the centre and left wing had been but little engaged, would not renew the battle the next day. The commands he issued that evening leave no doubt that he expected yet a third day of fighting. And in fact the plan of retiring with the whole army to the heights of Dippoldiswalde and renewing the battle there was discussed at the headquarters of the allies far into the night. Finally, Schwarzenberg urged that the Austrians were poorly armed, and so ordered a retreat. Not until the next morning did Napoleon, riding forward to the line of battle of the preceding day, learn this decision when he saw the enemy's columns disappearing in the valleys on the road to Dippoldiswalde and Maxen. As Vandamme with 40,000 men held the Pirna highroad that led by Peterswalde to Teplitz, it was the Emperor's conviction that the allies would seek to reach Teplitz by shorter though less convenient roads. He ordered Saint-Cyr and Marmont to follow them on the road past Sayda Victor, while Murat was to march to Freyberg and Frauenstein and threaten their flank and rear. On the 28th he wrote to Vandamme, whose position near Pirna was now taken by Mortier, that the enemy seemed to have started in the direc-

tion of Altenberg, and that he prevent their making connections with Teplitz and especially do great damage to their baggage-train.* He himself by no means deemed the enemy conquered, having just expected him to renew the battle, and evidently regarded it as a great success that he had victoriously repulsed the assault of the main army. If he had any inkling of the dejection in the other camp, the ill-feeling of the Austrians, the poor order on the retreat, the confused marching of the columns so that 40,000 Prussians under Kleist had to turn aside and climb the hills to make any progress at all, he would not have wavered for a moment, but completed his victory by a crushing blow.†

But there was another circumstance. During the last few days the Emperor had been notified of a calamity that had befallen the army of Oudinot: it had been defeated at Gross-Beeren on the 23d of August by Bülow and forced to retreat to Wittenberg. And as if that were not enough, just now, as he was about joining the pursuing corps, the news arrived of a brilliant victory by Blücher on the 26th at Wahlstatt on the Katzbach over Macdonald, whereby the eastern army of the French lost 20,000 men and was driven back into the Lausitz. Under these circumstances could he still afford to go into Bohemia? He weighed this question and answered it in a series of notes in the negative. For it had been his main plan origi-

* This letter of Berthier's to Vandamme is quoted by all historians, even the military ones, with the meaningless clerical error "Annaberg" instead of "Altenberg," which alone is possible. Neither the contents of the letter nor Napoleon's letter to Murat on the following day leave any doubt on this point. The latter contains this sentence: "Toute l'armée se retire par Altenberg sur Toeplitz."

† An indisposition that came upon him on the 28th at noon while breakfasting on the road to Pirna is said to have hindered him from advancing and forced him to return to Dresden. So runs the legend. But the illness must have been of very short duration, though it may have a basis of truth; for he was seen riding back to Dresden "very cheerful and merry," and there a messenger from the Katzbach found him in the best of health. He himself, to be sure, in 1815, in speaking to some generals sought by means of this petty accident to draw a veil over his great mistake as to the extent of his victory at Dresden.

nally to remain on the defensive in the south and make an offensive movement only in the north. Hence the Dresden affair he regarded as merely a defensive victory, at a time when his scheme of an attack on Berlin and the Oder, where the garrisons could hold out no longer than October according to his reckoning, was on the point of miscarrying. That, therefore, must be the direction of his next movement with stronger forces and in person, whereas Dresden he merely put into a better defensive position. And now it was the politician in him that joined the strategist and led him astray; "I can succeed thereby in separating the Russians from the Austrians, for I can bring to bear upon Austria my regard for her in not having carried the war into Bohemia." It was his plan within the next two weeks to take Berlin,—supposing Macdonald to check Bülow,—provision Stettin, destroy the Prussian defences, and disorganize the landwehr. The pursuit into Bohemia was given up.

It must be left to military experts to criticise the strategic aspect of this plan. Hitherto they have condemned it. And as if the very events themselves were to put the Emperor in the wrong, Vandamme in his advanced and isolated position met in front on the 29th of August resistance from a superior force of Russians and Austrians at Kuhn, and finally, on the 30th, was attacked in the rear, as well, by Kleist, who had got behind him on the Peterswalde road. His corps was annihilated with the exception of a small remnant, which sought safety in flight over the mountains.

Nor was the enterprise against Berlin destined to be carried out. The commands for it had indeed already been issued early in September, when a gloomy report came from Macdonald summoning the Emperor to Bautzen with the auxiliary corps. He repaired thither, intending to reinforce the threatened army with the corps of Marmont and a corps of cavalry, thus to defeat the impetuously advancing Blücher, and then move "in great haste" on Berlin. An excellent plan. But suppose no battle ensued? Suppose Blücher, whose vehement energy was guided and held in check by the superior intellect of his chief-of-staff, Gneisenau, learns again, as once before, in August, of

the Emperor's presence and retires, luring his foe after him into the wasted country? That was just what took place. Blücher fell back from Hochkirch to Görlitz, fighting constantly. This time, however, Napoleon discerned his aim and stopped the pursuit. He was now obliged to move against Bernadotte without having defeated, as he had hoped, the Silesian army. He gave orders to that effect, when news comes from Dresden of a new offensive movement of the Bohemian army. In any case, he would have been too late in the north for the present; for the impetuous energy of Bülow and the valour of the Prussian landwehr, for which Napoleon's contempt knew no bounds, had inflicted such a decisive defeat on Ney (now in Oudinot's place) at Dennewitz on the 6th of September that he had to take flight far beyond Torgau. "Your left flank is exposed," wrote the defeated marshal to the Emperor on the next day, "take care. I think it is time to leave the Elbe and retire to the Saale." *

Before receiving this letter Napoleon had already arrived at Dresden, and in a reconnoissance beheld the heights of the mountain roads to Bohemia occupied by the enemy. For the allies, thoroughly elated by their own victory at Kuhn and the successes of the other two armies, as soon as they learned of Napoleon's advance against Blücher, undertook a double diversion in favour of the latter. A division of 60,000 Austrians was to cross the Elbe and fall on the flank of the advancing enemy at Rumburg, while the remainder of the main army held in check the forces left at Dresden. Napoleon was aware of the intended diversion at Rumburg. He sought to seize the moment to drive the enemy back to Peterswalde and there venture an advance into Bohemia if circumstances favoured. He succeeded in doing the first, but the nature of the country frustrated the

* As to the other divisions that were to operate against the northern army of the allies: Girard's, on hearing of the affair at Gross-Beeren, had turned about and had been routed on the retreat to Magdeburg; Davout, on the other hand, whose corps consisted more than half of Dutch and South Germans, the least reliable elements of the whole army, could risk nothing but a weak demonstration, which was given up again after the defeat of Oudinot.

latter intention, and on the 12th of September the Emperor was again in Dresden. When the allies, who had recalled all but one division of the Austrian corps at the first news of his presence, soon afterwards advanced anew over the mountains to mask Schwarzenberg's march northwest in the direction of Leipzig, Napoleon thwarted the scheme by making another sally as far as Kuhn. The enemy's position seemed to him still too strong for a successful attack, as he himself was obliged by the difficulty of procuring supplies to send two corps to the north to protect convoys on the Elbe. He had to content himself with a "system of hither and thither" with Schwarzenberg. Here again he longed earnestly to be attacked, but in vain. The enemy evades the commander-in-chief and defeats his generals.

But he cannot afford to remain idle long, as the circle of the hostile forces keeps drawing closer around him and he can provide for the masses of his troops in the restricted space only with daily-increasing difficulty. Ney, who had crossed again to the left bank of the Elbe, reported that the army of Bernadotte and Bülow were planning to cross that river and were making preparations for it in the vicinity of Dessau, and that one division of Blücher's army was approaching from the southeast. In the face of this danger of having his flank turned, Napoleon ordered a retreat to the left bank of the Elbe and abandoned the right.

Ever since he had neglected the decisive moment after the battle of Dresden, his will-power seemed broken, and he himself to have become but a plaything of his enemies, tossed back and forth,—the people, on account of his repeated trips to Bautzen, jocularly called him the "Bautzen Messenger,"—until at last his advance position was wholly untenable. Besides, the army was in a most uncomfortable condition, on every hand were discontent and bitterness, especially among the higher officers. Even strangers could not help taking notice. The Würtemberg General Trancquemont wrote to his king on the 10th of September: "The French generals and officers seem to me disgusted with the war, and only the presence of the Emperor can

animate the soldiers." In fact, when his eye was not resting on them, they threw aside their duty like a heavy burden, frequently got rid of their weapons and left the columns or stole away among the slightly wounded by maiming themselves. Hardly a month had passed since hostilities reopened, and already over 60,000 men and nearly 300 cannon had fallen into the hands of the enemy, while companies of hundreds, nay, thousands, of unarmed men were bound for the west. What drove these from the ranks was the terrible distress that set in when the harried lands of Silesia and Saxony had given up their last potatoes, and the convoys from the Elbe found it almost impossible to get through, now that Ney had retired. "M. le Comte de Daru," wrote Napoleon himself on the 23d of September to the director of the commissariat, "the army is no longer being fed. It would be an illusion to take any other view of it." But he could not help matters, and he was far from knowing all the wretchedness which eye-service, forgetful of duty, carefully tried to conceal just as it knew how to deceive him as to the truth of unpleasant facts.* Under such circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at that of the 400,000 men at the Emperor's disposal at the middle of August, scarcely 250,000 answered the roll-call at the end of September. These were ill supplied with clothing and shoes, and soon ammunition began to fail as the transports from the west were captured by hostile bands with increasing frequency. While the allies were reinforced by a corps of 50,000 Russian and Polish reserves under command of Bennigsen, Augereau brought only 16,000 French troops to Leipzig. To be sure, orders were issued at Paris on the 27th of September for 160,000 conscripts of 1815 and 120,000 men of the last seven age classes; but although the Senate at once enacted the proper decree, the new recruits would be of no use in the immediate future, evidently so critical.

* Especially Bertrand, a devoted favourite without much talent or merit and notorious by reason of his breach of faith in 1805 in the war with Austria, sought to curry favour by such reports. It may have been his accounts of the battle of Gross-Beeren that led Napoleon to withhold reinforcements from the northern army, thus facilitating its second defeat by the Prussians.

In this serious situation at the close of September, while "his game of chess was growing puzzling," as the Emperor said to Marmont, he made another effort at diplomacy. We possess a letter of his to Francis I. which he sent on the 25th by the hand of Adjutant Flahault to the Austrian General Bubna, whose division was attached to Blücher's army. The proposed surrender of the Polish fortress Zamsoc was made a pretext in this letter for speaking of peace. The envoy had in addition verbal instructions to give assurances that his master was now especially solicitous to conclude a peace, and was ready to make great sacrifices to Prussia and Austria, "if they were willing to listen to him." But Francis I., on the 9th of September, at Teplitz, had changed his position with reference to Russia and Prussia from that of a mere companion-in-arms to that of a firm ally, and he now stood by his pledges. Moreover, he was to conclude on the 5th of October a subsidy treaty with England, and five days later negotiations with Bavaria, at Ried, were to lead to the formal accession of that state to the coalition. So diplomacy fails the Emperor of the French and everything now depends on his military genius: that must counterbalance the loss of allied troops, the want of enthusiasm among his forces, the lack of courage and self-denial in his army. Will it be equal to the task?

In September, even, Napoleon had determined to await Blücher in a firm position behind the Elbe, between Königstein and Meissen. "In this position," he writes to Murat on the 23d, "I shall follow the enemy with my eyes, and, if he leaves the way open for attack, shall rush upon him so that he cannot evade a battle." But he waited in vain. More than a week passed without any attack by Blücher. What was the reason? Blücher had deceived Macdonald by marching off as early as the 26th from Bautzen past Kamenz in the direction of Warthenburg, where Yorck then forced a passage in spite of Bertrand on the 3d of October. At the same time the Russian reserve army under Bennigsen had arrived at Teplitz, having come through Silesia and Bohemia, Bernadotte had crossed the Elbe at Dessau, and the main army had assumed the offensive in the

direction of Leipzig. Napoleon learned nothing of this until quite late. Even on the 4th of October he asked Macdonald where Blücher's army was. When he finally knew the facts he was profoundly astonished; he had not credited the enemy with such great enterprise. Now that it was the enemy's manifest plan to effect a junction in his rear, the Elbe line could not be held any longer, nor could he stay in Dresden. On the 5th of October he conceived the plan of forming two armies; one under Murat, with three or four corps, he would station between the army of Schwarzenberg and Leipzig with orders to maintain a strictly defensive attitude and gradually to retire before the superior forces toward that city. The other he would himself lead with haste through Meissen and Wurzen to the support of Ney, then together with him push between Leipzig and the Silesian army, defeat and rout the latter, and then join Murat in opposing the main army of the enemy. He deviated from this plan later only in the one point of leaving Dresden occupied by two corps under Saint-Cyr. Was his object to keep more of Schwarzenberg's army in Bohemia? or was the protector of the Rhenish Confederation unwilling to leave the capital city of the most loyal of its princes in the hands of the enemy, and so impair his prestige? However that may be, in the decisive battle he had occasion to mourn bitterly the absence of 30,000 men.

Blücher and Bernadotte, who had joined their forces and determined to march together toward Leipzig, heard nothing for a long time of Napoleon's approach. Then the news, when they supposed him to be at a distance, overthrew their plans. Bernadotte, who had hitherto allowed the Prussians to win his victories for him and guarded his Swedish corps most anxiously from all losses, at once talked of retreating over the Elbe and tried to urge this course on Blücher, but at last declared his willingness to stay on this side and to march south from Aken; but Blücher then proposed to evade the enemy by crossing the Mulde, and then in junction with the northern army to cross the Saale. The consequence of this bold plan was that Napoleon, who had now confidently counted on a pitched battle, again confronted a retiring foe. Accordingly it was in the worst

conceivable state of mind that he passed the four days from the 11th to the 14th of October at Düben. As he could not lay hold of Blücher, the plan occurred to him to operate against the Silesian and northern armies, which had effected a junction in his rear, i.e., against Wartenburg and Dessau; then, having forced them back, defeated them, and driven them over the Elbe, to threaten Berlin, and finally to move up stream to Dresden, take the garrison with him and attack the main army. Such extensive schemes he had to invent if he was to hold fast his purpose to beat the enemy separately. At first he knew nothing of Blücher's march to the Saale, where the latter was seeking to come into touch with the main army. He actually ordered an advance to the Elbe, and as the corps of Tauenzien, left behind at that river by Bernadotte when he set out for Cönnern, was forced to cross over, he lulled himself in the delusion that Bernadotte was over the river again with all his troops. On the morning of the 12th he learned something of Blücher's real movements, only he did not suppose he was yet at Halle. And as Schwarzenberg kept approaching Leipzig more threateningly, the most urgent step seemed to be thoroughly to defeat that general southeast of the city before he had an opportunity to join Blücher. But was it not already too late? Had he not tarried too long at Düben, waiting for favourable news ere he acted? One who saw him there, as Odeleben saw him whiling away his time, "waiting for news from the Elbe, on a sofa in his room, sitting absolutely idle before a large table on which lay a sheet of white paper that he filled with large scrawling letters"—one who thus saw him, the most active man in the world, might well say with Marmont, "No one would recognize Napoleon during this campaign." As matters were, no further manœuvre could prevent the co-operation of the enemies' forces. Strategically he was conquered, and his last sole hope lay in the decisive battle which he must now venture against enormous odds, 200,000 to 300,000.

The Emperor did not, indeed, regard his situation as so precarious on the 14th, when he left Düben and proceeded toward Leipzig. While he had heard by this time that Bernadotte

was not on the other side of the Elbe, he yet believed himself safe from attack on the north and west, and that in the next action he would have only Schwarzenberg to deal with. That would have been his fortune if he had not delayed so long. Nowhere near all of the main army had as yet arrived south of the city in face of Murat; Bennigsen with the reserves and one corps that had been watching Dresden but was now ordered to report, about 65,000 men in all, was still a day's march distant on the 16th. Moreover, Bernadotte, who as usual kept himself out of range, had not moved his 60,000 men forward in junction with Blücher, and hence the latter, advancing with great caution, had got no farther than Schkeuditz by the 15th. Besides that Schwarzenberg had taken a position broken by the Elster and Pleisse rivers and the Leipzig Ratsholz; so that if Napoleon had arrived only one day earlier he would have confronted with superior forces—he had at hand 170,000 men—a poorly situated enemy and might have overthrown him. But the Guards, the troops of Mortier and Oudinot, and the divisions of cavalry did not join Murat until the 15th, the latter with three corps (Poniatowski's, Victor's, and Lauriston's) holding the line between the Pleisse and Liebertwolkwitz. Macdonald did not come up on the left wing until the next day during the battle. Marmont had to stay north of the Parthe and try to maintain his position at Möckern against greater numbers, for Blücher had arrived after all. Reynier was still back in Düben. The Emperor is again in the most important position, south of the city, facing the enemy with a powerful force; but the situation in the north is highly critical.

On the 16th of October the allies opened the attack at nine o'clock in the forenoon about the villages of Markkleeberg, Wachau, and Liebertwolkwitz, and the battle raged for two hours with the greatest stubbornness. Meantime Macdonald and the cavalry corps of Sebastiani had arrived, and Napoleon then took the offensive; he planned to break the centre of the enemy between Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz by an artillery fire from 150 guns, and then pierce it by a powerful cavalry charge while Macdonald turned his left flank at Seiffertshayn.

This would throw the enemy westwards into the rivers and separate them from their reserves. The cannonade opened not far from noon, then followed the cavalry charges, which did throw the centre beyond Gossa. But the infantry failed to push into the gap quickly enough, the cavalry itself fell into disorder, and was repulsed by the Russian reserves hastily summoned from Magdeborn and a corps of Austrians which Schwarzenberg ordered from across the Pleisse. Under these circumstances it availed little that Victor, reinforced by Oudinot, pushed on as far as Auenhayn, and that Macdonald turned the right flank of the enemy as far as Gross-Pössnau; or that an ill-considered attack of Merveldt's Austrian corps utterly failed. For this very attack checked the last assault of the Guards by drawing it aside. A decisive victory was not therefore gained, only a part of the field was won. But a decisive victory with a rout of the enemy was just what Napoleon had to win if his cause was to escape a total wreck. For Marmont had meantime been driven back by Blücher after obstinate resistance from Möckern and Widderitsch beyond Gohlis and Eutritzsch to the Parthe. Hence, despite the gain of some ground at Wachau, the day as a whole was lost for Napoleon, as the next day would bring Bernadotte and Bennigsen with strong re-enforcements.

Although a reconnoissance on the morning of the 17th showed him his desperate situation and the necessity of retreating, there were many obstacles in the way of doing so at once. In the first place Reynier's corps was still behind, likewise Maret with the Foreign Office clerks. He had to wait for them. Again, would it not be a confession of defeat to sound the call for retreat at once? We have seen how jealously Napoleon guarded appearances. Finally, the troops that had fought so splendidly the day before were so worn out that they could not begin the march at once, especially as it would have to be hotly contested. He needed time; he must gain it. The Emperor summoned Merveldt, who had been captured in the affair at Dölitz, gave him back his sword on parole, and sent him to the headquarters of Francis with proposals of peace, the first

object of which was to secure a truce. He said to the Austrian: "I will retire, if desired, beyond the Saale; let the Russians and Prussians retire beyond the Elbe, you Austrians to Bohemia, and let poor Saxony be neutral." He threw out some hints as to how much of his position in Europe he was ready to give up: Hanover to England, the German coast on the North Sea, all states of the Rhenish Confederation that voluntarily deserted him, also Poland, Spain, and Holland, the last only on condition that its independence of England was guaranteed. Italy, however, was not to return to its former dependence on Austria; it would harmonize better with the European system if united under a ruler of its own. This last clause robbed Merveldt's mission of all prospect of success. For the suzerainty over Italy was the very object for which Austria had been fighting for ten years, and it needed an Austerlitz to make her forego that claim. Hence the allies were soon unanimous in leaving the proposal without an answer. The resumption of fighting was postponed until the next forenoon, in order to await the arrival of re-enforcements. An attack by Blücher's army, pushing the French beyond Gohlis and the Parthe, was soon abandoned.

After waiting in vain until late in the evening for Merveldt's return, Napoleon began to make arrangements for the retreat. He ordered Bertrand, who had held Lindenau on the 16th against a Russian corps, to go on the Lützen road the next morning as far as Weissenfels and secure that road; the young Guard relieved him at Lindenau. But that was all for the time being, and the historian is at a loss to explain to himself or others why the Emperor did not commence the retreat through Leipzig with all energy as soon as night came on, when Reynier had already arrived, when the troops had rested, and his own repute as a military leader was no longer in danger. Did he dread the confusion of the night march through the city and over the one bridge? For the building of others had been neglected. "The 17th passed quietly," says Marmont in his Memoirs; the enemy was awaiting re-enforcements. We, on our part, were busy in restoring order among our troops.

Yet we ought to have begun our retreat on the instant, or at least made preparations for it so as to effect it when night came on. But a certain carelessness on the part of Napoleon, which cannot be explained and only with difficulty be described, filled the cup of our woes." Not until after midnight did the Emperor draw the army a little closer to Leipzig, but he kept it in position for fighting. He now resolved to secure by fighting a retreat through Leipzig, difficult as it was, and to engage the entire army of the enemy to the east and check its advance at every village, in order thus to make sure for one corps after another a safe retreat to the west. Hence his task for the next day was merely a retreating battle, as it has rightly been termed, yet after all the grandest known in history. After Reynier's arrival and Bertrand's departure he still had about 146,000 men; the allies had more than double that number, Bernadotte having at last come forward, after Blücher had magnanimously loaned him 30,000 of his troops, and declared himself ready to fight.

On the 18th the French army was stationed along a line drawn from Connewitz up the Pleisse to Dölitz, passing from there past Dösen to Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen, and then running northwards to Schönfeld and along the Parthe to the suburbs of Halle. Napoleon himself took his position by a tobacco-mill on the Colditz road near Stötteritz. The allies opened the attack at eight o'clock. The Austrians on the left succeeded in pushing beyond Dölitz, Dösen, and Löbnitz; the Russians in the centre in conquering Zuckelhausen and Lössnitz; and finally the Prussians under Bernadotte, who had crossed the Parthe at Taucha with 50,000 men and was advancing thence in the afternoon in touch with Bennigsen, drove the enemy back to the villages Anger, Krottendorf, and Volkmarshausen. Darkness put an end to the bloody struggle. The allies, as may be seen, had not won the overwhelming victory naturally to be expected from such enormous odds, for the French still had possession of Connewitz and of the centre at Probstheida and Stötteritz. But the danger threatening his left wing, where a Saxon division and a Württemberg cavalry brigade had deserted to the enemy, forced Napoleon finally to abandon

those positions also and thus acknowledge his defeat. By noon he had already ordered the train to retreat, and three cavalry corps followed in the afternoon; as night came on the great artillery train passed through the city, and the Emperor then dictated to Berthier the order for a general retreat. Odeleben tells us that "a wooden stool was brought to him and on this, exhausted by the exertions of the preceding days, he sank in slumber. His hands rested, carelessly folded, in his lap; during these moments he looked like any other mortal man succumbing to the burden of misfortune. The generals stood about the fire, gloomy and silent, and the retreating troops marched by at a little distance." Then Napoleon repaired to Leipzig, where he spent the night at the Hôtel de Prusse.

It was long after midnight before the valiant defenders of Probstheida and Stötteritz entered the suburbs. A rear-guard only was left behind to keep the enemy away from the city until the next noon. If a general assault followed, it was the duty of the last corps entering Leipzig to hold it if possible until midnight. But the actual events were different. In the night and on the next morning the troops kept pouring in at three gates, and as they all had to pass out of one, the resulting confusion was well-nigh inextricable. In the forenoon the unexpected advance of a detachment of Russian chasseurs from Rosenthal so deceived the corporal of grenadiers posted at the high bridge over the Elster as to the real situation that he blew up the bridge and so sacrificed the entire corps of the rear-guard. There was nothing left for those troops but to surrender. Their leaders sought to escape. It was here that Macdonald saved himself by swimming across the river with his horse; while Poniatowski, the noblest of the marshals of the Empire and one of the bravest, was drowned. The others, Reynier and Lauriston, both of whom were wounded, were captured. Ney, Macdonald, Marmont, Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani, as well as others, were also wounded. Five division generals lay dead on the field. The two days, the 18th and 19th, had cost Napoleon more than 60,000 men. Rather heavy for a fight of the rear-guard. But that was not all: the retreat to the Rhine

which had now become an absolute necessity, meant the abandonment of the fortresses on the Elbe, Oder, and Vistula, i.e., about 150,000 men. And yet another sacrifice was imposed by the war: his Majesty Frederick Augustus of Saxony, to whom Napoleon had pretended before his departure that he was leaving the city only to manœuvre in the open field and that he would relieve it in a few days.* The King went to Berlin as a prisoner, and Stein, as president of the administrative commission, became the executive head of the Saxon government in the name of the three allied monarchs.

When Napoleon sought to restore some order to his retreating army at Weissenfels he still had about 120,000 men. But as soon as they were across the Saale and out of sight of the pursuing enemy, thousands left the ranks every day. Some of them threw away their weapons and deserted, others roamed about as marauding bands of "fricoteurs," others were left behind exhausted. The typhus brought on by hunger raged among the ranks and became thenceforth the constant companion of the army. Not until they arrived at Erfurt, where the dilatory pursuit of the enemy allowed them a two-days' rest, was it possible to procure supplies or rally the army. But beyond the Thuringian forest, around which the Emperor had gone at Eisenach so as to pass through Fulda and Hanau on his way to Frankfort and Mainz, the army was already reduced to hardly more than 60,000 rank and file. And even these had to fight their way to the Rhine; for on the 30th of October Wrede, with a Bavarian corps of 35,000 men, hastily marched from the Inn and confronted them. Blücher had marched after Napoleon almost as far as Fulda; if he had kept on the same road, the French army would have been in a desperate strait, provided Wrede stood firm. But at the headquarters of the monarchs the view had prevailed that the common enemy would push for the Rhine not by way of Fulda and Hanau, but via Alsfeld and Giessen, and accordingly Blücher and Wrede were both instructed to take the latter road. Wrede, there-

* Frederick Augustus himself reported Napoleon's misrepresentation of facts to several persons, the Russian Toll and the Prussian Natamer.

fore, supposed on the 30th that he would not be engaging the entire French army, and made a vigorous attack. Perceiving his error, he still persisted from political grounds; "our friendship is too young," said he, "for us not to exercise our goodwill with all earnestness." On that day Napoleon himself did not have more than 35,000 men at hand, including the Guards, the rest having followed at a considerable distance. At first he wanted to wait for them, but yielded reluctantly to Macdonald's advice to attack with the Guards. The movement was successful. The artillery general Drouot managed to bring a large number of guns to bear on the enemy's left flank, and Wrede lost the battle after a stubborn resistance. The way to Mainz was now open.

On the 2d of November Napoleon arrived at that city and after a few days' stay continued his journey to Paris. Of the half a million armed men who had crossed the Rhine in obedience to his command scarcely 90,000 returned, many without their weapons and with the poison of a deadly disease in their blood, which raged with terrible fury in the Rhine city and gave a sombre notoriety to the "typhus de Mayence." An eyewitness speaks as follows: "The mass of men that filled all the houses and streets was indescribable; one saw here the half-dead soldiers utterly forsaken, suffering the torments of hunger, lying on hard stones under the open sky in the rain and cold and waiting longingly for death. They died by the hundreds every day, and they often lay unburied on the streets for several days." The world saw, and the Emperor, too, whenever he looked over the square from the windows of his palace, saw, how the second of his great armies was perishing. What must have been his feelings at the spectacle! Before the opening of the campaign he had declared to Count Molé at Paris, "Do not think that I do not possess a heart that feels like others; I am a very kind-hearted man. But since my earliest childhood I have accustomed myself to silence that chord of my nature, and now it is dumb." He expressed himself quite differently in his interview with Metternich at Dresden. The latter had asked him: "When the generation of Frenchmen

which you have levied before their time shall have disappeared, shall you then appeal to the next generation?" Napoleon, excited by this embarrassing question, answered: "You are not a soldier and do not know what a soldier's soul is. I have become great in camp, and a man like me cares little for the lives of a million men." Almost that number his two last campaigns had cost him. And if he now cared for the sick and wounded at Mainz, it was not out of humanity so much as with the thought of being able to use them again. For all his activity was ruled by the one idea expressed shortly before at Erfurt, "By May I shall have an army of 250,000 fighting men on the Rhine."

CHAPTER XIX

ELBA

A SECOND year of war had thus closed with enormous losses for Napoleon. The national resistance of the Russians had forced him out of the Czar's realm by a "via dolorosa" without a parallel; the national enthusiasm of the Germans had driven him back over the Rhine. The statecraft of princes and their cabinets vanished entirely before this elemental impulse of the national heart for independence of foreign tyranny. Vain was the resolution of Frederick William III., the wavering deliberation of his diplomats; he had to enter upon a war against his former ally. In vain had Metternich conceived of a separate neutral position for his master, fortified by alliances; Francis I. had to give it up and draw the sword against his own son-in-law. In vain did Frederick Augustus of Saxony exhibit his loyalty to the founder of his throne; his regiment deserted to the enemy and left him to his fate. So also the Westphalian troops, the Württemberg cavalry, and the infantry of Baden had all gone over to the enemy long before Jerome left his country, the last week in October, or King Frederick I. and Grand Duke Charles joined the allies. Soon the entire Rhenish Confederation was arrayed against its protector. And as among the Germans, so among other peoples who had furnished contingents, the national party gained the ascendancy. This was the case with the Italians, on whom the "miso gallo" of Alfieri had made no little impression. Murat had taken leave of Napoleon with his Neapolitan troops even before the battle of Hanau, on the pretext that the state of affairs in his kingdom demanded his return. But his thoughts were wider; he aimed not only to retain the crown of Naples, but also win the crown of all Italy—provided that the power on the Danube

did not resume its old rights. By the end of October, 1813, the Austrians under Hiller had already driven the troops of Viceroy Eugene beyond the Adige and taken possession of Trieste and the Dalmatian fortresses. The Dutch revolted openly against Napoleon in Amsterdam about the middle of November and declared themselves in favour of the ancient House of Orange. And while all these things were happening the Spanish national war had resulted under the help and leadership of England in new successes over the French. In September the coast fortress San Sebastian, and in October Pampeluna, had fallen into Wellington's hands. This opened the road all the way to Bayonne, and the British commander, after hearing of Napoleon's losses, at once set out and kept advancing persistently, contesting every step with Soult. Suchet at the same time, to avoid having his communications with France cut off, retired from Catalonia over the Pyrenees.

Thus did the foreign nations rid themselves of the French ascendancy which weighed so heavily upon them, and Napoleon's most unique creation, the international Empire, fell to pieces under the energetic resistance of the people. His own fate now was in the balance. Was that nation, whose land and strength he had used as the fulcrum of his universal sovereignty, at last wearied with his rule that squandered her wealth and blood without stint in his unrelenting ambition? This time he could not do as he did the year before, and accuse the opposing elements of nature as his conquerors and as the destroyers of the second mighty army—a host that had been given in his charge in the hope of victory and peace. His prestige, too, which he regarded as the real basis of his power, was profoundly shaken. Could he a third time secure the means for a new war?

The Senate, indeed, had with its usual devotion granted him 280,000 men, even before the decisive blow on the plains of Leipzig. But how little that was in a war with Europe! The Convention had, to be sure, engaged the entire Continent, but that was when their forces were fresh, and inspired with the enthusiasm of newly-acquired freedom. Since then twenty

years of almost uninterrupted warfare had passed, the nation had lost her liberties again, and her enthusiasm for the man who restored order and gave her glory had vanished, since his own glory was dimmed, and in place of the long-desired rest and peaceful enjoyment there kept coming up new feuds and greater sacrifices. For the time was long gone by when the Emperor could lay province after province at the feet of the French people and assure them that all these wars would cost them next to nothing. In this last year he had been able to stop up the great gaps in the budget by laying a bold hand on the national domain, i.e., by ordering the sale of the communal lands. Now it appeared that this experiment had had little success, and that only a small fraction of the lands could be turned into ready money. So, just when the state was in the direst condition, the necessary material resources were lacking. Where were they to be found, when, as a consequence of the terrible tax on human life, the fields lay fallow, industries were idle, and trade at a standstill? By imposing higher tariffs? But importations were insignificant. Or was it by increasing the land tax (about 30 per cent), the tax on doors and windows, the tax on patents and salt, and the indirect taxes? This is what the Senate decreed on the 11th of November. But the income from these would not suffice. In January, 1814, the land tax was raised 50 per cent, and others in proportion; equally in vain. The revenue from taxes showed a falling off for that year of 50 per cent. The national securities fell to 50; the shares of the French Bank, which had once been worth 1400 francs, now sold for but little over 700 francs. There are no buyers, for nobody has money to spare. The wine-growers keep their produce in their cellars, the warehouses of factories are filled to overflowing. If Napoleon decides to arm anew, he will have nothing at hand for the moment but his treasure in the Tuileries, and of the 65,000,000 francs of this the next few weeks will use up the larger part.

But men, as well as money, were scarce. The conscriptions of October met with passable results, to be sure, for the enemy stood at the borders and patriotism called with loud voice. The

people had in defence of the fatherland no other general in whom they could trust in the same degree as in the genius of the Emperor. Hence the mass of the French people, as is shown by police reports, were still good imperialists. Only in the northern provinces, exposed to the English and Bourbon influences, such as Flanders, Artois, and Normandy, and in the southern provinces of Guyenne, Gascony, and Provence, the population was either indifferent to invasion or even opposed to the Empire. In the other sections of the country the peasant gave up his last remaining son with resignation; and not until a second Senate decree, November 15th, 1813, ordered a new levy of 300,000 men from the age classes of the years 1803–1814, which had already served, i.e. summoned heads of families and married men, were the obstacles insurmountable. Those who were summoned failed to appear, or fled to the woods; and at the beginning of the new year not more than a fifth of the 300,000 men had been recruited. And the results of trying to create a new national guard were equally poor; the Senate—and what did this Senate not consent to!—on December 17th ordered 450 cohorts to be raised. But the peasant knew from the experience of the last campaign that the Emperor made no difference between militia and regulars when he needed soldiers. He was ready to defend his farm, but not to leave farm and wife and child in the lurch and go to the army. Not 20,000 men were collected at the recruiting stations. And even for these few that responded to the new levies there was great scarcity of accoutrements, uniforms, and weapons.

In truth it was a rather gloomy prospect for the continuation of the war with allied Europe, even though the temper of the French people still favoured the Emperor and liberal agitation against him found no foothold in the lower orders, and though the Bourbons with their following of haughty aristocrats were still sure to find the same rooted aversion. If only France had not been obliged to face both sides at once, east and south, and if the troops of Suchet and Soult could be used against the allies. Napoleon kept that in mind, and therefore he determined to release Ferdinand VII. of Spain, give him back his

country, and conclude peace with him. The treaty was concluded at Valençay on the 8th of December. But instead of sending the king home at once, which Wellington declared was the only means of making war impossible for the English, Napoleon was induced by an intrigue of Talleyrand's, who was now trying with all the secret devices of politics to undermine the Emperor's position, to stipulate that the treaty be first laid before the Cortes in Madrid. The latter refused to accept,—Talleyrand had been sure of it,—negotiations were prolonged until January, and the armies of the south could not be withdrawn.

There was still another prisoner whom the Emperor must think of releasing: the Pope. By the collapse of the Empire Napoleon's plans with regard to supremacy over the Church were also undermined. How much he had promised himself from his power over the Holy Father! "From this moment," he said later, "I would have exalted the Pope again, surrounded him with pomp and homage, and made an idol of him; nor would he even have missed his temporal possessions. I would have held my church sessions like the legislative sessions. My councils would have been the representatives of Christendom, the Pope presiding; I would have opened them and closed them, approved and announced their decrees, just as Constantine and Charlemagne did. How fruitful this would have been of great events! The Pope's influence over Spain, Italy, the Rhenish Confederation, and Poland would have drawn closer the ties of alliance throughout the great Empire, while the influence exerted by the Head of the Church over believers in England and Ireland, Russia and Prussia, Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, would have become the inheritance of France." But the great Empire was tottering and its influence on neighbouring lands was gone. It was restricted to the boundaries of France, and its sovereign could no longer think of combining with it the international universal system of the papacy. At the very beginning of the last war, Pius VII. had renounced the Concordat of Fontainebleau, and later, when the congress of Prague was in session and Francis I. separated himself from

Napoleon, the Pope had appealed to His Apostolic Majesty of Austria for support. Now the Emperor proposed to release him, but again only in consideration of a treaty which should permanently cede the territory of the old papal state to the kingdom of Italy. But the Pope rejected all negotiations most positively, for they could not be conducted in Paris, but only in Rome. At that Napoleon kept him a prisoner, but did not thereby improve his political position, rather complicated it.

There were only two courses open whereby to retain his position: either to defeat with reduced forces an enemy many times his superior, or conclude peace with him before he could cross the Rhine—the peace for which France had longed for many years and now, after all her losses, longed for more ardently than ever. But could peace be obtained? Would the powers, who had just advanced victoriously to the Rhine, halt there and listen to proposals? And if they did, what terms would they demand? Napoleon learned the answer to these questions about the middle of November, 1813, when a French diplomat, Baron de Saint-Aignan, came to Paris from Frankfort, the headquarters of the allied monarchs. Saint-Aignan had hitherto represented the French government at the courts of Gotha and Weimar; he had been in Leipzig after the battle, and was taken by the allies to Frankfort, where they assigned him a rôle similar to that recently assigned by Napoleon to Merveldt. Metternich, in the presence and with the formal consent of Nesselrode and of the English plenipotentiary, Lord Aberdeen, announced to him that the powers were disposed to make peace if Napoleon would accept the natural boundaries of France, i.e., the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, as a basis for it, and summon a congress for the purpose of a general pacification. To be sure, to this offer was attached the limiting clause that pending negotiations war would continue; but it was, after all, a peace that was in prospect, and whoever sincerely wished the Emperor well must advise him to accept at once; for it was a fact, as the report of Saint-Aignan said, "that Napoleon could save much evil to humanity and many dangers to France if he would not put off negotiations a single day." What

led the allies to pause and offer such terms has not yet been fully explained. It was asserted that the solicitude of the Emperor of Austria for the fate and safety of his daughter prevailed over other considerations. Metternich himself was of the opinion, as he wrote Caulaincourt in a private letter handed to the negotiator, that the step would have no results. Was that an indirect hint to Napoleon to accept at once? Everything depended on his decision.

He recognized his situation exactly. "My situation," he remarked to his brother Joseph at this time, "allows me no longer to think of sovereignty over any foreign nation; and I shall esteem myself fortunate if I can keep the territory of old France by means of the peace. Everything about me threatens ruin. My armies are annihilated and the losses they have suffered can be made good only with extreme difficulty. Holland is irrevocably lost to us; Italy is wavering; the demeanour of the King of Naples makes me uneasy. The re-enforcements for the Viceroy Eugene fail to arrive, though his need is pressing; the Austrians are pushing him, and the Italians under his command waver. Belgium and the Rhine provinces give tokens of discontent. The Spanish frontier is in the power of the enemy. In such a crisis how can one think of foreign thrones? How can one demand of France, when she can scarcely defend herself, sacrifices for any other cause than her own preservation, when at best one can count only on such sacrifices as are indispensable for the protection of her own territory?"* And yet Napoleon did not accept the proposal of peace outright. Such, indeed, had been his intention at the outset, and Maret had already drawn up the official despatch; but he bethought himself of something else, and in order to gain more time for his armaments, so that he should not be obliged defenceless to accept the dictation of his enemies, he sent a letter on the 16th of

* Miot de Melito, *Mémoires*, III. 309. Of course we must not forget that these words of the Emperor formed a prelude to the demand that Joseph should throw up his hopes of the Spanish crown, and hence are more sombre than his situation really seemed to Napoleon. Still they correspond exactly to the actual facts.

November in which he made no mention of the basis of peace, but only proposed Mannheim as the seat of the congress. He deceived himself. Metternich took advantage of this procrastinating reply of the Emperor by using it in a manifesto of the monarchs to the French people. "The allied powers," it was declared, "are not in war against France, but against that loudly proclaimed ascendancy which the Emperor Napoleon has so long exercised beyond the boundaries of his realm, to the detriment of Europe and of France. Victory has brought the allied armies to the Rhine. The first use which their Imperial and Royal Majesties made of the fact was to offer peace to His Majesty the Emperor of the French." The terms of peace were, to be sure, no longer the Rhine, the Pyrenees, and the Alps, as a first draft of the proclamation by Metternich still read. It went on: "The allied sovereigns wish France to be great, strong, and happy"; and then, farther on, "The powers guarantee to the French Empire an extension of territory such as France never enjoyed under her kings." Thus did the cabinets of old legitimate Europe appeal—and this furnishes new evidence how strongly they were influenced by the current of public opinion at this moment—from the monarch to the sovereign, from the Emperor to the nation, from the ruler of an international empire to the French people. In this separation of prince and people, in this appeal to the latter as the higher authority, lay the whole force of the proclamation, which in other respects was rather weak, and it could not fail of effect. Napoleon was made aware of this in different ways; the reports of the prefects, for example, moved him to send senators and Councillors of State into the provinces in order to rouse sentiment and make it more favourable to the imperial government; he could not even afford to disdain appealing to the old revolutionary spirit, and the long-neglected Marseillaise was ground out of hand-organs on the streets once more. But the extent to which the French were finally distinguishing between him and themselves appeared most clearly when the Legislative Body met on the 19th of December, 1813.

Napoleon had postponed opening its sessions until that day

in order not to face its members without any evidence of his love of peace. When he had sacrificed Maret, in whom public opinion, misled by Savary, beheld an adversary of peace, by removing him from the conduct of foreign affairs and appointing in his stead Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, who was regarded as an advocate of pacification; when he had ordered the latter on the 2d of December to write to Metternich that he now accepted the proposed basis of peace, and the Austrian minister replied that nothing stood in the way of opening the congress and that England would be notified at once in order that she might send her representative: then, and not until then, did Napoleon think he possessed enough material to play the part, as he had in former years, of a peaceable man, whose good intentions were interfered with by wicked Europe. This correspondence was laid before the deputies, and only this—not the overtures of Saint-Aignan and the first procrastinating answer which had as good as destroyed all chance of peace. The Emperor, however, in the speech from the throne, assured them that all the original documents to be found in the portfolio of the ministry of foreign affairs would be transmitted to the Chamber. The close of his message, which appealed to the national honour, contained the usual demand for sacrifices, “for nations act with confidence only when they bring out all their forces.” But the deputies did not see matters in that light. A report of a committee presented by Lainé of Bordeaux defined the situation in clear and bold language: “All means of resistance would be effective only in case the French were convinced that the government were really concerned for the glory of peace alone, and that their blood would be shed only in defence of the fatherland and her protecting laws.” The last clause was an intimation that the French were no longer disposed to fight for an arbitrary ruler. Hence the Emperor was to be requested “to care for a full and consistent execution of the laws which guarantee to all Frenchmen the rights of liberty and security of property, and to the nation the undiminished exercise of her political privileges.” This report was greeted in the committee of the whole with a storm of applause

and accepted by a large majority. The partisans of the government worked hard to get the wording of the report changed, which was rather outspoken. Enough remained for the Emperor in a rage to forbid its publication. He closed the Legislative Body, and told its members to their faces in a public audience that they were factious and that he would have them under surveillance.

The dissolution of the Legislative Body roused intense indignation, especially in the provincial towns; and it seems almost as if nothing but the war just then thundering at the country's gates, with its train of privations and excesses, saved Napoleon and his government from an internal crisis that was already drawing nigh. Now, in the hour of need, he was not so much a sovereign to the French people as a military leader, certainly the ablest of them all and in this case the most earnest, for he fought for his throne. It will be no surprise to us to behold once more all the marvels of his genius.

The allies had made no pause in the war, as Metternich had informed Saint-Aignan they would not. During the first week in November they had already agreed on prosecuting it immediately, despite the objections of a few old-fashioned military men like the Austrian General Duka. He proposed taking up a fortified position along the Rhine, and once even brought Francis I. to the point of threatening Radetzky, who preached the offensive, with court martial. In regard to the plan of operations opinions were for a time divided. Gneisenau had proposed with good reason an offensive movement through Belgium. Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, insisted that only 30,000 men under Bülow should proceed to Holland, but that the main army must try to penetrate France through Switzerland, which must be won to the cause of the allies and should by no means be left on the flank, and thence gain the plateau of Langres. In that way, he thought, they would be nearer to the Austrians advancing through upper Italy and to Wellington. Blücher's army should go across the middle Rhine and so cover the right flank. It was a methodical plan, which involved a loss of time and aimed more at gaining a position than at a vic-

tory over the enemy. Yet the statement is incontestable with which Radetzky advocated it: "All the south of France, where now not a soldier is to be found, will be prevented from organizing, and the Emperor Napoleon will lose a considerable portion of his resources."

For this was the principal object of the allied leaders, to prevent by breaking into France the arming of the enemy, to make him by this means incapable of lasting resistance and to dispose him more to peace.* To annihilate him or banish him was by no means their purpose. And they did in fact succeed in so far that when the two armies at the end of the year crossed the Rhine and (during the first half of January) entered France, more than a third of the country was checked in the midst of its preparations, while Napoleon's new army was in the first stages of formation. The troops of the former army under Macdonald, Marmont, and Victor, which had been left at the Rhine, and those that Ney and Mortier gathered at Nancy and Langres, had amounted to little over 50,000, for at least as many more had died from typhus in December.† These forces, retiring before superior numbers, marched during January, 1814, in the direction of Vitry on the Marne. Gérard with a few thousand reserves and Lefebvre with the Guards added only about 10,000 to their numbers. The effort at a "levée en masse" was a total failure, and the decree of January 3d authorizing it was without effect.

Napoleon's original plan, when he heard of the advance of the allies, was to let them approach near the capital, where he in the mean time would have stationed and built up his new army, and then to unite all his available forces there and seek to decide matters in a battle. But to prevent the allies from seizing too much French soil with all its supplies he gave up

* The "military operations," writes Gentz on the 19th of December from Freiburg to the Princess of Wallachia, after speaking of the negotiations, "will be continued nevertheless with greater emphasis, because the allies hope in this way to prevent the reorganization of the army in the interior of France, and so confirm all the more the peaceful mood of Napoleon."

† Houssaye, "1814," p. 59, now gives the official figures.

this plan and determined to fight between the Seine and the Marne, though he had at first nothing but the remnants of the last army. His purpose in this was to strike the separate detachments of the enemy before they effected a junction, and, both for strategic as well as political reasons, to turn first upon Blücher, who was moving rapidly on Saint-Dizier, while the main army was slowly advancing by way of Montbéliard and Langres. There was a variety of reasons for this delay. In the first place, Alexander, influenced by Laharpe, Jomini, and other Swiss, had long been opposed to the march through Switzerland; then again, in sentimental memory of the passage over the Niemen on New Year's Day, he had waited until the Russian New Year (January 13th) before crossing the Rhine at Basel; and finally Metternich had directed Schwarzenberg on the 8th of January to advance "discreetly," as he hoped soon to bring to a close the great peace negotiations. For Caulaincourt was waiting at Lunéville for the congress to be opened and complained of the delay, as his Emperor had surely given the strongest evidence of his hearty desire for the establishment of a universal peace by sending his minister of foreign affairs with full powers.* Another thing hampered the operations of the main army. At Åbo Alexander had held out hopes to Bernadotte of getting the French throne, and the latter had accordingly shown himself very sparing toward the French throughout the campaign. Now this project of the Czar stood revealed and cooled Austria off still more, whose ardour was none too great at best.

On the 26th of January Napoleon left Paris and on the next

* See "Oesterreich's Teilnahme," etc., p. 790. Metternich states in his letter from Freiburg on the 9th of January addressed to Schwarzenberg that he had sent to Caulaincourt the official answer referring him to definite explanations in the immediate future, and a few lines in private besides. The latter have never been published. It would be most interesting to see them. Metternich's view of the situation before the arrival of England's minister, Castlereagh, at headquarters is also defined in a second letter to Schwarzenberg dated January 13th. "To make an end, and an honourable one, to obtain what is desirable and advantageous without going to Paris, or to go to Paris if it is not otherwise to be obtained: that is the whole of my policy."

morning arrived at Châlons. Blücher was on the road between Saint-Dizier and Brienne on that day, his object being to come closer to the main army. After sending Yorck's corps toward the Moselle and leaving that of Langeron's (all but one division) to watch Mainz, he had only about 30,000 men at hand. Napoleon thought he had still less, and determined to attack him although he, too, had no more than 40,000. He supposed Blücher to be still at Saint-Dizier, but found only the rear-guard there; he hastened on after him toward Brienne, leaving Mar-mont behind. There an engagement took place which compelled Blücher, who was just on the point of proceeding westward, to turn south toward Trannes.

Meantime at the headquarters of the allies some memorable resolutions were reached. The English Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Castlereagh, had arrived there on the 25th, and had at once begun to exercise a dominant influence. First of all he had demanded "the uninterrupted prosecution of military operations," and at the same time he had given encouragement for a conference of ministers who should determine the political course to be pursued. And so on the 29th it was agreed that at the congress to be opened presently at Châtillon the "old boundaries of France" were to be proposed to Caulaincourt as a basis of peace. That is to say, the conditions once given to Saint-Aignan, which Napoleon did not accept speedily enough, were retracted, and France was to be circumscribed no more by the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, but by the boundaries she had at the beginning of the wars of the Revolution in 1792, when a legitimate king still sat on the throne. In favour of this proposition they urged the successes of the allies since November: their invasion of France, the conquest of Holland, and the desertion of Murat, who had entered an offensive and defensive alliance with Austria on the 11th of January. By this decision, denying to France her gains through the Revolution and restricting the state to its former territory, the powers, assuming that they fought out their programme with all their resources, undermined the revolutionary monarchy, whose principle had been unlimited extension of boundaries and of

influence. Hence it was but consistent that at Langres the restoration of the old dynasty of the Bourbons had already been in view. The clause: "in case it [the dynasty] should be recalled by an act of the nation itself," laid much less stress on the sovereign people than the appeal from Frankfort had done.

These wide-reaching resolutions were to be emphatically supported by a victory over Napoleon during the next few days. He had followed Blücher to the vicinity of Trannes, ever hoping to strike him a blow before Schwarzenberg arrived. He was disappointed. Schwarzenberg, after much crying out upon those who could not get quickly enough to Paris and upon Metternich, who had not yet secured peace, had determined to support Blücher and sent him two corps that increased his force to 60,000, while Napoleon had only 40,000. Wrede's corps also hastened from Joinville, so that the dreaded Emperor of the French might be confronted with more than double odds. What, therefore, Napoleon had thought to prevent had been done after all. The stubbornness with which Blücher held his position at Trannes left no doubt as to the proximity of the main army. He had even given orders on the 1st of February to march west, when Blücher took the offensive at La Rothière. The entire afternoon the French troops held out against great odds, until towards evening their line on the left wing near Chaumesnil was broken by the onslaught of Wrede, and the reserves, led by Napoleon himself, were unable to repair the damage. The village, and with it the battle, was lost.

It was a brilliant victory for the allies, and it might, perhaps, have been definitive if it had been followed up by an energetic pursuit. But this was neglected. The allies deemed Napoleon incapable of further resistance. On the very evening after the battle Blücher wrote that "it had, as it were, decided everything," and in eight days they would be in Paris. Consequently they neglected to push rapidly after the beaten foe, and thus allow him no time to restore order to his confused troops. Napoleon, too, felt the whole weight of the blow he

had received. Maret, who was with him at Troyes during the gloomy days after the engagement and who assumed the office of secretary of state, relates in his Memoirs that the Emperor had made up his mind to the extreme of compliance and that he gave *carte blanche* to Caulaincourt when the latter requested definite instructions for the congress to be opened on the 5th of February. "The Duke of Bassano," we read in the Memoirs, "handed Napoleon the letter (from Caulaincourt) and conjured him to yield. The Emperor at first scarcely seemed to be listening to him, then he pointed to a passage in Montesquieu, whose pages he had been turning abstractedly. 'Read it,' said he, 'read it aloud.' The words were: 'I know nothing more magnanimous than the determination of a monarch of our time to bury himself under the ruins of his throne rather than accept terms that no king should listen to.'" "But I know something far more magnanimous," exclaimed Maret, "that you make a sacrifice of your glory and thereby fill up the abyss which will otherwise swallow up France and you together." "Well, then, gentlemen, make peace; Caulaincourt shall conclude it, and shall sign everything that can bring it about; I will bear the shame. Only do not ask me to dictate my own humiliation." So Maret wrote to the minister that the Emperor gave him *carte blanche* to bring the negotiations to a happy conclusion, to save the capital and to prevent a battle in which the very last hopes of the nation would be at stake. When Caulaincourt, frightened by the weight of responsibility laid on him, asked on the 6th of February for definite instructions as to how far he could go, Maret finally brought the Emperor, who had gone back to Nogent on the 7th, to the point of actually "dictating his humiliation" during the night. "It was settled," the Memoirs proceed to relate, "that for the sake of peace Belgium and even the left bank of the Rhine must be given up, and the instructions read that the plenipotentiary should first offer Belgium, and then, if it was indispensable, the left bank of the Rhine as well. Italy, Piedmont, Genoa, nay, even the colonies, were to be sacrificed first of all. Napoleon intended to sign the new instructions the next morning. But

before the break of day tidings came that upset everything, and when Maret appeared in the cabinet with the document he found his master bending eagerly over his maps. "I am concerned with wholly different matters," the Emperor shouted to him; "I am just on the point of dealing Blücher a blow." And nothing further was said about signing the order. Talleyrand was right: he could not be King of France as long as he was the Emperor Napoleon.*

Shortly after the battle of La Rothière, when the allies had agreed to move on Paris, they had separated the two armies. Schwarzenberg held the road to Troyes and Fontainebleau, and Blücher marched north at first, later turning west past Fère Champenoise. He was to send for Yorck, who was marching from Châlons along the Marne after Macdonald, and for certain re-enforcements that were following along from Germany under Kleist and Kapzevitch. That meant slow progress for his division, and in fact Schwarzenberg, too, advanced but cautiously. Then Blücher quite suddenly conceived the plan of pushing hastily forward northwest by Montmirail with two Russian divisions (Sacken and Olssufief), blocking Macdonald's road on the Marne, cutting him off from Napoleon and crushing him between his own force and Yorck's. He did not now wait for re-enforcements, which, besides, had gone in the wrong direction by command of Emperor Alexander, and he divided his army into three widely separated columns. Napoleon had learned of this when he refused to sign the document for Maret on the 8th. He was going to follow the plan recommended by Marmont and overpower in detail the "best army of the allies," as he called Blücher's forces. He left Oudinot, Victor, and Gérard behind at Montereau with not quite 40,000 men to watch Schwarzenberg, and hastened with nearly 30,000 (Marmont, Ney, and the Guards) by Sézanne north to Champaubert. At this point the corps of Olssufief was marching by on the 10th of

* Even though Maret's story be true, it must not be overlooked that Napoleon had been following Blücher's movements for several days, and on the evening of February 7th he wrote to Joseph: "In this state of affairs we must show confidence and adopt bold measures."

February, while Sacken had already gone ahead to Montmirail. Blücher had rejected Gneisenau's advice to recall all the corps. So Olssufief was on that day nearly annihilated, and Napoleon, leaving Marmont behind, rushed on after Sacken, who met him at Montmirail. Here, on the forenoon of the 11th, the Emperor advanced his troops under cover of a splendid artillery fire, that prevented the enemy from breaking through. Then he purposely weakened his left wing to draw Sacken's attack in that direction, while he pressed the latter's left with superior forces. That made it impossible for Sacken to join Yorck, who was advancing from Château-Thierry; the latter was driven back and Sacken meantime totally defeated. Both generals then retreated after great losses, while those of the French were insignificant, to Château-Thierry, whither the Emperor followed them on the 12th, but where Macdonald failed to intercept them. He sent the latter general with reinforcements to Montereau on the Seine. He himself did not turn and move at once on Schwarzenberg, for he had heard that Blücher, with the corps of Kleist and Kapzevitch, was advancing in person on Montmirail, to which point Marmont was retiring before him. He therefore paused in his pursuit of the enemy defeated in the last few days and turned rapidly south from Château-Thierry, to treat this third column to the fate of the other two. At Vauchamps on the 14th of February, at noon, the French encountered the vanguard of the enemy and dislodged them, whereupon Blücher resolved to retreat. He was able to effect, it however, only at the cost of constant fighting with heavy losses, especially when Napoleon sent a corps of cavalry under Grouchy in a wide circuit to intercept the retreating column at Étoges. The valiant troops, retiring in the best order, succeeded in breaking through, but only with great sacrifice of life. They then retreated to Châlons, where Yorck and Sacken also met with the remnants of their forces.

These rapidly succeeding actions at Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps have been compared with the first victories of Napoleon as a young general; and in fact there was the same fire, the same bold energy, the same force of genius

now, indeed, refined by a rich experience. But would all that suffice to bring such an unequal contest to a tolerable conclusion? And supposing the general does his share, will not the Emperor interfere as he has so often in the last two years? After the third victory gained within the last five days, he could no longer afford to follow up the Silesian army. It was high time to turn and move on Schwarzenberg. So Marmont alone was left behind to face Blücher, with orders to retreat, at the latter's first offensive move, slowly past Montmirail, and get into communication with Napoleon again. The Emperor supposed the main army of the enemy to be already far beyond the Seine above Montereau. He therefore took the troops of Ney and Gérard and the Guards and marched with incredible speed to Guignes on the Yères, where he also found Macdonald, Oudinot, and Victor, and so had his entire army together with the exception of Marmont's corps. His hopes had risen to the highest pitch; perhaps he could succeed with the second general as well as he had with the first; perhaps the columns of Schwarzenberg could be defeated in detail. Appearances favoured his hopes. Pushing forward from Guignes towards Nangis, Napoleon met at Mormant the advance-guard of the enemy's right wing under Wittgenstein, who was moving from Nogent and Provins on Paris, and annihilated it. And if Victor could only have advanced, as he was ordered to, on the same day over the Seine at Montereau, the Austrian corps of Bianchi, which had reached Fontainebleau and was now hastily recalled, might possibly have been cut off like Sacken at Montmirail. But this advance could not be undertaken until the next day, and then Napoleon led it; but Schwarzenberg had managed by that time to retire beyond the Seine and the Yonne with all his forces.

The commander-in-chief of the allied forces had been chagrined at Blücher's ill fortune and was now in sheer despair. "To avoid being beaten in detail," he wrote from Bray to Metternich, who had remained with his Emperor at Troyes, "I shall limit myself to defending resolutely ["*sérieusement*"] the bridges of Bray and Nugent and uniting my forces behind the Seine

and Yonne." He was beside himself with rage because Alexander had, on the 9th of February, called his plenipotentiary away from the congress at Châtillon, and because the proposal of Caulaincourt, to negotiate on the basis of the "ancient boundaries" provided a truce were allowed, was not accepted. He now set out to make good this neglect, and got authority from the Czar and King Frederick William to write to Berthier on the 17th. In this letter he himself suggested a cessation of hostilities, as the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon had received instructions to close preliminaries on the basis of Caulaincourt's proposal, and should have done so on the 16th. The last statement was but a ruse, and it was at once detected by Napoleon. He perceived the enemy's ill-concealed embarrassment, and his spirits rose high. "According to the latest news," he wrote to Joseph on the 18th, "everything is different with the allies. The Emperor of Russia, who but a few days ago had broken off negotiations because he wanted to impose on France still worse terms than the 'ancient boundaries,'* now wants to resume them; and I hope that I shall secure a peace on the basis of the Frankfort terms, the minimum that I can treat for with honour. If I had (before the last operations) signed a peace on the 'ancient boundaries' basis, I would have taken up arms again two years later and told the nation that that was no peace, but a capitulation. In the new state of affairs I could no more say that, as my good fortune has returned and I am master of my own terms." In a similar strain he had sent word to Caulaincourt through Bassano after the victory of Montmirail: "There is no reasonable peace except on the terms of Frankfort; any other is a mere armistice."† Caulaincourt's full powers were limited accordingly on the 17th, and Eugene received orders to bestir himself in Italy.

* This was true. Alexander, who wanted the whole of Poland, wished to indemnify Austria for the loss of Galicia by giving her Alsace. His neighbour would thus get into a dispute with France, and very likely with Prussia as well, on account of encroachments on Germany. Russia would thus have her hands free in the Orient. (Cf. Oncken in Raumer's *Hist. Taschenbuch*, 1886, p. 34.)

† Houssaye, "1814," p. 103.

Napoleon was right: "everything was different." At the very time when he was fighting Blücher sharp antagonisms had arisen at the headquarters of the allies. Alexander had come forward with the plan to conclude no peace, but to move with utmost speed on Paris, put the capital under a Russian governor, and then let the nation decide—of course under Russian patronage—the question of a ruler, be it Bernadotte, the republic, or Napoleon again. Manifestly, any head of the French nation thus confirmed would be the devoted ally of Russia. These plans were opposed by Austria in particular, which hoped rather for an understanding with the Bourbons, who had conceded during the last century her powerful position in Europe and her ascendancy in Italy. It was these dissensions that caused the dilatory operations of the main army. Not until they felt the pressure of Napoleon's victories over Blücher did they begin to act a little more in unison, and by the middle of February Alexander had yielded to the requirements of the other powers. Negotiations were resumed at Châtillon, and the proposals of Caulaincourt were to be the basis. So when Schwarzenberg retired to Troyes—after Napoleon had defeated a Württemberg corps at Montereau on the 18th—he felt that he had made way for peace, rather than for his conquering foe. And when he summoned Blücher, who had rapidly recovered himself, to come up from Châlons, it was only in case of emergency. He would not risk a battle, although the allies certainly had 150,000 men, while Napoleon, who was boldly moving on Troyes, could only command 70,000. On the 23d of February he actually retired to Bar sur Aube, and even had thoughts of receding to the plateau of Langres if the dreaded foe should follow him farther. But his hopes of peace were not destined to be fulfilled. The powers at Châtillon demanded as conditions of a preliminary peace the boundaries of 1792, and as a guarantee the evacuation not only of all fortresses outside of France, but also of the French ones of Belfort, Besançon and Hüningen. When Caulaincourt reported this he received from Napoleon the following answer: "I am so irritated by this project that I feel myself dishonoured by the mere proposal." He himself would send

an ultimatum. But he omitted to do so; the campaign absorbed all his energies. For things had just taken a decisive turn. Blücher, who did not want to join the ignominious retreat, had accepted the advice of Grolmann, Kleist's chief-of-staff, and obtained permission of the monarchs to march to the right, effect a junction with Bülow and Winzingerode, who were coming from Belgium, and, thus re-enforced, to move right on Paris.

That was a momentous determination. For who knows what would have happened if Blücher, too, had joined the retreat? Under the heavy burden of invasion the people had been roused to an intense bitterness of feeling, so that everywhere the peasants sought to defend themselves from the foreign oppressor, especially since Napoleon had regained some of his lost prestige by means of the recent victories.* The popular enthusiasm for the conqueror of the foreign invaders increased daily; and though in December the Emperor had not succeeded with his *levée en masse*, he would certainly succeed in part in March, at least in the eastern half of France. Now Blücher's forward movement put a stop to that and drew Napoleon, who was anxious about his capital, away from Schwarzenberg. The latter, to be sure, was to be kept ignorant of his absence, for his personal presence was equal to an army and often kept the enemy from bold attacks.† He now hoped that Marmont and Mortier, whom he had left to oppose Blücher, would succeed in checking his advance, while he himself pressed him from behind and so brought him between two fires—and all that before Schwarzenberg found out that he was gone

* Since Houssaye in "1814" has collected authentic data on this point, Napoleon can no longer be charged with exaggeration in his letters. Even the general quartermaster of Blücher's army wrote to Gneisenau "The officers scarcely dared say anything more to the troops." And Schwarzenberg was of the opinion that "in order to prevent excesses among these nationalities in so long a line, we would have to station another army behind the troops in operation." However, the French themselves were by no means guiltless.

† "I have 50,000 men," he once said to General Poltaratzky, "and myself, that makes 150,000."

Three corps, amounting to 40,000 men, were left under MacDonald to watch the Austrian.

But events did not turn out just as Napoleon wished. On the 28th Marmont and Mortier did indeed block Blücher's road east of Meaux on the right bank of the Marne and dislodge his advance-guard. But Napoleon was prevented by a late start and the bottomless mud in the roads from sharing in the fight on that day. The Silesian army managed to escape north to Soissons; the two corps of Bülow and Winzingerode had just arrived at that important point and had forced the town to surrender. This was very opportune, for Blücher had now not only escaped the fate prepared for him by Napoleon, but had swelled his forces to 100,000. And now the Emperor's situation had in turn become extremely difficult. If he turned back from the Marne to face Schwarzenberg, who had again advanced and defeated a corps under Oudinot at Bar sur Aube,—and he actually thought of that,—then Blücher would put Marmont and Mortier to flight and seize Paris. He wanted to be easy on that head, and so gave his first attention to this foe. On the 7th of March a Russian corps in an advanced position at Craonne was driven back at a heavy cost, and two days later Blücher stood ready in a strong position at Laon to offer battle. Napoleon had gained control of the road to Soissons, while Marmont was approaching from Berry on the Rheims road; so that the army was now moving on Laon in two divisions between which it was difficult to keep up communication, because the land between the roads was marshy and moreover Cossack patrols intercepted the couriers. Hence on the 9th Napoleon, who had twice over gained possession of the neighbouring villages of Sémilly and Ardon, did not learn all day that Marmont did not arrive before Laon until afternoon instead of in the morning and was unable to capture the village of Athies until evening, and then, when he supposed the bloody work to be finished, as it was dark, he was driven out from it by the enemy and his troops fled precipitately along the road they had come by as far as Corbény. Fortunately the enemy's pursuit was impeded by the intervention of a few thousand

men who had been sent out under Fabvier to seek a junction with Napoleon and were on their way back. Of all this the Emperor heard nothing until about midnight, as his own right wing had been driven out of Ardon again and so communication with Marmont had grown more difficult. He was beside himself at the latter for behaving "like a lieutenant." Of course he could not divine that the Duke of Ragusa had given up his master's cause as lost ever since the fall of Soissons and the re-enforcement of Blücher, and hence did only what was most necessary, and not always even that. Napoleon saw nothing of this, but only that he had to preserve from a destructive pursuit an important part of his army now in disorder. Therefore he continued boldly standing in battle array against great odds on the 10th, and actually secured an orderly retreat on the part of Marmont. Not until then did he turn upon Soissons, and then only on the second day after to hasten thence toward Rheims to drive out a detached Russian corps which meantime had occupied that city. That was accomplished on the evening of March 14th, and at that place he gave his jaded troops a few days of rest.

The allied powers had in the meanwhile adopted a new resolution, not of military strategy, but of diplomacy. This was necessitated by the fact that Caulaincourt had neither accepted the offer of February 17th nor made a counter-proposal, and that Napoleon himself had in a letter to Francis I. on the 21st designated the Frankfort programme as the ultimatum for himself and France. The greatest activity in securing the resolution was displayed by Castlereagh, who was at last anxious to know what England was spending her money for. On the 28th of February, at the fourth session of the congress of Châtillon, the envoy of Napoleon was notified that he had until March 10th at the farthest to make counter-proposals, but that these must agree in all essential points with its proposals of February 9th. The required communication failed to appear, and on the 9th of March the four great powers, England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, concluded a treaty at Chaumont that bound Great Britain to pay five million pounds annually to

the Continental powers, and bound the latter to carry out by force of arms the programme proposed at Châtillon, i.e., the restriction of France to the boundaries of 1792, and the full independence of Holland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and Germany, though it should require twenty years to accomplish it. Each of the allied Continental powers agreed to contribute 150,000 men. The treaty was antedated March 1st; but it came into full force only after the victory at Laon. For Schwarzenberg, after having driven back Oudinot at Bar sur Aube and advanced to Troyes on the 4th of March, had there remained stationary; so that the Czar and the King of Prussia thought that Emperor Francis had not only forbidden him to strike, but had even ordered him to retreat to the Rhine for the mere purpose of sacrificing Blücher.* At Blücher's headquarters the same opinion was held, and it was determined, as they had no wish to be sacrificed, to proceed more deliberately. Not until Schwarzenberg heard of the battle on the 9th of March with its favourable issue did he decide to make a further advance. During these days the peace congress was also dissolved without any results, as Napoleon had made no counter-proposals and as the suggestions which Caulaincourt offered on his own initiative were so wide of the programme of the allies that the latter broke off negotiations.

Napoleon's unyielding attitude might seem incomprehensible if the only thing at stake were his sovereignty over France,

* This view of the case has also passed into the works of historians. Perhaps it will be dislodged by the recently published correspondence between Schwarzenberg and Metternich during those days. Although Radetzky in a memorial of November, 1813, makes mention of the Prussians in these terms: "for whom, as they now show themselves, the fewest possible troops are to be desired in case of peace," that of itself is no sufficient basis for charging the commander-in-chief with the intentional sacrifice of an entire army four months later. The military incompetence of Schwarzenberg, his constant dread of starvation, his fear of the *levée en masse*, which he sees in fancy about to be organized, fully explain his behaviour. Add to that, finally, that he was confirmed in his course by Metternich, who told him "to see safety not in battle but in the military attitude," and no further suspicion is needed, especially as it has no valid grounds. (See "*Oesterreichs Teilnahme*," etc., p. 814 ff.)

and not rather a great principle which he represented and which was confronted by an opposite principle in the camp of the allies. It was impossible for the representative of a cosmopolitan revolution, who was reaching out in every direction without regard to boundaries between states and social classes, to adapt himself to the pre-revolutionary system of a balance of power; and it was perfectly logical to regard a peace on the basis of the limited territory of the old Bourbon state only in the light of a capitulation. The fact that the idea of the Revolution and its inevitable consequence of boundless expansion had long been incarnated in this one personality, while the French people, on the contrary, had already returned perforce to the path of a national life, gave rise to a conflict that had to come, finally, to a settlement. At the capital the victories of February had restored some of the old confidence; but when March brought reports only of the retreat of Macdonald and of the defeat of Soult by Wellington at Orthez on the 27th of February, and no reports of Napoleon, government securities fell to 51, and anxiety and concern reigned anew. Joseph, who was at the side of Marie Louise as regent, kept writing incessantly for peace.

But Napoleon at Rheims thought of nothing but how to gain yet another favourable chance. He considered whether he should not in junction with Macdonald intercept the main army of the enemy at Meaux, in order to contest its march towards the capital; but he formed another and far bolder plan. Leaving Macdonald in front of Schwarzenberg, whom he supposed to be across the Seine above Nogent with the most of his army, he proposed himself to operate with 22,000 men in his rear on Méry or Troyes. Mortier and Marmont remained in and near Rheims facing Blücher. He set out southward on the 17th, and on the 19th was at Plancy, while a detachment marched on Arcis sur Aube. The Austro-Russian army retired from that point at the command of the commander-in-chief, who wished to collect his army between Troyes and Lesmont in order to advance with united forces against his weaker enemy. Napoleon looked for no offensive movement after this retreat.

but supposed the enemy was retiring to Brienne; so on the morning of the 20th he made up his mind to extend his original plan still farther; i.e., to march upon Vitry and win it back from the enemy that occupied it, to concentrate at that point the forces of Marmont and Mortier and the garrisons of Metz and Nancy, with Macdonald following by way of Arcis, and so with a compact force of 90,000 men to fall upon the communications of the enemy in the rear. He himself planned to take the road from Plancy through Arcis to make more sure of keeping Schwarzenberg. But a bitter disappointment was in store for him.

On the forenoon of the 20th peasants announced to the French advancing east by Arcis the approach of large masses of the enemy. Napoleon refused to believe it. He sent out his orderly to reconnoitre, and he not riding far enough to see the hostile columns, confirmed the Emperor in his error. The army was thus attacked while on the march by a superior force, and a portion of it was driven in wild confusion to Arcis. There, at the bridge, an officer with drawn sword—such is the story—stood in their way and cried: "Who dares to cross before me?" They recognized Napoleon and submitted to being led back against the enemy. At the same time the vanguard, under Ney, was attacked near Torcy. That general held the place against great odds, and at Arcis, too, the troops fought with desperate valour, so that the enemy were unable to accomplish anything worth mentioning, particularly because only Schwarzenberg's right wing had been engaged, while the left was on the march from the west. Napoleon was misled by this partial engagement of the enemy's forces into taking the whole affair for a rear-guard battle, which confirmed his opinion that the bulk of the enemy was on the retreat. He accordingly persisted in the direction already planned, and in all good faith advanced on the forenoon of the 21st against the supposed rear-guard of the enemy, until suddenly he saw himself confronted by the entire main army. Now it is his turn to command a retreat over the Aube, and nothing but Schwarzenberg's slow movements enabled him to bring the larger part

of his troops with comparatively little loss to the opposite bank. Then indeed, when the 100,000 men finally attacked the 30,000, the remainder could not escape without heroic fighting. The battle of Arcis was lost.

His error as to the enemy's intention had cost the Emperor 3500 men. He now had to continue his march to Vitry on the other bank of the Aube, but he did it so rapidly that the allies soon knew nothing of his real whereabouts. MacDonald, who had not taken part in the battle, also marched on the other bank of the Aube to the northeast and escaped with a rear skirmish. At this juncture, on the 23d of March, a courier was captured by the Austrians bearing a letter of Berthier to the marshal, with the information that the Emperor was in the rear of the army between Vitry and Saint-Dizier, and that his cavalry had already pushed on to Joinville. About the same time some Cossacks waylaid a second messenger who had a letter from Napoleon to the Empress at Paris which initiated her into his plan to move nearer to the Marne and his fortresses in the east "in order to keep the enemy away from the capital." These letters and some others from the capital picturing the hopeless state of feeling that prevailed there and the inability of the city to defend itself; the news that on the 12th of March the English had occupied Bordeaux and the inhabitants had declared themselves for the Bourbons; and, finally, the reported march of Blücher past Rheims to Châlons—all these put together led the allies to abandon entirely the pursuit of Napoleon and to move in junction on Paris. A manifesto to the French, dated the 25th of March, again laid all the blame for the bloody war on the Corsican with his insatiable ambition, and at the same time attacked the principle he represented. "France," it reads, "has only her own government to hold responsible for the ills she endures. Peace alone can close the wounds made by a spirit of universal conquest unequalled in the annals of the world. This peace will be the peace of Europe; any other is inadmissible. It is time at last that princes should be enabled to watch over the weal of their peoples without external interference or influence, that

nations should respect their mutual independence, and that social institutions should be protected against daily assaults, that property be secure and commerce free."

If the French people gave ear, they would be turning their backs on the political programme of the Revolution, and the man who had fought for it hitherto, with the whole force of his genius and his ambitious will, would be annihilated.

Napoleon's course in pursuing his eastward march, after the second day of fighting at Arcis, when he must have been convinced of the enemy's offensive purposes, has been severely censured. He should, it is held have hastened west toward the capital with all available troops; this would have given him a good start of his enemy, and time to adopt measures for defence. But however correct this reasoning may be, the Emperor's plan also had great advantages if chance did not thwart him. He had passed on from Vitry by Saint-Dizier and reached Doulevant, where he waited during the 25th of March and tried to get news of the enemy, of whose movements he was ignorant. The only definite information was that a strong corps had made its appearance in the vicinity of Saint-Dizier. Had the enemy divided and scattered? In that case he might perhaps be defeated, as at Champaubert and Montmirail. Napoleon at once advanced against this corps, and on the 26th put it to flight. It consisted of 10,000 men under Winzingerode which the allies had left behind to oppose the Emperor. The latter thought it strange that the prisoners brought in were not Schwarzenberg's soldiers, but Blücher's, and his uncertainty was increased. He hastened back to Vitry to secure reliable information and found it; all statements agreed that the enemy was on his way to Paris in full force. What was he to do now? It was no longer possible to forestall their arrival at the capital; they had a three days' start of him. Should he turn east collect the garrisons and call upon the militia? Perhaps this last would have been successful, for the peasants in the entire east were ready for resistance; they were traversing the land and bringing in prisoners to headquarters. Hence Macdonald was disposed to carry the war into Alsace and Lorraine; and it

has been conjectured, not without reason, that this idea seemed to the Emperor more feasible than the other, urged by Caulaincourt, Maret, Berthier, and others about him, to save the capital at all hazards. He spent hours of extreme suspense shut up in his closet at Saint-Dizier, trying to decide one way or the other. But finally he determined to go to Paris by way of Bar, Troyes, and Fontainebleau. The troops were set in motion on the morning of the 28th. They marched with speed, and yet it seemed slow to the Emperor. On the evening of that day he received a letter from his former adjutant, Lavalette, now postmaster-general; his presence, said the letter, was absolutely necessary at Paris, and he must not delay an instant if he would not lose his capital. He learned soon after that the enemy had already arrived at Meaux, had defeated Marmont and Mortier at Fère Champenoise and were now driving them toward Paris. His impatience rose to a feverish pitch; arrived at Troyes, he could hardly sleep. He gave over the command to Berthier and rode on, accompanied only by the squadrons of his body-guard; at Villeneuve-sur-Vannes he left even that escort, and flinging himself with Caulaincourt into a carriage, sped on at a furious pace.

Meantime the allies had arrived in the immediate vicinity of Paris, and on the 29th Marie Louise fled with the King of Rome to Blois. The councillors of the regency had urged her to stay, but an explicit order of Napoleon's on no account to expose his son to the fate of Astyanax, required his removal.* The impression this produced in Paris was profound; for the large numbers of wounded constantly coming in, the peasants fleeing from their homes, and the terrible prophecies of the officious press bureau as to the impending doom of the city, all this kept the population in a fever of suspense. Government securities fell to 45. Joseph, the Regent, who remained behind, did not know how to inspire confidence. His proclamation to the Parisians to resist the enemy, as the Emperor was at his heels, roused no enthusiasm; and if it had, means of resistance and

* "I would prefer that my son were strangled rather than to see him growing up at Vienna as an Austrian prince," Napoleon wrote to Joseph on the 8th of February.

weapons for volunteers were wanting. The fortifications were not completed. There were hardly more than 30,000 national guards in Paris. These did, indeed, fight heroically on the 30th of March in conjunction with the troops of Marmont and Mortier before the walls of the city. Not until late in the afternoon, when the superior force of the enemy had captured Montmartre and planted there a large number of guns, did the fighting cease. Authorized by Joseph, who had fled at noon, Marmont concluded at evening the capitulation which delivered the city into the hands of the enemy. At the same time Mortier ordered one of his generals to ride in a southerly direction and arrange quarters for the columns retreating from Paris. At the posting station, La Cour de France, the messenger came in the darkness upon some travellers who were waiting for a change of horses, and was hailed by one of them. It was the Emperor, who thus learned of the loss of his capital. He was beside himself with indignation at Joseph and Clarke, the Minister of War, unjustly laying this loss at their door; he wanted to go straightway on to Paris, and would not be convinced that it was too late until the fires of Mortier's vanguard appeared, and General Flahault, whom he had sent to Marmont, arrived with a letter from the latter which told him that the Parisians were wholly averse to further resistance. Thereupon he betook himself to Fontainebleau again.

The next morning, the 31st of March, the Czar and Frederick William III. made their formal entry into the conquered city. Emperor Francis had stayed behind at Dijon. They were greeted by a small but intensely active band of royalists with cheers for Louis XVIII., and were completely deceived thereby as to the feelings of the population. The latter had grown wholly indifferent to the Boorbons; they scarcely gave them a thought, and least of all were disposed to recall them. The old dynasty could count on devotion and sympathy nowhere save in the circle of the Faubourg St. Germain, where regret for forfeited privileges and narrow-minded aversion to all other classes of men dreamed of bringing back the good old times with the old court. In vain had Napoleon striven to win to his side these old

nobles of France. Only a very few of them, who discerned with clear vision the trend of public affairs, acknowledged and respected his work of reform; all the rest plotted for his ruin. More than one submitted to be the tool of the Emperor's intriguing enemies, who for years had looked forward to the downfall of the insatiable conqueror. They now managed to masquerade before the foreign sovereigns as the true representatives of public sentiment, and since Tallyrand, who entertained the Czar, led their cause, it soon gained the day. Alexander merely mentioned timidly and dubiously the name of Bernadotte, but learned at once from his host that France had no wish for another soldier. "If we wanted one, we would keep the one we have; he is the first soldier in the world. After him any other would surely not draw ten men to himself." It was either Napoleon or Louis XVIII.; there was no third possibility. The Czar assented. In a proclamation which the allies sent to the Senate on the 31st of March by the hand of the Prince of Benevento, and which at once was posted on the walls of Paris in thousands of places, it was declared "that they would no longer negotiate with Napoleon Bonaparte or with any member of his family. And the Senate—the same body that but a few weeks before had so slavishly served its master and creator—first decreed, on April 1st, its own continued existence to be indispensable, and then proceeded to pronounce the deposition of the Emperor and released the nation and army from its oath of loyalty. The nation had no objections to offer; the Legislative Body confirmed the vote of the Senate, and the high imperial offices, the *cour des comptes* and the *cour de cassation*, passed over to the royalist camp. But would the army, too, his faithful instrument, submit to being wrenched from the hands of its leader, the master artist of war and battle?

While still at La Cour de France Napoleon had sent Caulaincourt to Alexander and given him full powers for a peace such as the allies had desired at Châtillon. Now the envoy returned to Fontainebleau and brought as the answer of the enemy the substance of Napoleon's own words, that peace with him was nothing but an armistice, and that he stood even in the way of his son's recognition by the allies. Yet Alexander did not strip

the messenger of all hope with regard to the regency; only the Emperor must first abdicate. The latter had no thought of so doing; he was defeated, but by no means vanquished. He still had troops. There was Marmont with 12,000 men at Corbeil and Essonnes, beyond him Mortier with 8000; by the 1st of April the head of the troops defeated at Arcis had arrived, on the 2d the Guards, while the rest were already on the march thither from Troyes. Ere long he could collect nearly 60,000 men there; and he needed only to reckon in the 100,000 to which his own personality was equivalent, according to his own statement, and the experiences of this campaign, to come to the conclusion that there was no need of throwing up all hope. And besides, Maison had a detachment in the north, Augereau, who had indeed given up Lyons in unnecessary haste, was in the south, and Soult and Suchet were facing the English and Spanish. And the soldiers and their officers were all enthusiastic over him. He could see that at a review of the Guards on the 3d of April, when, in answer to his speech, they impetuously shouted: "To Paris!" Not so, however, the leaders. There were indeed fiery partisans of the Emperor even among them, ready for any emergency, like Mortier, Drouot, Gérard, and others. But the most of those who were second in command, the marshals, dukes, princes, and counts, whose services and rewards were alike magnificent, had prosecuted the war of the previous year only with vexation of spirit, seeing no end to the business and yet longing so earnestly to enjoy in peace the fruits of their valiant labours. To go on fighting now seemed to them utterly hopeless. Suppose they did conquer; look at the sacrifices! And would there be peace even then? How easily a civil war might be kindled! The return of the Bourbons of course they were bitterly opposed to, but there was another way. Caulaincourt had brought back from Paris the idea of the Emperor's abdicating in favour of his son, and Napoleon had talked of it with his immediate circle. The marshals heard of it as they had heard of the Senate's decree of deposition and the proclamation of the allies, and saw in it the only means of saving the present system and with it their own position and prestige, without exposing themselves to

new toils and trouble. On the 4th of April, after the parade, they plucked up courage. Ney, Lefebvre, Oudinot, and Macdonald appeared before the Emperor as representatives of the rest and broached the subject. Inasmuch as the Senate had decided against him, they urged, and the peace had been lost by neglect, nothing remained but for him to abdicate. Napoleon is said to have disputed the right of the Senate to deprive him of the crown, to have pointed out the poor position of the enemy, enumerated his own forces, unfolded his plan of attack; but all in vain. He was forced to yield, and signed the required document. It reads as follows: "The allied powers having declared the Emperor Napoleon to be the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to leave France, and even to lay down his life for the good of the country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, from those of the Empress's regency, and from the laws of the Empire." *

When Napoleon made up his mind to this step he did not, to be sure, entirely banish the thought that the allies might reject this conditional abdication. He wished outright that they would, for then he could convince those who had urged him to abdicate that they had no alternative but Louis XVIII., and then they would no longer refuse him their support. It was merely following out this line of thought when, instead of sending Caulaincourt alone to Paris with the abdication, he had Ney and Macdonald accompany him. Alexander received them and

* It is not without interest to read the first draft of this document, which the Emperor wrote with his own hand, and from which he afterwards struck out certain passages. It read as follows: "The allied powers having declared the Emperor Napoleon to be the sole obstacle to the establishment of peace in Europe, and since the Emperor cannot assuredly without violating his oath surrender any one of the departments which were united with France when he ascended the throne, the Emperor Napoleon declares himself ready to abdicate and leave France, even to lay down his life for the welfare of his country and for the preservation of the rights of his son the King, of the Empress-regent, and of the laws and institutions, which shall be subject to no change until the definite conclusion of peace and while foreign armies stand upon our soil."

seemed even on the point of wavering, especially when Macdonald assured him that the army could look forward only with abhorrence to the return of the monarchy, which had remained a stranger to its warlike deeds and to its glory. But scarcely were the words out of his mouth before they were most strikingly refuted. An officer sent by Schwarzenberg reported something to the Czar in the Russian tongue, whereupon the latter turned to the marshals and said: "Gentlemen, you base your request for the regency on the unswerving fidelity of the troops to the imperial government. Well, Napoleon's vanguard has just deserted him and is now within our lines." It was indeed true. When Marmont had to give over the defence of the capital, he yielded to Talleyrand's solicitations. "The army and people," he wrote to Schwarzenberg, "have been released from their oath of fidelity to Napoleon by the decree of the Senate. I am ready to help in securing such a good understanding between people and army as shall make a civil war with new shedding of blood impossible." His subordinate general Souham with 12,000 men marched under cover of night, on the pretext of leading them against the enemy, right into the midst of the Austrian lines. When morning broke, the valiant troopers saw with gnashing of teeth what their leader had done. On hearing this from Alexander I., Ney and Macdonald also gave up the cause of the Empire for lost. Doubtless persuasion and promises left their traces on their minds. On the way back they concluded a truce with Schwarzenberg without Napoleon's knowledge.

In the mean time Napoleon heard of Marmont's desertion, and as his position north of the Loire had become wholly untenable, he had issued orders to march to Pithiviers and Orléans on the 5th of April. At the same time he is reported to have spoken of throwing himself into Italy, joining Eugene, supporting the cause of Italian unity with an army and with the force of his genius, and so gaining in place of France, which had fallen away from him, a new basis for his political aims, now without a country. But the French soldiers were not yet without a country, and on that rock such plans must be wrecked. Accordingly the only authentic order was to march to the Loire. The returning

marshals refused quite openly to obey it, and on April 6th they made a statement that nothing but the ruins of an army was now available, that these were surrounded, and that even if escape beyond the Loire were possible, nothing but civil war would result. They advised the Emperor to abdicate now unconditionally. In place of France they brought him from Paris the offer of the island of Elba, which Alexander wished to concede to him. Napoleon again hesitated. But that same day the Senate proclaimed Louis XVIII. king; and then, deserted by his captains, he wrote out a new form of abdication in which he "for himself and his heirs renounced the thrones of Italy and France."

With this new declaration in their hands, Caulaincourt and the two marshals again repaired to Paris, and there concluded on this basis a treaty with the allies. It provided that Napoleon with the title of Emperor should be sovereign ruler of Elba, should have a revenue of two million francs and a body-guard of four hundred of his Guards, while the Empress Marie Louise was to have the Italian duchy of Parma. Alexander had insisted on Elba despite the warning protests of Talleyrand and Metternich. Even Emperor Francis felt that the nearness of the dethroned Cæsar would be a source of anxiety. And so it was not without strenuous opposition that to the former dictator of a continent this little crumb of land was tossed, more in mockery of the idea of sovereignty than to show in what narrow compass it could be confined. On the night of April 10th the Treaty of Fontainebleau was signed by Ney, Caulaincourt, Macdonald, and the four ministers of the allied powers. Soon afterwards Napoleon set his name to it, and so made his renunciation complete. What must have been his feelings! Was it a resignation without any ray of hope that filled his mind? Or did his energetic spirit still find something in reserve to set over against his fate? Did he feel himself thoroughly conquered,—or only defeated,—in his life as well as on the field of battle? Some of his suite, who gave him their unquestioning devotion under the spell of his personality, could not understand how their master could keep on living. They thought him bent on suicide, and removed his pistols. But

those not immediately under his spell, who did not exalt him above all criticism, like Metternich, Fouché, and others, did not credit him with such thoughts. And however positively the story is told that the Emperor took poison on the night of the 12th of April, the historian will not be easily convinced of its truth. It seems so absolutely out of accord with the whole character of the man, who even on St. Helena did not regard his rôle in the world as ended, that one is much more disposed to explain what happened as one of those attacks of sickness with which the mortal disease already coming upon him announced itself as it had done once before, after the battle of Dresden at Pirna, and, again, on the journey to Elba. One thing is sure, on the next day he had entirely recovered, and was soon full of new courage, full of confidence, full of hope, and anxious about only one thing, his life.*

* Napoleon's secretary, Fain, was the first to speak of this attempt at suicide, in his "Manuscrit de 1814," published after the Emperor's death; it is treated more in full in Ségur's "Histoire et Mémoires" (VII. 196 ff.). Ségur even claims to have his information directly from the Emperor's physician Ivan, who, after putting his master's life out of danger, would no longer be responsible for it, and then, fearful of being suspected, "lost his head" and ran away. But Ségur's own account is not free from inconsistencies; moreover, Fain's story differs with regards to the supposed poison. Only the day before Napoleon had told Bausset, who brought him a letter from Marie Louise, how he escaped death on the battlefield of Arcis sur Aube, and then added: "If I should seek death by an act of despair it would be a piece of cowardice. Suicide neither accords with my principles nor with the rank I occupy in the world." To the same messenger he seemed "filled with an indifference masked under the guise of philosophy, and with a strange confidence in destiny that regulates everything and which none can escape" (Hérisson, "Cabinet noir," p. 299). It was a similar impression that he conveyed to the foreign officers who later escorted him to Elba. To the Austrian General Koller he said before his departure: "There are those who would blame me for being able to survive my own fall; but they are in the wrong. I see nothing great in ending one's life like a man who has gambled away his money." (Helfert, "Napoleon I. Fahrt von Fontainebleau nach Elba," p. 81.) This is hardly the language of a man who a week before wanted to kill himself. Meneval in his work on Napoleon and Marie Louise (II. 115 ff.) says that Ivan had thrown away on the day before a part of the opiate which Napoleon had carried on his person ever since the Russian campaign

Even before the abdication the palace of Fontainebleau had lost many of its military guests; soon the fallen Emperor was almost wholly deserted. Even Berthier took his leave, never to return. Only a few faithful ones remained until the 20th of April, when Napoleon, escorted by commissioners of the allies,—partly as a guard, partly for protection,—left the spot whence he had so often made known his will to Europe. Before mounting into the carriage he bade the Old Guard farewell. He thanked them first of all for the noble zeal they had displayed. Although a part of the army had betrayed him, he might have continued the war for two or three years behind the Loire or with the aid of his fortresses. But civil war would then have raged on the soil of France; and ever since this had become clear to him, he had sacrificed all his personal rights and interests to the welfare and glory of the fatherland. He admonished them to persevere in the path of duty and of honour, and to serve faithfully the sovereign chosen by the nation. He might have ended his existence, but he wanted to live, he told them, in order to write and proclaim to posterity the feats of his warriors.* Then he kissed General Petit, who was in command of the Guards, kissed their flag, shouted a final greeting to his "old growlers," and rode away. "Nothing but sobbing was heard in all the ranks," Coignet writes in his journal, "and I can say that I too shed tears when I saw my Emperor depart."

On the 4th of May, 1814, the "Undaunted" cast anchor in the harbour of Portoferrajo, and the dethroned Emperor stepped ashore. No sooner had he received a deputation of the inhabit-

(Ségur says since the Spanish), and that the Emperor tried to poison himself with what was left. Is it not a reasonable supposition that he used it as a means of allaying violent cramps of the stomach, and that this led to the suspicion of suicide? As to his anxiety in regard to his own life there is positive evidence in Helfert, *op. cit.*, p. 82, and Campbell, "Napoleon at Fontainebleau," p. 199.

*The text of the address as officially edited by Fain, "*Manuscrit de 1814*," has been included in the "*Correspondance*." The words actually uttered have been appended by the commissioners Koller (Austrian), Truchsess-Waldburg (Prussian), Campbell (English), to their reports and later published.

ants of his miniature realm with the statement that he would give them the loving care of a father, than he mounted a horse in order to inspect the fortifications of the island. He seemed to be not wholly dissatisfied, but thought certain improvements were necessary; and in fact very soon he gave orders to equip the island of Pianosa on the south with two batteries. He did not feel safe enough. His journey through the south of France had made a profound impression on him, that left him uneasy for a long time. And in fact, despite the escort of the foreign commissioners, that journey had been full of danger, such was the fierce animosity of the people in Provence. Only by changing his seat in the carriage, donning an Austrian uniform, and wearing the white cockade of the Bourbons was he able to evade the fury of his former subjects. More than once those about him saw tears of faint-hearted terror in his eyes and all the signs of fear in his words and gestures. Royalist agents, he had been informed, had roused the people against him; and he would not give up the conviction that the provisional government had a hand in it. Not until the English corvette bore him from Fréjus—the same Fréjus where he had once before landed on his arrival from Egypt—past Corsica to Elba, did he recover a sense of security and some equanimity. He consented quite readily to the stay of Campbell, the British plenipotentiary, at Portoferraio; three weeks later came the 400 grenadiers of the Old Guard for whom he had stipulated in the Treaty of Fontainebleau. These together with a paid battalion of foreigners and the native soldiery made up a little army of over a thousand men, on which the Emperor—he had retained this title as his right—now bestowed the same eager attention that had once been claimed by the immense hosts of his world-wide wars.

Yet this and his care for his little flotilla did not absorb all his energies. The restless man, who had to be busied about something every moment, entered into the smallest details of his little government. Here, too, he had his Council of State, to which he called Generals Drouot and Bertrand and a dozen of the inhabitants. Its decrees were concerned at first with increasing the yield of the iron-mines and salt-works, in both of which it

was successful. Then new roads were built, mulberry-trees planted beside them, sanitary and police measures were adopted, etc. But Napoleon also administered his own household in detail, so that he knew, for example, far better than his steward, Bertrand, how many mattresses, sheets and bedsteads, etc., he possessed. In money affairs he was most painfully accurate and not without reason. The four million francs he had saved from his private treasure of the Tuileries would not last long, and Louis XVIII. did not pay the two millions of allowance stipulated in the treaty. Who can find fault with him, then, for collecting the taxes of his tiny realm without leniency? He even had to cut down the reduced pay of his beloved grenadiers. In the year 1812, when he met de Pradt in Warsaw on the retreat from Russia, he jested about his desperate condition, saying: "It is but one step from the sublime to the ridiculous." At that time the remark was not pertinent; now it would be much more to the point.

When the summer heat made it uncomfortable to stay at Portoferraio, Napoleon withdrew to the heights of Marciana, where he lived with his company in tents. It was a beautiful spot, shaded by old chestnut trees; from there the eye could sweep the ocean, look over to Bastia on Corsica, and to Livorno in Tuscany, an outlook quite after his heart. Here he received a visit from the Countess Walewska, with whom he had become acquainted in Poland in 1807 and had since kept up intimate relations. She came with a boy, his son.* The profound mystery in which this visit was veiled led to the common opinion that it was the Empress. The latter, however, did not come. Her father had induced her to return to Austria, and

* Count Alexander Florian Walewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs under Napoleon III., was born on the 4th of May, 1810. He was not the only son of the Emperor born out of wedlock. We know certainly of the following: a Count Léon, born in 1806, whose mother, Frau Revel, belonged in the suite of Princess Caroline; also a certain Devienne, born in 1802 at Lyons; and finally the son of the housekeeper at St. Helena, who afterwards married a Mr. Gordon. Gordon-Bonaparte died in 1886 at San Francisco as a watchmaker. (On this point see the periodical "*Le Curieux*," no. 8 of 1884 and no. 40 of 1887.)

had cut off all communication with her husband. She submitted to it with indifference. Seven years later, after the death of Napoleon, she wrote once to a friend that she never had cherished a warmer feeling for him, and yet she would gladly have given him yet many a year of happiness, "provided that he stayed at a distance." Napoleon tried to console himself at Elba, although he often thought of the little King of Rome and sorely missed receiving letters from his wife, though that may have been for political reasons. After the short stay of Countess Walewska came Pauline Borghese, who is said—on evidence claimed to be found in her own confidential correspondence—to have been even more than a sister to the dethroned Cæsar. No other member of his family came, excepting only his mother, Lætitia, who wanted to be near her son, and came over to Elba to live.

Not that the Emperor gave up all communication with his relatives. The secret police of Livorno, particularly the French consul there, Mariotti, and his agents on the island, claim to have had information of a very active correspondence, especially with Murat. The latter in his uncertainty whether the powers would accord him the reward of his defection from Napoleon, his sovereignty over Naples, resumed intercourse with him. It is difficult to ascertain what was the nature of their negotiations and arrangements in detail, the more so that their correspondence must have been largely oral through trusted messengers. Was it their purpose to support a plan of insurrection in Italy, such as was sent to Napoleon in May, 1814, by a number of conspirators? Or was it still the other idea, of rising again to his former state in France? We cannot say. At any rate, Napoleon received at Portoferraio many Italians during the autumn, who doubtless took little pains to conceal their dissatisfaction with the re-instated Austrian rule and of the hopes they had fixed on him. It is quite possible that he did not altogether repel them. The memory of what he passed through in Provence may have shaken his confidence in a reaction in France and given another direction to his thoughts.* But if this plan was ever

* Livi in his "Napoleone all' isola d'Elba" has recently advocated this

anything more than a passing thought, it certainly fell into the background completely when secret information and public prints no longer left it in doubt that the French people were undergoing a change of mind which could not fail to be favourable to himself.

In fact the government of Louis XVIII. was growing more distasteful to the people every day. On the 30th of May the King had concluded peace with the powers, including England, which gave up all the colonies conquered during the war; a few days later he also made a sort of compromise with the Revolution by giving France a constitution, the Charte. Despite various faults and defects, this document was after all a valuable concession, and certainly left the people more of a share in legislation than Napoleon had ever granted. The King, moreover, was a man of discretion, who was disposed to adapt himself to the changed conditions; only he was old, obtuse, and sickly, and not capable of checking all the reactionary elements that highly disapproved his compact with insurrection. Chief among these was his own brother, the Count of Artois, the head of an ultra-royalist party of émigrés, who were striving to restore the old order. They compromised the government and turned the people against it completely, for there was no such thing as any great sympathy for the Bourbons, of whom Wellington truly said that they were as great strangers to the land as though they had never reigned over it. The mere fact that they ascended the throne under the protection of foreigners was enough to discredit them. A caricature had shown Louis XVIII. mounted on a horse behind a view of the case. But his acceptance of the speech of Napoleon reported in the anonymous pamphlet, "*La vérité sur les Cent Jours*," p. 218, as entirely authentic is to be questioned. For if Napoleon there really spoke of a united Italian kingdom with Rome as the capital, he must have wholly forgotten what he had said in the previous December to La Besnardière about Murat, who was pursuing the same plan; viz., "Does not this simpleton see that nothing but my predominance in Europe can keep the Pope away from Rome? It is the wish and interest of Europe that he should return there." (Pallain-Ballieu, "*Talleyrand's Briefwechsel mit König Ludwig XVIII.*," p. 163.) Moreover, a plan that took in the whole of Italy would sever all relations with Austria, while such relations would be of great weight in case of Napoleon's return to France.

Cossack riding over the corpses of French warriors. It was not wise on the part of the monarch to keep reiterating to his friend George, prince regent of England, his gratitude for the protection accorded him; and it was equally unwise to raise barriers between himself and the people by an antiquated ceremonial. And this was by no means all. The very fact that the new constitution was represented as a gift of the king violated the principle of popular sovereignty which had had its roots struck deep into the vanity of the people. Now, while the constitution guaranteed to the owners of national land undisturbed possession of their property, one of the ministers nevertheless expressed in the lower house the hope of its restoration to its "rightful" owners, i.e., the émigrés. These now laid stress on their loyalty, and as they were for the most part incapable of official duties they accepted as a reward peerages, sinecures, and pensions; enough to make all employed in the service of the state wish the preceding régime back again. The money for such large benefactions was secured by adding the "extraordinary domain" of Napoleon arbitrarily to the civil list. And in spite of such rewards the returning nobles persistently strove to regain their old estates, in which project they received important support from the like-minded clergy. The latter not infrequently misused the confessional to move dying men to make restitution, by raising scruples as to their rights. Favoured by a devout court party, the clergy recorded still further successes. The abolished office of Grand Almoner was restored, and it hampered the efforts of the Ministry of Public Worship; a police ordinance forbade labour on Sundays and holidays with penalties, although the Charte had guaranteed freedom of worship and although the French people had for a long time observed only the holidays appointed in the Concordat of 1801. Processions moved again through the streets. The reaction even went so far that a favourite actress of the Paris Théâtre Français was refused Christian burial. This, indeed, gave rise to a public riot.

While such arbitrary acts created disaffection among the bourgeois, the treatment of the army was characterized by a colossal stupidity. Not only did the old nobility, with the

princes in the lead, make sport of the new nobility of the marshals and generals, but the entire army was alienated. The prisoners of war and garrisons of eastern fortresses, together with the Spanish and Italian armies, made up, on their return to France, no inconsiderable number. Wholesale reductions were made, the pay of the Old Guard was cut down, and thousands of officers were put on half-pay, and they had even that only as long as they behaved like good Catholics. There would not have been many objections to this if several thousands of royalists had not been appointed in their stead, a new Royal Guard created of émigrés and nobles with splendid appointments, and a new military school established for nobles. All this not only entailed great expense, but also threatened to restore the old inequality between officers. And when they went so far as to abolish the institutions for the education of the orphans of the members of the Legion of Honour, indignation knew no bounds, even among those not directly concerned. What wonder was it, under such circumstances, that the army was wholly Bonapartist, and that a conspiracy was formed, especially among some young generals, which accomplished nothing, indeed, yet was well enough known to keep the exile of Elba informed as to the state of public sentiment? What wonder, too, that his credit rose higher every day? "The French," says a contemporary, Fleury de Chaboulon, "disposed by nature to change their opinions and sentiments, passed from their former prejudice against Napoleon to outbursts of enthusiasm in his favour. They compared the condition of disorder and humiliation into which France had sunk under the King with her exaltation, her power and unity of administration under Napoleon; and Napoleon, whom they had before denounced as the author of all their woes, now seemed to them a great man, a hero in misfortune." Of course no one had any desire to recall him, but they began to excuse him and hated his successors.

There were not wanting far-sighted men who discerned the danger hidden in this change of feeling. One of the keenest, Talleyrand, was not in Paris at that time, but was staying at the great Congress of Vienna as the plenipotentiary of Louis XVIII.,

where questions unsolved by the war of the nations were awaiting settlement. His sharp eye saw on Elba the glimmer of the spark that might kindle to another destructive conflagration the combustible material accumulating in France, and he determined to stamp it out. His first thought was to have Napoleon secretly abducted. Mariotti, his trusted agent in Livorno, declared that to be very difficult, and possible only if the captains of one of the Emperor's four ships could be won over. This is said to have been attempted, and to have been thwarted by Napoleon's vigilance.* Talleyrand then turned to the powers in the Congress and proposed to them (in October, 1814) to remove the exile to the Azores, five hundred miles from the mainland, an idea that Louis XVIII. thought "excellent."† But the powers had weightier matters on hand. Russia's sole anxiety was as to how she could secure her Polish prize undivided, Prussia wanted to take in the whole of Saxony; and each so positively opposed the other's plans that a general conflict seemed imminent. France wanted to break up the coalition, regain her lost prestige, and at the same time help out Saxony for kindred's sake (the mother of Louis XVIII. had been a princess of Saxony); England was working against a preponderance of Russia; and to Austria the growing power of her neighbours was a thorn in the flesh. These three powers accordingly signed, on January 3d, 1815, a treaty binding them to extreme measures if necessary.

* See Jung, "Mémoires de Lucien Bonaparte," III. 222, and Pellet, "Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe," p. 62. Jung says that Captain Tallade was dismissed; but over against this is the statement of several authorities that Tallade remained in service and afterwards commanded the Emperor's brig on the voyage to France.

† In December the minister wrote to the King that he must make haste to get rid of the man of Elba, and of Murat; Castlereagh had already been won over and only Metternich still remained opposed to it. But this zeal of Talleyrand's cooled off perceptibly whenever Murat's chances at the Congress rose; for the latter had held up to the avaricious diplomat prospects of a favourable sale of his principedom of Benevento. At such moments he could even answer Pozzo di Borgo when urged by him to lay before the Congress the arrest of Napoleon: "Say nothing of that, pray; he is a dead man." (M. Lehman, "Tagebuch des Freih. v. Stein," in *Histor. Zeitschrift*, N. F. XXIV. 446.)

While this remained a secret for a time, the differences between the powers were but too public for Napoleon to fail of being informed not only of that, but also of the secret plan to remove him to a distance from Europe. He had learned of the latter as early as December, and had already prepared for a siege, improving his defences and letting his cannoniers practise firing shells. He would have liked best of all to leave Elba at once, but at that time it would have been foolhardy presumption. Now, indeed, the complications in the Congress and the change in France lent some support to the idea. It wanted but the fitting opportunity. In his interview with Fleury de Chaboulon, who came to Portoferraio in February as Maret's secret messenger, he mentioned the 1st of April as the probable date of his departure for the mainland. By that time, he thought, the princes would have left the Congress, probably in anger, and once at home they would have no desire to plunge anew into a war. Only as long as they were still together was it to be feared that they would make it a point of honour to resist him. This much, at least, he felt: that Europe would not look on with a quiet conscience while he violated the treaty and his oath and instigated others to do likewise, as he now contemplated doing.

However, shortly afterwards, before the end of February, he made up his mind to set to work. What led him to it so early has not been explained. Had he heard of the provisional agreement of the powers on the Polish and Saxon questions on the 8th of February, of Castlereagh's departure, and of the preparations of the sovereigns to leave the Congress? Did he think the right moment had arrived? Or was he in ignorance as to that settlement, and merely wanted to take quick advantage of the dissensions prevailing? We cannot say. We know little more than that on the 24th of February—Campbell, the British plenipotentiary, who also represented England at the court of Tuscany, having just gone to the mainland—Napoleon issued orders to his troops to be in readiness to depart, while he meantime laid an embargo on all vessels at the island in order to prevent any news from reaching the Continent. On the same evening he received deputations of the authorities who expressed their

regrets at his departure. On the 26th, a Sunday, 1100 men with some cannon embarked on seven vessels; and when darkness came on, Napoleon himself went on board, after bidding his mother and sister farewell. Both of the latter approved his plan; some of his courtiers, like Bertrand, had hailed it with enthusiasm, as also had the troops. Only the honest Drouot made no effort to conceal his misgivings. But who could have held back the fool-hardy gamester when about to make his last desperate throw?

On the voyage they met a French cruiser steering for Livorno to put itself under the direction of the consul Mariotti. Its mission was to keep an eye on Elba; but it had come too late. Mariotti afterwards deplored this delay and said he would have hindered Napoleon's escape if he had had that ship, but that is a gross exaggeration. Far more correct is the answer Castlereagh made in the British Parliament to the charge that he had let the Emperor slip; he reminded his audience that Napoleon was not on Elba as a prisoner, and that any restraint on him would have been a violation of the treaty; moreover, it would have been impossible to keep him under surveillance, as the whole English navy would not suffice to prevent the escape of one man from the island.*

* See Pellet, "*Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe*," p. 84. The author seems fully convinced of Campbell's secret connivance, nay, even England's, and that was at the time a widespread opinion. A few days before Napoleon's departure the secret agent of Mariotti had written to his employer: "The departure of Napoleon under favour of the English will take place very soon." But who would accept the correctness of the statement without further evidence? Let any one compare with that what Napoleon said to Maret's messenger: "You surely will not believe that the police know everything? The police invent much more than they discover. Mine were certainly as good as those of these people, and yet they very often knew only what they learned two or three weeks later by luck, stupidity, or treachery." It is a fact that he represented his enterprise to be favoured by Great Britain, as he also claimed to be on good terms with Austria; but in both his aim was to mislead. The actual attitude of England is to be gathered from the intimate relations obtaining between that government and Louis XVIII., and from the diplomatic course of Castlereagh, who saw in the Bourbons the surest guarantee that the Netherlands, lying so near, just across the Channel from England, would not fall into the hands of the French again.

On the 1st of March the flotilla cast anchor in the Gulf of Jouan, between Cannes and Antibes, and Cambronne brought the Guards to land. Soon Napoleon again stood on French soil. While still on board he gave his followers some explanations about the enterprise; he told them that he counted on the surprise of the population, on public opinion, on the love of his soldiers, in short on all the Napoleonic elements in France, but above all on the consternation that such a great novelty ("une grande nouveauté") must produce, and on the perplexed hesitation of all minds under the impression of such an unexpected and audacious deed. But he had to take other things into account as well. He knew that public opinion had not turned against the new régime everywhere in France; that if, for example, he proceeded now on the highroad from Cannes leading north through Aix and Avignon, his venturesome enterprise would be wrecked on the rocks of the invincible loyalty of royalist Provence. Hence he could not afford to shun the hardship incident to a march over the still snow-covered roads of the Maritime Alps; he must leave behind the cannon he had brought, and, passing through Grasse and Sisteron, try to reach Dauphiné, where the peasants were thoroughly disaffected toward the priests and émigrés, and were desirous of keeping undisturbed possession of their farms, most of which had come out of the public domains. And in fact the inhabitants of the valleys on the way to Gap and beyond were exceedingly friendly and gave all possible help to the jaded soldiers. But the main question for Napoleon was, after all, whether the troops whom they should meet on the way would join him, as he hoped, or would be loyal to the oath of allegiance to Louis XVIII., which he himself had admonished them the preceding year to take.* If they chose the latter course, then he was lost. At La Mure, near Grenoble, a battalion of General Marchand advanced upon him, and the officers seemed more

* "Serve faithfully the sovereign whom the nation has chosen." These were his words to his grenadiers, according to the report of the Austrian plenipotentiary. The later officially revised version of his address in the palace courtyard at Fontainebleau changed this to read as follows: "Continue to serve France."

inclined to obey their orders than their sympathies. The decisive moment had come. Napoleon discerned it. He approached within range, opened his gray overcoat and, offering his breast, shouted, "Who among you would fire on his Emperor?" At that the soldiers took off their caps, put them on their bayonets, and shouted "Vive l'Empereur!" They then mingled with the retinue from Elba and marched enthusiastically after the beloved leader. The officers had to follow the revolutionary lead of their troops, and they were far from unwilling.

At Grenoble, the chief city of Dauphiné, where there was a strong garrison, Napoleon meantime had caused to be circulated secretly a manifesto to the French army. "Soldiers," it began, "we have not been conquered. Two men from our ranks (Marmont and Augereau) have betrayed our laurels and their country to the princes their benefactors. And now shall those whom we have seen for twenty-five years roaming through Europe to raise up enemies against us, who have spent their lives in fighting in foreign armies against us and in cursing our fair France—shall they now claim to hold command and carry our eagles, into whose eyes they never could look? Your rank, your possessions, your glory, and the rank, possessions, and glory of your children have no more bitter enemies than these princes whom foreigners have forced upon us. Their tokens of honour, their rewards, and their favour are reserved for those only who have served them in fighting against the fatherland and against us. Soldiers! Come and rally under the banner of your leader. His existence depends wholly on yours; his rights are but the nation's and yours; his interests, his honour, his glory, are your interests, your honour, your glory. Come! Then will victory march on in double-quick step, and the eagle with the national colours shall fly from spire to spire on to Notre-Dame." These and many other things he said to the soldiers of France, and they listened with enthusiasm. That was the same language that had so often thanked them for their victories and announced new triumphs; the language of the man who estimated his soldiers at their full value, highly prized them, though it were but as

instruments of his greatness; whereas the protégé of England regarded them only as a burden, if he considered them at all. So the garrison of Grenoble, the regiment of Colonel Labédoyère, went over to him; likewise the battalion of La Mure. These men of iron yielded to the spell of that one man, just as the children of Hamelin were drawn by the Pied Piper. He was already advancing with 7000 men toward Lyons, certain now of complete success. He could understand why his marshals, the Macdonalds, Oudinots, and others, whose careers were behind them and who loved the peace for which they had fought so long and so valiantly, did not join his cause. But others, like Masséna at Marseilles, and Ney, who had even promised boldly to bring the newcomer bound to the King, could not withstand the tide of sentiment in the army; they, too, became imperialists again.

The army, then, was his; particularly after he had assured them that he certainly would make no more wars, for the army had no desire for war. And he declared the same purpose still more emphatically on every occasion to the citizens of the towns, who, especially the well-to-do, despite much sympathy for him and all their aversion to the arrogance of the aristocrats, saw peace endangered by his reappearance. He had used the ten months of exile, he said at Grenoble, in reflecting on the past; the disgrace that had been his lot, far from embittering him, had but instructed him; he saw what France needed; *peace and liberty* were the imperative demand of the times, and he would henceforth make them the rule of his conduct. Similar was also the tenor of his addresses in Lyons, where he arrived on the 10th of March, and was welcomed with cheers by the people. It was his task now (such was the purport of his words) to protect the principles and interests of the revolution from the émigrés, to restore her glory to France without involving her in war, which he hoped to avoid; for he accepted the treaties arranged with the European powers and would live in peace with them, provided, of course, they did not interfere in French affairs. The French people must content themselves with being the most important nation, without making any claim to rule over the others.

Here at Lyons he was already once more completely the monarch. He dissolved the Chambers and summoned an imperial assembly to meet at Paris to be made up from the former electoral colleges; to this he gave the Carolingian name "Champs de Mai." It was to change and amend the constitution and participate in the coronation of the Empress and of his son. This was to intimate that on the part of Austria, at least, no danger threatened his enterprise, nay, even an understanding was to be hoped for—a gross deception, as he himself later admitted to some intimates. A second decree banished all the émigrés that did not return until 1814, and confiscated their estates. In addition Napoleon abolished the old aristocracy, proscribed Talleyrand, Marmont and Augereau, the Duke of Dalberg, and others, as betrayers of France to her enemies, deposed all the émigrés that Louis XVIII. had appointed as officers, and dissolved the King's guard, the so-called "maison militaire" of the King.

The threatened court at Paris was at first disposed to look upon this enterprise of the "Man of Elba" as an adventure which must necessarily fail. It was firmly believed that all he wanted was to seek a way over the mountains into Italy, in order to rouse the people there into revolt; and for some time false reports were printed in the "Moniteur" of his impending downfall, even after he had already won the hearts of the army. In the Chambers the King found some support among the Liberals, the Frondeurs of 1800, led by Benjamin Constant, and those of 1813, led by Lainé. But nothing was done aside from making high-sounding speeches. For all decrees—for example, that declaring property in the national lands inalienable and any attack upon it punishable with imprisonment—were too late and inspired no confidence because they were dictated by the need of the moment. As late as March 18th, when Napoleon had got as far as Fontainebleau, Louis wrote with his own hand a manifesto to the army, wherein he referred to his word which had been pledged for their loyalty, to civil war in the land, to the struggle with foreigners that again was threatened; but all in vain. A reserve army south of the capital likewise joined Napoleon.

The King had to think of his own safety at last, and left the capital on the next day.

On the evening of March 20th Napoleon, leaning on the arm of one of his most loyal adherents, ascended the steps of the Tuileries. In the streets of the capital the commanding positions had been occupied mostly by the military element, who now were in exclusive possession. In the rest of the population there was more resignation than interest; no trace appeared of the enthusiasm with which Paris had welcomed Napoleon in 1799 or 1806. "Every one was gloomy," Broglie says, "quiet, indifferent, without complaining. without hoping. yet not without anxiety." And the Emperor himself, who was listening most attentively to the voice of the nation, received a like impression. "They let me come," said he to Mollien, "as they let the others go."

CHAPTER XX

WATERLOO

"PEACE and Liberty," so ran the motto with which Napoleon now sought to commend himself to the French and to overcome the distrust which met him everywhere in civilian circles. "Peace"! How often had he promised it, and how often broken it! "Liberty"! In what various ways had he suppressed it! If he promised now to give it and protect it, would he be believed? On the very day of his arrival at Paris he assured his faithful followers, Maret, Cambacérès, Davout, and others who had come to the Tuileries, that he was not proposing to renew the programme of the past; one must learn to profit by the enemies' mistakes and one's own; that he knew now what was to be avoided and what was desirable; he had loved power only as long as he was planning to found a mighty empire—it was indispensable for that purpose; but to-day that was no longer in his thoughts. And they all trusted his words. Maret again accepted the office of Secretary of State, Davout was persuaded to take the Ministry of War, Cambacérès declared his readiness to conduct the business of the Minister of Justice, Gaudin and Mollien again had the portfolios of Finance and of the Treasury, and Decrès that of the Navy. But that was no difficult task, to win back those who were more or less thrown on him anyway. The most important thing was to offer the people guarantees that he returned as an entirely different man. And here words were of no avail. No matter how solemnly he declared to the various deputations in audience that he would forget that France had ever been the mistress of the world; that he had long since renounced the idea of a universal empire, and that he thought only of the welfare and strengthening of the French Empire, that he no longer sought for absolute rule, but only for respect of personal rights, protection

of property, and free expression of opinion, for princes were but the first citizens of the state: it did not suffice. They wanted the evidence of deeds; and Napoleon gave that, too. First of all he accepted Fouché as Minister of Police, a man in whose past record the liberal circles saw a certain guarantee. Then he abolished the censorship of the press, which had been a source of great bitterness of feeling against the Bourbons. This cost him but little effort, for he rightly reasoned that after what the press had written against him for a year past it could do nothing more to hurt him, but it might say much yet about his enemies. But far more effective than that measure was his winning over in his old age the honourable Carnot, whose genius had defended the Republic, to become Minister of the Interior, and Benjamin Constant, the leader of the party of constitutional monarchy which had vainly opposed him at the time of the Consulate, as a member of the reorganized Council of State.

Only a short time before the Emperor's return, Constant had made a violent attack upon him in the "*Journal des Débats*," which was already one of the leading daily papers, comparing him with Gengis Khan and Attila, and declaring in the name of the friends of liberty that he would never have any connection with him. Napoleon, acting, it is said, on the advice of his brother Joseph, invited him to court and spoke to him so openly and confidentially that the hostile tribune was won over and even undertook to serve the Empire. The nation, said the Emperor, had now enjoyed twelve years of calm from internal political storms, and had been resting for a year from war; this rest had awakened a need of active life. She was now again desirous for assemblies and public discussion, which she had not always wanted. "She threw herself at my feet when I came to power; you must remember that, as you were then of the opposition. Where was your support, your strength? You found none. I took less power than was given to me. To-day all is different. The taste for constitutions, debates, and speeches seems to have returned, after a weak government hostile to national interests has called forth criticisms on authority. But, after all, it is only the minority that wants these things; make no

mistake on that head. The people, or, if you will, the masses, want only me. You have not seen how they crowded about me, rushed down from the mountain heights to call me, seek me and hail me. I am not a soldier's emperor, as has been said; I am the emperor of the peasants and the common people of France. This is why you see the people coming to me despite all that has happened. There is a community of feeling between us. I have risen from the ranks of the people, they hear my voice. I have had about me Montmorencys, Rohans, Noailles, Beauvans, Mortemarts, but there was no sympathy between us. Look at these conscripts, these sons of peasants; I have not flattered them, have even dealt harshly with them, and yet they flocked around me and shouted, 'Vive l'Empereur!' They regard me as their mainstay, their deliverer from the nobility. One sign from me, and the nobles in all the provinces would be murdered. But I would not be king of a peasant war. Hence, if it is possible to rule with a constitution, very well, so be it. Because I wanted universal empire I needed unlimited power on which to found it. And who in my place would not have lusted for mastery of the world? Did not sovereigns and subjects vie with each other in hastening to put themselves under my sceptre? I met more resistance from a few unknown and unarmed Frenchmen in France than from all the kings, who are so proud to-day because no one from the people is their equal. I am no longer a conqueror, cannot be one; for I know what is possible and what is not; and in order to rule France alone, perhaps a constitution is better. Do you then consider what seems to you practicable and lay your plans before me; public discussions, independent elections, responsible ministers, free press—I accept it all. Along with these I desire peace; and I shall secure it by my victories. I would raise no false hopes in you. Although I give out the report that negotiations with the powers are in process, there are no negotiations. I look forward, rather, to a difficult and tedious war. If I am to hold my own, the nation must support me. In return she will demand liberty; she shall have it." Thus spoke the Emperor to Constant, who has himself reported the words that captivated him. The frank way in which

Napoleon characterized his situation made an impression on him. He declared his readiness to prepare the outline of a constitution.

Not "Peace and Liberty," therefore, as it was posted on the walls in every corner of France, but, at the best, "War and Liberty." And so it was, indeed, to be. No one could have less reason than the Man of Elba to expect the European powers to look on quietly while he was breaking the treaties he had made, and seizing again the sovereign power over one of the most restless nations of the earth, which had kept Europe busy with war for twenty years. Was, then, the great expenditure of wealth and blood, whereby the old legitimate system of a balance of power among the states had been restored, to have been in vain, just because a single man was not inclined to be content with the sovereignty of Elba? No one had called him, no conspiracy worthy of mention, even in the French army, had desired his return; he had come unexpectedly in order to conquer by a "bluff," and his personal magnetism was needed to rouse the army to revolt. No; the European powers could not tolerate this bold intrusion upon the treaty rights that bound them. In the last declaration, made in March, 1814, they had solemnly pledged themselves never to conclude peace with Bonaparte, and he on his part had promised at Fontainebleau to renounce sovereignty over France forever. He knew well that they would resist his efforts. Therefore he knew also that by seizing again the crown of France he was creating anew for that country enemies superior in resources and was conjuring up a new and frightful war. It was this which made his conduct a wanton outrage for which there could be no expiation.

On the morning of the 6th of March the news of Napoleon's departure from Portoferraio had reached Vienna, where the Congress had by no means dissolved, as he had hoped, for the princes and diplomats were still present almost to a man. Under the profound impression of that event, Russia and the two German powers agreed in the determination to meet the "adventurer," as Emperor Francis called him, with united front. Since his destination at first was uncertain, and Talleyrand had mentioned Italy as probable, the Austrian field-marshal, Bellegarde,

in command there, was ordered to "attack him at once and crush him." Castlereagh had gone away, but Wellington, who represented him, was authorized to sign such an agreement. The two main questions that divided the Congress, the Polish and the Saxon, had already reached a settlement; one through the enforced moderation of Alexander I., the second at the expense of the King of Saxony, who had to consent to cede a half of his territory to Prussia, while Frederick William III. yielded his claims to the other half. And so Napoleon's reckoning on the dissensions of the Congress proved to be mistaken. On the contrary, they all had an interest now that united them in turning unanimously against him. England was concerned for the new kingdom of the Netherlands; Prussia equally uneasy about her Rhine province; the Czar of Russia wanted to offset the reproach of having brought the Corsican to Elba by a show of energetic hostility to him; and Austria's monarch wished to avoid all appearance of interest in the son of the Revolution. On the 13th of March the Congress issued a proclamation declaring Napoleon an outlaw and giving him over to public vengeance as "the enemy and disturber of the world's peace." On the 25th the four great powers renewed their treaty of Chaumont by pledging themselves to furnish 150,000 men apiece (England giving an equivalent in money), and "not to lay down their arms until Napoleon is rendered wholly incapable of disturbing peace again and of renewing his efforts to seize the supreme power in France." The other states fell into line.

Thus Napoleon was proscribed by the Continent which he had once seen at his feet. He did his very best now to weaken the unfavourable impression which this judgment of the world could not fail to make on the French people, or perhaps to secure some milder statement in Vienna itself. In vain did he represent the declaration of March 13th as the contrivance of the agents of Louis XVIII.; the truth soon became public property, when the foreign diplomats demanded their passports and left the country. In vain he assured the world that he would respect the Paris peace of May 30th, 1814, and wrote on April 4th to all the sovereigns that it was his dearest wish to make the imperial throne

of France a bulwark for the peace of Europe; the only answer was that the powers, which had not yet put their armies on a peace footing, mobilized them in the direction of France. It did no good for him to ask Emperor Francis to send back his wife and son, whose coronation he had held in prospect to the French; child and wife remained far away; nay, Marie Louise even sent a written communication to the foremost representatives of the powers that no power on earth could ever induce her to live with Napoleon again. Nor did it do any good to reveal to Alexander the secret offensive alliance of January 3d, in order to sow new discord among the allies; nor again to seek communication with Talleyrand, who had just heard of his proscription and naturally was not to be found. The princes did indeed consider the question whether the fact of France's tolerating Napoleon should lead to a different procedure from that agreed upon. But they decided, in a protocol signed by all the plenipotentiaries, that if such were the fact, it could make no difference in their plans: "The powers are not authorized to give France a government, but they would never forego the right to prevent anything under the title of 'government' from producing there a centre of disorder and danger for the other states." The offer of the Emperor to respect the peace of Paris was rejected, for they had signed that peace with a government that furnished sufficient guarantees for the peace of the Continent, and would never have made similar conditions with Bonaparte. Fouché, who had been led at once by seeing the European powers arrayed against Napoleon to begin intriguing against him, and who was secretly in touch with Vienna, had word from Metternich as follows: "The powers will have nothing to do with him. They will wage war on him to the uttermost, but they do not wish to fight against France." So again the old essential question arose whether it was possible to discriminate between the two, Napoleon and France.

It was not long before all Frenchmen discovered that the Emperor's pretence of negotiations with Austria and other states was empty deception, and that a war was imminent which must be laid to his account alone and was due to nothing but his

reappearance. The impression of this on the people was one of deep-seated disaffection and was finally determinative of Napoleon's destiny; no other construction can be put on the facts. The public securities, that had risen on the basis of his representations, fell from 83, where they were at the beginning of March, to 51 in April, and this alienated all property owners, particularly the mass of small stockholders. And he estranged not only the purses of the French, but also their hearts. For a decade they had looked forward with longing to peace, and found it only when the Empire fell. It was now re-established, and already the necessity of more bloodshed threatened all families who would be affected by the dangers of war. "I cannot conceal from you"—so ran the report of State Councillor Miot de Melito, whom Napoleon had sent into the northern departments as commissioner—"that the women are everywhere your avowed enemies, and in France such a foe is not to be despised." The Emperor had to admit that he heard the same from other messengers. An Englishman wrote to Castlereagh from Paris, "Everybody is a prey to dejection."

In view of this change of public opinion it was of small account that Napoleon was successful in suppressing forcibly Bourbon movements in the south, where the Duke and Duchess of Angoulême gathered a few faithful adherents, and in forcing the Duke to capitulate and his wife to take flight. That wrested France from the Bourbons, but it by no means won it for the Bonapartes. Carnot had foreseen this weeks before when he asked Napoleon whether he really had any assurances from Austria; on receiving a negative answer, he added: "Then you still have more to do than you have already done." The army alone retained its unwavering loyalty to its leader, but this was true only of those actually under arms. There was, indeed, by this time abundant material in the land, in the hundreds of thousands of veterans that had returned home from imprisonment and from the Italian and Spanish armies, only to be for the most part discharged by Louis XVIII. Would they not all hasten with enthusiasm when the hero of Austerlitz and Friedland set up his eagles? They did not, or at least only a few did; not more than 60,000 answered the

appeal to the old soldiers, and Napoleon had counted on four times that number. It was a natural result. Even the most hardened warriors at last longed for rest, and they had but just begun to enjoy its pleasures when the Emperor's voice gave the alarm. Castlereagh's emissary at Paris reports some soldiers as saying: "We love our 'Père Violette' (i.e. Napoleon) much better than the 'Gros Papa' whom we don't know (Louis XVIII.); but we are sick of war, and if we have got to fight all Europe again, we prefer to take back the 'Gros Papa.'" So the Emperor could soon discover that while he had plenty of officers and the complete skeleton of an army, there was a great lack of men to fill the ranks. One day he asked the paymaster Peyrusse in confidence whether people in Paris were convinced that he would gather a large army. "Your majesty will not stand alone," was the reply. "I am almost afraid I shall," was Napoleon's rejoinder.

Added to all this was the circumstance that the national guards in most of the cities were mostly revolutionists and took sides with the Imperator only if he yielded to their radical desires. We have no reason to be surprised that Napoleon was slow about arming them and did not count on them for open war. He was very anxious, as Molé assured Lord Holland, lest the republican party should get the upper hand, and deplored the impossibility of bringing France to the point of war without resorting to expedients that he had always repudiated; he is even reported to have openly admitted to his suite that he would never have left Elba if he had had any anticipation of being obliged to make such concessions to the democrats.* All these things filled him with gloom. One of his councillors describes him as follows: "He was full of anxiety; the self-confidence that used to be heard in his utterances, the tone of authority, the lofty flight of thought, all had disappeared; he seemed already to feel the weight of the hand of misfortune which was soon to be laid on him so heavily, and no longer counted on his star." Others speak of him as in suffering and exhausted; due, as some thought, to the frequent hot baths he took, and according to

* Reminiscences of H. R. Lord Holland, p. 166 of the German edition.

others to a secret disease; he felt the need of more sleep. All thought him changed.*

Two things first of all claimed close attention: foreign nations must not discover what slight results came from his appeal to the disciplined soldiers of France, nor how strongly the people were opposed to the thought of war. Hence Napoleon could not make up his mind to intrust to a representative assembly the care of drawing up the new constitution which was to make good his promise of a free government. What debates would ensue! And after all, there was the danger that the representatives of the people might stay his hand and wrest from his grasp the only expedient from which he could expect safety—victory over the foreign foe. No: a constituent assembly would not do. Rather a dictatorship, suggested Maret. But gladly as he would have adopted this way out, he now rejected it. He had gone too far in his promises, public speeches, and manifestoes to turn back. He had to seek some other means, and thought he had found it in the plan of having the proposed concessions which he must soon make drawn up by his councillors in the shape of a "novella" [supplementary enactment] to the former constitutions issued during his reign, which the "sovereign" people would simply adopt. That was what he had called Constant for, and the latter now set to work.

On the 22d of April the work was finished, and after being submitted to a committee of the Council of State and finally to the full Council, it was published under the title "Additional Act to the Constitutions of the Empire." It is reported to have been Constant's own judgment to give an entirely new constitution, which would have disavowed, as it were, all previous legislation of the Empire; but Napoleon would not consent to that. He wished to explain and justify his former dictatorial procedure, and it is interesting historically to see how he did it, for the reason that he sought to represent the blind impulses of his ambition as something premeditated, as a deliberately

* In regard to his disease, see among other authorities the statement of the Austrian General Koller in Helfert, "Napoleon's Fahrt von Fontainebleau nach Elba," p. 39.

chosen policy, destined for the highest good of the world. In the preamble to the new "Act" we read as follows: "Our aim at that time was to establish a great European federal system, which we had adopted as in accord with the spirit of the age and as favouring the progress of civilization. For the purpose of making it complete and giving it all possible extension and stability, we delayed meantime the establishment of certain institutions that were intended to guarantee the liberty of citizens. Henceforth, however, our sole aim is to promote the welfare of France by safeguarding her public liberties. Hence arises the necessity of important changes in the constitutions, senatus consulta, and other documents by which this Empire is governed." Universal empire had not been Napoleon's goal, then? And yet he had admitted it repeatedly, and but recently to Benjamin Constant himself. Of course what he wanted was a federation of states; but they were to be subject to the absolute power of one man, who at will wiped out of existence individual members of the federation, if it was to his advantage; for example, Piedmont, the Papal States, Holland, the Hanseatic cities, Oldenburg, Hanover, the northern departments of Spain, and the Vallais. Who knows what others he had in mind? Of course it was a federation, and far be it from him to absorb Europe into France; but that it should culminate in Napoleon I. was his aim real. Perhaps some still recalled his article published in the "Moniteur" in 1806, admonishing his nephew, the young crown prince of Holland, that he always regarded the duties of the regents to the Emperor as first in importance. And when he wanted to induce Lucien to accept a crown, had he not announced for his guidance "that soldiers, laws, taxes, in short everything in the country he ruled, was solely for the purposes of the imperial throne"?* We must grant that, along with all the mischief wrought by the ambitious career of this man of world-wide aims and unparalleled energy, there came valuable contributions to the development of the European world; it would be rank injustice to deny it. But to say that the object at which he now professed to aim had always hovered

* Lucien, "Mémoires" (ed. Jung), III. 111, 326.

before his mind as an ideal was but to devise for the occasion specious pretences and a lie.*

This preamble had the subordinate aim of proving to the foreign nations in the most solemn way that the Empire had finally ended its conquering career. It was followed by sixty-seven articles containing the new constitution. The principles of "liberty" appeared in the last of these; no one was to be denied fair trial by law, no one was to be prosecuted, imprisoned, or banished, except by due process of law; freedom of worship and liberty of the press were both granted, the latter being left subject only to suits for libel; all legally acquired property was protected; right of petition accorded to everybody; government could declare martial law only in case of invasion. The former Corps législatif was transformed into a representative chamber of 629 members chosen by the electoral colleges of the departments; and the Senate into a chamber of peers, appointed by the Emperor, except such as had a seat and vote as princes of the reigning family; the peerage was made hereditary. The great privileges possessed by the former Senate were not transferred to the chamber of peers. Both chambers were to have their sessions in public. Both had the right to initiate legislation and to approve the budget. The Chamber of Deputies was the special representative of the industrial interest. The ministers were made responsible and could be impeached by the Chamber; in that case the peers acted as judges. The right of interpreting laws, formerly possessed by the Senate, reverted to the deputies. A final article excluded the Bourbons forever from ruling in France.

Before submitting his first draft to the Council of State, Constant had had long discussions with Napoleon on two points. In the first place, an hereditary peerage would not fail to aggrieve the liberal and democratic elements, which it was desirable to conciliate. But the Emperor who would not forego the advantages of an aristocracy, thought that after two or three victories the old French nobility would rally to him again, and then they would find a more suitable field of public activity in the higher Chamber than they could in a Senate. A second difference grew

* See above, p. 534.

out of Constant's proposal to deny, in one article, the right of confiscation to the head of the state. Here again Napoleon opposed him; he could not afford, he said, to be defenceless against political factions; he was no angel, but a man, who was not accustomed to suffer attack with impunity. The article was omitted. Both of these points were noticed after the publication of the constitution, which was presented to the French people for acceptance just as the laws of 1802 and 1804 had been. But above all, the title "*Acte Additionnel*" made a bad impression. So then the old despotic government, said the people, was back again; constitutions were drawn up by officials like administrative decrees, and then submitted to a vote of the people in order that all possible pressure might be brought to bear and a simple "yea" or "nay" secured, without the possibility of debates or amendments. All France was stirred with indignation. "No notice was taken of the wise and liberal features of the new constitution," says Broglie; "enough that it was imposed upon them, a '*charte octroyée*,' a new, revised, and improved edition of the constitutions of the Empire; what more was needed to set loose the clamours of a public that was little concerned about the real substance of things?"

So the new constitution failed on its publication to produce the effect which the Emperor had anticipated. "Liberty" did not counterbalance "war." This was especially manifest in the voting. While 3,500,000 had voted for the Consulate for life in 1802 and for the Empire in 1804, Napoleon now secured but 1,300,000 votes, not counting 244,000 votes of the army. More than a half of the voters sullenly stayed away from the polls. This was a defeat that could not be concealed no matter what theatrical pomp of scenery was employed at the "*Champ de Mai*," held at Paris on June 1st, where the result was announced.

An enormous concourse of people thronged the *Champ de Mars* on that day; there were thousands of voters from the departments, national guards, regular troops, and a vast multitude of curious spectators. After solemn mass had been celebrated, the speaker for the representatives of the electoral colleges addressed the Emperor, saying that he might expect from them

everything that a hero and founder of order could ever expect from a nation that was loyal, energetic, and unalterable in its desire for liberty and independence. That had a very loyal ring, but these words were offset by a reservation. "Trusting your promises," it was said, "our deputies will revise our laws with mature deliberation and wisdom and bring them into accord with the constitutional system." This meant that the task of framing a constitution was by no means finished, and that the people would take its due share in making up its bill of rights. Foreign relations were, however, touched upon with true patriotism. "What do these monarchs want," it was asked, "who are moving upon us with such mighty engines of war? How have we provoked their attack? Have we violated the treaties since peace was declared? Every Frenchman is a soldier; victory will again accompany your eagles, and our enemies who reckoned on our dissensions will regret having challenged us." To these and other utterances Napoleon, after announcing the result of the popular vote, signing the constitution and taking the oath, replied in a confident tone: What did the foreigners want? They would like to enlarge the Netherlands by making the strongholds of northern France her boundary; to divide Alsace and Lorraine among themselves. That must be resisted. Then, when this has been done, a solemn law shall combine the various scattered provisions of our constitutions in accordance with the spirit of the "Acte Additionnel." [By thus representing the latter as something transitory Napoleon thought he could yet overcome the general disaffection.] He even touched another and very delicate point. The report had been circulated that he was about to abdicate in view of the imminent war. This was the work of the arch-plotter Fouché, bringing his mighty instrument, the police, into play against the Emperor. Alluding to this rumour, Napoleon said that he would gladly offer his life a sacrifice to the foreign kings, as they seemed so embittered against him, but that he saw they were aiming at the fatherland. In other words, people were mistaken in taking him alone for the stone of stumbling.

But all his words failed to calm men's minds; while other

things even gave offence. (To show his independent authority he had appeared not in the uniform of the national guard, but in a dazzling and fanciful costume of royalty.) This made an impression as adverse as did his using the expressions "my people," "my capital," in his speech. The people never liked such phrases from the son of the Revolution; and least of all now. Even the most zealous Bonapartists could not help noticing that the question shouted by the Emperor to the National Guards, whether they were ready to defend their eagles with their blood, failed to call forth an enthusiastic response.* Only the Imperial Guards took the oath with any show of feeling. "As they defiled past the Emperor," says an eye-witness "their eyes flashed with a deep fire; one seemed to read on their lips, 'Morituri te salutant.'" So the solemnities of the new government had not only profited nothing, but they had rather intensified the opposition. On one only of the spectators did they make the full and lasting effect of grandiose power and splendour. It was a boy of seven. History knows him as Napoleon III.

The strained relations between people and ruler came to light most clearly when the Chamber of Representatives assembled, June 3d. Napoleon had supposed originally that he could sufficiently recommend himself to the nation as a liberal monarch by the "Acte" and the solemn oath on the Champ de Mars. But when the disaffection persisted and was nourished still more by the press, now free from all restraint, he was obliged at last to yield to the universal demand for a session of the deputies. He called it with the greatest reluctance, for he clearly foresaw the most uncomfortable debates and discussions, which would surely reveal the internal dissensions and insecurity of his position to foreign nations. If it had only been possible to guide and influence the assembly; but even this expedient failed on the very first day. The Emperor had had his brother Lucien appointed deputy, having become reconciled with him again—a still further public pledge of his liberal intentions—and wished

* Coignet says: "The oaths were given without energy, the enthusiasm was weak. Those were not the shouts of Austerlitz and Wagram. The Emperor perceived it clearly."

him to be chosen president. But no sooner was this known than the deputies hastened to show their constituents how independent they were; Lucien did not receive a single vote, and they elected as president Lanjuinais, one of the opposition minority in the old Senate, and one who had once voted against the Empire. Thus management of the lower chamber was out of the question, and the only thing left was to make a counter-check of the upper house, to which Napoleon now proceeded to appoint members. He included his three brothers still in Paris, Joseph, Lucien and Jerome, Uncle Fesch, Eugene Beauharnais, his Ministers, the loyal marshals Davout, Suchet, Ney, Brune, Moncey, Soult, Lefebvre, Grouchy, Jourdain, Mortier, a considerable number of generals headed by Bertrand and Drouot, several former senators, but only Monge and Chaptal of the savants, some representatives of the old noblesse, among whom was his master of ceremonies, Ségur, Councillors of State, financiers, etc. Even Sieyès was not wanting. On the 7th of June the Emperor opened the sessions of both houses with a speech from the throne in which he omitted all the objectionable expressions of June 1st, and which therefore made a better impression. He and the army would do their duty, he said. Thereupon the Chamber of Deputies in an address of June 11th put all the forces of the land at his disposal for its defence; but only for purposes of defense. "For," it said, "not even the will of the sovereign is in a position to draw the nation on beyond the limits of self-defence." And such was their distrust in the conqueror of old that even the loyal majority of the House of Peers referred to the new institutions of France as "furnishing Europe with the guarantee that the French government can never be carried away by the seductions of victory."

This anxiety, however, was vain. The great general, who departed to the army on the 12th of June, 1815, with troubled mind, as his suite noticed, was to return in nine days, conquered as never before, his power annihilated forever.

The unfavourable foreign and domestic conditions under which Napoleon began his new reign had this consequence, that he could not command at the beginning of June the forces which he had doubtless counted on. To avoid appearing before

Europe and France as the aggressor, he had delayed war preparations for weeks, and then called them defensive, fortifying Paris and Lyons. Out of regard for public opinion, and to avoid demanding sacrifices that had roused hatred against him, he had deferred the conscription of 1815 until the last moment. The result of this, combined with the partial failure of his appeal to the old soldiers, was that when finally hostilities commenced he had little more than 200,000 men available for open war. To be sure, he might have delayed still more, gained time and strengthened himself; but instead of doing that, after exhausting the resources of diplomacy, he assumed the defensive. And good reason he had.

The allies of the 25th of March had not put the war against Napoleon into operation as early as they had resolved. Prussia alone had mobilized her army rapidly, sent a corps stationed on the lower Rhine to Belgium at Wellington's request, followed it with three others, and soon after the middle of April had an army of 120,000 men in the field, ready for battle. Blücher with his faithful Gneisenau again took command. At the same time Wellington also had gathered an army of 95,000, composed of English, Dutch, and Germans, from Brunswick, Hanover, and Nassau, destined particularly for the defence of Brussels and Ghent. The two generals wanted to take the offensive in order to leave no time for Napoleon to prepare; but their counsels did not prevail at Vienna. The plan of war there adopted was based on great masses of troops; it contemplated advancing with the greatest possible assurance of victory, and hence required much time, as the Russians moved west very slowly and Alexander was hungering for the leading rôle he had before played, which the Austrians were perfectly willing to assign to him on account of events in Italy. For in that country Murat, just as the Vienna Congress was on the point of granting him the kingdom as a reward for his joining the coalition against Napoleon, had struck a blow for his brother-in-law. He pushed rapidly on to the Po, but then, the expected national support failing, he retired before the Austrians, and was defeated by them on May 2d and 3d at Tolentino. Nothing was now left for him but to fly to France.

Under the pressure of all these circumstances, the powers at last postponed the opening of the great co-operative movement until the 27th of June, when they expected to push it through with some 700,000 or 900,000 men.

Should Napoleon now await the attack of the enemy? Wait until the several armies had reached points equally distant from Paris, and then were invading France on converging lines, the English and Prussians from the northeast, the Russians and Austrians from the east and southeast? His precarious position and the unwillingness of the French to fight would not permit him to bring on his country the burden of an invasion without taking some step to prevent it. Now, as the mobilizing of the hostile armies was not equally rapid everywhere, so that the English and Prussian armies stood ready while those of Austria and Russia were only in process of formation, the possibility was apparent of defeating the former by a vigorous onslaught before the latter arrived. And what might not be the political consequences of such a victory! Could the powers have forgotten so completely and quickly their late dissensions and the consciousness of their conflicting interests, which had recently almost led to open hostility? Napoleon certainly was well aware that Bourbon stock had fallen in Vienna and that the allies were by no means united as to the future of the throne of France. Under such circumstances he made up his mind, contrary, it is said, to Carnot's advice, to go north and take the offensive, striking the first blow in Belgium. To be sure his entire army was not available for this purpose; 20,000 men were necessary in the Vendée to quell a revolt which the royalists had kindled on the old field of their agitations; and besides that three corps under Suchet, Rapp, and Lecombe must try to cover the eastern district from the Rhone to the Meuse, so that only about 125,000 were left him for the attack. But they seemed to him enough. He stationed them in all secrecy south of the Sambre, between Beaumont and Philippeville; there were 21,000 Guards, five corps under Drouet, Reille, Vandamme, Gérard, and Mouton, and four corps of cavalry under Grouchy as a reserve. On the 14th he himself arrived in Beaumont; he gathered with

his own peculiar skill all these troops close by the border, opposite Charleroi, and early on the morning of the 15th began operations.

Wellington and Blücher had not remained in ignorance of the small forces at the enemy's command, and had therefore not looked for so rapid an attack. Wellington supposed, even when he heard of movements of the enemy and of Napoleon's arrival, that only defensive measures were being taken. The corps of both the allied armies were widely scattered: the English, because their leader wanted to "cover everything," were stationed from Binche, on the French frontier, west and north as far as Brussels and Oudenarde, with a line of retreat past Brussels to the sea; the Prussian line, on account of difficulty in procuring supplies, stretched east from Binche and Charleroi beyond Liège, and their line of retreat was through that town to the Rhine. Charleroi, then, the meeting-point of the roads from Brussels on the one hand and Liège on the other, was the junction of the two armies, and it was here that Napoleon proposed to break through. Just as in his first campaign in Italy he had broken through from Savona over the mountain and separated the Piedmont troops from the Austrians, so now he planned to separate the two armies; he hoped thus to defeat Wellington and Blücher singly, as he had then defeated Colli and Beaulieu and driven them back on their diverging lines of retreat. On the 15th he occupied Charleroi with little difficulty, as the Prussians had neglected to fortify the line of the Sambre, and thought that by so doing he had already succeeded in surprising the enemy and piercing his line. But in this he was deceived. He would have had to advance much farther north to the Namur-Nivelles road, which formed the line of communication between the two armies, in order to encounter the Prussians, who were in the act of concentrating at Sombrefe. Wellington, far from supposing his colleague to be really threatened, was dominated by the idea that Napoleon would approach on the west, try to turn his right flank and cut off his retreat from the sea—a strategic blunder, by the way, of which his great antagonist would never have been guilty. He therefore neglected to concentrate his troops on the left

on the 15th, and so the Emperor might have struck the Prussians alone if he had hastened forward. Nay, he might even have done it on the following day, if he had made haste. For Blücher was in so far surprised that he was unable on the 16th to bring up a distant corps in time; and it was only when Wellington, learning of the enemy's movements, promised to be at Nivelles the next morning with his army and to support him in case of attack, that he finally ventured to await Napoleon at Sombreffe.

But Napoleon, still under the delusion of having completely surprised his two enemies, neglected to use on the 16th the advantage he had let slip the day before. That he might engage the whole Prussian army near by he had no thought; he supposed Blücher was on his way east to gather his forces together there. He therefore divided his army, sent Ney in command of 50,000 men along the road to Brussels, and gave Grouchy charge of a division of about the same size which was to follow the Prussians. He kept a reserve with himself, ready to strike here or there at need. Making a reconnoissance about noon at Fleurus, to which point he had followed the Prussians on the preceding day, he noticed to his astonishment that they were holding their ground. Still he thought it was only a corps of Blücher's, until at last, at three o'clock in the afternoon, he perceived from Ligny that a whole army was facing him. Then, indeed, he deeply regretted having detached Ney. He recalled him with earnest messages, saying that the fate of France was in his hands and urging him not to hesitate a moment, but turn the right flank of the enemy and attack him in the rear. But this command could not be obeyed; for in the first place it was given too late, and then, secondly, Ney had long since been engaged in fighting Wellington much farther north at Quatre-Bras, where some of the English troops were stationed. Only one of the corps assigned to him (Drouet d'Erlon) was persuaded by the adjutant who brought the order to turn about and march to Ligny. It was of no use there, however, while Ney without its aid was unable to gain any advantage besides that of keeping Wellington away from Blücher. In consequence Blücher lost the battle, which he began only on the expectation of help from the English general.

And yet he was himself partly to blame. For, as the arrangement of the Prussian troops was not favourable for taking advantage of the promised aid of Wellington,—along a re-entering angle from St. Amand to Ligny, Sombreffe, and Tongrinne,—the situation required that the battle be fought entirely on the defensive until the ally arrived on the scene, and to be maintained on the defensive if he failed to appear. But that was not in accordance with Blücher's temperament, and besides he had great odds over the enemy.* After the battle had been hotly contested several hours near St. Amand and especially about Ligny, during which the Prussians suffered much more heavily than the old veterans of Napoleon, the gray-headed marshal undertook to assail the right wing of the French with the reserves from his centre. The French parried the assault. But the Emperor had already noticed the weakening of the enemy's centre. He pierced it at once and drove the enemy in flight back to Erye. In the tumult at the close of the battle Blücher fell with his wounded horse, and was given up for lost; Gneisenau had to give orders as to the direction of retreat. Unshaken by the adverse fate of the day, full of hope in a more glorious future, this General held fast to the idea of co-operating with the English, and gave Wavre, to the north, as the destination of the retiring army. That command was to decide the campaign.

Napoleon now perceived the full extent of his mistake in supposing the Prussians to have been surprised in their concentration and to have retired on their line of operations. The battle of the 16th opened his eyes. Well, he had won it and put the enemy to flight. All was well again, and this time surely there was no doubt that Blücher was marching along his line of retreat to rally his forces, say at Namur. General Pajol, sent along that road in pursuit with two divisions, ran across many fugitives hastening eastward,—5000 according to report,—and that fact fully confirmed the Emperor in his opinion that he had at last rid himself thoroughly of the Prussians and could now move on

* The Prussians had 86,000 men, the French 68,000, in the battle. Ten thousand of the latter stayed behind and took no part; while of the Prussians, on the other hand, 20,000 on the left wing were but little engaged.

Wellington without being annoyed by them in the least and without any special need of haste.* During the forenoon of the 17th he allowed his brave soldiers, who were fagged out by the battle, to rest, and not until about noon did he order Grouchy with 33,000 men to hunt up Blücher and ascertain where he was rallying, whether he had already evacuated Namur, and in general what were his purposes. "March," the order read, "with all the forces assigned you to Gembloux." This shows plainly Napoleon's confident opinion that the Prussians had gone back to Namur, but he might have rallied quickly—he knew Blücher of old—and might soon be on the point of marching either on the highroad leading to Louvain, or on some other road in a north-westerly direction towards the English. In that case Grouchy's orders were to go on beyond Gembloux until he overtook him, and hold him in check while Wellington was crushed. All that called for considerable time, for Napoleon had not the faintest inkling that the routed Prussian troops could be brought to order again on a single day on the march, and yet that is just what was accomplished. So completely was he under the dominion of this error that he could not even entertain any other idea; least of all the truth, that the Prussians, who had suffered a loss of 20,000 in dead, wounded, and missing, had been able, summoning their utmost energy, to march straight from the field of battle towards their ally, to prevent his defeat in the arduous struggle that was imminent, and to help him, rather, to conquer. He did not credit his enemies with such magnificent courage.

When Grouchy started for the east the other French troops were already on the march to Quatre-Bras to join Ney and follow Wellington. The English commander had, at the news of the Prussian defeat, withdrawn north to Mont Saint-Jean and fixed his headquarters at Waterloo. Here the French found him in battle array on the 17th of June. His course in taking and holding this position, showing he did not share Napoleon's conviction that he would be forced from it in the end, was based on

* On the next morning Soult, who now took Berthier's place, wrote to Ney, saying among other things: "The Prussian army has suffered defeat; General Pajol is pursuing it on the road to Namur and Liége."

assurances received from Blücher, who had already gathered and drawn up his entire army at Wavre, that he would support the English with all the forces at his command if there should be a battle the next day. This state of things was very far from Napoleon's thoughts, even on the next day, when he made up his mind to attack the English and rout them as he had the Prussians. Grouchy did indeed mention in his reports that a Prussian column had without doubt advanced to Wavre; but it was only one column, the marshal was following it and was equal to handling it while Wellington was being crushed. So little danger did Napoleon apprehend that on the 18th he did not even begin the attack the first thing in the morning, as his custom was, but left time for the ground to dry again after the long, soaking rain, so that the guns could operate more effectively. Could he but have guessed that Bülow's corps was toiling painfully along through the same clayey soil by unbeaten routes, with the columns defeated at Ligny behind him, all advancing for the purpose of bringing down upon him such a catastrophe as has seldom so swiftly befallen the great men of earth, how he would have hastened to fight and win the victory!

At eleven in the forenoon Napoleon rode from Caillou, where he had spent the night, past Plancenoit on the Brussels road, until he reached the farm La Belle Alliance. Here the road slopes gradually into a shallow vale, and a little less than a mile farther, beyond the farm La Haye Sainte, it ascends the hill that lies across it and on whose gentle northern slope lies the village of Mont Saint-Jean. Wellington had picked out this hill for his defensive position; and he meant to remain on the defensive only, on account of his inferior forces, if for no other reason. He had but 68,000 men, and was not aware that a third of the enemy's army was still at a distance. In excess of caution he had detached 19,000 men to Hal to avoid being surprised from the west. In reality Napoleon was stronger by only about 4000 cavalry and artillery. To be sure, they were his best troops, which had long been under his command. As it was their own cause they were fighting for, they would fight with ardour and let victory be wrested from their grasp only by direct

necessity. The Emperor disposed them in three lines. Two corps were stationed at the southern line of the vale above mentioned on both sides of La Belle Alliance, resting on the Nivelles road to the left and on the château of Frichemont to the right, with Ney in command. Behind these in the second line were two corps of cavalry on the wings, and in the centre as a first reserve along the highway two divisions of infantry and cavalry. And finally in the third line were the Guards as a second reserve, the heavy and light horse on both sides of the road, and the Old Guard in the centre. On arriving at La Belle Alliance, Napoleon made a reconnoissance. He could not obtain a full view of the enemy's lines, and saw only the front that held the rising ground. This eminence not only shut off his view, but also enabled Wellington to move his divisions concealed and unnoticed during the action and thus transfer them to any point where the onset of the enemy called for greater resistance. The Emperor then rode down the front lines, to inspire his men by his glance and words and also to show the Englishman, who commanded a full view of the French army, what he had to cope with. He knew, perhaps, that a goodly part of Wellington's troops were not very reliable, although that commander may have exaggerated when he called it "the worst army that ever stood on legs." Finally, at noon, he ordered the battle to begin. What an advantage the allies reaped from this delay!

Napoleon's principal aim, founded on the general plan of the whole campaign, which contemplated a complete separation of the two armies, was to force the left wing and then the centre of the enemy, and thereby drive him away from the Prussians and from Brussels. (The proclamation to the people of Brussels was printed and ready to be scattered.) To accomplish this he made a strong attack with his left wing on the château of Hougomont, which the enemy held, to attract Wellington's attention away from his own left; the "main attack" was expected to follow at one o'clock. But this very first calculation was upset. The enemy had transformed the château into a citadel, and defended it with unexampled coolness against ever-renewed assaults, until at last an entire corps of the French front line melted away

without accomplishing anything. And as Hougomont held its own without the necessity of support that might weaken the left and centre, the French had to undertake their main attack against an 'undiminished enemy. But as if that were not enough, just as they were making ready to advance, the Emperor learned from a captured letter that he would have to deal with the Prussians as well, that Bülow was going to fall on his right flank; and as if to preclude all possibility of doubt, masses of troops began to appear on the right, near the chapel of St. Lambert, a mile distant, which an adjutant recognized as Prussians. There, suddenly and close at hand, was a danger that he had not reckoned with in the least; within two hours Bülow might strike. To avoid exposing his flank, the larger part of the reserve under Mouton had to be sent against him northeast of Plancenoit; those forces could not therefore join in the decisive blow that was to rout Wellington. If Bülow were but advancing alone! If Grouchy were only holding the rest of the Prussians in check! Better yet, if he were on the spot and could drive Bülow back! "Delay not a moment to come and join us," was the message Napoleon now sent him. But would the order ever reach him? And suppose it did, could he get away from the enemy, whom in fact he had been told to keep in check? Vain hopes. Grouchy was at Wavre, having arrived by a long detour from the east, and was engaged with a much weaker Prussian corps, while two others had long since followed Bülow on the way to join Wellington, and were advancing slowly, indeed, on account of heavy roads, yet inexorably.

Napoleon was not aware of his full danger when he determined to dispose of the enemy in front with all possible haste before the first cannon was fired on the right. It was explained to the army that it was Grouchy approaching on the right, and that victory was no longer in doubt. Then four divisions in closed columns advanced against the left wing of the enemy on La Haye Sainte, Papelotte and Smohain. The first point was stormed, but could not be held as the subsequent assault on the heights was repulsed, and the divisions had to fall back before the onslaught of the English cuirassiers. Then, while fighting was still in progress

on the right, Napoleon, who was now at La Belle Alliance, tried to pierce the enemy's centre by a cavalry charge on the grandest scale. This was the culminating point of the battle. Milhaud's corps of cuirassiers hurled themselves on the squares of the English, but with little success, for the British shot well and stood firm. Wellington, too, saw the danger coming and strengthened his centre, which was an easy task, as the left wing had already repulsed the attack there, and Hougomont on the right still held out. A new charge was made with three times the number, thirty-six squadrons. A very sea of horsemen poured over the ground and thundered in terrible billows about the enemy's battalions. Many of the latter were overwhelmed, many crumbled away, but others stood firm as a rock. And as Napoleon neglected to throw infantry into the gaps opened by the cavalry, this charge, too, failed of its intended effect. In fact the Emperor had exhausted his reserves, all but the Old Guard; and he would not now risk them, because at about five o'clock Bülow's batteries had begun to play and had driven Mouton back to Plancenoit. That point must be held at every cost, otherwise the enemy would fall upon the line of retreat and a catastrophe would be the result. For these reasons Napoleon held back the Guard at the one moment when it might have turned the tide in his favour. For the position of the English was by that time so sorely shaken, especially when Ney at six o'clock recaptured La Haye Sainte, that General Müffling of Wellington's suite hastened toward the Prussian corps of Zieten and shouted: "The battle is lost if the corps do not press on at once and support the English army." Meantime the Guard was busy in driving back Blücher, who with Bülow's troops had captured Plancenoit at last. This it accomplished at about seven o'clock. Carried away by this success, Napoleon again ordered a general advance all along the line. He gathered the last 5000 Guards still left for a final blow at the British centre. It was the act of a man in despair, for strictly speaking he had lost the battle when the cavalry charge failed, and it was necessary to retire while the loophole at Plancenoit still stood open. But if he did so he was conquered, and what was he good for if he was

conquered? Therefore he staked everything that offered even a chance of salvation. With shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" the triarii of his host dashed forward. And as if fate wanted to deceive her spoiled favourite of old up to the last moment, on the right two important positions were actually wrested from the English, and the Guards pushed on to the very last line of the enemy. But here at last, their ranks decimated by a well-directed fire, they, too, weakened, fell into disorder and retired. Moreover, the corps of Zieten had just then arrived and joined in the battle. The already exhausted French troops were driven from the captured positions; and thus supported, Wellington's army, sadly shrunk as it was, even ventured to assume the offensive. It was now eight o'clock. Half an hour later, after the arrival of the third Prussian corps, Plancenoit was retaken, and so any orderly retreat on the part of the French was out of the question. The road was soon impassable, as the Prussian bullets were already raking it, and so the disorganized host swept in wild haste to the west.

Only two reserve squares of the Guard still held together; in one of these, when the crash came, the Emperor took refuge in front of La Haye Sainte, where he had awaited the issue of the last charge, exposed to the fire of the English guns. It escorted him back to the heights of La Belle Alliance.* From this point he tried in vain to stem the tide of fugitives with the aid of his adjutants. He soon had to think of his own safety, and as his carriage at Caillou could no longer be reached, he rode across the fields to Genappe, guarded only by grenadiers à cheval. But so vigorous was the pursuit of the enemy that it was impossible to halt there; and Napoleon, who was wont to suffer pain even from a short ride, had to stay in the saddle until five o'clock in the morn-

* One of the two squares was broken up. The second escaped, but Cambronne, its commanding general, was forced to surrender. It has long been proved that he neither uttered the words that have been put into his mouth, "The Guard dies, but never surrenders," nor demonstrated their truth. Bertrand claimed while at St. Helena to have heard the same words from General Michel. But who would believe Bertrand? More reliable witnesses than he ascribe to General Michel a much shorter and more pungent expression.

ing, when he found a vehicle at last that brought him to Philippeville. Then only could he give himself a few hours of rest. He then issued orders to the corps not engaged in the campaign of Waterloo, wrote the bulletins on Ligny and Mont Saint-Jean, as he called the battle of Waterloo, and dictated to Joseph a letter which shows that this man would give up hope only with his very last breath. Everything was not yet lost, he declared. If he could only succeed in uniting all forces at his disposal, he would still have 150,000 men, nay, 300,000 with the national guards and the battalions in regimental depots. If Grouchy were not captured, for he had heard nothing from him, it was possible to gather 50,000 men on the spot and hold the enemy in check until Paris and France had done their duty. His brother must see to it that the Chambers give the Emperor the proper support. He himself closed the letter, adding in his own hand, "Courage, constancy!"

CHAPTER XXI.

ST. HELENA

EVER since the Emperor set out for the army, Paris had been anxiously waiting for news. It is enough to show the burden of anxiety that weighed on the people to remember that they feared the success of the war-lord almost as much as the defeat of his army. And that not only because in case of victory he would be the unlimited ruler again as of old, and rid himself of the bonds he had imposed upon himself, but also that a victory was but the real beginning of the war, and who knew when it would end? Long ago they had felt the violent contrast between their military glory and their distress as a nation. And had not even that glory been strangely dimmed during the last years of Napoleon's reign? Yet on the 18th of June the cannon before the Hôtel des Invalides proclaimed a new first victory, just as the thunders of artillery were rolling over Mont Saint-Jean; it was the battle of Ligny. So the war-god still showered upon his favourite the marks of his favour. Those who could rejoice at the news rejoiced; they were the revolutionists and excited masses of Paris, glad because the advocates of legitimacy and the Bourbons were humiliated, and the Bonapartists, who rejoiced at the triumph of their idol. But only two days later the picture was wholly changed. Dull rumours were in the air of a dreadful defeat, and the cannon were now silent. On the 21st all doubt seemed removed; the army was a wreck, the Emperor in full flight. It was even said that he was in Paris. What! had he left the army, then, instead of rallying it and opposing the enemy's march on the capital? Men were beside themselves at the thought.

As a matter of fact Napoleon had been in Paris ever since the early morning of June 21st, at the Elysée, where he had formerly

lived. At Laon he had discussed with the officers of his suite the next steps to be taken, and had decided to go to the capital. He supposed Grouchy to be a prisoner of war, and now took in the full consequences of the fateful battle of Sunday. It had cost the French more than 30,000 men. The rest were scattered to the four winds, and it was with difficulty that a few thousand could be rallied here and there. And how easily he might have avoided this and have conquered a second time if he had only pursued the Prussians without delay after the battle of Ligny and then hurled his army on the English, just as he had done in Italy in 1796! The most dangerous opponent was already beaten, and the other, who was unwieldy in face of the new military tactics, and massed his forces poorly, was isolated and virtually lost. And then? Would it not have been possible for diplomacy to follow close before arms, and dissolve the alliance of the powers before they had gained a victory? "In all history there is no more decisive battle than that of Waterloo," wrote Gneisenau to Hardenberg on June 22d; "decisive both in its effect on the battlefield itself, and in its moral effect. Had it been lost, what would have become of the coalition with all its memories of the Congress?" But not on the enemies alone; on France, too, the issue of the battle of June 18th could not fail to have a powerful effect. The end had not been expected so suddenly. Even the sly intriguer Fouché, whom Napoleon did not dare to set aside, although he saw through him, had given him a little longer time in which to meet his fate; he had said to an aristocrat: "This man has returned madder than he went. He is making a mighty stir, but it will not last three months." Napoleon now saw a storm brewing within the country that might but too easily sweep him aside, unless he could lull it at the last moment. Hence he had hastened to Paris, and for the same reason he now sat in company with his brothers and ministers considering ways and means, although himself extremely exhausted and nervous.

He seemed to have found what he needed. He tried to paint the situation as regards defensive forces in the brightest colours. and then came to the final point: he needed a temporary dictatorship in order to save the fatherland; he could simply assume it

himself, yet it would be more expedient and dignified for the Chamber to invest him with the office. But he had scarcely made this suggestion when one of his most devoted followers, Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, announced that the Chamber no longer deemed it his mission to save the fatherland, and that he must lay his abdication before them as a sacrifice. And such was, in fact, the situation. Lucien, indeed, spoke eagerly of seizing the power, of proroguing parliament and proclaiming a state of siege; and Napoleon, too, began to favour this idea. But Davout, the Minister of War, positively refused to permit the army to be put to such a use. A message now arrived from the second Chamber, which had been in session since morning and had secret information of the councils at the Elysée, to the effect that it had declared itself en permanence, that it held every effort to prorogue it an act of high treason, and would prosecute any one guilty of the crime; further, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the Interior, of War, and of Police were summoned before the deputies. This was a coup d'état from beneath, intended to parry the coup feared from above, i.e., from Napoleon. The deputies of the people, with Lafayette at their head, revolted against Napoleon's law and will, for the new constitution conceded him the privilege of dissolving the Chambers. "I see but one man alone," exclaimed the republican Lacoste, "between us and peace. Let him go, and we are sure of peace." So powerful was this current of feeling that it invaded the upper Chamber, and the peers adopted the resolution of the deputies. What was to be done? Napoleon, still sitting with his ministers, had forbidden them to obey the call of the rebellious Chamber, when news came that the latter was on the point of putting the motion for the deposition of the Emperor. Then Napoleon yielded. He sent the ministers and Lucien to the deputies with the message that he had created a commission consisting of Caulaincourt, Carnot, and Fouché, to open negotiations with the enemies and to end the war, so far as that was compatible with the honour and independence of the fatherland; that he counted on the patriotism of the parliament. But this did not satisfy the Chamber. The powers, they said, had proscribed him, they

would not negotiate with him; hence his commission was useless, and parliament itself must negotiate; and he must abdicate, or else he would be deposed. Then the deputies elected from their own number five commissioners who, together with five peers and the ministers, were empowered to consider means of saving the state.

So passed by the 21st of June. On the next day the situation had grown still more acute, even his brothers now advising him to abdicate. The deputies waited long for a message to that effect, but in vain; finally one of them made the motion that the Emperor be requested to withdraw in the name of the public welfare. Napoleon delayed answering. He walked up and down before his ministers in the Elysée, denouncing the "Jacobins" with trembling voice and distorted features. His judgment wrestled with his ambition in a terrible struggle. He remained stubborn, as if he would cling to the very last moments of his sway, until President Lanjuinais sent the commandant of the Palais Bourbon, where the sessions were being held, with the demand that he should abdicate, as the Chamber would wait no longer, and would declare him an outlaw. "Hors la loi!" That was the shout that had greeted him on the 18th Brumaire, when he was seizing the reins that were now slipping from his hands. At that time he had coerced the Chamber; now the tables were turned. With that threat in his ears he dictated on the afternoon of the 22d of June his abdication in favour of his son Napoleon II. Would the deputies take any notice of this last clause? For the time they merely expressed to the Emperor through a deputation their thanks for the magnanimous sacrifice he had made, and at once proceeded to appoint Carnot, Fouché, and Grenier, and the peers Caulaincourt and Quinette, members of a provisional government. It seemed as if the circle of events was to be complete, when Napoleon saw rising before him this copy of the Directory of Five, which he had once displaced. Even the indifferent public was not wanting to complete the parallel; it looked on now as it had then, without any show of deep interest. An eye-witness says: "Absolute quiet prevailed in the city and was not disturbed for

a moment. Tossed from government to government, back and forth, the people neither cared for the man they had lost nor for the man who was to come. They slept, expecting to be told on awaking whether they were to obey Napoleon II. or Louis XVIII." Under no circumstances, however, Napoleon I. His reign of a "Hundred Days" was at an end.

Of the population only the lowest elements, and that mainly from the suburbs, appeared occasionally before the palace in groups, shouting for a dictatorship and cheering the Emperor. Whether it was such utterances, or in general the embarrassment the provisional government felt in having the discarded Emperor still in the capital, especially after news came that Grouchy had saved his corps, that the troops in the Vendée were returning victorious, and that hence, together with the rallied fragments from Waterloo, an army of over 60,000 might be gathered, all clamouring for their leader: whatever the grounds may have been, he was urged to leave Paris. Davout finally succeeded in persuading him to this step, though, it is said, only by means of threats. For Napoleon, too, had learned of the presence of the army, and while he left the capital on the 25th of June, it was only to repair to the not distant palace of Malmaison and there await the course of events. Did he hope to be recalled? A part of France was still devoted to him, though it was but the smallest part by far. Or did he wait for the army to come in search of its leader? Be that as it may, he spent the next few days there, apparently absorbed in reminiscences of the time when, as Consul, he conceived in these same rooms the plans of his universal dominion, and in weighing the project of settling in the United States if France really thrust him out. But meantime the enemy, Blücher's Prussians in advance of the English, had kept drawing nearer, and soon Malmaison would not be safe. Then, at the last moment, on June 29th, just after a couple of French regiments had marched past with shouts of "Vive l'Empereur," he determined to offer his services to the provisional government as a simple general, for the sole purpose, he said, of saving the capital and beating the enemy while his forces were separated. Fouché, the leader of the Five, who had long

since been in secret correspondence with a confidential agent of Louis XVIII., answered this rather naïve message by saying that Napoleon was entirely mistaken if he thought the members of the government so crazy as to accept his proposal. He could give him only this advice, to depart at once, as the government could no longer be responsible for his safety. Nor was that untrue. We know to-day that a Prussian detachment had received direct orders to secure his person and shoot him. No sooner did the messenger return to Malmaison than Napoleon gave the signal for departure. He took off his soldier's coat and drove away in civilian garb with Bertrand, Savary, and Generals Becker and Gourgaud.

He directed his journey through Tours to the port of Rochefort, where two French frigates stood ready to take him to America, provided it was possible to escape the English cruisers. They proceeded slowly, making several long stops, more slowly, in fact, than was directed in the instructions of General Becker, who was delegated by the government to conduct Napoleon out of the country. But Napoleon could not even yet grasp the thought that his part had now been played to the end. From Niort, where two cavalry regiments had once more cheered him enthusiastically, he even entered into a correspondence with Generals Clauzel and Lamarque, who were in command in Bordeaux and the Vendée, with regard to the idea of marching to Paris against the traitorous government; but at once gave it up as impossible. On the 3d of July the party at last reached Rochefort. Here there were new delays. Until the 8th Napoleon spent his time in long daily consultations with his suite, which included Councillor of State Count Las Cases, the young Montholon, General Lallement, and others, as to the best means of eluding the English. Various feasible plans were proposed. Some were for escaping in small ships. But he rejected all such proposals. Becker induced him with great difficulty to cross over to the Isle d'Aix; here his brother Joseph came and said he had secured secret passage for himself at Bordeaux on an American ship. He offered to let Napoleon take his own berth, and proposed to act the part of his brother at Rochefort. But

Napoleon would not accept that either. At last news from Paris abruptly put an end to all further procrastination. On the 8th of July, one day after the entry of the Prussians into Paris, Louis XVIII. had returned under England's protection, and two days later the allied monarchs arrived. All further hesitation must now prove fatal to Napoleon. He entered into correspondence with the captain of the English ship *Bellerophon* that was blockading the harbour, and on receiving his assurance that he should be taken to England if he desired, he determined to imitate that Athenian who, being condemned and banished by his countrymen, sought and found a refuge among the Persians, whom he had fiercely fought. He had ended his career, he wrote to the Prince Regent of England; he was coming like Themistocles to sit at the hearth of the British people, and placed himself under the protection of their laws. And with that he went on board the enemy's vessel on July 15th.

Had Napoleon forgotten that the representative of Great Britain did not lag behind when the Vienna Congress proclaimed him an outlaw? The admiral to whose fleet the *Bellerophon* belonged had long had strict orders to seize his person and bring him to Plymouth. What was he counting on, then? For he certainly was counting on something. Now his messengers, after their second interview with Captain Maitland, had reported his statement that the Emperor would be treated with attention in England, that in that country the monarch and his ministers exercise no arbitrary power, and the generosity of the people and their liberal opinions stand above sovereignty. This is what he was counting on. But his calculations were fallacious. As soon as he left French soil he was no longer the guest, but the prisoner of the power against which he had most eagerly waged war.

And in what a plight he was leaving the country to which his unconquerable ambition had brought him back! Conquered in the field, overrun by enemies, torn by parties which his return had definitely arrayed against each other: such was France after the day of Waterloo. No sooner had the news of the lost battle reached Provence than the royalist fury broke loose and began

a slaughter among the Bonapartists, republicans, and Protestants of Marseilles, Nîmes, Avignon, Toulouse and Toulon, which did not fall behind the infamous scenes of the Jacobin Terror. Below raged the mob; above, the Camarilla; their victims were all who had yielded to the seductions of the Corsican. The names of those faithful to him were collected in proscription lists, and all who could not escape were executed. So perished Labédoyère, who had brought his regiment to Napoleon at Grenoble; so also Ney, whom death had passed by at Waterloo, though he sought it in his despair. And the family whose various members had filled the thrones of Europe as long as the all-embracing sceptre of the greatest of them intimidated the world, who now in Plymouth roads was a spectacle for the gaping English, was now soon scattered in every direction, homeless as when it had been obliged to take flight from Ajaccio twenty-two years before.

On the night of June 25th the Bellerophon put out to sea, and on the next morning reached the coast of England. The ship was kept here under strict surveillance a few days, until the government at London should determine the fate of the prisoner. They would have much preferred to see him fall into the hands of Louis XVIII., to be executed as a rebel, as the British premier Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh July 20th. But Napoleon had escaped that fate, and whether they would or no they must take up the question of his future. Their decision was announced to him on the 30th. As it would be incompatible with their duties to England herself as well as to the allies of her king—so ran the announcement—if “General Bonaparte” still had the means or opportunity of again disturbing the peace of Europe, it was necessary to limit his personal freedom. Accordingly the island of St. Helena had been appointed to be his future abode; the climate was healthy and the isolation of the island would permit of his being treated with greater consideration than would be possible elsewhere on account of necessary precautions. He was allowed to take with him three officers, a physician, and twelve servants, who could not, however, leave the island again except by permission of the English government. This was the

sentence. It could have been no great surprise to Napoleon, for the name of St. Helena had come up in the negotiations of the Congress; and his mind must have been prepared for the removal from Europe, as he had been threatened with it while still at Elba. So that when he now protested against the violence done him, when he appealed to the fact that he had come without constraint on to an English ship, and was therefore England's guest and not her prisoner, he could have had but one purpose, i.e., to impress public opinion in that country in his favour and to exercise an influence upon it that might at no distant date, if not immediately, loosen his fetters. We shall see him continue to live and act with this thought constantly before him. It was in vain, of course. The situation was not so simple as all that; it was not England alone that fixed his destiny. At the same time, August 2d, 1815, a treaty was signed in Paris by representatives of the allies, declaring Napoleon to be a prisoner of all the four powers which had concluded the agreement of the 25th of March. To England was conceded only the task of guarding him and the choice of a place of confinement; the other governments reserved the right to send commissioners to his destination to make sure of his presence there.

On the 7th of August Napoleon embarked in the ship of the line *Northumberland* which was to bear him to St. Helena. He had chosen as companions Bertrand, Las Cases, and Montholon, but General Gourgaud also managed to gain permission to sail with him. They took their families along. Besides these, O'Meara ship's surgeon of the *Bellerophon*, accompanied the Emperor. His farewell from Savary, whose company had been expressly denied him by the British government, is described as deeply touching. "You see, my lord," said Las Cases to the British admiral, "those who stay behind are weeping." Three days later, on August 10th, the *Northumberland* with her escort of two frigates had left the English Channel, and the coast of Europe vanished from the gaze of the exile.

On the 15th of October the gloomy island, with its walls of rock rising almost perpendicularly from the sea, came in sight.

In its solitary harbour, Jamestown, the Northumberland cast anchor. The destined home of Napoleon, the farm-house of Longwood, was on an elevated plateau with somewhat cooler climate; but it was not ready for occupancy, and meantime he found shelter in the neighbouring villa of "The Briars" belonging to the merchant Balcombe. Here he was on most friendly terms with the inmates, played with the children and good-humouredly put up with their jokes. Not until December did he change his residence to Longwood. There, at some distance from the house, a military cordon was established, within which his movements were perfectly free; if he left it, an English officer was to accompany him. But this was not allowed when ships came in sight; at such times neither he nor any of his suite could hold any intercourse with the inhabitants of the island. All letters addressed to Longwood or written there were subject to inspection by the Governor. This officer was not appointed in 1815, and Admiral Cockburn who was stationed in these waters, temporarily acted in that capacity. In November Napoleon entered a protest through his "master of the horse," Bertrand, against these precautionary measures, but it was returned to him because an "Emperor" Napoleon was referred to in it, whereas the admiral knew only of a "General" Bonaparte. This was the signal for a petty warfare between the colony of prisoners and the authorities, which only grew more bitter after the arrival of the new Governor, Sir Hudson Lowe, who began to administer office with a pedantic strictness that was unnecessary. He, too, disregarded the title of emperor, and this course was, strictly speaking, not incorrect. For England had never acknowledged Napoleon's imperial dignity during his reign,* and had done so only temporarily while he was at Elba. She was now under no obligations whatever to acknowledge it after the violation of the treaty.† Lowe had once defended Capri against the French, how-

* Cf. Rose, II. 490.—B.

† The question came up once at the end of 1816 between Napoleon and Admiral Malcolm (who replaced Cockburn). When the admiral informed Napoleon that he could no longer be treated as a sovereign, he replied:

ever, and in the war of liberation had been assigned to Blücher's headquarters. There he was very likely to hear reports not highly flattering to him who was now entrusted to his keeping. In any case he did his duty as governor, although with a moody reserve, without waste of words, always punctilious about his office, yet without the malignity that was ascribed to him in Longwood.

In this low one-storied farm-house the company had established itself after a fashion. Napoleon had a rather plain bedroom with a bath, a salon with billiard-table on which he liked to play, a dining-room, and an apartment that was called, in memory of old times, the "topographical cabinet." In the same building lived also the two Las Cases, father and son, Montholon and his wife, and General Gourgaud; Bertrand and his family occupied a second house at some distance. As far as circumstances permitted the appearance of court life was zealously maintained, the ladies appearing at table in full dress, the Emperor wearing the great cross of the Legion of Honour. He divided his time between working on his memoirs, often dictating for hours without weariness to Las Cases, Gourgaud, or Montholon; billiards, chess, reading the English papers, which he had just learned to read for himself, and new books that were sent him. In the evening he would read aloud from Voltaire or Corneille, the *Odyssey* or the Bible, and was not exactly edified when one or another of the listening ladies quite disrespectfully fell asleep. No little time was taken up by the feud with Lowe. Napoleon sometimes indulged in a fit of unjust rage at that officer. Once he threatened to blow out the brains of the first man that crossed his threshold without his consent; another time he called the governor his executioner. Finally, the latter showed himself no more, but simply took the English officer's report as to Napoleon's presence.

"Why not? In my present situation these honours should be left me for my enjoyment. What harm can it do on this cliff?" When asked, however, whether they were to term him Emperor, he had to answer with a negative, since he had abdicated, adding, however, that he had not been General since leaving Egypt. He proposed simply "Napoleon," and the Governor also finally adopted that.

In general it may be said that Napoleon was pursuing a definite, systematic line of action based on the hope of his ultimate deliverance. He would not flee, nor be set free by violence. The opportunity for the latter was repeatedly held up to view; in particular, some of his faithful followers who had escaped to America and taken part in the revolt of Brazil against Portugal thought they might risk an attack on St. Helena from that quarter, and sent word to the prisoner by means of insertions in cipher in the English paper "The Anti-Gallican." But that was no part of Napoleon's plan. He was too much concerned about his personal safety for that. "I could not be in America six months," he said to Montholon, "without being attacked by the murderers which the royalist committees that returned to France in the train of Count d'Artois have hired against me. In America I see nothing but murder and oblivion, so I prefer to stay on St. Helena." "Murder and oblivion": he dreaded the one as much as the other. But that did not betoken any resignation; no, he rather looked with confidence for deliverance through the victory of the English Opposition, or through the exile of the Bourbons from France. When Lowe shortly after his arrival offered to have a new house erected for him within two years, he replied: "Ah! in two years' time there will be a change of ministry in England or else a new government in France, and I shall not be here any longer." * This conviction is in full accord with his twofold aim of creating, on the one hand, a sentiment among the English in his favour, and of winning again, on the other, the lost confidence of the French.

He thought the former would be accomplished if he succeeded in discrediting the official of the Tory ministry and representing himself as the victim of unexampled arbitrariness. Hence every one of the regulations had the taint of suspicion thrown upon it, and its effect was exaggerated. The regulation for-

* Lowe gave the French commissioner Montchenu his word of honour that Napoleon had uttered these words, although the latter subsequently denied uttering them. The new house was begun after all, and was completed in 1820.

bidding long walks except under escort of an English officer was met with the determination to forego exercise entirely; the evil consequences of this course on his health were then laid at the door of the Governor, who was thus depriving him of free movement, and of the government which permitted his health to be ruined in such a baleful climate. Once when Lowe, none too gently, perhaps, touched on the question of provisions, Napoleon ordered some of his silver plate to be broken up and sold in order to get some money; but his chief aim in so doing was to show to what sacrifices he was reduced by the parsimony of this régime. All this had to be speedily made known to the public. This was accomplished by the "Letters from the Cape of Good Hope," which either he dictated or directed Las Cases to compose. They presented a long list of the sins of Lowe and the sufferings of those under his protection. They were sent secretly to London, and appeared there in 1817, ostensibly as the production of an Englishman.* The climate is there represented as baleful, the temperature hot and cold in sudden changes. And yet Napoleon himself had said once to his suite confidentially that if one must live in exile, St. Helena was after all the best spot; the weather in fact was monotonous and not very healthy, but the temperature was mild and pleasant.† And—so ran the letters—what makes the climate still more pernicious in its effects is the restraint on his movements and his intercourse with others which the new Governor imposed on the prisoner;

* The "Letters from the Cape of Good Hope in reply to M. Warden, 'Letters written from Saint Helena'" (London, Piccadilly, 1817), have been included in a retranslation into French as "*Lettres du Cap de Bonne Espérance*," with the collected works of Napoleon in the last volume of his officially edited correspondence (Vol. XXX). They are addressed to a Lady C. and connect themselves with a book published in 1816 by Warden, ship's surgeon on the Northumberland. Lady C. manifestly means that Lady Clavering, a Frenchwoman, to whom Las Cases wanted to send secretly a servant picked up on the island. The latter, however, revealed the plan and so brought on the arrest of Las Cases and his separation from Napoleon. (Schlitter, "*Stürmers Berichte*," p. 49.)

† Las Cases, "*Memorial*," Feb. 1, 1816.

and yet he is really no prisoner, as he voluntarily put himself under England's protection when it was still in his power to place himself at the head of the army and carry on the war. "It was the mistaken ideas Napoleon had formed of the influence of a great, free, and generous people on its own government that led him to prefer the protection of the English laws to that of a father-in-law or of an old friend" (Alexander I.). This was intended for the same address as the closing sentences in which one can hardly fail to recognize Napoleon's style. "This spectacle of persecution and injustice has always roused my indignation. Judge of my feelings when I saw so basely tortured a man who had been victor in sixty battles, and once was the ruler of so many nations and kings. Then I said to myself: 'I honour thee still more with the thorny crown that foreign power has pressed on thy brow than with the many diadems that once adorned it.'"

But this appeal proved fruitless. For as early as March, 1817, when Lord Holland of the opposition brought Napoleon's charges, drawn up in a written statement by Montholon, before the upper house, the Lords supported the Ministry; and even some of Holland's own party voted against his motion to lay the correspondence with Lowe before Parliament for judgment. This disposed of Napoleon for the time being, and the "Letters from the Cape" fell flat. For although the Whigs urged in his favour that he alone of all men would be in a position at the head of France to hold the balance on the Continent against Great Britain's growing rival, Russia, yet the country was so tired of all hostilities that this reason for releasing the prisoner was given no weight.* On the contrary, the Liverpool-Castlereagh cabinet joined the Continental powers at the Con-

* Cf. Schlitter, "Kaiser Franz I. und die Napoleoniden," p. 32. It is a striking coincidence that Napoleon, too, in conversation with Englishmen who visited him with passes from the governor and whom he never failed to greet in the most cordial manner, brought up the same point. For instance, in the summer of 1817 he said to Lord Amherst: "Russia is the power that is now most to be feared. France and England are the only nations for whose interest it is to oppose her plans." (Scott, *Life of Napoleon*, Vol. IX, Appendix IX.)

gress of Aix-la-Chapelle in an agreement "concerning the rumours, started in England and repeated in other parts of Europe, as to the treatment accorded the man whose ominous renown has not yet ceased to agitate the world." And the representatives of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England declared in a protocol issued on November 30, 1818, "that the stricter instructions of the British government to Hudson Lowe meet with the unanimous approval of all the signatory powers"; further, "that all correspondence with the prisoner, any sending of money or other communication, which is not submitted to the inspection of the governor, must be regarded as an attack on the public safety and punished accordingly."

Thus did the Continent, hand in hand with England, Russians side by side with the British, bring to naught Napoleon's hope of a favourable turn of affairs. So far he himself had reaped nothing but disadvantages. For Lowe, having discovered the secret correspondence with Europe and America, felt obliged to double his precautions. Las Cases had been arrested and sent away from the island as early as November, 1816, and a year and a half later O'Meara was treated in the same way. Perhaps both of these had counted on their removal in order to work as missionaries in the cause of the Exile.* In his petty warfare with the Governor Napoleon had imposed restrictions on himself that actually began to result in injury to his health; in particular, he omitted all exercise. He became seriously ill. The symptoms of a disease inherited from his father, cancer of the stomach, manifested themselves in frequent shooting pains and nausea. He himself was not unconscious of his condition, and the less so when he heard later that his oldest sister had died of the same disease. As he refused the services of the physicians recommended by the Governor, Fesch managed to send to St. Helena an Italian named Antommarchi, a surgeon of Corsican descent, who arrived in September, 1819. Acting on his advice, Napoleon changed his manner of life, cultivated a garden in which he worked every day, took rides on horseback,

* Gourgaud, too, left him, ostensibly on account of a quarrel with Montholon. (Schlitter, "Stürmers Berichte," pp. 122, 127.)

and even made a sort of truce with the Governor. The latter on his part met him half-way, by extending to a range of thirteen miles the territory on which his prisoner was free to come and go without a guard. Of what use would the feud be now? Public opinion in England remained unresponsive, and meantime Napoleon's condition had become incurable and was growing worse every day in spite of his change of regimen.

On the last night of the year 1820 he for the last time talked in a confidential way of past events. Thenceforward his disease had a rapid course. The restless, ever-busy man became faint and weary, lay in his easy chair, and had no more relish for any occupation, although he forced himself to dictate now and then and to arrange his papers. With difficulty could he be persuaded to go into the open air. He lost flesh perceptibly, as he could not retain any nourishment. His pulse, which had never been higher than sixty to sixty-five, now became feverish. Antommarchi having made an incorrect diagnosis, the patient was not satisfied and asked for an older and more experienced physician from the Paris Clinic. But before his wish could reach the Continent he had ceased to live. On the 15th of April, after an English army surgeon had perceived the critical condition of the prisoner, he dictated his testament to Montholon. In this he distributed among his most faithful followers the six million francs which had been deposited with the Paris banker Laffitte before his departure from Malmaison; also various relics. Soon after, the fits of vomiting grew so frequent that death was to be looked for at any moment as a consequence of a sudden failing of strength. On the 3d of May his mind, which had remained clear until then, began to wander. Two days later began the death-struggle, and on the evening of the 5th of May, 1821, at ten minutes before six o'clock, he died. After the autopsy, which was performed at his own request, the body was embalmed and clad in the uniform which the Emperor had been wont to wear; he was then buried not far from Longwood. The cannons of St. Helena saluted the dead enemy, and Great Britain's officers stood in profound reverence about his fresh grave.

The historian of Napoleon I. is not yet at liberty to lay aside his pen, now that the eyes of that extraordinary man have lost forever their fires of genius. He has still to reckon with a wealth of literary remains on which he must pass judgment, especially as they constitute an appeal to the memory of coming generations. For only the last struggle with death put an end to his unceasing efforts to establish his prestige; and nowhere, perhaps, was he more indefatigable in these efforts than on the rocky island in the Atlantic. We have seen how constantly he busied himself in trying to turn opinion in England in his favour. This was the purpose of the "Letters from the Cape," and every conversation with English visitors had the same end in view. But we have also seen him pursuing another goal: the French, and they above all, should recover their faith in him when they had once thrown off the yoke of the Bourbons. To gain this end he was untiring in his activity from the moment he set foot on the Northumberland. The works which he dictated, on board ship and afterwards at The Briars and Longwood, sometimes with excessive haste as if to make up for lost time, and the interviews with his faithful followers, whose duty it was to give widest publicity to his words—all these served this one end. First of all his fame as a general must be regarded as without a blemish. Hence he rubbed and scrubbed away at the blot of Waterloo, until he made it appear that it was not Napoleon who lost that battle but Grouchy, who, although sent after the Prussians to Wavre (1), rendered the success of Ligny nugatory by his poorly conducted operations. And the fact that that success was not more decisive, so that Blücher was ready to fight again two days later, was not all Napoleon's fault; it was the fault of Ney, who did not advance rapidly enough on the 16th of June despite urgent orders. No wonder that the brilliant plans of the Emperor came to naught under such circumstances!* This was what Napoleon dictated, and

* Compare, e.g., with the facts now established, as stated briefly in the foregoing chapter, the following passage in Napoleon's "Campagne de 1815": "Marshal Grouchy started away with the cavalry of Excelman and Pajol, the third and fourth infantry corps, and Teste's division of the

his officers wrote it down. This was the reward of his valiant followers: of Grouchy, who was racking his brains in America, thinking how he could free his master from captivity; of Ney, who, almost ere his body was under the sod, was thus calumniated by the very man for whom he suffered death. The manuscript of the "Campagne de 1815" was smuggled into Europe as secretly as the "Letters from the Cape," and was published in 1818. Gourgaud was named as the author, yet every line betrays the true author. Well, it accomplished its end, and did it so completely that even several decades later historians of distinction accepted blindly the representations of the captive. But other failures of his on the battlefield had to be glossed over. In Russia, the war against which grew "out of a misunderstanding," he told O'Meara, the premature cold was to blame for the misfortune of his army. He had made a careful examination of the weather records for fifty years back, and found that the severest cold never began before the 20th of December, that is, twenty days later than in 1812. With the thermometer at -18° Réaumur* 30,000 horses perished in a single night. The artillery, ammunition, and provisions could no longer be transported, no reconnaissances were possible; as a consequence the troops fell into disorder. In the battle on the Moskwa he fought with 90,000 men, the Russians with 250,000; in the burning metropolis he risked his life in the flames, scorched his hair and eyebrows and clothes, etc. All this was received and written down with credence, and soon afterwards given to the world as the truth of history.

By the way, Napoleon also dictated various other matters: the narrative of the beginnings of his military career, his share in the siege of Toulon and in the Italian wars, his expedition into Egypt, the campaign of 1800; in short, all his achievements

sixth. His orders were to follow on the heels of the Prussian army and prevent its rallying, and he was explicitly charged to keep himself always between the Charleroi-Brussels road and Marshal Blücher, in order to be in constant touch with the army and ready at any time to join it. It was probable that Marshal Blücher would retire to Wavre; he was to be there at the same time." Was there ever a bolder perversion of the truth?

* About 9° below zero, Fahrenheit.

in the service of the Revolution. But nothing else. Why was this? Why not relate his great exploits at Austerlitz and Jena, at Friedland and in Bavaria? Did death cut short the thread of his narrative? Not that, for we know that in the last years he composed works on military history in which he passed judgment on the deeds of Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick the Great, and all of which are preserved. What could have deterred him from telling more and still greater deeds of his own? A simple line of reasoning, which had already been his guide when he escaped from Elba: it was the Revolution which was to expel the Bourbons, and he was the man of the Revolution; just see how he fought for it; none better. Not a word, therefore, of the time when he himself ruled France as an autocrat; not a word of the wars of conquest on which he was to found his universal empire and which roused all Europe against him. Everything was *Liberty* and universal Peace, that was the trend of his labours. To be sure, occasionally a discordant note might steal in; as, for example, when Montholon reports a conversation with an English officer in which Napoleon said that the less liberty monarchs wished to give, the more assiduously they must speak of it, for the iron rod with which men are ruled must be gilded. But such slips were rare. In general a single theme monopolizes all these conversations: the Bourbons will be driven away, because they represent only a royalty of the nobles and the priests, not of the people, but the latter cannot afford to snatch at rule for itself, France is secured from such a step by her memories of the Terror under the Convention and of the pitiable failure of the Directory; her only safety lies in a popular monarchy. "Under a monarchical system of government," said Napoleon to his suite in the summer of 1816, "the rule of *my* dynasty can alone furnish guarantees for the true interests of the people, for it is the creation of the people." When he said this he was still full of hope for himself. Five years later, but two weeks before his death, he gave utterance to the same thought; but this time it was only in the interest of his son. "The Bourbons," he said, "will not hold out. After my death a reaction in my favour will set in, even in England.

After some civil disturbances my son will come to the throne. Great things are accomplished in France only when one leans on the masses. My son must be a man of the new ideas and represent the cause I made to prevail everywhere; he must carry out everywhere the new ideas, which obliterate the traces of the feudal system, make secure the dignity of man and develop the seeds of happiness that have been lying dormant for ages; he must bestow upon the people at large what has hitherto been the privileged possession of the few; he must unite Europe in the bonds of an indissoluble federation and spread the benefits of Christian civilization in all the still uncivilized portions of the globe. That must be the goal of all my son's thoughts, that is the cause for which I die a martyr. Let him take the hate with which oligarchs pursue me as a measure of the sacredness of my cause."

His works, dictations, and judgments were intended to raise his image above the rude reality of facts into an ideal sphere, and it was the same result that he sought to accomplish also by his testament, always looking forward to the future of his dynasty in France and always with the same contempt for truth. In that document we read: "I wish my ashes to rest on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the French people that I have so dearly loved." And farther on: "I recommend to my son never to forget that he is a born French prince, and never to permit himself to be used as a tool in the hands of the three rulers who are oppressing the nations of Europe. He must never fight against France, never injure her in any way; he must adopt my motto: 'Everything for the French people.'" Nay, more: to avoid hurting any of the feelings sacred to the people, he, the unbeliever, sent for priests to come to St. Helena and pray by his bier; and in his testament he wrote: "I die in the apostolic and Roman religion in which I was born more than fifty years ago."* But if there were any Frenchmen who

* We are told that on the night of the 21st of April he received the sacrament, and even that he confessed, as Beauterne declares in his book, "*Sentiments religieux de Napoléon*"; but the testimony for this is not authentic. He did indeed ask for the Abbé Vignali about one o'clock in the

found the execution of the Duke d'Enghien incompatible with the principles of religion, they were to learn from the testament of St. Helena "that it was necessary for the safety, the interest, and the honour of the French people at a time when the Count d'Artois had on his own confession sixty assassins in his pay," the same Count d'Artois who was afterwards to become king of France as Charles X.

Such was the intellectual legacy of the Emperor, his ambition resorting on the very verge of the tomb to means of gratifying itself that are not permissible. And it was abundantly successful. When the reign of Louis XVIII. ended and that of his brother began, of which every honest Frenchman was ashamed; when, later, a new revolution only resulted in replacing a policy of folly with one of self-seeking commercialism: then the seed sown at St. Helena in the soil of France, deeply furrowed as it was by hatred and dissatisfaction, suddenly sprouted. The best poets of the nation clothed the legend, still young, in the garb of verse, and so powerfully did the memory of the glorious days of a greater ruler thrill all hearts that even the historian with his serious mission was carried along by the current. It really seemed as if historians of his reign had followed Napoleon's own precept. "A French historian who desires to depict the empire," he said once in 1816,—and his

morning of the 21st; in this agree the only two sources we have for the last days, the diaries of Montholon and Antommarchi. But the physician was present at the interview with the priest, in which Napoleon only said that he wanted to perform the duties prescribed in the Catholic religion, and to receive its consolations; he then requested him to read mass in the next room daily (it was read only on Sundays up to that time), to elevate the Host, to celebrate the mass at the head of his body when dead, and perform all the other customary ceremonies. On the 3d of May, as his mind began to wander, Vignali when alone with him gave him extreme unction, and reported the act to the others waiting in the adjoining room. That is all that can be ascertained with some definiteness; unless, indeed, a remark of Napoleon's to Antommarchi be cited as evidence that he had abandoned his former sceptical views. "Not every one is an atheist who would like to be one," is his reported rebuke of the doubter. But these words are preserved for us only by Montholon and not by the man to whom they were addressed.


words went over the world,—“will, if he is courageous, give full credit to the good I have done. I closed the crater of anarchy and brought order out of chaos. I purified the Revolution of its defilement, ennobled the peoples, and established the kings. I have awakened all ambitions everywhere, rewarded all merit, and enlarged the borders of glory. That is something, surely. And at what point can I be attacked without the historian finding means to defend me? In my aims? There he knows enough to acquit me. Or in my despotism? Then he will show that the dictatorship was a necessity. Should it be said that I impeded liberty, he will point out that license, anarchy, and disorder were still at the door. Should I be accused of having loved war too much, he will demonstrate that I was never the aggressor. Should I be censured for desiring universal empire for myself, he will show that that was the product of circumstances and how my enemies drove me to it step by step. Or, finally, is my ambition the culprit? Well, he will doubtless find plenty of it in me, but it is of the highest and most exalted character, the ambition to establish and to consecrate, in short the reign of reason and the free exercise of all human capacity. And the only regret of the historian will be that such an ambition failed of its full realization.”*

That was the watchword for the historian, and so resolutely rang out the words of command of the immortal general that he was obeyed for whole decades after his death. The time came—it was in 1840—when his body was brought in triumph to Paris and deposited under the dome of the Invalides; and a minister of Louis Philippe spoke of him in the Chamber of Deputies in the following terms: “He was emperor and king, the legitimate sovereign of this land; as such he might rest in Saint-Denis. But he is entitled to more than the usual burial-place of kings.” Nay, the hour came when the legend of St. Helena itself mounted the throne of France; but when the rule of Napoleon III. proved incapable of maintaining what the carefully fostered Bonaparte tradition had so lavishly promised, then, and not until then, did the science of history at last come into its rights.

* Las Cases, *Mémorial*, May 1, 1816.

Among the precepts which the prisoner at Longwood left for the guidance of him for whom he thought to prepare the way, and whose early end he did not divine, is the following: "May my son often study history and reflect on it, for it is the only true philosophy."

To be sure, but only when it is true history. X



BIBLIOGRAPHY

PREFATORY NOTE

In preparing this bibliography the French edition of Fournier's work has been followed for the first two volumes (all that has appeared), as it contains many titles not mentioned in the German original. So far as has been practicable the existence of English translations of works in French and German has been indicated by the editor. The titles in the sections appended to Fournier's lists have been compiled mainly from Kirchsen, *Bibliography of Napoleon*, Leipzig and London, 1903. A list of the principal memoirs, etc., published since Fournier wrote follows the bibliography to Chapter XXI.

E. G. B

CHAPTER I

THE BONAPARTES IN CORSICA. NAPOLEON'S BIRTH AND EARLY TRAINING

Among the earlier works on the youth of Napoleon three may be mentioned in which the authors have drawn from the sources: Coston, *Biographie des premières années de Napoléon-Bonaparte*, Paris, 1840; Libri, *Souvenirs de la jeunesse de Napoléon*, *Revue des Deux Mondes* de 1842; Nasica, *Mémoires sur l'enfance et la jeunesse de Napoléon I^{er}*, jusqu'à l'âge de 23 ans, 1851. These writers are all somewhat prepossessed in Napoleon's favour. Of those hostile to Napoleon, Lanfrey may be named, *Histoire de Napoléon I^{er}* [Eng. tr.]. On the early years he is not sufficiently thorough. The first attempt to give something new was made by Boehtlingk in *Napoleon Bonaparte, seine Jugend und sein Emporkommen bis zum 13. Vendémiaire*, Jena, 1877; 2d edition, not revised, Leipzig, 1883. Next comes Jung in his *Bonaparte et son temps, 1769-1799, d'après les documents inédits*, Paris, 1880-81 [2d ed., 1880-1883]. The author furnishes authentic data, taken from the archives of the war department, and in many respects restores to order the chronological disorder that prevails in Coston and the authors who follow him. For the genealogy of the Bonapartes consult: Reumont, *Beiträge zur italienischen Geschichte*, IV. The schoolmates of Napoleon

whom we mention are Bourrienne, who speaks of the stay at Brienne in his *Mémoires*, 1st vol. [in English in many editions. Latest ed. by Phipps, London, 1893], and a writer signing himself C. H., who published in London in 1797 "Some account of the early years of Bonaparte at the military school of Brienne." The same work appeared in French trans. by Bourgoing: *Quelques notices sur les premières années de Bonaparte*, Paris, an VI. Read also: *Traits caractéristiques de la jeunesse de Bonaparte*, Leipzig, 1802. The *Mémoires* of Lucien Bonaparte (published by Jung, Paris, 1882, volume first) give some details of the childhood of Napoleon; Ségur, in *Histoire et Mémoires*, speaks of the stay at the military school. For what Napoleon himself reported about the years of his youth, see among others: *Mme. de Rémusat, Mémoires*, I. p. 267 and following [Eng. tr. 1894], the memoranda of Las Cases [Eng. tr. 1823, many eds.], and of Montholon [Eng. tr. 1846] at St. Helena, and Antommarchi, *Les derniers moments de Napoléon*. Some letters relating to this period will be found in Du Casse, *Supplément à la correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}*, Paris, 1887. Napoleon's early writings are found, in part, in Paul Lacroix, *Œuvres politiques et littéraires de Napoléon I^{er}*, Paris, 1840, in Kermoyan, *Napoléon*, 1853, and Martel, *Œuvres littéraires de Napoléon I^{er}*, 1st vol., 1888.

As to the date of Napoleon's birth, it was asserted while he was still alive that he made himself out a year younger than he was (see the article Bonaparte in the "Biographie universelle" by Michaud). Boettlingk has repeated the assertion without furnishing sufficient proofs. Jung was the first to raise serious objections to the date, August 15, 1769. He in fact produced a certificate from the records of civil status of Corte, according to which one Nabulione Buonaparte was baptized the 8th of January, 1768. The same document reappears almost identically—there is no difference but the name of Joseph, hardly Italian, placed before Nabulione—in the archives of Ajaccio, as being the certificate of baptism of Joseph Bonaparte. Finally, Jung quotes Napoleon's marriage certificate, in which the bridegroom is entered as having been born the 5th of February, 1768. Relying on these proofs, he tries to show that Napoleon was the eldest of the children of Charles Bonaparte, having been born in 1768, and that the father produced, not the certificate of his baptism, but that of Joseph, to prove that he was not more than ten years old, the age limit for entrance at the school of Brienne. There are a good many objections to this: first, there is in the archives of the war department, at Paris, a certificate of baptism drawn up on the 21st of July, 1771, to the effect that that day a son of Carlo Bonaparte, born the 15th of August, 1769, was baptized and received the name of Napoleone. Second, in July, 1776, Charles Bonaparte, in his petition, asked for a scholarship in one of the royal schools for his two eldest sons. He must have indicated exactly the age of the children, and must have added to his petition the certificates of baptism, and in fact there is in the archives of the war department a certified extract from the

certificate of baptism, witnessed June 23, 1776, of Napoleon, born "August 15, 1769." The consideration of this request lasted years; the minister of war had inquiries made, demanded proofs of nobility and other things of that kind; at last, in 1779, in accordance with the rules, a scholarship was granted to one of the children, the one who was born in 1769. How could the father, while his petition and all the documents relating to it were in the minister's portfolios, get a chance to substitute the certificate of Napoleon's baptism for that of Joseph—that is, falsify both the documents? But previously, at the time of sending in the request, in 1776, there was no reason for making this substitution. Finally, at the ministry, relying on the certificates of baptism, they gave the scholarship to the younger of the two children, who alone could claim it, and they kept the record that fixed the date of his birth. This younger son was Napoleon, and that is why the extract from the certificate of his birth is still preserved in the documents of the case in Paris.

In the official list—of January 23, 1779—of young Corsicans who were in the military schools, is found, with regard to the school at Tiron, in which Napoleon was to have been put at first, this statement: "Napoléon de Buonaparte, born August 15, 1769. He was accepted at the nomination of the 31st of last December and was not to be received until he should have given proofs of his nobility." Archives historiques, artistiques et littéraires, December 1, 1889. It can no longer be maintained that Napoleon was born in the year 1768, without admitting that it was not only the certificate of Joseph's birth, but also Joseph himself that was substituted. This hypothesis has found some defenders, see Jung, I. p. 50, Hérisson, *Le Cabinet noir*, p. 123, only the objection will undoubtedly be made that it was scarcely possible that such a substitution could have taken place in the house of the representative of the Corsican nobility at which the royal governor was a visitor every day. If it be urged that later Charles Bonaparte's sons furnished incorrect certificates of baptism, the answer to be made is that this happened between 1793 and 1796, and that at that time it was not possible for any one to procure extracts from the Corsican registers, for the island was at war with the mother country, and that it was necessary to be satisfied with the somewhat vague testimony of some fellow countrymen. See also, on the subject of Joseph's seniority, the recollections of Méneval, in his book *Napoléon et Marie-Louise*, II. p. 194 [Eng. trans. by Sherard, London, 1894], and the 2d volume of the *Mémoires de Lucien Bonaparte* published by Jung. Jung, however, has not stated his hypothesis without making certain reservations.

[The most important general biographies of Napoleon that have appeared in English since Fournier wrote are: W. M. Sloane, *Life of Napoleon Bonaparte*, 4 vols., New York, 1896, and J. H. Rose, *Life of Napoleon I.*, 2 vols., London and New York, 1902.

On Napoleon's birth and early training: A. Chuquet, *La Jeunesse de Napoléon*, Paris, 1897, vol. I., Brienne. F. Masson, *Napoléon inconnu*,

Paris, 1895. Contains all the authentic early writings of Napoleon. F. Masson, *Napoléon et sa famille*, 2 vols., 1769-1804, Paris, 1897-98. Larrey, Mme. Mère (*Napoleonis mater*), *essai historique*, 2 vols., Paris, 1892. Tschudi, *The Mother of Napoleon*, trans. fr. the Norwegian, London, 1900. J. Colin, *L'Education militaire de Napoléon*, Paris, 1900. A. Fournier, *Zur Textkritik der Korrespondenz Napoleons I.*, Vienna, 1903.]

CHAPTER II

THE REVOLUTION. NAPOLEON'S CORSICAN ADVENTURES. 1789-1793

On Napoleon's activities in Corsica, principally Jung, *Napoléon et son temps*, and Lucien Bonaparte et ses mémoires, 1775-1840, Paris, 1882, 1st and 2d volumes. What he says, moreover, will serve to rectify certain details of the elaborate discussion of Boehtlingk. Next, Bianchi, *Lettere inedite de P. Paoli, 1790-1795*, in the "*Rassegna Settimanale*," December, 1881, eleven letters addressed to Baretti, consul at Leghorn. In the very short biography of Pozzo di Borgo in the "*Russ. hist. Sbornik*," II. p. 158 ff., one finds very little information, and the dates in it are not exact. See besides the earlier works mentioned before, especially Coston. In the years following there was obviously a desire to pass over the Corsican period of Napoleon's life in silence. In a *Histoire de Bonaparte, Premier Consul, depuis sa naissance jusqu'à la paix de Lunéville*, a work obviously inspired, that appeared in 1802, we read, for example, on the twentieth page: "All the time that passed from the dawn of the Revolution to the famous epoch of the siege of Toulon, in December, 1793, was devoted by Napoleon to instructing himself in military tactics, which he studied in peace and in obscurity, for until the siege of Toulon he lived so to speak unknown."

[Masson, *Napoléon inconnu*; Chuquet, *La jeunesse de Napoléon*, vol. II, *La révolution*, Paris, 1898; Baron J. du Teil, *Napoléon Bonaparte et les généraux Du Teil, 1788-1894, L'école d'artillerie d'Auxonne et le siège de Toulon*, Paris, 1897. General works: Lavisse et Rambaud, *Histoire générale de l'Europe*, vol. VIII, "*La Révolution française*"; Aulard, *L'Histoire politique de la Révolution française*, Paris, 1901.]

CHAPTER III

THE SIEGE OF TOULON AND THE DEFENCE OF THE CONVENTION. 1793-1795

From this point the *Correspondance de Napoléon I.*, published under the auspices of Napoleon III., becomes an important source. It begins with some letters written in the late autumn of 1793, before the siege of Toulon. Napoleon's correspondence, as we know, was subjected to a thorough sifting before its publication, and since, that is to say from 1856, there have been constant rumours of papers of the first emperor that are said to have been destroyed.

The gaps, however, in the Correspondance may be filled in part by turning to the *Mémoires de Joseph Bonaparte* published by Du Casse [Eng. tr. of the letters in these *Mémoires* as *Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with his brother Joseph, etc.*, New York, 1856], to those of Bourrienne, and to the official documents furnished by Coston and by Jung. Other sources are: the *Œuvres de Napoléon* in the Correspondance, XXIX; the *Mémoires* attributed to Robespierre's sister; those of Marmont, which give (I. p. 120) Dugommier's report of the siege of Toulon; of Doucet de Pontécoulant; of Hyde de Neuville, and those of the Duchess d'Abrantès (wife of Junot) [Eng. tr. *Familiar Memoirs*, London, 1835]. Upon the different phases of party politics the following may be consulted with profit: Louis Blanc, *Histoire de la Révolution française*, vols. XI, XII; Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit* [Eng. tr. by Perry, London, 1867]; Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*; H. Taine, *Les origines de la France contemporaine, la Révolution*, III [Eng. tr. by Durand]; Hélie, *Les Constitutions de la France*; C. Rousset, *Les volontaires de 1791-1794. La Correspondance de Mallet du Pan avec la cour de Vienne, 1794-1798* (2 volumes), published by André Michel, contains nothing with regard to Napoleon at the time of the 13th of Vendémiaire, except a very short notice to the effect that he was a "Corsican terrorist." It would seem from this that it was not till the Italian campaign that his name became known to the general public. A reminiscence of *Mme. de Rémusat* further confirms us in our supposition. She says (*Mémoires*, I. p. 142): "I know that my mother was astonished that the widow of M. de Beauharnais should have married a man so little known."

[P. Cottin, *Toulon et les Anglais en 1793, d'après des documents inédits*, Paris, 1898; Chuquet, *La jeunesse de Napoléon*, vol. III, Toulon, Paris, 1899; Spencer Wilkinson, *Napoleon, the First Phase*, Owens College Historical Essays, London, 1902; the text of the Constitution of 1795 in English in Roelker, *The Constitutions of France*, Boston, 1848.]

CHAPTER IV

JOSEPHINE. 1796

On society and the salons after the Terror, see: Goncourt, *Histoire de la Société française sous le Directoire*, and especially the works of a German scholar, Adolph Schmidt, *Tableaux de la Révolution française* and *Pariser Zustände während der Revolutionszeit*, remarkable volumes upon which are based a large number of French books that are at present undermining the revolutionary legend. On Napoleon before his marriage, see the *Mémoires* of Joseph, of Bourrienne, the picture that Stendhal makes of the year 1795 in his *Vie de Napoléon*, and last Hochschild, *Désirée, reine de Suède*, 1889. On Josephine: *Napoléon I et Joséphine, lettres authentiques* [for Eng. trans. see Hall, below], 2 vols., Paris, 1833; then

the *Mémoires sur Joséphine et ses contemporains* by Mlle. Ducrest, the memoirs of Dufort de Cheverny and of Mme. de Rémusat; Aubenas, *Histoire de l'impératrice Joséphine*, 2 vols., Paris, 1858-59 (an apology). It was on the basis of this publication and of original documents published later that Imbert de Saint-Amand wrote his *Jeunesse de l'impératrice Joséphine*, Paris, 1884. This, however, is the work of a literary man and essayist rather than of an historian. We mention also the article Joséphine in the "Biographie universelle" by Michaud. The *Mémoires* of Josephine, which appeared in 1827, are apocryphal [Eng. tr. by J. M. Howard, Phil., 1848]. The letters in which Napoleon complains of the unfaithfulness of Josephine do not appear in the Correspondance. The letter to Joseph, mentioned by us, does not appear except as an extract from Coston and in the *Mémoires du roi Joseph*. It has not been published in full except by Pertz in the "Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie," 1861, p. 221, and in Du Casse, *Les rois frères de Napoléon*, p. 8.

[J. Turquan, *La générale Bonaparte—L'impératrice Joséphine*, 2 vols., Paris, 1895, 1896, *Joséphine de Beauharnais, 1763-1796*; F. Masson, *Joséphine de Beauharnais, 1763-1796—Joséphine, impératrice et reine*, 2 vols., Paris, 1899, 1900; H. F. Hall, *Napoleon's Letters to Josephine, 1796-1812*, for the first time collected and translated, London, 1901; J. S. C. Abbott, *Confidential Correspondence of the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine, etc., etc.*, New York, 1856; F. Masson, *Napoléon et les femmes*, vol. I, Paris, 1893, Eng. trans., London, 1894; A. Lévy, *Napoléon intime*, Paris, 1893, Eng. trans. by Simeon as *Private Life of Napoleon*, London, 1894; Bondois, *Napoléon et la société de son temps*, Paris, 1895.]

CHAPTER V

THE CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY AND THE PEACE OF CAMPO FORMIO. 1796-1797

For the history of the campaigns of 1796-1797 the chief source from which we have drawn is the Correspondance, both the official edition of the letters and the earlier edition, *Correspondance inédite, officielle et confidentielle de Napoléon Bonaparte* [ed. by Beauvais, Paris, 1809-1820]. To complete it, several important documents may be found in Hueffer, *Ungedruckte Briefe Napoleons aus den Jahren 1796 et 1797* (Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, XLIX) [Vienna, 1872], which relate especially to the diplomatic negotiations of the summer of 1797. [In English there is "A Selection from the Letters and Despatches of the First Napoleon," D. A. Bingham, 3 vols., London, 1884.] Further, the memoirs of Mar-mont, Masséna, Landrieux (these last in the *Revue du cercle militaire*, 1887), Desgenettes. Consult also the earlier technical writings of Clausewitz, Jomini [Eng. tr. by Halleck, New York, 1864], Ruestow, Lossau, and the recent book by Yorck von Wartenburg, *Napoleon als Feldherr*,

first vol., Berlin, 1885 [Eng. tran., London, 1902], and **Malachowski's** pamphlet, *Über die Entwicklung der leitenden Gedanken zur ersten Campagne Bonapartes*. Vortrag, Berlin, 1884, and **Hans Delbrueck**, *Über den Unterschied der Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen und Napoleons historische und politische Aufsätze*, 1887. Up to the present time we have no complete history of the events of the war during those years, written after a thorough study of the documents of the archives of the war department [yet see below]. Certain episodes have been treated by **Pellet**, *Bonaparte en Toscane en 1796*, *Revue bleue*, 1887; **Pierron**, *Les méthodes de guerre actuelles*, appendix *Litta Biumi, Della battaglia de Montenotte*, Milano, 1846; **Corte**, *Battaglia di S. Michele et Mondovi*, Torino, 1846; **Sforza**, *Sull' occupazione di Massa di Lunigiano da Francesi nel 1796*, *lettere d'un giacobino*, Lucca, 1880; **Kappelin**, *Bataille de Castiglione*; the same, *Bataille de S.-Georges*, Paris, 1843; and *Rélation de la bataille d'Arcole*, Paris, 1810; **von Rothenburg**, *Die Schlacht bei Rivoli*, Leipzig, 1845; **Belloc**, *Bonaparte et les Grecs*, Paris, 1826; **Antonopoulos**, *Bonaparte et la Grèce*, "Nouvelle Revue," 1889. On Venice: **Romanin**, *Storia documentata di Venezia*; **Dandolo**, *La caduta della repubblica di Venezia*, 1855; **Bonnal**, *La chute d'une république*, Paris, 1885. The memoirs of **Manin**, last doge of Venice, are deposited in the archives of that city. For the events of which Paris was the theatre and which are connected with those of the war, see the memoirs of **Carnot**, of **Larévillière-Lepeaux**, Paris, 1895, the recollections and the correspondence of **Mallet du Pan**, the memoirs of **Bourrienne**, of **Mathieu Dumas** [Eng. tr., London, 1839], and of **Hyde de Neuville**; then the reports of **Bayard**, October, 1796, on the internal condition of France, in *Baile*, *Preussen und Frankreich, 1795-1797*, I; **Barbé-Marbois**, *Journal d'un déporté*; **Dufort de Cheverny**, *Mémoires*; **Lacretelle**, *Dix ans d'épreuves*; **Barante**, *Souvenirs*; also the newspapers, the "Moniteur" and the "Rédacteur" (organ of the Directory). Among the narrative histories the following are authorities: **Von Sybel**, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*, IV, fourth edition; **Jung**, *Bonaparte, etc.*, III, gives some new information; **Bœhtlingk**, *Napoléon Bonaparte*, 2d vol., and **Taine**, *Les origines de la France contemporaine, La Révolution*, III [Eng. tr. by **Durand**], new points of view. On the foreign policy see: **H. Hüffer**, *Österreich und Preussen gegenüber der französischen Revolution bis zum Frieden von Campo-Formio*, and the articles by **A. Sorel**, in the "Revue historique," especially in the 17th and 18th volumes and in the number for November, 1885. For certain special subjects: **Sciout**, *Le Directoire et la République Romaine* ("Revue des questions historiques, 1886"); the same, *Pie VI, le Directoire et le grand duc de Toscane* (*ibidem*); the same, *La République française et la République de Gênes* (*ibid.*, 1889); **Boulay de la Meurthe**, *Quelques lettres de Marie Caroline, Reine des Deux-Siciles* (*Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1888); and *Ämtliche Sammlung von Akten aus der Zeit der helvetischen Republik*, vol. I, 1836.

[**H. H. Sargent**, *Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign*, London, 1895;

A. Sorel, *Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797*, Paris, 1896; A. Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, 5^{ème} partie. *Bonaparte et le Directoire*, 1795-1799, Paris, 1903; J. Colin, *Études sur la campagne de 1796-97 en Italie*, Paris, 1897; F. Bouvier, *Bonaparte en Italie, 1796*, Paris, 1899; G. Fabry, *Histoire de l'armée d'Italie, 1796-97*, 3 vols., Paris, 1900, 1901, pub. under the supervision of the historical section of the General Staff; J. H. Rose, ed., Col. T. Graham's *Despatches on the Italian Campaign of 1796-97*, "Eng. Hist. Rev.," vol. XIV, 111-124, 321-331; Kuhl, *Bonapartes erster Feldzug, der Ausgangspunkt moderne Kriegführung*, Berlin, 1902; L. Sciout, *Le Directoire*, Paris, 1895, 2 vols.; C. Tivaroni, *Storia del risorgimento Italiano*, vol. II, 2 parts. *L'Italia durante il dominio francese 1789-1815*, Turin, 1889-1890; P. Gaffarel, *Bonaparte et les républiques italiennes, 1796-1799*, Paris, 1894; E. Gachot, *Histoire Militaire de Masséna*, 1st vol., *La première campagne d'Italie, 1795 à 1798*, Paris, 1901; M. Herbet, *Une Ambassade Turque sous le Directoire*, Paris, 1902; *The Dropmore Papers*, vol. III, Eng. Hist. MSS. Com., Report on the MSS. of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at Dropmore, London, 1899.]

CHAPTER VI

EGYPT. 1798-1799

Upon the attitude maintained by Napoleon during the winter of 1797-1798 until his departure for Toulon our information is still inadequate. There are the *Mémoires of Barras*, ed. by G. Duruy, 4 vols., Paris, 1895-1896 [Eng. tr. by C. E. Roche, 4 vols., London, 1895-96]; the *Mémoires of Talleyrand*, ed. by the Duc de Broglie, 5 vols., Paris, 1891-92 [Eng. tr. by A. Hall, 5 vols., London, 1891-92]. Those of Larévellière-Lepeaux are not very trustworthy.

In addition there are the recollections of Mathieu Dumas [Eng. tr. 1839], Thibaudeau, Miot de Méliot [Eng. tr. New York, 1881], Bourrienne [Eng. tr.], the *Considérations sur la Révolution française* by Mme. de Staël (II) [Eng. tr. London, 1821], the reports of the Prussian envoy to Paris, Sandoz Rollin, published lately by Bailieu; and the correspondence already mentioned of Mallet du Pan with the court of Vienna, furnish many interesting data. See also Barants, *Histoire du Directoire*, III. Hüffer, in *Der Rastatter Kongress*, vol. 2; Jung, in *Bonaparte et son temps*, vol. 3; and Boehtlingk, in *Napoleon Bonaparte*, vol. 2, have tried, by making researches in the archives, to fill up the gaps that exist in spite of these publications. Boehtlingk especially has taken hold of it with a great deal of penetration, but on many points he has gone much farther than sound criticism can justify. This applies especially to one of his theses; he maintains that it is not the fact that Bonaparte, to advance his personal interests, simply took advantage of the policy of conquest of the Directory, a policy which undermined the principle of European balance, and founded his ambitious aims upon it; but that he him-

self was the author of this policy and consequently the real promoter of the war of 1799. Boehtlingk pretends, moreover, that Bonaparte, working with Bernadotte, arranged the Vienna affair. He gives no proof of it, any more than he does of his hypothesis that the murder of the French ambassadors at Rastatt was the work of this same Bonaparte who enjoys complicating and entangling everything. See Wegele, *Zur Kritik der neuesten Litteratur über den Rastatter Gesandtenmord* in the "Historische Zeitschrift," 1881, and Boehtlingk, *Napoleon Bonaparte und der Rastatter Gesandtenmord*, Leipzig, 1883. For the Egyptian expedition, the most important publications are first of all the *Correspondance de Napoléon I* (4th and 5th vols.), the *Correspondance inédite, officielle et confidentielle, de Napoléon Bonaparte*, 1819, 5th and 6th vols., and the *Letters from the Army of Bonaparte in Egypt*, London, 1798-1799. In addition, the memoirs of Bourrienne (which one should not consult without comparing them with A. B., Bourrienne et ses erreurs), those of Marmont, of Savary [Eng. tr. London, 1828], Lavalette, Beauharnais (Napoleon's stepson, who was with him in the Egyptian campaign), of Miot, Mme. de Rémusat, and the recollections and notes of a French superior officer of which Gopcevic has made use for his article in the "Jahrbücher für die deutschen Armee und Marine," 1880, 35th and 36th vols. See also the *Correspondance secrète d'un chevalier de Malte sur les causes qui ont rendu les Français maîtres de l'Isle*, Paris, 1802; Doublet, *Mémoires historiques sur l'invasion et l'occupation de Malte en 1798*, published by Panisse-Pastiz (hardly a conclusive justification); Gallé, *L'armée française en Égypte*, from the specifications of Captain Vertray, of the division Regnier, Paris, 1883, *La cour de la Gardiolle, Quatre Lettres sur l'expédition d'Égypte*; Richardot, *Nouveaux mémoires sur l'armée française en Égypte, et en Syrie*, Paris, 1848; Niellosargy, *Mémoires secrets sur l'expédition d'Égypte*, published by Beauchamp, Paris, 1825; Pelleport, *Souvenirs*, I; and the *Despatches and Letters of Nelson*, published by Nicolas [London, 1844-46]. Historical works: besides those already mentioned of Sybel, Hüffer, Jung, Boehtlingk, we will mention specially: Mathieu Dumas, *Les campagnes d'Égypte et de Syrie*; Besancenet, *Le général Dommartin*; Martin, *Histoire de l'expédition française en Égypte*, vol. II, Paris, 1815, 1816; Boulay de la Meurthe, *Le Directoire et l'expédition d'Égypte*, 1885 (a publication that deprives Meneval of all authority); *Sur le retour du Général Bonaparte d'Égypte*, "Spectateur militaire," 1840, 15th of May. Further, Wilson, *Historical account of the British expedition to Egypt*, London, 1803; Payol, *Kléber, sa vie, sa correspondance*, 1877; Ernouf, *La vie de Kléber*, 1867; Jomard, *Souvenirs sur Gaspard Monge et ses rapports avec Napoléon*, Paris, 1853; Pongerville, *G. Monge et l'expédition d'Égypte*, Paris, 1860. As to the Arabian historians, we should mention Gabarti and Nacoula el Turc, whose works have been translated into French. The scientific results of the expedition are recorded in the voluminous *Description de l'Égypte*, 2d edition, 1821-1830.

[H. Hüffer, *Der Rastatter Gesandtenmord*, mit bisher ungedruckten Archivalien und Nachwort, Bonn, 1896, Fr. trans. in *Rev. Hist.*, vol. 61; K. T. Heigel, *Zur Geschichte des Rastatter Gesandten-Mordes am 28. April, 1799*, "*Hist. Vierteljahrschr.*," 1900, 478-499 (further refs. in *Kirch-eisen*, p. 50); Thoulmas, ed., *L'Agenda de Malus, souvenirs de l'expédition d'Égypte, 1798-1801*, Paris, 1892; Guityry, *L'Armée de Bonaparte en Égypte, 1798-99*, Paris, 1898; E. de Villiers du Terrage, *Journal et souvenirs sur l'expédition d'Égypte, 1798-1801*, Paris, 1899; C. de La Jonquière, *L'Expédition d'Égypte, 1798-1801*, 2 vols., Paris, 1900-1901, under the supervision of the historical section of the General Staff; F. Rousseau, *Les Successeurs de Bonaparte en Égypte, Kléber et Menou*, "*Rev. des quest. hist.*," vol. 67, 554-599, Paris, 1900; Thurman, *Capt., Bonaparte en Égypte, Souvenirs du Capitaine Thurman*, publ. par. Comte Fleury, Paris, 1902; Constance H. D. Giglioli, *Naples in 1799: An Account of the Revolution of 1799 and of the Rise and Fall of the Parthenopean Republic*, London, 1903; A. Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, V^e partie: *Bonaparte et le Directoire, 1795-1799*, Paris, 1903; Rousseau, *Kléber et Menou en Égypte depuis le départ de Bonaparte, août 1799-septembre 1801*, Documents, Paris, 1900.]

CHAPTER VII

THE COUP D'ÉTAT AND THE CONSULATE. 1799

On French politics in 1799: Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit* vol. 2 [Eng. trans.]; Boulay de la Meurthe, *Le Directoire et l'Expédition d'Égypte*; Lanfrey, *Histoire de Napoléon I*, vol. 2 [Eng. tr. London, 1871-72]; the despatches of Sandoz Rollin in P. Bailieu, *Preussen und Frankreich von 1795-1807*, I; the letters of the Swedish envoy, Brinkmann, in Léouzon-Leduc, *Correspondance diplomatique du Baron de Staël-Holstein et du Baron Brinkmann*, Paris, 1881. On the internal condition of France: Taine, *Les origines de la France contemporaine. La révolution*, III [Eng. tr.]; Félix Rocquain, *L'état de la France au 18 brumaire*, Paris, 1874; Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, I [Eng. tr. by Campbell]. On the Coup d'État: the *Mémoires of Lucien* in Jung's edition (*Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires*, I and III) (where, on page 90 ff., Lucien reviews the events of the 19th of Brumaire); those of Gohier, of Marmont, Joseph Bonaparte, Bourrienne (consult A. B., *Bourrienne et ses erreurs*); the *Mémoires of Hyde de Neuville*, of Mme. de Rémusat [Eng. tr.]; the *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène of Las Cases* [Eng. tr. New York, 1823, frequently repub.]; the "*Moniteur*" for the year VIII; Duvergier de Hauranne, *Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire*; the notes published by Ludovic Lalanne and attributed to the scholar Fau-riol, on *Les derniers jours du consulat*, Paris, 1886 [Eng. tr., London, 1885]. 1st part, entitled *Esquisse historique des pronostics de la destruction de la République à dater du 18 Brumaire*; the text of the constitu-

tion in *Hélie*, *Les constitutions de la France* [Eng. tr. of *Constitution of 1799* in *Roelker*, *The Constitutions of France*, Boston, 1848].

[*A. Vandal*, *L'Avènement de Napoléon*, Paris, 1902; *Aulard*, *Histoire politique de la Révolution française*, Paris, 1901; *Aulard*, ed., *Registre des délibérations du Consulat provisoire*, pub. by the Société de l'histoire de la Révolution, Paris, 1894; *Lavisse et Rambaud*, *Hist. gén. de l'Europe*, vol. IX, *Napoléon*, Paris, 1897; *A. Aulard*, *Paris sous le consulat*, T. I, Paris, 1903; *A. Sorel*, *L'Europe et le Directoire*, V^e partie, Paris, 1903; *E. Gachot*, *Les Campagnes de 1799*, *Souvarow en Italie*, Paris, 1903.]

CHAPTER VIII

WAR AND PEACE. 1800-1802

On the campaign of 1800: *La correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}*, volume 6, the memoirs of Generals *Kellerman*, *Victor*, *Marmont*, and *Masséna*; the recollections of a soldier in the *Cahiers du capitaine Coignet*, Paris, 1883 [Eng. tr. by *Mrs. Carey* as *Narrative of Captain Coignet*, New York]. General narratives are to be found in *Sybel*, V; *Jomini*, *Histoire des guerres de la Révolution*; *Yorck*, *Napoléon I^{er} als Feldherr* [Eng. tr. London, 1903]. On the battle of Marengo, see the narrative in the "*Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift*" of 1823 and the article *Zum 80. Jahrestag der Schlacht bei Marengo* in the *Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine*, 36th vol. For the immediate consequences of the battle, see the article by *A. Fournier*, *Die Mission des Grafen Saint-Julien im Jahre 1800* in "*Historische Studien und Skizzen*," pp. 179-209, 1885. On the battle of Hohenlinden, see: *Tessier*, *La bataille de Hohenlinden et les premiers rapports de Bonaparte avec le général Moreau* in the "*Revue historique*," IX (from the memoirs of General *Decaen*, who took part in it), and *A. Schleifer*, *Die Schlacht bei Hohenlinden*, *Erding*, 1885. For the diplomatic history consult especially *Du Casse*, *Histoire des négociations diplomatiques relatives aux traités de Mortfontaine, de Lunéville et d'Amiens*, Paris, 1855, 3 volumes; also the account of the negotiations in *Lefebvre*, *Histoire des cabinets de l'Europe*, I; *Sybel*, V; *Lanfrey*, III; *Thiers*, II and III. For certain points of detail: *Bernhardi*, *Geschichte Russlands im 19. Jahrhundert*, II; *E. Daudet*, *Les Bourbons et la Russie pendant l'émigration*, "*Revue des deux mondes*," 1885; *Tatischeff*, *Paul I et Bonaparte*, "*Nouvelle Revue*," 1887; *E. Paul*, *Das Projekt einer Occupation Indiens im Jahre 1800*, "*Deutsche Revue*," 1888; *Tratchevski*, *L'empereur Paul et Bonaparte*, "*Revue d'histoire diplomatique*," 1889; the same, *Relations diplomatiques entre la Russie et la France à l'époque de Napoléon I^{er}*, I, 1800-1802, "*Recueil de la Société russe*"; *Baumgarten*, *Geschichte Spaniens*, I; *Bernhardi*, *Napoleons I. Politik in Spanien*, "*Hist. Zeitschrift*," vol. 40; *Noorden*, *Der Rücktritt des Ministeriums Pitt*, 1801, "*Hist. Zeitschrift*," vol. 9; *Larsson*, *Sveriges deltagande i den vapnade neutraliteten*, 1800, pub. 1888.

Among the abundant literature on the Concordat may be mentioned: d'Haussonville, *L'Église romaine et le premier Empire*, vol. I; Theiner, *Histoire des deux concordats conclus en 1801 et en 1803*; Cretineau-Joly, *Mémoires du Cardinal Consalvi*; Ranke's essay on Consalvi in vol. 40 of his works; Boulay de la Meurthe, *La Négociation du Concordat, "Le Correspondant,"* 1881, 1882; Lucien Bonaparte, *Mémoires*, vol. 2, ed. Jung. Some other titles may be found in Lacombe, *Essai d'une bibliographie des ouvrages relatifs à l'histoire religieuse de Paris pendant la révolution 1789-1802*, Paris, 1884.

[H. Hüffer, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Zeitalters der französischen Revolution*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1900; H. H. Sargent, *The Campaign of Marengo*, London, 1897; E. Gachot, *La deuxième campagne d'Italie*, 1800, Paris, 1898; De Cugnac, *Campagnes de l'armée de réserve en 1800*, 2 vols., Paris, 1900-01, under the supervision of the historical section of the General Staff; H. M. Bowman, *The Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens*, Toronto, 1900; M. Philippson, *La paix d'Amiens et la politique générale de Napoléon I^{er}*, "Revue hist.," vols. 75 and 76; A. Sorel, *La paix d'Amiens*, "Rev. des Deux Mondes," 1 and 15 of Aug. and of Sept. 1902; L. M. Roberts, *The Negotiations preceding the Peace of Lunéville, 1801*, Trans. of the Royal Hist. Soc., New Ser., vol. 15; The Paget Papers: Diplomatic and other correspondence of the Right Hon. Sir Arthur Paget, 1794-1807, vol. II, London, 1896 (Sir Arthur Paget was the English Ambassador at Vienna); Boulay de la Meurthe, *Documents sur la négociation du Concordat et les autres rapports de la France avec le Saint-Siège en 1800-'01*, 5 vols., Paris, 1891-97; L. Séché, *Les origines du concordat*, 2 vols., Paris, 1894; Debidour, *Histoire des rapports de l'église et de l'état en France, 1789-'70*, Paris, 1898; A. Aulard, *Paris sous le consulat*, Paris, 1903; Mathieu, *Le Concordat de 1801, ses origines, son histoire d'après des documents inédits*, Paris, 1903.]

CHAPTER IX

THE NEW FRANCE AND HER SOVEREIGN. 1802

On the political reorganization as a whole: Felix Rocquain, *L'état de la France au 18 brumaire*; Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, vols. I-III [Eng. tr.]. On Thiers, see Barni, *Napoléon et son historien*, M. Thiers, 2d ed., Paris, 1869; Lanfrey, *Histoire de Napoléon I^{er}*, vol. 2 [Eng. tr.]; A. E. Blanc, *Napoléon I^{er}, ses institutions civiles et administratives*, Paris, 1880, a eulogy exhibiting only the good side of things, yet useful as a general survey; Taine, *Les origines de la France contemporaine, "La régime moderne,"* I, Paris, 1890 [Eng. tr. by Durand], a very brilliant analysis of the creative work of the Consulate, finely conceived, but dominated exclusively by a single point of view as regards Napoleon. Extracts from the *Mémoires* of Pasquier and of Chaptal are an important feature of the work. [Pasquier, *Histoire de mon temps*,

Mémoires, 6 vols., Paris, 1894-95, vol. I; Eng. tr. by Roche of first three vols., London, 1893; Chaptal, *Mes Souvenirs sur Napoléon*, Paris, 1893.]

Among the contemporary accounts may be mentioned; Jullien, *Entretiens politiques sur la situation actuelle de la France*, Paris, an VIII [1800]; Frankreich im Jahre 1800, *Briefe deutscher Männer in Paris*, Altona, 1800; Panckoucke, *La république considérée dans ses divers gouvernements comme elle est, après ce qu'elle a été*, 1801; Gabricat, *Voyage de la duchesse de Guiche en France*, 1801, "Revue d'histoire diplomatique," 1889; Peuchet, *Essai d'une statistique générale de la France*, Paris, an IX [1801]. On the organization of the system of administration: Locré, *Procès-verbaux du Conseil d'État*, I; Aucoc, *Le Conseil d'État, avant et depuis 1789*; Pelet de la Lozère, *Opinions de Napoléon au Conseil d'État*. In addition the *Mémoires* of Roederer, III; of Thibaudeau; of Broglie, I [Eng. tr.]. See also Ernouf, *Maret, duc de Bassano*. On the financial reform, the *Mémoires* of Gaudin, duc de Gaëte; also Gaudin's *Notice historique sur les finances de la France, 1800-1814*, written before the *Mémoires*; Mollien, *Mémoires d'un ministre du trésor public*; Bosse, *Übersicht der französischen Staatswirthschaft, 1806-1807*; Stourm, *Les finances de l'ancien régime et de la Révolution*, 2 vols., Paris, 1885; A. Wagner, *Die französische Besteuerung seit 1789*, in his "Finanzwissenschaft," vol. IV, 1888; Ch. Nicolas, *Les budgets de la France depuis le commencement du XIX^e siècle*; Vuhrrer, *Histoire de la dette publique en France*, 2 vols.; Poinsard, *Le crédit public et les emprunts sous le Consulat et l'Empire*, in "Annales de l'École libre des sciences politiques," 1890.

On the reforms in the administration of justice: Schöffner, *Geschichte der Rechtsverfassung in Frankreich*; Sévin, *Étude sur les origines révolutionnaires des Codes Napoléon*, new ed., Paris, 1879; Troplong, *De l'esprit démocratique dans le Code Civil* (extracts from this will be found in Sévin); Rehberg, *Über den Code Napoléon und seine Einführung in Deutschland*; Thézard, *De l'influence des travaux de Bigot de Préameneu; Pérouse, Napoléon et les lois civiles*.

On the reforms in public instruction: Hahn, *Das Unterrichtswesen in Frankreich, mit einer Geschichte der Päriser Universität*, I, Breslau, 1848; Alb. Duruy, *L'instruction publique et la Révolution*; Liard, *L'enseignement supérieur en France de 1789 à 1889*, I, 1888; Beauchamp, *Recueil des lois et règlements sur l'enseignement supérieur*; P. Dupuy, *L'école normale*, in "Revue internationale de l'enseignement supérieur," 1883.

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On the censorship of the press: **Welschinger**, *La censure sous le premier empire*, Paris, 1882.

On the conspiracies: **Fescourt**, *Histoire de la double conspiration de 1800*; **Destrem**, *Documents sur les déportations du Consulat in the "Revue historique,"* vol. VIII; **Gaffarel**, *L'opposition militaire sous le Consulat*, in "*La Révolution française*," 1887, pp. 10-12; and the *Mémoires of General Rapp*. The *Mémoires of Fouché*, Paris, 1828-29, although not authentic, are not without value, since their author, **A. de Beauchamp**, made use of authentic documents [cf. **P. J. Proudhon**, *Commentaires sur les Mémoires de Fouché*, ed. by **Rochel**, Paris, 1900].

[**R. Stourm**, *Les Finances du Consulat*, Paris, 1902; **E. Jac**, *Bonaparte et le code civil, "De l'influence personnelle exercée par le premier Consul sur notre législation civile,"* Paris, 1898; **E. Daudet**, *La Police et les Chouans sous le consulat et l'empire*, Paris, 1893; **E. Guillon**, *Les conspirations militaires sous le consulat et l'empire*, Paris, 1894; **P. Corréard**, *La France sous le consulat*, Paris, 1899; **A. Aulard**, *Paris sous le consulat*, Paris, 1903.]

CHAPTER X

THE LAST YEARS OF THE CONSULATE. THE EMPEROR. 1802-1804

On the internal condition of France—A. Impressions and reports of foreigners who visited France and Paris: **Hase**, *Briefe und Tagebücher von 1801 und 1802 in the "Deutsche Revue,"* 1881; **F. J. L. Meyer**, *Briefe aus der Hauptstadt und dem Innern Frankreichs*, geschrieben im J. 1801, 2 Theile, Tübingen, 1802; **J. F. Reichardt**, *Vertraute Briefe aus Paris, geschrieben in den Jahren 1802 und 1803*, Hamburg, 1805; *Une année d'une correspondance de Paris, ou lettres sur Bonaparte*, reprinted from the "*Courrier de Londres*," London, 1803; **A. v. Kotzebue**, *Erinnerungen aus Paris im Jahre 1804*, Berlin, 1804; **Schlabrendorf**, *Napoleon Bonaparte u. d. Franz. Volk unter seinem Consulate*, "*Germanien*," 1814 [ed. by **Reichardt**]; **J. G. Rist's** *Lebenserinnerungen*, herausgegeben von **G. Poel**, Gotha, 1880. B. French sources: the "*Moniteur*," the official organ after 1799; the *Correspondance de Napoléon I*, vol. VII [Eng. tr. of selections by **Bingham**]; **Fauriel**, *Les derniers jours du Consulat*, ed. by **Lalanne**, Paris, 1885 [Eng. tr. 1885]; the *Mémoires of Bourrienne* [Eng. tr.]; (down to 1802 they are more trustworthy than after that date); those of **Lucien** in **Jung's** edition, which is unfortunately very deficient in critical spirit; **Thibaudeau**, *Mémoires sur le Consulat*; the *Mémoires of Mme. de Rémusat* [Eng. tr.]; the *Mémoires of Miot De Méliot* [Eng. tr.]; the *Considérations sur la révolution française de Mme. de Staël* [Eng. tr.]; the letters of **P. L. Courier**, written in 1804, in his *Œuvres complètes*. Further, **Montgaillard**, *De la France et de l'Europe sous gouvernement de Bonaparte*,

Paris et Lyon, an XII (1804); **Forneron**, Les émigrés et la Société française sous Napoléon I^{er}, Paris, 1890; **Gaffarel**, L'opposition militaire sous le Consulat, in "la Révolution Française," sixth year, No. 10; **Debidour**, Le général Fabvier, in the "Annales de l'Est," January, 1887, based on Fabvier's letters; L'opposition littéraire sous le Consulat in "La Nouvelle Revue," 1889; **Doinel**, Les conspirations dans le Loiret sous le Consulat, in "La Révolution Française," 1888; **Welschinger**, La censure sous le premier Empire, 1882; **Thiers**, Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, vols. III and IV [Eng. tr.]; **Lanfrey**, Napoleon I, vols. II and III [Eng. tr.].

On Foreign Relations: A. In general, in addition to the treaties in **De Clercq**, Recueil des traités conclus par la France (the first vol. stops with the year 1803) and the Correspondance de Napoleon I^{er}, vol. VIII, the very important work of **Lefebvre**, Histoire des cabinets de l'Europe. B. With Italy: **Botta**, Storia d'Italia dal 1789 al 1814 [Eng. tr. London, 1828]; **Castro**, Storia d'Italia dal 1799 al 1814, Milan, 1881; the same, Milano durante la dominazione napoleonica, 1880; **Francesco Melzi d'Eril**, Memorie, Documenti e lettere inedite di Napoleone I e Beauharnais, ed. Giov. Melzi, 2 vol., 1865; **Bonacossi**, Bourrienne et ses erreurs; **Dejob**, Mme. de Staël et l'Italie, with a bibliography on the influence of France on Italy, 1796-1814, Paris, 1890. C. With Switzerland: **Vuillemin**, Histoire de la Confédération suisse; **Muralt**, Hans von Reinhard, Zürich, 1839; *ibid.*, Bonaparte, Talleyrand et Stapfer, Zürich, 1869; **Luginbul**, Stapfer, 1887. D. With Germany: **Hüsser**, Deutsche Geschichte, with full notes from the literature of the subject; **Ranke**, Hardenberg und der preussische Staat, works, vol. 47; **Martens**, Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie, first section (Austria); vol. II; **Fournier**, Gentz u. Cobenzl, Geschichte der österreichischen Diplomatie von 1801 bis 1805. E. With Spain: **Baumgarten**, Geschichte Spaniens seit dem Ausbruch der franz. Revolution, I; **Bernhardi**, Napoleon I und Spanien in the "Historische Zeitschrift," vol. XL.

On the constitutions of the Italian States, of Holland, and of Switzerland: **Pöhlz**, Europäische Verfassungen.

On Napoleon's colonial policy: **H. Adams**, "Napoleon at St. Domingo," in his Historical Essays; **Tessier**, Le général Decaen aux Indes, "Revue historique," XV. On Toussaint l'Ouverture the "Revue de l'Agénais," 1884, contains documents; **Schoelcher**, La vie de Toussaint l'Ouverture.

On the strained relations with England (besides the Correspondance, VII, and the "Moniteur" for 1803): **Browning**, England and Napoleon in 1803, London, 1887, with Lord Whitworth's despatches; **Lord John Russell**, Memorials and Correspondence of Ch. J. Fox, vol. 3; The Annual Register, or A View of the History, etc., for the year 1803; the Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh, vol. V; **Stanhope**, Life of Pitt, IV; **Ashton**, English Caricature and Satire on Napoleon I., London, 1885; **Max Duncker**, "Die Landung in England" in his Abhandlungen aus der neuen Geschichte; **Seeley**, A Short History of Napoleon I., 1886; **Ompteda**, Die Ueberwältigung Hannovers durch die Franzosen, Hanover, 1866. On

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CHAPTER XI

THE WAR OF 1805

On the preliminary history of the war of 1805, besides the letters of Napoleon in the Correspondance, vols. 8, 9, and 10, and the Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoleon, 1800-1809, published by P. Bertaud, there are the Mémoires of Miot de Méliot, one of the most important and most trustworthy sources for this period; the Mémoires of Mme. de Rémusat, of Savary, duc de Rovigo, of Hulot in the "Spectateur militaire" for 1883; the correspondence of Villeneuve in Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres maritimes. On the project to invade England, the article of Max Duncker, mentioned above under Chap. X, which is, however, not conclusive. On Pius VII. in Paris, the Mémoires of Consalvi, Crétineau-Joly, and the great work of Haussonville, l'Église romaine et le premier Empire; also, "Paris zur Zeit der Kaiserkrönung," extracts from the letters of an eye-witness, Cologne, 1805. On the formation of the third coalition: Martens, Recueil des Traités, I; Neumann, Recueil des traités conclus par l'Autriche; Martens, Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie, II and VI; Tatistcheff, Alexandre et Napoléon d'après leur correspondance inédite, from the archives of St. Petersburg, published in "La Nouvelle Revue," 1890; in addition, the correspondence of Adam Czartoryski with Alexander I., published by de Mazade, 1865; the Mémoires of Czartoryski, 1887 [Eng. tr. London, 1888]; the recollections of Rasumovski in his biography by Wassiltchikow, in Russia, 1887; and the reports sent from Paris by Markow, in the "Archiv Worontzova," XIII, XIV, 1879; also the memoirs of Hardenberg, edited by Ranke; the reports of Lucchesini in Bailleu, II; the Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh, V; Cobbett, "Parliamentary Debates," vol. VI, London, 1806; the "Annual Register," 1803-1805.

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the critical essay by **Max Duncker**, *Graf Haugwitz und Freiherr von Hardenberg* in the "Abhandlungen a. d. neueren Geschichte," and his review of **Ranke's** work in the "Mittheilungen a. d. historischen Litteratur," sixth year; **Bernhardi**, *Geschichte Russlands im 19. Jahrhundert*, II; **Beer**, *Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik*; **Fournier**, *Gentz und Cobenzl*, *Geschichte der österreichischen Diplomatie von 1801-1805*; **Stanhope**, *Life of Pitt*, vol. IV. On the war of 1805, besides the correspondence of Napoleon and the correspondence of Talleyrand with Napoleon, mentioned just above, the *Mémoires* of **Marmont**, **Rapp**, **Ségur**, **Savary**, and **Fézensac**; **Piou des Loches**, *Mes campagnes, 1792-1815*, the cahiers of **Capitaine Coignet** [Eng. tr. as "Narrative" of, etc.]; Correspondence of **Davout**, pub. by de Mazade, 1885, 4 vols., and **Montégut**, *Le maréchal Davout*, Paris, 1882; in addition the *Mémoires* of **Czartoryski** [Eng. tr.], and his account of the month of April, 1806, in his "Correspondence with Alexander"; the memoirs of **de Maistre** (cf. **von Sybel's** article in the "Historische Zeitschrift," 1859), *Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire de la bataille d'Austerlitz* recueillis par un militaire, 1806, with a very instructive map; **Stutterheim**, *La bataille d'Austerlitz*, par un militaire témoin de la journée du 2 décembre 1805, Hamburg, 1806; the *Recollections* of **Radetky** in the "Mittheilungen des k.k. Kriegsarchivs," 1887; **Bernhardi**, *Denkwürdigkeiten des Generals Toll*, 2d ed., Leipzig, 1865; further, **Michailowski-Danilevski**, *La campagne de 1805*; **Angeli**, *Ulm und Austerlitz*, in "Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift," 1877, 1879; **Einsiedel**, *Der Feldzug der Österreicher in Italien 1805*, Weimar, 1812. Details drawn from the papers of the Archduke Charles are given in **Wertheimer**, *Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns im ersten Jahrzehnt des 19. Jahrhunderts*, vol. I, a work of no value as regards the great international diplomatic questions; **Yorck**, *Napoleon als Feldherr*, vol. I [Eng. tr.]; **Mack's** own defence in the "Historische Taschenbuch" of **Raumer**, 1873; **Dieffenbach**, *K. L. Schulmeister, der Hauptspion, Parteigänger, Polizeipräfekt und geheime Agent Napoleon I*, 1879. On the attitude of Prussia: *Die preussischen Kriegsvorbereitungen und Operationspläne 1805* in the "Kriegsgeschichtlichen Einzelschriften," part I, Berlin, 1805; **Bailleu**, *Preussen und Frankreich 1795 bis 1807*, vol. II; **M. Lehmann**, *Scharnhorst*; **Bailleu**, *Prinz Louis Ferdinand* in the "Deutsche Rundschau," 1883. On South Germany among other things the *Denkwürdigkeiten* of **Montgelas**, 1887; **Perthes**, *Politische Zustände u. Personen in Deutschland zur Zeit d. franz. Herrschaft*.

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CHAPTER XII

NAPOLEONIC CREATIONS. BREACH WITH PRUSSIA

On public opinion in France in 1805 and 1806: the reports of **Lucchesini** and the letters of **Hauterive** to **Talleyrand** in **Bailieu**, *Preussen und Frankreich*, vol. II; **Mollien**, *Souvenirs d'un ministre du trésor* [new ed. by **Gomel**, 1898]; the *Mémoires* of **Mme. de Rémusat**; the *Souvenirs* of **Barante**. On France and Naples: **Helfert**, *Königin Karoline von Neapel*; **Boulay de la Meurthe**, *Quelques lettres de Marie Caroline, Reine des Deux-Siciles*, in the "*Revue d'histoire diplomatique*," 1888; **Coletta**, *Histoire du royaume de Naples*, 3 vols.; the *Mémoires* of **King Joseph**, ed. by **Du Casse**; the *Mémoires* of **Miot de Mélito** [Eng. tr.]. On the relations with the Pope: in addition to the *Correspondance de Napoleon I^{er}*, the *Mémoires* of **Consalvi**; **d'Haussonville**, *L'église romaine et le premier Empire*; **Artaud**, *Histoire du Pape Pie VII.* On the establishment of the kingdom of Holland: **King Louis's Documents historiques et réflexions sur le gouvernement de la Hollande**, Paris, 1820; further, **Alb. Reville**, *La Hollande et le Roi Louis*, in the "*Revue de Deux Mondes*," 1870; **Félix Rocquain**, *Napoleon I^{er} et le Roi Louis*. On the Confederation of the Rhine: **Häusser**, *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. II, and the literature given by **Dahlmann**, *Quellenkunde zur Deutschen Geschichte*; in addition, **Perthes**, *Pol. Zustände und Personen zur Zeit der franz. Herrschaft*, 2 vols.; **J. G. v. Pohl**, *Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben und aus meiner Zeit*, 1840; the *Memoirs* of **Montgelas**; the letters of a secret agent of Austria in 1806 in **Fournier**, *Historische Studien und Skizzen*; **Schlossberger**, *Briefwechsel der Königin Katharina u. d. Königs Jérôme*, I; the same, *Politische Correspondenz Napoleons u. König Friedrich I. v. Württemberg* (it contains little that is new and important); **Göcke**, *Das Grossherzogthum Berg unter Joachim Murat* 1877; **Baulieu-Marcconay**, *K. F. v. Dalberg*, 2 vols.; in addition, **Bailieu**, *Fürstenbriefe an Napoleon I.* in the "*Historische Zeitschrift*," 1887; **Strippelmann**, *Beiträge zur Geschichte Hessen-Kassels*, part II, Marburg, 1878; **Baader**, *Streiflichter auf die Zeit der tiefsten Erniedrigung Deutschlands, oder die Reichstadt Nürnberg von 1801-1806*, Nürnberg, 1878; **Mejer**, *Zur Geschichte der römisch-deutschen Frage*. On the French Army in South Germany: among others, the *Souvenirs militaires de Fézensac* and the *Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}*. On the strained relations with England: **Lord John Russell**, *Life and Times of Fox*, 1859; **Cobbett**, *Parliamentary Debates*, VI; **Sir G. Jackson**, *Diaries and Letters*, I; **Lefebvre**, *Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe*, III. On the negotiations with Russia: **Bignon**, **Thiers**, **Bernhardi**, and **Martens**, *Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie*, VI. The origin of the French-Prussian War is not yet adequately explained, since **Haugwitz** burned up the documents. Still some of the most essential documents are in the second volume of **Bailieu**,

Preussen und Frankreich von 1795-1807. See further the *Memoirs of Hardenberg* edited by Ranke and the critical remarks of M. Lehmann in the "Historische Zeitschrift," Neue Folge, vol. III; Lombard, *Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire des années 1805, 1806, 1807*; the letters of Gentz to Starhemberg in the "Mittheilungen d. Instituts f. österr. Geschichtsforschung," 7th year; in addition, Ranke, *Hardenberg und der preussische Staat*; Häusser, *Deutsche Geschichte*, I; Hoppner, *Geschichte des Krieges von 1806 und 1807*; M. Lehmann Scharnhorst, I; Bailleu, Prinz Louis Ferdinand in the "Deutsche Rundschau," 1887.

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CHAPTER XIII

FROM JENA TO TILSIT

On the campaign in Thuringia: primarily the *Correspondance de Napoleon Ier*; the military writings of Clausewitz-Lossau, *Charakteristik der Kriege Napoleon I.*, vol. 2, "an eye-witness of the battle of Auerstädt"; Math. Dumas, *Précis des événements militaires*, vol. 18; Höpfner, *Geschichte d. Krieges von 1806 u. 1807*; P. Foucart, *La campagne de Prusse en 1806*, 2 vols., Paris, 1887 and 1890; C. v. d. Goltz, *Rosbach und Jena, 1883*; Yorck, *Napoleon I. als Feldherr*, vol. I [Eng. tr.]; Heimann, *Der Feldzug v. 1806 in Deutschland*; Dechend, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Krieges von 1806-1807*; Lettow-Vorbeck, *Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807*, 1st vol. 2d ed. 1899 up to the battle of Auerstädt [vols. II-IV, Berlin, 1892-1896, carry the narrative through to Tilsit]; in addition, Rühle von Lilienstern, *Bericht eines Augenzeugen vom Feldzuge 1806* (written under the influence of Massenbach, an officer of Hohenlohe's staff, whose ideas were far from clear); Massenbach, *Geschichtliche Denkwürdigkeiten* (confused and unreliable); Müffling, *Der Operationsplan der preussisch-sächsischen Armee 1806*, Weimar, 1806; Müffling, *Aus meinem Leben*, 1851, unreliable; Plotho, *Tagebuch während der Kriegsoperationen, 1806*,

und 1807, Berlin, 1811; **Ledebur**, Erlebnisse aus den Kriegsjahren 1806 und 1807, Berlin, 1855; **Borcke-Leszczynski**, Kriegsleben des Johann v. Borcke, 1806-1815, Berlin, 1888; Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des General-Feldmarschalls **Hermann v. Boyen**, vol. I, Leipzig, 1889; **Gentz**, "Tagebuch im preussischen Hauptquartier," in his collected works ed. by Schlesier; **Tiedemann**, Denkwürdigkeiten; **Gentz** and **Mayer von Heldenfeld**, Berichte über die Schlacht bei Jena in the "Mittheilungen des k. k. Kriegsarchivs," 1882; **Burckhardt**, Aus den Tagen der Schlacht bei Jena, "Neues Archiv. für Sachs. Gesch.," IV. See also the later judgment in retrospect of **Scharnhorst** on this campaign, which has been published by **Lehmann** in the "Histor. Zeitschrift," Neue Folge, XXIV; the Correspondence of **Davout** and the judgment of **Montégut** on **Davout** in **Ségur**, Histoire et mémoires, vol. 3 [Eng. tr. by Patchett-Martin, London, 1895]; **Fézensac**, Souvenirs militaires; **Piou des Loches**, Mes Campagnes; **Coignet**, Cahiers [Eng. tr. as "Narrative"]; **Pertz**, Gneisenau, vol. I; **Lehmann**, Scharnhorst, vol. I. On the war in Poland, in addition to the works just mentioned: **Foucart**, La Campagne de Pologne, Paris, 1882; **R. T. Wilson**, Brief Remarks on the Character and Composition of the Russian Army, and a Sketch of the Campaigns in Poland, 1806-1807; the Mémoires of **Count Oginski**, of **Eugen von Würtemberg**, of **Benning** in the anonymous "Beiträge zur Geschichte des Kriegs von 1806 und 1807," Breslau, 1836; **Grolmann**, Tagebuch über d. Feldzug d. Erb-grossherzogs von Baden, 1887. On Napoleon's policy during this war: **Bertrand**, Lettres inédites de Talleyrand; **Lefebvre**, Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe, vol. 3 in the second edition, where there is an admirable exposition of the extremely complicated situation of affairs, needing only slight corrections; **Vandal**, Napoléon et Alexandre I^{er}, vol. I, De Tilsit à Erfurt, Paris, 1891; **Tatistcheff**, Alexandre I^{er} et Napoléon in the "Nouvelle Revue," 1888; **Bailleu**, Preussen und Frankreich, vol. II; **Beer**, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik; **Thiers**, vol. VII; **Ranke**, Hardenberg und Preussen, vol. III; **Bernhardi**, Geschichte Russlands, vol. II; "The Annual Register for the Year 1807"; Diaries and Letters from the Peace of Amiens to the Battle of Talavera, London, 1872; **De Maistre**, Mémoires politiques, letters written in the spring of 1807; **Czartoryski**, Mémoires [Eng. tr.], vol. II; **Bernhardi**, Denkwürdigkeiten Tolls; the Mémoires of **Savary** [Eng. tr.] become more reliable for this period; **Barante**, Souvenirs, vol. I; **Gagern**, Mein Anteil an der Politik, vol. I; **Countess Voss**, Neunundsechzig Jahre am preussischen Hof, 1876; **Hardenberg's** Memoirs, ed. by **Ranke**, especially vol. V with the documents; the Tagebuch of **Schladen**; **G. Horn**, Das Buch v. d. Königin Luise, 1883; **Martens**, Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie, vol. VI; **Ernouf**, Maret, duc de Bassano; **Meneval**, Napoléon et Marie Louise [new ed. as Mémoires, Paris, 1894, Eng. tr. London, 1894]; **Boppe**, La mission de l'adjudant-commandant Mériage à Widdin, 1807-1809, in the "Annales de l'École politique"; **Gardane**, La mission du général Gardane en Perse sous le premier Empire, Paris, 1865. For further

details on the relations of Napoleon to the Shah Feth-Ali, see Gaffarel, in the "Revue politique et littéraire," 1878. On the treaties of Tilsit see De Clercq, *Recueil des traités de la France*, vol. II; Garden, *Histoire générale des traités de paix*, vol. X; Bignon, *Histoire de France*, vol. VI; Lefebvre, *Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe*, vol. III; Thiers, *Consulat et Empire* [Eng. tr.], vol. VII; Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre I^{er}*: this work and also the articles of Tatistcheff in the "Nouvelle Revue," 1890, contain the authentic text of the secret treaty of alliance which was first published by me. [It will be found in the German and French editions at this place, but is omitted here.—B.]

[The works above mentioned of Heigel, p. 760; Denis, p. 760; Fisher, p. 760; Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst, p. 760; H. v. Treuenfeld, *Auerstädt und Jena*, Hanover, 1893; Lewal, *La veillée d'Jéna, Étude de stratégie de combat*, Paris, 1899; E. Leydolph, *Die Schlacht bei Jena*, 2d ed., Jena, 1901; E. Driault, *Napoléon à Finkenstein (avril—mai 1807) d'après la correspondance de l'empereur, les archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, les archives nationales*, "Rev. d'histoire diplomatique," vol. XIII, Paris, 1899; F. Loraine Petrie, *Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806-07*, London, 1903.]

CHAPTER XIV

THE SITUATION OF AFFAIRS IN FRANCE

For the internal conditions in France see the references given for Chapter IX; in addition, Thiers, vols. VI-VIII, with Barni, *Napoléon I^{er} et son historien M. Thiers*; Lanfrey, vols. III-IV [Eng. tr.]; Taine, *Le régime moderne* [Eng. tr.]; "Le Moniteur," *la Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}*, vols. XIII-XVII; the *Mémoires* of Mme. de Rémusat [Eng. tr.]; the *Mémoires* of Mme. Avrillon (who was lady's maid to the Empress Josephine); the *Mémoires* of Beugnot [Eng. tr.]; *Souvenirs of the Duc de Broglie* [Eng. tr.]; Véron, *Mémoires d'un bourgeois de Paris*, vol. I; Faber, *Notices sur l'intérieur de la France*; the *Considérations* of Mme. de Staël, vol. II [Eng. tr.]; the despatches of Metternich, in the second vol. of the "Nachgelassene Papiere" [Eng. tr. as "Mémoires"]; Pelet de la Lozère, *Opinions de Napoléon au Conseil d'État*; the *Mémoires* of Vitrolles, vol. II, p. 443 ff.; Welschinger, *La Censure sous Napoléon I^{er}*; Sainte-Beuve, *Chateaubriand et son groupe littéraire*, 2 vols.; Merlet, *Tableau de la littérature française, 1800-1815*, Paris, 1877; B. Jullien, *Histoire de la poésie à l'époque impériale*; Vauthier, Lemerancier; Nodier, *Souvenirs*; Brunetière, *Études critiques sur l'histoire de la littérature française*, 1880; Boissonnade, *La critique littéraire sous le premier Empire*; Fauchille, *La question juive sous le premier Empire*, 1886; Taine, "Napoléon Bonaparte" in his *Le régime moderne*, vol. I.

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CHAPTER XV

THE CAMPAIGNS IN SPAIN AND AUSTRIA. MARIE LOUISE. 1808-1810

On the campaign in Spain see the works mentioned for Chapter XIV, and in addition the Correspondance of Napoleon, vols. XVII and XVIII; Ducasse, *Les rois frères de Napoléon*, I; Yorck, *Napoleon als Feldherr*, vol. II; Napier, *History of the War in the Peninsula*; the Correspondance of Davout; *souvenirs of Fezensac*; the cahiers of Captain Coignet [Eng. tr. as "Narrative"]; the "Letters from Spain by German Soldiers" in Bernays, *Die Schicksale des Grossherzogtums Frankfurt u. s. Truppen*. On the expedition against Sir John Moore: A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army in Spain commanded by Sir John Moore, London, 1809. On the causes of the war with Austria: Metternich, *Nachgelassene Papiere* [Eng. tr. as "Memoirs"]—the despatches of vol. II are often at variance with the recollections in vol. I, cf. Bailleu, *Die Memoiren Metternichs in the "Histor. Zeitschrift," Neue Folge*, vol. VIII; the reports of Fred. Stadion, sent from Bavaria from 1807 to 1809, "Archiv für österr. Geschichte," 63d vol.; the *Denkwürdigkeiten of Montgelas*; in addition, Thiers; Bignon; Beer, *Zehn Jahre österr. Politik*; Wertheimer, *Geschichte Österreichs u. Ungarns im ersten Jahrzehnten des 19. Jahrh.*, vol. II, based on the memoranda of Archduke Charles and following them too closely; Albert Jäger, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges von 1809, "Sitzungsberichte" of the Vienna Academy*. On the attitude of Russia: Bernhardt, *Geschichte Russlands*, vol. II; Mazade, *Alexandre I^{er} et le Prince Czartoryski*; Czartoryski, Correspondance in vol. II of his *Mémoires* [Eng. tr.]; the *Souvenirs of de Maistre*. On the attitude of Prussia: Hassel, *Gesch. der preuss. Politik seit 1807*, vol. I; the articles of Max Duncker, "Preussen während der franz. Okkupation" and "Eine Milliarde Kriegsentschädigung, welche Preussen an Frankreich gezahlt hat," in his "Aus der Zeit Friedrich d. Grossen u. Friedr. Wilhelm III., vol. I; Max Duncker, "Friedr. Wilhelm im Jahre 1809" in his *Abhand-*

lungen aus der neueren Geschichte; **Ranke**, "Hardenberg und die Geschichte des preussischen Staates von 1793-1813," *Sämmtl. Werke*, vol. 48; **A. Stern**, *Abhandlungen und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der preussischen Reformzeit*; **M. Lehmann**, *Scharnhorst*, 2d vol.; **Boyen**, *Erinnerungen*, 1st vol.; **Martens**, *Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie*, 6th vol.; **H. v. Kleist**, *Politische Schriften und andere Nachträge zu seinen Werken*, ed. by R. Köpke, Berlin, 1862. On the campaign in Bavaria and in Austria, in addition to the military works which have been mentioned before: 1. French authorities: the *Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}*; **Pelet**, *Mémoire sur la guerre de 1809 en Allemagne*, 4 vols., 1825; **Cadet de Gassicourt**, *Voyage en Autriche*, 1818; **Ségur**, *Histoire et Mémoires*, 3d vol.; **Marmont**, *Mémoires*, 3d vol.; **Rapp**, *Mémoires*; in addition, the *Correspondance of Davout* and the *Mémoires et Correspondance of Prince Eugène*, vol. IV. 2. Austrian authorities: **Stutterheim**, *La Guerre de 1809 entre l'Autriche et la France*; in addition, *Der Feldzug des Jahres 1809 in Süddeutschland* in **Streffleur's** "*Österr. milit. Zeitschrift*," 1862. **Stutterheim** is continued by **Welden**, *Der Krieg von 1809 zwischen Österreich und Frankreich von Anfang Mai bis zum Friedensschluss*, 1872. On the battle of Aspern or Essling in particular: **Schels**, *Die Schlacht bei Aspern am 21. u. 22. Mai 1809* in **Streffleur's** "*Zeitschrift*," 1843; **Angeli**, *Wagram*, *Novelle zur Geschichte von 1809* (*Mittheilungen des k. k. Kriegsarchivs*, 1881); **Varnhagen**, *Die Schlacht bei Wagram*, in his *Memoirs*; **Ruhle von Lilienstern**, *Reise eines Malers mit der Armee im Jahre 1809*, vol. III, also his art. in "*Pallas*," 1810; **Hormayr**, *Lebensbilder a. d. Befreiungskriegen*, 3 vols.; **Hormayr**, *Kaiser Franz und Metternich*; **Archduke John**, *Das Heer von Innerösterreich*; **F. de Gentz**, *Tagebücher*, 1st vol. The reports of Count Hardenberg in the archives of Hanover are pretty nearly in accord with Gentz's diary. Some extracts from them will be found in **Oncken**, *Das Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreichs u. der Befreiungskriege*, 2d vol. The diary of **Mayer de Heldensfeld**, which is in the archives of the war department at Vienna, is not accessible to scholars. The *Erinnerungen of Radetsky* in "*Mittheil. des k. k. Kriegsarchivs*," 1887; **Radetsky**, *Denkschrift über die österr. Armee nach der Schlacht bei Wagram*, "*Mittheil. des k. k. Kriegsarchivs*," 1884; in addition, the very instructive report of an Austrian officer on *Die Armee Napoleon I. im J. 1809*, mit vergleichenden Rückblicken auf das österreichische Heer (ibid. 1881); **Wertheimer's** *Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns im ersten Jahrzehnt des 19. Jahrh.*, based on the memoranda of Archduke Charles, is not impartial. Interesting details from the papers of Archduke John will be found in **Krones**, *Geschichte Österreich im Zeitalter der französischen Kriege*, Gotha, 1886; and in **Zwiedineck-Studenhorst**, *Erzherzog Johann im Feldzug 1809*, Graz, 1892. In his review of **Krones** in the "*Histor. Zeitschrift*," 1887, **Fournier** has published the letters of **Archduke Charles** after the battle of Essling (Aspern). The letters of **Stadion** to his wife which are referred to in the text are still unpublished. Others of his letters may be found in **Thurheim**, *Ludwig, Fürst Starhemberg*,

Graz, 1889. On the agitation which prevailed in Germany at this time, in addition to the works mentioned above on the attitude of Prussia, see **Häusser**, *Deutsche Geschichte*, 3d vol., where the literature is indicated in detail, and also Steindorff's edition of the *Quellenkunde* of **Dahlmann-Waitz**, Göttingen, 1894. On the uprising in the Tyrol and the literature of it: **Egger**, *Geschichte Tirols*, 3d vol., and **C. Clair**, *André Hofer et l'insurrection du Tyrol en 1809*, Paris, 1880. On the Peace of Schönbrunn, the works of **Thiers** and of **Bignon**, both of whom made use of the memoranda of **Champagny**; **Ernouf**, *Maret, duc de Bassano*, based on *Maret's* recollections; **Beer**, *Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik*; **Klinkowström**, *Aus der alten Registratur der Staatskanzlei*; **Gentz**, *Tagebücher*, 1st vol.; **Fournier**, *Gentz und der Friede von Schönbrunn*, "*Deutsche Rundschau*," 1886; **Krones**, *Zur Geschichte*, etc., and **Fournier's** review in the "*Histor. Zeitschrift*." **Metternich's** *Memoirs* are quite unreliable. The private correspondence of Prince **Johann Lichtenstein** for this year was burned after his death. On **Staps' attempt** at assassination: *Fr. Staps, erschossen zu Schönbrunn bei Wien auf Napoleons Befehl im Oktober 1809*, eine Biographie a. d. hinterlassenen Papieren seines Vaters, Berlin, 1843; in addition, the *Mémoires* of **Rapp** and the *Mémorial* of the treasurer, **Peyrusse**. On *Marie Louise*: **Helfert**, *Marie Louise; Correspondance de Marie Louise, 1799-1847, Lettres intimes, 1887; the despatches of Metternich in vol. II of his "Nachgelassene Papiere"* [Eng. tr. as "*Memoirs*"]; **Metternich's** letters to his friends among the diplomats in **Hormayr**, *Lebensbilder a. d. Befreiungskriegen*; **Vandal**, *Projet de mariage de Napoleon I^{er} avec la grande duchesse Anne de Russie*, in the "*Correspondant*," 1890; **Wertheimer**, *Die Heirat der Erzherzogin Marie Luise mit Napoleon*, "*Archiv f. österr. Geschichte*," 64th v.; **Welschinger**, *Le divorce de Napoléon*, Paris, 1889. Both these works are deficient in their treatment of the political causes. Also, **Duhr**, *Ehescheidung und 2. Heirath Napoleon I.*, "*Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*," 1888; **Lefebvre**, *Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe*, 5th vol.; **Ernouf**, *Maret, duc de Bassano*; **Barante**, *Souvenirs*, 1st vol.; **Broglie**, *Souvenirs*, 1st vol. [Eng. tr.]; **Montgelas**, *Denkwürdigkeiten*.

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CHAPTER XVI

AT THE ZENITH. 1810-1812

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CHAPTER XVII

Moscow. 1812

The literature on the Russian campaign is enormous; only the most important is given here. Besides vol. 24 of the *Correspondance of Napoleon* the materials comprise the memoirs of his generals, the narratives of the Russian generals, the accounts of German and French officers, also the official Russian sources, all of which have been made the basis of recent historical works on the war. Much of the French material may have got lost on the retreat.

I. Memoirs and documents. *a. From French side:* *Du Casse*, *Mémoires et Correspondance du Prince Eugène*, 1858-60; *Memoirs of Rapp*, 1823; *Gouvion Saint-Cyr*, 1829-31; *Ségur* (vols. 4 and 5 of *Histoire et Mémoires*); *Bausset*, Paris, 1827 [Eng. tr. Philadelphia, 1828]; *Constant*, Paris, 1830-31 and 1894 [Eng. tr. London, 1830, new ed. 1894]; *Gourgaud*, *Napoléon et la Grande Armée en Russie ou examen critique de l'ouvrage de Ségur*, Paris, 1825 [Eng. tr. Paris, 1825]; *Fain*, *Manuscrit de 1812*, Paris, 1827; *Villemain*, *Souvenirs contemporains 1855-6* (based on reminiscences of Narbonne); *Davout*, *Correspondance* (ed. Mazade, 1885), vol. III: *Blocqueville*, *Le Maréchal Davout*, Paris, 1879-80, vol. III (containing his letters to his wife); *Peyrusse*, *Mémorial et Archives*, Carcassonne, 1869; *Fézensac*, *Souvenirs militaires*, Paris, 1870 [the *Journal de la Campagne de Russie en 1812*, first pub. in 1850, Eng. tr. by Knollys, London, 1852]; *Denniée*, *Itinéraire de l'Empereur Napoléon pendant la campagne de 1812, 1842*; *Coignet* (already an officer in this campaign), *Cahiers*, 1889 [Eng. tr. as *Narrative of Captain C.*]; *Léher*, *Lettre d'un capitaine de cuirassiers sur la campagne de Russie*, Paris, 1885; *Vaudoncourt*, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la guerre entre la France et la Russie en 1812*, London, 1815; *Labauume*, *Relation circonstanciée de la campagne de Russie en 1812*, Paris, 1814, and later [Eng. tr. London, 1815, ed. by Parker, 1844]; *Larrey*, *Mémoires de chirurgie militaire*, 1812-18 [Eng. tr. by Hall, Baltimore, 1814; by Waller, London]; *Bourgeois*, *Tableau de la campagne de Moscou*, Paris, 1814; *Puibusque*, *Lettres sur la guerre de Russie*, Paris, 1816 and later. *b. From the Allies:* *V. Lossberg*, *Briefe in die Heimat geschrieben während d. Feldzugs 1812 in Russland*, Cassel, 1844; *Wolzogen*, *Memoiren des Generals v. Wolzogen*, Leipzig, 1851; *Pönitz*, *Militärische Briefe eines Verstorbenen*, Adorf, 1841-5; *Roos*, *Ein Jahr aus meinem Leben*, St. Petersburg, 1832; *Von Meerheim*, *Erlebnisse eines Veteranen der grossen Armée während des Feldzugs in Russland im Jahre 1812*, Dresden, 1860; *Theodor Goethe*, *Aus dem Leben e. sächsischen Husaren*, Leipzig, 1853; *Funck*, *Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge des sächsischen Corps 1812*, Dresden, 1829; *Legler*, *Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem russischen Feldzuge*, Glarus, 1868; *Leianig*, *Erinnerungen e. sächsischen Dragoneroffiziers*, Leipzig, 1828; *Röder v. Bornsdorf*, *Mitteilungen aus dem russischen Feldzuge*, Leipzig,

1810; **Stoltyk**, *Napoléon en Russie*, Paris, 1836; **Albrecht Adam**, *Aus d. Leben e. Schlachtenmählers*, Stuttgart, 1886 (he was in Eugene's headquarters at Moscow); **Wessenberg**, "Denkschrift über den russischen Feldzug" in the "Deutsche Revue" for 1881. c. From the Russian camp: **Herzog Eugen v. Württemberg**, *Memoiren*, Frankfurt, 1862 (cf. **Helldorf**, *Aus d. Leben des Prinzen Eugen v. Württemberg*); **Bernhardi**, *Denkwürdigkeiten d. Generals Toll*, Leipzig, 1865, vols. I and II; **Tchitchagoff**, *Mémoires inédits*, Berlin, 1855 (cf. **Harnack**, *Zur Vorgeschichte u. Gesch. d. Krieges v. 1812*, in "Hist. Zeitschrift," vol. LXI). The numerous unprinted journals of Russian generals have been used by **Bogdanovitsch** (see infra); **Wilson**, *Narrative of Events during the Invasion of Russia*, London, 1860. [Also, *Private Diary during the Campaigns of 1812-1814*, London, 1861.]

II. Historical narratives of the campaign: **Chambray**, *Histoire de l'expédition de Russie*, 3 vols., Paris, 1823 and later (fundamental). The works of the Russian historians **Buturlin**, Paris, 1824, **Michailowsky-Danilewsky** [Ger. tr. Leipzig, 1840]; **Ker-Poter, Smitt**, Leipzig, 1861, are all superseded by the comprehensive narrative of **Bogdanovitsch**, based on authentic sources in the Russian archives for military topography, but without making use of Napoleon's correspondence. **Yorck** uses the latter and is accordingly fuller on certain points in his *Napoleon als Feldherr*, 1887-8, vol. II [Eng. tr.]; also **Thiers**, XXII and XIV; **Jomini**; **Förster**, *Napoleons I russischer Feldzug*, 1857; **Beitzke**, *Gesch. d. russ. Krieges*, Bremen, 1883; **Clausewitz**, *Hinterlassene Werke*, 1862-89, VII [Eng. tr. of part on Russian camp., London, 1843]; **Landrey-Kalkstein**, VI. **Tolstoi's** little book, *Napoléon et la campagne de Russie*, is an attempt as brilliant as it is unsuccessful to combine fiction and history. Special phases of the war: a. Preparations and beginning of campaign: **De Pradt**, *Histoire de l'ambassade dans le Grande-Duché de Varsovie en 1812*, Paris, 1815, and later [Eng. tr. London, 1816]; **Bignon**, *Souvenirs d'un diplomate*, Paris, 1864; **Lensky**, *Notice historique, sur les armements qui eurent lieu en Lithuanie pendant l'occupation française en 1812*; **Ernouf, Maret**, *duc de Bassano*; *Zusammenstellung d. diplom. u. milit. Massnahmen Napoleon I. zur Einleitung des Feldzuges von 1812*, "Jahrb. f. d. deutsche Armée u. Marine," 1878; **Liebert**, *Die Rüstungen Napoleons für d. Feldzug 1812*, appended to part 9, 1888, of the "Militär-Wochenblatt." b. On the battle of Borodino: **Pelet**, *La Bataille de la Moskwa*, "Spectateur militaire," 1881; **Hofmann**, *Die Schlacht bei Borodino*, Coblenz, 1846; **Ditfurth**, *Die Schlacht bei Borodino*, Marburg, 1887; **Roth von Schreckenstein**, *Die Kavallerie in d. Schlacht a. d. Moskwa*, Münster, 1858; *Über d. Mitwirkung d. sächs. Kürassier-Brigade i. d. Schlacht a. d. Moskwa*, "Österr. Militär-Zeitschrift," 1824. c. On the burning of Moscow: *Histoire de la Destruction de Moscou en 1812*; **Rostopchine**, *La vérité sur l'incendie de Moscou*, Paris, 1823; **Surrugue**, *Lettres sur l'incendie de Moscou*, Paris, 1823. d. On events at the crossing of the Beresina cf. the general histories, in particular **Bogda-**

novitsch, and the recollections of participants; also Mosbach, *Der Übergang über die Beresina aus ungedruckten Denkw. d. polnischen Obersten Bialkowski, Streffleur's "Österr. militär. Zeitschrift,"* 1875; Clausewitz (who was with Wittgenstein), "Über die Schlacht a. d. Beresina," letter to Stein, published in the "Hist. Zeitschrift" for 1888; Pfeil, *Der Rückzug d. Franzosen a. Russland*, ed. Förster, Berlin, 1867. c. On the share of the Allies in the campaign: Welden, *Der Feldzug d. Österreicher gegen Russland i. J. 1812*, Vienna, 1870; Angeli, *Die Teilnahme d. österr. Auxiliarkorps im Feldzuge Napoleon I. gegen Russland*, "Mitteilungen des k. k. Kriegsarchivs," 1884; Droysen, *Leben d. Feldmarschalls Yorck*, Leipzig, 1890; Guretzky-Cornitz, *Gesch. d. ersten Brandenburger Ulanenregiments*, Berlin, 1866; Cerrini, *Die Feldzüge d. Sachsen 1812 u. 1813*, Dresden, 1821; Zezschwitz, *Die Feldzüge d. Sach. 1812 u. 1813*; Burkersroda, *Die Sachsen in Russland*, Naumburg, 1846; Holtzendorff, *Gesch. d. königl. sächs. leichten Infanterie*; Liebenstein, *Die Kriege Napoleons gegen Russland 1812 u. 1813*, Frankfurt, 1888; Minckwitz, *Die Brigade Thielmann im Feldzuge v. 1812*, Dresden, 1879; Krauss, *Gesch. d. bayrischen Heeresabteilung im Feldzuge gegen Russland*, Augsburg, 1857; Heilmann, *Feldmarschall Fürst Wrede*, Leipzig, 1881, and *Die Bayrische Kavallerie-Division Preysing i. J. 1812*, "Jahrb. f. d. deutsche Armee u. Marine," vol. 7; Miller, *Darstellung d. Feldzuges d. französ. verbündeten Armee gegen d. Russen i. J. 1812 mit besondere Rücksicht auf d. Teilnahme d. kgl. württembergischen Truppen*, Stuttgart, 1823; Bernays, *Die Schicksale des Grossherzogtums Frankfurt und seine Truppen*, Berlin, 1882; Büdinger, *Die Schweizer i. Feldzug v. 1812*, "Hist. Zeitschrift," XIX.

III. On Malet's plot: Lafon, *Histoire de la conjuration du général Malet*, Paris, 1814; *Histoire des sociétés secrètes de l'armée et des conspirations militaires qui ont eu pour objet la destruction de gouvernement de Bonaparte*, Paris, 1815; Desmarest, *Quinze ans de haute police*, Paris, 1833, new ed. 1900; Savary, *Mémoires*, Paris, 1829, vol. VI [Eng. tr.]; Fiévée, *Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte*, III; Hamel, *Histoire des deux conspirations du général Malet*, Paris, 1873; Passy, Frochot, préfet de la Seine, Evreux, 1867; A. Duruy, "La conspiration du général Malet" in his *Études d'histoire militaire*, Paris, 1888. On the attempts to assassinate Napoleon: Bernhardt, Toll, vol. II; Senfft, "Mémoires," Leipzig, 1863; Bernays, *Schicksale*, etc.; Förster, *Napoleon I. russischer Feldzug*; Bourgoing, *Itinéraire de Napoléon de Smorgoni à Paris*, Paris, 1862. A narrative by Wousowicz on Napoleon's journey back to Paris, which Ernouf quotes in his work on Maret (p. 467), I have not had access to.

[A. Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre I^{er}*, III; A. Maag, *Die Schicksale der Schweizer-Regimenter in Napoleons I. Feldzug nach Russland*, 1812, Biel, 1890; G. Bertin, *La campagne de 1812 d'après des témoins oculaires*, Paris, 1895; M. Exner, *Der Anteil der Königl. Sächsischen Armee am Feldzug gegen Russland, 1812*, Leipzig, 1896; H. B. George,

Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, London, 1899; J. Ullmann, *Studie über die Ausrüstung und das Verpflegs- und Nachschubwesen im Feldzuge Napoleon I. gegen Russland im Jahre 1812*, Wien, 1891; *Sergent F. Bourgonne*, *Mémoires 1812-1813*, ed. by Cottin and Henault, Paris, 1898 [Eng. trans. London, 1899]; *Von der Osten-Sacken*, *Milit. polit. Geschichte d. Befreiungskrieges im Jahr 1813*, vol. I, "Vom Njemen bis zur Elbe," Berlin, 1902; *A. de Pastoret*, *De Witebsk à la Bérésina*, "Rev. de Paris," Année 9, T. 2, 1902; *G. Fabry*, *Campagne de Russie, 1812, Opérations Militaires, 1-10 août*, Paris, 1902.]

CHAPTER XVIII

LEIPZIG. 1813

I. Before the spring campaign. *a.* On Napoleon's war preparations and the internal political measures to promote them: his Correspondance; Councillor of State *Fiévée*, *Correspondance et Relations avec Bonaparte*, vol. III; *Mémoires of Savary and Mollien*, Paris, 1837, new ed. 1898; *Fain*, *Manuscrit de l'an '13*, Paris, 1824; *Thiers*, vol. XV; *Lanfrey-Kalkstein*, vol. VI; *Rousset*, *La grande armée de 1813*, Paris, 1871; *Pelet*, *Tableau de la Grande Armée en 1813*. The most complete, however, is *Die französ. Armee i. J. 1813*, Berlin, 1889. *b.* On the defection of Prussia: *Droysen*, *Yorck*, I; *Eckardt*, *Yorck und Paulucci*, Leipzig, 1865; *Ebeling*, *Yorck's Konvention von Tauroggen*, "Jahrb. f. d. deutsche Armee u. Marine," XXXVIII; *Natzmer*, *Aus d. Leben O. v. Natzmers*, Berlin, 1876; *Henckel v. Donnersmarck*, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, Zerbst, 1847; *Ranke*, *Hardenberg*; *Duncker*, *Preussen während der franz. Okkupation in his Aus d. Zeit Friedrich d. Grossen u. Friedrich Wilhelm III.*; *Lehman*, *Scharnhorst*, II, presents a different view; *Oncken*, *Österreich und Preussen im Befreiungskriege*, 2 vols.; a condensed account in his *Das Zeitalter d. Revolution, d. Kaiserreichs, u. d. Befreiungskriege*, 1884-6, vol. II; *Stern*, *Abhandlungen und Aktenstücke*, etc., containing reports of the French ambassador in Berlin; *Aegidi*, *Knesebecks Sendung i. d. russ. Hauptquartier*, "Hist. Zeitschrift," XVI; *Lehman*, *Knesebeck u. Schön*, Leipzig, 1875; *Pertz*, *Das Leben Steins*, Berlin, 1849-55, vol. III; *Martens*, *Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie*, vols. VII and III; *Ernouf*, *Maret*. *c.* On the uprisings and armaments in Germany: *Gildemeister*, *Finks u. Bergers Ermordung*, Bremen, 1814; *Rist*, *Lebenserinnerungen*, Gotha, 1880; *Wohlwill*, *Die Befreiung Hamburgs am 18. März, 1813*, Hamburg, 1888, and *Z. Gesch. Hamburgs i. J. 1813* ("Transactions of the Verein f. Hamb. Gesch.," 1888); *Varnhagen*, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. III; *Lefebvre*, op. cit. III. On Prussian armaments in particular: *Häusser*, *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. IV; *Ompteda*, *Politischer Nachlass*, Jena, 1869; *Steffens*, *Was ich erlebte*, Breslau, 1840-4, vol. VII; *Lehmann*, *Vorstellungen u. d. Ausbruch d. Krieges von 1813*, "Hist. Zeitschr.," XXVII; fur-

ther, the biographies: Delbrück's Pertz-Gneisenau; Euler's Jahn, Lehmann's Scharnhorst; Wigger's Blücher, Schwerin, 1870-9; Eyssenhardt's Niebuhr, Gotha, 1886; Varnhagen's Bülow and his Tettenborn, etc.; Ziehlberg, Ferdinande von Schmettau; Koberstein, Lützows wilde verwegene Jagd in "Preuss. Bilderbuch," 1887; K. v. L. Adolf, Lützows Freikorps, Berlin, 1884. d. On the Saxon question and the formation of the coalition: Flathe, Gesch. Sachsens, Gotha, 1873, vol. III; Senfft, Mémoires; Castlereagh's Correspondence, London, 1851-3; Bernhardi, Gesch. Russlands, Leipzig, 1863-77, vol. II; Aperçu des transactions politiques du Cabinet de Russie in the "Sbornik" of the Russian Hist. Soc., vol. XXXI; Garden, Hist. gén. des Traités, vol. XIV; Thorsø, Danske Stats politiske historie 1800-1814, Copenhagen, 1873; Nielsen, Bidrag til Sveriges politiske historie 1813, 1814; v. Schmidt, Schweden unter Karl XIV. Johann, Heidelberg, 1842; Touchard-Lafosse, Hist. Charles XIV, 1838; also the work of Schwederus above mentioned, and lastly Lefebvre, vol. V.

II. Spring campaign of 1813: Only a few memoirs are available. Marmont and Saint-Cyr furnish but little material; Ségur and Fézencac were not on the scene of war; the Mémorial of Peyrusse is of little account here. The only French sources of considerable importance are the Mémoires of Eugene (ed. Du Casse), the papers of Davout (ed. Mazade and Blocqueville), and especially the reminiscences of the Saxon officer Odeleben in Napoleons Feldzug in Sachsen [Eng. tr.]; consult also the work of Fain mentioned above, Norvin's Portefeuille de 1813, and above all the Correspondance de Napoléon I., vol. XXV. On the other side: Bernhardi, Toll; Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 2d ed., 1855; Eugen v. Württemberg's Memoiren, vol. III; Wolzogen, Memoiren; Helldorff's Eugen von Württemberg: Prittwitz, Beiträge z. Gesch. d. J. 1813; Wilson, Private Diary of 1812, 1813, 1814. General works: Schulz, Gesch. d. Feldzug v. 1813; Müffling, Zur Kriegsgesch. d. Jahre 1813 u. 1814; Frickius, Gesch. d. Krieges i. d. Jahre 1813 u. 1814; Michailowski-Danielewski, Denkwürdigkeiten a. d. Kriege v. 1813 [German tr. 1837]; Plotho, Der Krieg in Deutschland u. Frankreich 1813 u. 1814, 1817; Beitzke, Gesch. d. Freiheitskriege (2d ed. by Goldschmidt, 1883; Charras, Histoire de la guerre de 1813 en Allemagne, 1870; Bogdanovitch, Gesch. d. Krieges v. 1813 [German tr. by A. S., 1863-9]; Jomini, Précis politique et militaire des Campagnes de 1812 à 1814; Yorck, Napoleon als Feldherr [Eng. tr.], vol. II. On the battle of Bautzen in particular: Meerheimb, Die Schlachten bei Bautzen am 20. u. 21. Mai 1813, Berlin, 1873.

III. The period of the truce and Austria's defection: Correspondance de Napoléon I., vol. XXVI; Bignon, Histoire de France, vols. X and XII; Thiers, vol. XVI (based on information given by Metternich). On the other side: Ernouf, Maret, with memoranda of the minister's, and Metternich, Nachgelassene Papiere, vols. I and II [Eng. tr.]. The report of the interview of June 26th at Dresden, composed in 1820, is found in Helfert, Marie Louise, in the appendix; Broglie, Souvenirs, vol. I, 1886-7 [Eng. tr.];

Radetzky, Denkschriften milit.-polit. Inhalts, 1858; cf. **Wehner**, Über zwei Denkschriften Radetzky's a. d. Frühjahr 1813; **Hormayr**, Lebensbilder a. d. Befreiungskriege; **Gentz**, *Dépêches inédites aux Hospodars de la Valachie*, ed. Prokesch, 1876-7, vol. I; **De Clercq**, *Recueil des traités de la France*, vol. II; **Martens**, *Recueil*, as above, vol. III. General accounts are given in **Oncken**, *Österreich und Preussen*, etc., as above, fundamental, although not final; **Ranke**, *Hardenberg*; **Lefebvre**, vol. V. On life at the court of Napoleon in Dresden: **Odeleben**, *Napoleons Feldzug in Sachsen*.

IV. The fall campaign of 1813: In addition to works already named we have here again the *Mémoires* of **Marmont**, vol. V, **Fézensac**, **Ségur**, **Saint-Cyr**, and **Berthezène**; also **Du Casse**, *Vandamme*. The foregoing are on the French side. On the side of the Allies: **Reiche**, *Memoiren*, ed. **Weltzien**, 1857; **Colomb**, *Aus dem Tagebuche d. Rittmeisters v. Colomb 1813 u. 1814*, Berlin, 1854; **Blasendorff**, *Fünzig Briefe Blüchers*, "*Hist. Zeitsch.*," LIV; **Radetzky**, *Erinnerungen in "Mitteil. d. k. k. Kriegsarchivs,"* 1887; **Prokesch-Osten**, *Denkwürdigkeiten a. d. Leben d. Fürsten v. Schwarzenberg*, new ed. 1861; **Thiele**, *Erinnerungen a. d. Kriegerleben eines 82jährigen Veteranen d. österr. Armee*, Vienna, 1863; **Heilmann**, *Fürst Wrede*, 1881; **Bianchi**, *Duca di Casalanza*; **Richard Metternich**, *Österr. Teilnahme a. d. Befreiungskriegen*, 1887 (with letters from **Gentz**, **Metternich**, and **Schwarzenberg**). Supplementary to the narratives in the general histories of this special campaign we have: **Londonderry**, *Narrative of the War of 1813 and 1814*; **Burgherah**, *Operations of the Allied Armies under Prince Schwarzenberg and Marshal Blücher*, 1822; **Hofmann**, *Gesch. d. Feldzuges v. 1813*, Berlin, 1843; **Pelet**, *Tableau de la grande armée en septembre et octobre 1813* (not reliable); *Gesch. d. Nordarmee i. J. 1813*, Berlin, 1859; **Aster**, *Schilderung d. Kriegseignisse in u. um Dresden*, 1856; **Wagner**, *Die Tage v. Dresden u. Kulm*; **Aster**, *Schilderung d. Kriegseignisse zwischen Peterswalde, Pirna, Königstein u. Priesten, und d. Schlacht bei Kulm*, 1845; **Helfert**, *Die Schlacht bei Kulm*; **Kleist**, *Von Dresden nach Nollendorf*, supplement to "*Militärwochenblatt*," 1889, 3; **Helldorf**, *Z. Gesch. d. Schlacht bei Kulm*, 1856; **Mirus**, *D. Treffen b. Wartenberg*, 1863; **Schell**, *D. Operationen d. Korps Bubna*, "*Österr. mil. Zeitschr.*," vol. III. On the battle of Leipzig, first of all, **Aster**, *Die Schlachten bei Leipzig*, 2d ed., 1856; in addition, the works of **Hofmann**, 1835, **Naumann**, 1863, and **Wuttke**, 1863; **Dörr**, *D. Schlacht bei Hanau*, 1851; **Bochenheimer**, *Gesch. d. Stadt Mainz*, 1813 u. 1814.

[**E. Wiehr**, *Napoleon und Bernadotte im Herbstfeldzuge*, 1813, Berlin, 1893; **G. von Schimpf**, 1813; *Napoleon in Sachsen*, Dresden, 1894; **G. Bertin**, *La campagne de 1813*, publ. d'après des témoins oculaires, Paris, 1896; **F. Luckwaldt**, *Österreich und die Anfänge des Befreiungskrieges von 1813: Vom Abschluss der Allianz mit Frankreich bis zum Eintritt in die Koalition*, Berlin, 1894; **G. Fabry**, *Journal des Opérations des 3. et 5. corps en 1813*, pub. of the Hist. Sect. of the Gen. Staff, Paris,

1902; Foucart, Boutsen: Une bataille de deux jours, 20-21 mai 1813, Paris, 1897; the same, La poursuite jusqu'à l'armistice 22 mai-4 juin 1813, Paris, 1901; A. G., Stratégie napoléonienne, La campagne d'automne de 1813 et les lignes intérieures, Paris, 1897; Friedrich, Der Herbstfeldzug 1813, vol. I, Vom Abschluss d. Waffenstillstand bis z. Schlacht bei Kulm, Berlin, 1902.]

CHAPTER XIX

ELBA. 1814

I. Before the renewal of the war. On the first negotiations for peace: Castlereagh's Correspondence; Metternich, Memoirs, vols. I and II, cf. Bailled, Metternich's Memoiren in "Hist. Zeitschr.," XLIV; Rich. Metternich, Österreichs Teilnahme, etc.; Fain, Manuscrit de 1814; Ernouf, Maret; Bignon, Histoire de France, vol. XIV; Angeberg, Le Congrès de Vienne, vol. I; Oncken, Aus den letzten Monaten d. J. 1813, "Hist. Taschenbuch," 1883, and Das Zeitalter d. Rev., u. d. Befreiungskriege, 1884-6, 2 vols. On internal relations in France: Correspondance de Napoléon I., vols. XXVI and XXVII; Buchez et Roux, Histoire Parlementaire de la Rév. française, vol. XXXIX, Bulletin des lois; Memoirs of Mollien, Miot, Bausset, Savary; Meneval, Napoléon et Marie Louise, 1845, vol. II; Béranger, Ma biographie, 1859; Rodriguez, Relation de ce qui s'est passé à Paris à l'époque de la déchéance de Buonaparte, 1814; Journal d'un prisonnier anglais, in "Revue Britannique," vols. V and VI; Journal d'un officier anglais pendant les quatre premiers mois de 1814; ibid., vol. IV; Véron, Mémoires d'un bourgeois de Paris, vol. I; Broglie, Souvenirs, vol. I; Thiers, vol. XVII; Vaulabelle, Hist. des deux restaurations; Lubis, Hist. de la restauration, 1848; Houssaye, 1814, Paris, 1888 (fundamental for internal history), in which the literature for the local history for that year is indicated.

II. The war in France. On the campaign: Correspondance, vol. XVII; Mémoires du roi Joseph, 1855; Memoirs of Marmont, Belliard, Pajol, Lavalette, Koch, Fabvier, Journal des opérations du 6^{me} corps; Girard, La campagne de Paris en 1814; Beauchamps, Histoire des campagnes de 1814 et 1815; Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes de 1814 et 1815; Du Casse, Le général Arrighi. Sources other than French, besides the works already cited: Danitz, Gesch. d. Feldzugs v. 1814, 4 vols.; Schels, Die Operationen d. verbündeten Heere gegen Paris, "Österr. mil. Zeitschr.," 1845; Thielen, Der Feldzug d. verbündeten Heere; Schulz, Gesch. d. Feldzugs v. 1814, 2 vols.; Nostiz, Tagebuch, "Kriegsgeschicht. Einzelschriften," vols. 5 and 6; Delbrück, Gneisenau, vol. II; Colomb. Blücher in Briefen; Boie, Die Stunde d. Entscheidung vor Beginn d. ungl. Kämpfe i. Febr. 1814, "Jahrb. f. d. deutsche Armee u. Marine," 1878; Danilewsky, Der Feldzug in Frankreich; Bogdanovitsch, Gesch.

d. Kriegs v. 1814 (German tr. 1866). On diplomatic negotiations during the war, in addition to above-cited sources: **Oncken**, *Lord Castlereagh u. d. Minister-Konferenz zu Langres*, "Hist. Taschenb.," 1885, and his *Die Krisis d. letzten Kriegsverhandlungen mit Napoleon I.*, *ibid.*, 1886; **Houssaye**, 1814, based on the protocols of the Congress of Châtillon; **Pons de l'Hérault**, *Le Congrès de Châtillon*, 1825; **Lapérouse**, *Le Congrès de Châtillon*. On Napoleon's fall, besides the more general works already named: *Mémoires of Bourrienne*, 1829-31 [Eng. tr. by Phipps, 1889]; **A. B.**, *Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, vol. II; **Talleyrand**, *Lettres inédites à la Princesse de Courlande*, "Revue d'histoire diplomatique," vol. I; **Vitrolles**, *Mémoires et relations politiques*, 1884, vol. I; **De Pradt**, *Récit des événements qui ont amené la restauration de la royauté*; **Rapetti**, *La défection d'Essonne*; **Chateaubriand**, *Mémoires d'Outretombe* [Eng. tr. by Teixeira de Mattos, 1902]. The *Souvenirs du Duc de Vicence* by Mme. Sorr are not authentic. Also the following newspapers: *Moniteur*, *Journal de l'Empire*, *Gazette de France*, *Journal des Débats*. Pamphlets against Napoleon are exceedingly numerous. A collection of them with excerpts is given by **Germond de Lavigne**, *Les Pamphlets de la fin de l'Empire, des 100 jours et de la Restauration*, 1879.

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[F. von Hiller, *Geschichte des Feldzuges '14 gegen Frankreich unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Anteilnahme der Königl. württembergischen Truppen, etc.*, Stuttgart, 1893; G. Bertin, *La campagne de 1814, d'après des témoins oculaires*, Paris, 1897; A. Fournier, *Der Congress von Châtillon, Die Politik im Kriege von 1814*, Vienna, 1900; *Das Nachtgefecht bei Laon am 9. März 1814*, in series of monographs pub. by the General Staff, Berlin, 1890; G. Roloff, *Politik und Kriegführung während des Feldzuges von 1814*, Berlin, 1891; A. Chuquet, *L'Alsace in 1814*, Paris, 1900; H. Houssaye, *Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe*, "Rev. Hist.," vol. 51, Paris, 1893; A. Fournier, *Marie Louise et la chute de Napoléon*, "Revue hist.," mai—juin 1903; L. G. Pelissier, *Le registre de l'île d'Elbe, Lettres et ordres inédits de Napoléon I^{er}*, 28 mai 1814—22 févr. 1815, Paris, 1897; A. Pingaud, *Le congrès de Vienna et la politique de Talleyrand*, "Revue hist.," vol. 70, Paris, 1900; *Correspondance diplomatique des ambassadeurs et ministres de Russie en France et de France en Russie avec leurs gouvernements de 1814 à 1830*, ed. by A. Polovtsoff, vol. I, 1814—1816, édit. de la Soc. imp. d'hist. de Russie; *Correspondance diplomatique de C^{te} Pozzo di Borgo, ambassadeur de Russie en France et du C^{te} Nesselrode depuis la restauration des Bourbons, etc.*, 1814—1818, 2 vols, Paris, 1890, 1897.]

CHAPTER XX

WATERLOO. 1815

I. The Hundred Days' reign: *Correspondance*, vol. XXVIII; *Napoleon, L'île d'Elbe et les Cent-Jours*, in *Correspondance*, XXXI. In particular on Napoleon's journey from Cannes to Paris: A. D. B. Mounier, *Une année de la vie de l'Emp. Napoléon*, 1815; the *Memoirs of Vitrolles*, vol. I, Villemain, vol. II, Broglie, vol. I, Lucien Bonaparte, vol. III (ed. Jung.), Fleury de Chaboulon, vols. I and II, Peyrusse, Mollien, Miot de Méliot, vol. III, Véron, vol. I. Further, Benjamin Constant, *Mémoires sur les Cent-Jours*, 2d ed., 1829; Sismondi, *Notes sur l'Empire et les Cent-Jours*, "Revue historique," IX, and letters to his mother, "Revue hist.," VI—unreliable; Hobhouse, the substance of some Letters written by an Englishman at Paris during the last reign of Emperor Napoleon, London, 1817 (cf. Napoleon's comments in *Correspondance*, XXXI); Davout, *Correspondance*, vol. IV, ed. Mazade; Blocqueville, *Le Maréchal Davout*, vol. IV; Béranger, *Ma biographie*; Lord Holland, *Foreign Reminiscences*, London, 1851; Picaud, Carnot, 1885; F. v. Weech, *Französische Zustände während d. hundert Tage u. d. Okkupation*, "Hist. Zeitschr.," XVI, 1866, based on Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, X. In addition, the narrative histories, Thiers, vol. XIX, Vaulabelle, vol. II, Lubis, vol. III, Bignon, vol. XIV; Thibaudeau, *Hist. du Cons. et de l'Empire*, vol. X;

Hélie, *Les Constitutions de la France*, 1875-9; **Politz**, *Europäische Verfassungen*, 1833, vol. III; *Archives parlementaires*, 2^{ème} série; **Germond de Lavigne**, *Les pamphlets de la fin de l'Empire*, etc. In addition to the newspapers already named, *L'Aristarque*, *L'Indépendant*, *Le Patriote* de '89, and *Le Nain Jaune*, comic.

II. The campaign of 1815. Napoleon's Correspondance is hardly of account here. His narrative of the war, dictated to Gourgaud at St. Helena and afterwards published under the latter's name as *La campagne de 1815*, has served as the basis for several historical works, that of **Thiers** among others, although it at once provoked other writers to reply and to correct its misstatements. Among the latter cf. in particular: **Grouchy**, *Observations sur la relation de la camp. de 1815 publiée par Gourgaud*, Paris, 1819; **Heymès**, *Relation de la campagne de 1815 pour servir à l'histoire du Maréchal Ney*, Paris, 1829; **D'Elchingen**, *Documents inédits sur la campagne de 1815*, Paris, 1840; **Gérard**, *Quelques documents sur la bataille de Waterloo*, Paris, 1829. Cf. also the *Memoirs of Berthézène*, **Lamarque**, **Fleury de Chaboulon**, etc. Our knowledge to-day is based chiefly on **Charras**, *Hist. de la campagne de 1815*, 5th ed., 1868, and **Ollech**, *Gesch. d. Feldz. v. 1815, nach archivalischen Quellen*, Berlin, 1876, although they are not wholly free from prejudice in their criticisms. All the older general works have been superseded by these and by the following: **Quinet**, *Hist. de la campagne de 1815*, Paris, 1862; **Cheaney**, *Waterloo Lectures*, 3d ed., 1875; **Gardner**, *Quatrebras, Ligny, and Waterloo*, Boston, 1882; **Yorck**, *Napoleon als Feldherr*, vol. II [Eng. tr.]. Some earlier works deserve consideration on account of the abundant material they contain from original sources: **Siborne**, *History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815*, 3d ed., London, 1848, cf. **Fransecky** in the "*Militärwochenblatt*" for 1845; **Clausewitz**, "D. Feldz. v. 1815," in *Hintergelassene Werke*, vol. VIII, 1862-89; **Plötho**, *D. Krieg d. Verbündeten gegen Frankreich i. 1815*, Berlin, 1818; **Wagner**, *Pläne d. Schlachten u. Treffen*; **Hofmann**, *Z. Gesch. d. Feldz. v. 1815*, 2d ed., 1849; **Schulz**, *Geschichte der Kriege*, vols. XIV and XV; **Löben-Sels**, *Précis de la camp. de 1815*, La Haye, 1849, Dutch view; **Pringle**, *Remarks on the Campaign of 1815*; **Jomini**, *Précis polit. et milit. de la camp. de 1815*, Paris, 1839 [Eng. tr. New York, 1853]; **Cerens**, *Dissertation sur la participation des troupes des Pay-Bas à la campagne de 1815*, 1880; *La Tour d'Auvergne*, *Waterloo, Études de la campagne de 1815*, Paris, 1870 (under Bonapartist influence). Also, **Wellington's Despatches**, ed. **Gurwood**, vol. XII, and *Supplementary Desp.*, vol. X; **Reiche**, *Memoiren*, ed. **Weltzien**, Leipzig, 1857; **Müffling**, *Aus meinem Leben*; **Pertz-Delbrück**, *Gneisenau*, vol. IV; **Delbrück**, *D. Leben d. F.-M. Gneisenau*, vol. II, 1882; **M. Lehmann**, *Zur Gesch. d. Feldz. v. 1815*, "*Hist. Zeitschr.*," 1877; **Bernhardi**, *Gesch. Russlands*, vol. I; **Treuenfeld**, *Die Tage v. Ligny u. Belle-Alliance*, Hanover, 1880. On the beginning of the flight of the French: **Büdinger**, *Wellington* (in the appendix). On Cambronne and the destruction of the Guard: **Knesebeck**, *Leben d. Freih. Hugh v. Halkett*,

Stuttgart, 1865; **Poten**, article, "Hackett" in *Allgem. d. Biographie*; **Fransecky** in the "Militärwochenblatt" for 1876, no. 47. On **Murat**: **Helfert**, *Joachim Murat, seine letzten Kämpfe u. s. Ende*, Vienna, 1878.

[**J. C. Ropes**, *The Campaign of Waterloo: a Military History*, Boston, 1892; **Wolsley**, *Field Marshal Viscount Lord, The Decline and Fall of Napoleon*, London, 1895; **H. Houssaye**, 1815, *Waterloo*, Paris, 1898 [Eng. tr. London, 1900]; **W. O'Connor Morris**, *The Campaign of 1815*, London, 1900; **E. L. S. Horsburg**, *Waterloo: a Narrative and a Criticism*, London, 1895; **G. Bustelli**, *L'Enigma di Ligny e di Waterloo: Studiato e Sciolto*, 3 vols., Viterbo, 1897; **A. Lombroso**, *La campagne de Murat en 1815*, Paris, 1899. In addition to the earlier works mentioned by **Fournier**, attention may be called to the observations on the Hundred Days to be found in **John Quincy Adams's** *Memoirs*, vol. III, Philadelphia, 1874.]

CHAPTER XXI

ST. HELENA. 1815-1821

On the last days in France: **Fleury de Chaboulon**, vol. II; **Sismondi**; **Savary**, vol. III; **Lucien**, vol. III; **Miot**, vol. III; **Vitrolles**, vol. III; **Montholon**, *History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena*, London, 1846, vol. I; **Las Cases**, *Mémorial de Ste. Hélène*, vol. I, Paris, 1823 [Eng. tr.]; **Villemain**, vol. II; **Lafayette**, *Mémoires*, Paris, 1837 [Eng. tr. London, 1837]; **Broglie**, vol. I [Eng. tr.]; **Villèle**, *Mémoires*, 1888-90; **Quinet**, *Hist. de la camp. de 1815*; **Castlereagh's** *Correspondence*; finally, the newspapers above mentioned and the pamphlets in **Germond de Lavigne's** collection. As to Napoleon's residence at St. Helena, the above-mentioned works of **Montholon** and **Las Cases** are important sources; but the most thorough is **Forsyth's** *History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena*, 1853, 3 vols., based on the English Government documents. The *Lettres du Cap de Bonne Espérance*, dictated by Napoleon (included in *Correspondance*, vol. XXXII) and published in 1818, laid the basis for the legend of martyrdom, which was also confirmed by **O'Meara**, *Napoleon in Exile, or a Voice from St. Helena*, London, 1822, 2 vols., and by **Antommarchi**, *Derniers moments de Napoléon*, Paris, 1825, 2 vols. Cf. also: **Capt. Maitland**, *Narrative of the Surrender of Bonaparte*, London, 1826; **Warden**, Surgeon of the "Northumberland," *Letters written on board H. M. S. "Northumberland" and at St. Helena*, London, 1816; **Abell** (the younger daughter of Mr. Balcombe), *Recollections of the Emperor Napoleon during the first three years of his captivity on the island of St. Helena*, London 1844; **Henry** (an officer of the garrison of St. Helena), *Events of a Military Life*, vol. II, London, 1843; valuable contributions also in **Scott's** *Life of Napoleon*, 1827, vol. IX; **Yonge**, *The Life*

and Administration of Robert Banks, second Earl of Liverpool, 1868, 3 vols., vol. II; Schlitter, *Die Berichte d. k. k. Kommissärs Frh. v. Stürmer aus St. Helena*, 1816-1818, Vienna, 1888, and Kaiser Franz I. u. d. Napoleoniden v. Sturz Napoleons bis zu dessen Tod, Vienna, 1888. Napoleon's dictations on the history of his times appeared first as *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France sous Napoléon, écrits à St^e Hélène par ses généraux qui ont partagé sa captivité, et publiés sur les manuscrits corrigés de la main de Napoléon*, Paris, 1823, 8 vols.

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LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND BIOGRAPHIES WHICH HAVE APPEARED SINCE THE PREPARATION OF FOURNIER'S BIBLIOGRAPHY AND WHICH FOR THE MOST PART HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES.

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
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
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
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